static int init_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al);
static int init_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
+static int final_key_share(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
static int init_srtp(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
#endif
*/
int (*init)(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
/* Parse extension sent from client to server */
- int (*parse_ctos)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al);
+ int (*parse_ctos)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al);
/* Parse extension send from server to client */
- int (*parse_stoc)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al);
+ int (*parse_stoc)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al);
/* Construct extension sent from server to client */
- int (*construct_stoc)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
- int *al);
+ int (*construct_stoc)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al);
/* Construct extension sent from client to server */
- int (*construct_ctos)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
- int *al);
+ int (*construct_ctos)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al);
/*
* Finalise extension after parsing. Always called where an extensions was
* initialised even if the extension was not present. |sent| is set to 1 if
NULL, NULL, NULL, tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions, NULL
},
{
- /* Must be before key_share */
TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes,
EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY | EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
init_psk_kex_modes, tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes, NULL, NULL,
| EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST | EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY
| EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
NULL, tls_parse_ctos_key_share, tls_parse_stoc_key_share,
- tls_construct_stoc_key_share, tls_construct_ctos_key_share, NULL
+ tls_construct_stoc_key_share, tls_construct_ctos_key_share,
+ final_key_share
},
{
/*
NULL, NULL, NULL, tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug, NULL, NULL
},
{
- /* Last in the list because it must be added as the last extension */
+ /* Must be immediately before pre_shared_key */
+ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Fix me */
TLSEXT_TYPE_padding,
EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
NULL,
/* We send this, but don't read it */
NULL, NULL, NULL, tls_construct_ctos_padding, NULL
+ },
+ {
+ /* Required by the TLSv1.3 spec to always be the last extension */
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_psk,
+ EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO | EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY
+ | EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
+ NULL, tls_parse_ctos_psk, tls_parse_stoc_psk, tls_construct_stoc_psk,
+ tls_construct_ctos_psk, NULL
}
};
RAW_EXTENSION *exts, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
RAW_EXTENSION *currext = &exts[idx];
- int (*parser)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) = NULL;
+ int (*parser)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al) = NULL;
/* Skip if the extension is not present */
if (!currext->present)
parser = s->server ? extdef->parse_ctos : extdef->parse_stoc;
if (parser != NULL)
- return parser(s, &currext->data, x, chainidx, al);
+ return parser(s, &currext->data, context, x, chainidx, al);
/*
* If the parser is NULL we fall through to the custom extension
}
for (i = 0, thisexd = ext_defs; i < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs); i++, thisexd++) {
- int (*construct)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
- int *al);
+ int (*construct)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al);
/* Skip if not relevant for our context */
if ((thisexd->context & context) == 0)
|| construct == NULL)
continue;
- if (!construct(s, pkt, x, chainidx, &tmpal))
+ if (!construct(s, pkt, context, x, chainidx, &tmpal))
goto err;
}
if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->ext.servername_cb != 0)
ret = s->ctx->ext.servername_cb(s, &altmp,
s->ctx->ext.servername_arg);
- else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
- && s->initial_ctx->ext.servername_cb != 0)
- ret = s->initial_ctx->ext.servername_cb(s, &altmp,
- s->initial_ctx->ext.servername_arg);
+ else if (s->session_ctx != NULL
+ && s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb != 0)
+ ret = s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb(s, &altmp,
+ s->session_ctx->ext.servername_arg);
switch (ret) {
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
return 1;
}
+
+static int final_key_share(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al)
+{
+ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
+ return 1;
+
+ /*
+ * If
+ * we have no key_share
+ * AND
+ * (we are not resuming
+ * OR the kex_mode doesn't allow non key_share resumes)
+ * THEN
+ * fail
+ */
+ if (((s->server && s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL) || (!s->server && !sent))
+ && (!s->hit
+ || (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE) == 0)) {
+ /* No suitable share */
+ if (s->server && s->hello_retry_request == 0 && sent) {
+ s->hello_retry_request = 1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Nothing left we can do - just fail */
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ s->hello_retry_request = 0;
+ /*
+ * For a client side resumption with no key_share we need to generate
+ * the handshake secret (otherwise this is done during key_share
+ * processing).
+ */
+ if (!sent && !s->server && !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
static int init_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_NONE;
-
return 1;
}
+
+int tls_psk_do_binder(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *msgstart,
+ size_t binderoffset, const unsigned char *binderin,
+ unsigned char *binderout,
+ SSL_SESSION *sess, int sign)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *mackey = NULL;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
+ unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], binderkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char finishedkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], tmpbinder[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ const char resumption_label[] = "resumption psk binder key";
+ size_t bindersize, hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ /* Generate the early_secret */
+ if (!tls13_generate_secret(s, md, NULL, sess->master_key,
+ sess->master_key_length,
+ (unsigned char *)&s->early_secret)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the handshake hash for the binder key...the messages so far are
+ * empty!
+ */
+ mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (mctx == NULL
+ || EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, hash, NULL) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Generate the binder key */
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->early_secret,
+ (unsigned char *)resumption_label,
+ sizeof(resumption_label) - 1, hash, binderkey,
+ hashsize)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Generate the finished key */
+ if (!tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, md, binderkey, finishedkey, hashsize)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Get a hash of the ClientHello up to the start of the binders.
+ * TODO(TLS1.3): This will need to be tweaked when we implement
+ * HelloRetryRequest to include the digest of the previous messages here.
+ */
+ if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, msgstart, binderoffset) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, hash, NULL) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ mackey = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, finishedkey, hashsize);
+ if (mackey == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!sign)
+ binderout = tmpbinder;
+
+ bindersize = hashsize;
+ if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, NULL, md, NULL, mackey) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hash, hashsize) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, binderout, &bindersize) <= 0
+ || bindersize != hashsize) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (sign) {
+ ret = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* HMAC keys can't do EVP_DigestVerify* - use CRYPTO_memcmp instead */
+ ret = (CRYPTO_memcmp(binderin, binderout, hashsize) == 0);
+ }
+
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(binderkey, sizeof(binderkey));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(finishedkey, sizeof(finishedkey));
+ EVP_PKEY_free(mackey);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+
+ return ret;
+}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff