* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
+#include <string.h>
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
#include "statem_locl.h"
static int init_session_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
static int init_status_request(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
-static int final_status_request(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent,
- int *al);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
static int init_npn(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
static int init_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al);
+static int init_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+static int final_key_share(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al);
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
static int init_srtp(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
#endif
+static int final_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al);
+static int final_early_data(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al);
/* Structure to define a built-in extension */
typedef struct extensions_definition_st {
*/
int (*init)(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
/* Parse extension sent from client to server */
- int (*parse_ctos)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al);
+ int (*parse_ctos)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al);
/* Parse extension send from server to client */
- int (*parse_stoc)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al);
+ int (*parse_stoc)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al);
/* Construct extension sent from server to client */
- int (*construct_stoc)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain,
- int *al);
+ int (*construct_stoc)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al);
/* Construct extension sent from client to server */
- int (*construct_ctos)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, int *al);
+ int (*construct_ctos)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al);
/*
* Finalise extension after parsing. Always called where an extensions was
* initialised even if the extension was not present. |sent| is set to 1 if
/*
* Definitions of all built-in extensions. NOTE: Changes in the number or order
- * of these extensions should be mirrored with equivalent changes to the indexes
- * defined in statem_locl.h.
+ * of these extensions should be mirrored with equivalent changes to the
+ * indexes ( TLSEXT_IDX_* ) defined in ssl_locl.h.
* Each extension has an initialiser, a client and
* server side parser and a finaliser. The initialiser is called (if the
* extension is relevant to the given context) even if we did not see the
* significant.
* The extension context is defined by a series of flags which specify which
* messages the extension is relevant to. These flags also specify whether the
- * extension is relevant to a paricular protocol or protocol version.
+ * extension is relevant to a particular protocol or protocol version.
*
* TODO(TLS1.3): Make sure we have a test to check the consistency of these
*/
TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,
EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
init_sig_algs, tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs, NULL, NULL,
- tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs, NULL
+ tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs, final_sig_algs
},
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
{
| EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
init_status_request, tls_parse_ctos_status_request,
tls_parse_stoc_status_request, tls_construct_stoc_status_request,
- tls_construct_ctos_status_request, final_status_request
+ tls_construct_ctos_status_request, NULL
},
#else
INVALID_EXTENSION,
#endif
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,
- EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY,
+ EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY | EXT_SSL3_ALLOWED,
init_etm, tls_parse_ctos_etm, tls_parse_stoc_etm,
tls_construct_stoc_etm, tls_construct_ctos_etm, NULL
},
/* Processed inline as part of version selection */
NULL, NULL, NULL, tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions, NULL
},
+ {
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes,
+ EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY | EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
+ init_psk_kex_modes, tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes, NULL, NULL,
+ tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes, NULL
+ },
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
{
/*
* Must be in this list after supported_groups. We need that to have
| EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST | EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY
| EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
NULL, tls_parse_ctos_key_share, tls_parse_stoc_key_share,
- tls_construct_stoc_key_share, tls_construct_ctos_key_share, NULL
+ tls_construct_stoc_key_share, tls_construct_ctos_key_share,
+ final_key_share
+ },
+#endif
+ {
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie,
+ EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
+ | EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY | EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
+ NULL, NULL, tls_parse_stoc_cookie, NULL, tls_construct_ctos_cookie,
+ NULL
},
{
/*
NULL, NULL, NULL, tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug, NULL, NULL
},
{
- /* Last in the list because it must be added as the last extension */
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data,
+ EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
+ | EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ NULL, tls_parse_ctos_early_data, tls_parse_stoc_early_data,
+ tls_construct_stoc_early_data, tls_construct_ctos_early_data,
+ final_early_data
+ },
+ {
+ /* Must be immediately before pre_shared_key */
+ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Fix me */
TLSEXT_TYPE_padding,
EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
NULL,
/* We send this, but don't read it */
NULL, NULL, NULL, tls_construct_ctos_padding, NULL
+ },
+ {
+ /* Required by the TLSv1.3 spec to always be the last extension */
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_psk,
+ EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO | EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY
+ | EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
+ NULL, tls_parse_ctos_psk, tls_parse_stoc_psk, tls_construct_stoc_psk,
+ tls_construct_ctos_psk, NULL
}
};
* extensions that we know about. We ignore others.
*/
int tls_collect_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *packet, unsigned int context,
- RAW_EXTENSION **res, int *al)
+ RAW_EXTENSION **res, int *al, size_t *len)
{
PACKET extensions = *packet;
size_t i = 0;
+ size_t num_exts;
custom_ext_methods *exts = NULL;
RAW_EXTENSION *raw_extensions = NULL;
const EXTENSION_DEFINITION *thisexd;
exts = &s->cert->cli_ext;
}
- raw_extensions = OPENSSL_zalloc((OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs)
- + (exts != NULL ? exts->meths_count : 0))
- * sizeof(*raw_extensions));
+ num_exts = OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs) + (exts != NULL ? exts->meths_count : 0);
+ raw_extensions = OPENSSL_zalloc(num_exts * sizeof(*raw_extensions));
if (raw_extensions == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
}
/*
* Verify this extension is allowed. We only check duplicates for
- * extensions that we recognise.
+ * extensions that we recognise. We also have a special case for the
+ * PSK extension, which must be the last one in the ClientHello.
*/
if (!verify_extension(s, context, type, exts, raw_extensions, &thisex)
- || (thisex != NULL && thisex->present == 1)) {
+ || (thisex != NULL && thisex->present == 1)
+ || (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
+ && (context & EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0
+ && PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
goto err;
}
*res = raw_extensions;
+ if (len != NULL)
+ *len = num_exts;
return 1;
err:
* Runs the parser for a given extension with index |idx|. |exts| contains the
* list of all parsed extensions previously collected by
* tls_collect_extensions(). The parser is only run if it is applicable for the
- * given |context| and the parser has not already been run. Returns 1 on success
- * or 0 on failure. In the event of a failure |*al| is populated with a suitable
- * alert code. If an extension is not present this counted as success.
+ * given |context| and the parser has not already been run. If this is for a
+ * Certificate message, then we also provide the parser with the relevant
+ * Certificate |x| and its position in the |chainidx| with 0 being the first
+ * Certificate. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. In the event of a failure
+ * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code. If an extension is not present
+ * this counted as success.
*/
int tls_parse_extension(SSL *s, TLSEXT_INDEX idx, int context,
- RAW_EXTENSION *exts, int *al)
+ RAW_EXTENSION *exts, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
RAW_EXTENSION *currext = &exts[idx];
- int (*parser)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) = NULL;
+ int (*parser)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al) = NULL;
/* Skip if the extension is not present */
if (!currext->present)
return 1;
- if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
- s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, !s->server, currext->type,
- PACKET_data(&currext->data),
- PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
- s->tlsext_debug_arg);
+ if (s->ext.debug_cb)
+ s->ext.debug_cb(s, !s->server, currext->type,
+ PACKET_data(&currext->data),
+ PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
+ s->ext.debug_arg);
/* Skip if we've already parsed this extension */
if (currext->parsed)
parser = s->server ? extdef->parse_ctos : extdef->parse_stoc;
if (parser != NULL)
- return parser(s, &currext->data, al);
+ return parser(s, &currext->data, context, x, chainidx, al);
/*
* If the parser is NULL we fall through to the custom extension
/*
* This is a custom extension. We only allow this if it is a non
* resumed session on the server side.
- *
+ *chain
* TODO(TLS1.3): We only allow old style <=TLS1.2 custom extensions.
* We're going to need a new mechanism for TLS1.3 to specify which
* messages to add the custom extensions to.
/*
* Parse all remaining extensions that have not yet been parsed. Also calls the
* finalisation for all extensions at the end, whether we collected them or not.
- * Returns 1 for success or 0 for failure. On failure, |*al| is populated with a
- * suitable alert code.
+ * Returns 1 for success or 0 for failure. If we are working on a Certificate
+ * message then we also pass the Certificate |x| and its position in the
+ * |chainidx|, with 0 being the first certificate. On failure, |*al| is
+ * populated with a suitable alert code.
*/
-int tls_parse_all_extensions(SSL *s, int context, RAW_EXTENSION *exts, int *al)
+int tls_parse_all_extensions(SSL *s, int context, RAW_EXTENSION *exts, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
size_t i, numexts = OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs);
const EXTENSION_DEFINITION *thisexd;
/* Parse each extension in turn */
for (i = 0; i < numexts; i++) {
- if (!tls_parse_extension(s, i, context, exts, al))
+ if (!tls_parse_extension(s, i, context, exts, x, chainidx, al))
return 0;
}
/*
* Construct all the extensions relevant to the current |context| and write
* them to |pkt|. If this is an extension for a Certificate in a Certificate
- * message, then |x| will be set to the Certificate we are handling, and |chain|
- * will indicate the position in the chain we are processing (with 0 being the
- * first in the chain). Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. If a failure
- * occurs then |al| is populated with a suitable alert code. On a failure
- * construction stops at the first extension to fail to construct.
+ * message, then |x| will be set to the Certificate we are handling, and
+ * |chainidx| will indicate the position in the chainidx we are processing (with
+ * 0 being the first in the chain). Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. If a
+ * failure occurs then |al| is populated with a suitable alert code. On a
+ * failure construction stops at the first extension to fail to construct.
*/
int tls_construct_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
- X509 *x, size_t chain, int *al)
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
size_t i;
int addcustom = 0, min_version, max_version = 0, reason, tmpal;
}
for (i = 0, thisexd = ext_defs; i < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs); i++, thisexd++) {
- int (*construct)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, int *al);
+ int (*construct)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx, int *al);
/* Skip if not relevant for our context */
if ((thisexd->context & context) == 0)
|| construct == NULL)
continue;
- if (!construct(s, pkt, x, chain, &tmpal))
+ if (!construct(s, pkt, context, x, chainidx, &tmpal))
goto err;
}
int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
int altmp = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &altmp,
- s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
- else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
- && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &altmp,
- s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+ if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->ext.servername_cb != 0)
+ ret = s->ctx->ext.servername_cb(s, &altmp,
+ s->ctx->ext.servername_arg);
+ else if (s->session_ctx != NULL
+ && s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb != 0)
+ ret = s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb(s, &altmp,
+ s->session_ctx->ext.servername_arg);
switch (ret) {
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
* suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
* must contain uncompressed.
*/
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL
- && s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0
- && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL
- && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0
+ if (s->ext.ecpointformats != NULL
+ && s->ext.ecpointformats_len > 0
+ && s->session->ext.ecpointformats != NULL
+ && s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len > 0
&& ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
/* we are using an ECC cipher */
size_t i;
- unsigned char *list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+ unsigned char *list = s->session->ext.ecpointformats;
- for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len; i++) {
if (*list++ == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
break;
}
- if (i == s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length) {
+ if (i == s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_EC_PT_FORMATS,
SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
return 0;
static int init_session_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
if (!s->server)
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+ s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
static int init_status_request(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
- if (s->server)
- s->tlsext_status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int final_status_request(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent,
- int *al)
-{
- if (s->server)
- return 1;
-
- /*
- * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
- * that we don't receive a status message
- */
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0;
+ if (s->server) {
+ s->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
+ * that we don't receive a status message
+ */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->ext.ocsp.resp);
+ s->ext.ocsp.resp = NULL;
+ s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0;
+ }
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
static int init_npn(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+ s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
return 1;
}
{
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
+ s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
if (s->server) {
- s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
if (!s->server)
return 1;
- if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
- int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
- s->s3->alpn_proposed,
- (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
- s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
+ if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
+ int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
+ s->s3->alpn_proposed,
+ (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
+ s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+ s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
#endif
} else {
*al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+ s->ext.use_etm = 0;
return 1;
}
return 1;
}
#endif
+
+static int final_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al)
+{
+ if (!sent && SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ *al = TLS13_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGALGS_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+static int final_key_share(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al)
+{
+ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
+ return 1;
+
+ /*
+ * If
+ * we are a client
+ * AND
+ * we have no key_share
+ * AND
+ * (we are not resuming
+ * OR the kex_mode doesn't allow non key_share resumes)
+ * THEN
+ * fail;
+ */
+ if (!s->server
+ && !sent
+ && (!s->hit
+ || (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE) == 0)) {
+ /* Nothing left we can do - just fail */
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If
+ * we are a server
+ * AND
+ * we have no key_share
+ * THEN
+ * If
+ * we didn't already send a HelloRetryRequest
+ * AND
+ * the client sent a key_share extension
+ * AND
+ * (we are not resuming
+ * OR the kex_mode allows key_share resumes)
+ * AND
+ * a shared group exists
+ * THEN
+ * send a HelloRetryRequest
+ * ELSE If
+ * we are not resuming
+ * OR
+ * the kex_mode doesn't allow non key_share resumes
+ * THEN
+ * fail;
+ */
+ if (s->server && s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL) {
+ /* No suitable share */
+ if (s->hello_retry_request == 0 && sent
+ && (!s->hit
+ || (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)
+ != 0)) {
+ const unsigned char *pcurves, *pcurvestmp, *clntcurves;
+ size_t num_curves, clnt_num_curves, i;
+ unsigned int group_id = 0;
+
+ /* Check if a shared group exists */
+
+ /* Get the clients list of supported groups. */
+ if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &clntcurves, &clnt_num_curves)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Get our list of available groups */
+ if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Find the first group we allow that is also in client's list */
+ for (i = 0, pcurvestmp = pcurves; i < num_curves;
+ i++, pcurvestmp += 2) {
+ group_id = bytestogroup(pcurvestmp);
+
+ if (check_in_list(s, group_id, clntcurves, clnt_num_curves, 1))
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (i < num_curves) {
+ /* A shared group exists so send a HelloRetryRequest */
+ s->s3->group_id = group_id;
+ s->hello_retry_request = 1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!s->hit
+ || (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE) == 0) {
+ /* Nothing left we can do - just fail */
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* We have a key_share so don't send any more HelloRetryRequest messages */
+ if (s->server)
+ s->hello_retry_request = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * For a client side resumption with no key_share we need to generate
+ * the handshake secret (otherwise this is done during key_share
+ * processing).
+ */
+ if (!sent && !s->server && !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int init_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
+{
+ s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_NONE;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_psk_do_binder(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *msgstart,
+ size_t binderoffset, const unsigned char *binderin,
+ unsigned char *binderout,
+ SSL_SESSION *sess, int sign)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *mackey = NULL;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
+ unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], binderkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char finishedkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], tmpbinder[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ const char resumption_label[] = "resumption psk binder key";
+ size_t bindersize, hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ /* Generate the early_secret */
+ if (!tls13_generate_secret(s, md, NULL, sess->master_key,
+ sess->master_key_length,
+ (unsigned char *)&s->early_secret)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the handshake hash for the binder key...the messages so far are
+ * empty!
+ */
+ mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (mctx == NULL
+ || EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, hash, NULL) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Generate the binder key */
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->early_secret,
+ (unsigned char *)resumption_label,
+ sizeof(resumption_label) - 1, hash, binderkey,
+ hashsize)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Generate the finished key */
+ if (!tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, md, binderkey, finishedkey, hashsize)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Get a hash of the ClientHello up to the start of the binders. If we are
+ * following a HelloRetryRequest then this includes the hash of the first
+ * ClientHello and the HelloRetryRequest itself.
+ */
+ if (s->hello_retry_request) {
+ size_t hdatalen;
+ void *hdata;
+
+ hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
+ if (hdatalen <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * For servers the handshake buffer data will include the second
+ * ClientHello - which we don't want - so we need to take that bit off.
+ */
+ if (s->server) {
+ if (hdatalen < s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ hdatalen -= s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, msgstart, binderoffset) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, hash, NULL) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ mackey = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, finishedkey, hashsize);
+ if (mackey == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!sign)
+ binderout = tmpbinder;
+
+ bindersize = hashsize;
+ if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, NULL, md, NULL, mackey) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hash, hashsize) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, binderout, &bindersize) <= 0
+ || bindersize != hashsize) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (sign) {
+ ret = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* HMAC keys can't do EVP_DigestVerify* - use CRYPTO_memcmp instead */
+ ret = (CRYPTO_memcmp(binderin, binderout, hashsize) == 0);
+ }
+
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(binderkey, sizeof(binderkey));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(finishedkey, sizeof(finishedkey));
+ EVP_PKEY_free(mackey);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int final_early_data(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al)
+{
+ if (!s->server || !sent)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (s->max_early_data == 0
+ || !s->hit
+ || s->session->ext.tick_identity != 0
+ || s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
+ || !s->ext.early_data_ok
+ || s->hello_retry_request
+ || s->s3->alpn_selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
+ || (s->s3->alpn_selected_len > 0
+ && memcmp(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
+ s->s3->alpn_selected_len) != 0)) {
+ s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
+ } else {
+ s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;
+
+ if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff