/*
- * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
*/
#include <string.h>
+#include "internal/nelem.h"
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
#include "statem_locl.h"
static int final_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al);
static int init_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
static int init_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
-static int tls_construct_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
- unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al);
+static EXT_RETURN tls_construct_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx,
+ int *al);
static int tls_parse_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx, int *al);
int (*parse_stoc)(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx, int *al);
/* Construct extension sent from server to client */
- int (*construct_stoc)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al);
+ EXT_RETURN (*construct_stoc)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al);
/* Construct extension sent from client to server */
- int (*construct_ctos)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al);
+ EXT_RETURN (*construct_ctos)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al);
/*
* Finalise extension after parsing. Always called where an extensions was
* initialised even if the extension was not present. |sent| is set to 1 if
/*
* Definitions of all built-in extensions. NOTE: Changes in the number or order
- * of these extensions should be mirrored with equivalent changes to the
+ * of these extensions should be mirrored with equivalent changes to the
* indexes ( TLSEXT_IDX_* ) defined in ssl_locl.h.
* Each extension has an initialiser, a client and
* server side parser and a finaliser. The initialiser is called (if the
* extension is relevant to a particular protocol or protocol version.
*
* TODO(TLS1.3): Make sure we have a test to check the consistency of these
+ *
+ * NOTE: WebSphere Application Server 7+ cannot handle empty extensions at
+ * the end, keep these extensions before signature_algorithm.
*/
#define INVALID_EXTENSION { 0x10000, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }
static const EXTENSION_DEFINITION ext_defs[] = {
TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
NULL, tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups, NULL,
- NULL /* TODO(TLS1.3): Need to add this */,
+ tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups,
tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups, NULL
},
#else
tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket, tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket,
tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket, NULL
},
- {
- TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,
- SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- init_sig_algs, tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs,
- tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs, tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs,
- tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs, final_sig_algs
- },
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,
init_ems, tls_parse_ctos_ems, tls_parse_stoc_ems,
tls_construct_stoc_ems, tls_construct_ctos_ems, final_ems
},
+ {
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,
+ SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ init_sig_algs, tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs,
+ tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs, tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs,
+ tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs, final_sig_algs
+ },
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions,
SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY
return 0;
}
+ i = 0;
while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
- unsigned int type;
+ unsigned int type, idx;
PACKET extension;
RAW_EXTENSION *thisex;
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
goto err;
}
+ idx = thisex - raw_extensions;
+ /*-
+ * Check that we requested this extension (if appropriate). Requests can
+ * be sent in the ClientHello and CertificateRequest. Unsolicited
+ * extensions can be sent in the NewSessionTicket. We only do this for
+ * the built-in extensions. Custom extensions have a different but
+ * similar check elsewhere.
+ * Special cases:
+ * - The HRR cookie extension is unsolicited
+ * - The renegotiate extension is unsolicited (the client signals
+ * support via an SCSV)
+ * - The signed_certificate_timestamp extension can be provided by a
+ * custom extension or by the built-in version. We let the extension
+ * itself handle unsolicited response checks.
+ */
+ if (idx < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs)
+ && (context & (SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET)) == 0
+ && type != TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie
+ && type != TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate
+ && type != TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp
+ && (s->ext.extflags[idx] & SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT) == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_UNSOLICITED_EXTENSION);
+ *al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+ goto err;
+ }
if (thisex != NULL) {
thisex->data = extension;
thisex->present = 1;
thisex->type = type;
+ thisex->received_order = i++;
+ if (s->ext.debug_cb)
+ s->ext.debug_cb(s, !s->server, thisex->type,
+ PACKET_data(&thisex->data),
+ PACKET_remaining(&thisex->data),
+ s->ext.debug_arg);
}
}
if (!currext->present)
return 1;
- if (s->ext.debug_cb)
- s->ext.debug_cb(s, !s->server, currext->type,
- PACKET_data(&currext->data),
- PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
- s->ext.debug_arg);
-
/* Skip if we've already parsed this extension */
if (currext->parsed)
return 1;
/* Add custom extensions first */
if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) {
- /* On the server side with initiase during ClientHello parsing */
+ /* On the server side with initialise during ClientHello parsing */
custom_ext_init(&s->cert->custext);
}
if (!custom_ext_add(s, context, pkt, x, chainidx, max_version, &tmpal)) {
}
for (i = 0, thisexd = ext_defs; i < OSSL_NELEM(ext_defs); i++, thisexd++) {
- int (*construct)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al);
+ EXT_RETURN (*construct)(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al);
+ EXT_RETURN ret;
/* Skip if not relevant for our context */
if (!should_add_extension(s, thisexd->context, context, max_version))
if (construct == NULL)
continue;
- if (!construct(s, pkt, context, x, chainidx, &tmpal))
+ ret = construct(s, pkt, context, x, chainidx, &tmpal);
+ if (ret == EXT_RETURN_FAIL)
goto err;
+ if (ret == EXT_RETURN_SENT
+ && (context & (SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
+ | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET)) != 0)
+ s->ext.extflags[i] |= SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT;
}
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
s->servername_done = 0;
+ if (s->server && s->session->ext.hostname != NULL)
+ s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
return 1;
default:
static int final_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al)
{
- const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
- unsigned char selected_len = 0;
+ if (!s->server && !sent && s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL)
+ s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
- if (!s->server)
+ if (!s->server || !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
return 1;
- if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
- int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
- s->s3->alpn_proposed,
- (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
- s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
-
- if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
- s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
-#endif
- } else if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
- /* Behave as if no callback was present. */
- return 1;
- } else {
- *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- return 1;
+ /*
+ * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
+ * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
+ * we also have to do this before we decide whether to accept early_data.
+ * In TLSv1.3 we've already negotiated our cipher so we do this call now.
+ * For < TLSv1.3 we defer it until after cipher negotiation.
+ */
+ return tls_handle_alpn(s, al);
}
static int init_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
return 1;
}
-static int tls_construct_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
- unsigned int context, X509 *x,
- size_t chainidx, int *al)
+static EXT_RETURN tls_construct_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx,
+ int *al)
{
const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
if (ca_sk == NULL || sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0)
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_authorities)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITIES,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- return 1;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
}
static int tls_parse_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt,
static int final_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al)
{
- if (!sent && SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (!sent && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->hit) {
*al = TLS13_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGALGS_EXTENSION);
return 0;
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
return 1;
+ /* Nothing to do for key_share in an HRR */
+ if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0)
+ return 1;
+
/*
* If
* we are a client
&& (!s->hit
|| (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE) == 0)) {
/* Nothing left we can do - just fail */
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ *al = SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit
|| (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE) == 0) {
/* Nothing left we can do - just fail */
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ if (!sent)
+ *al = SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION;
+ else
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
int tls_psk_do_binder(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *msgstart,
size_t binderoffset, const unsigned char *binderin,
- unsigned char *binderout,
- SSL_SESSION *sess, int sign)
+ unsigned char *binderout, SSL_SESSION *sess, int sign,
+ int external)
{
EVP_PKEY *mackey = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], binderkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char finishedkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], tmpbinder[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- const char resumption_label[] = "resumption psk binder key";
- size_t bindersize, hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ unsigned char tmppsk[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char *early_secret, *psk;
+ const char resumption_label[] = "res binder";
+ const char external_label[] = "ext binder";
+ const char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
+ const char *label;
+ size_t bindersize, labelsize, hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
int ret = -1;
+ int usepskfored = 0;
+
+ if (external
+ && s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
+ && s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0
+ && sess->ext.max_early_data > 0)
+ usepskfored = 1;
+
+ if (external) {
+ label = external_label;
+ labelsize = sizeof(external_label) - 1;
+ } else {
+ label = resumption_label;
+ labelsize = sizeof(resumption_label) - 1;
+ }
+
+ if (sess->master_key_length != hashsize) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
+ goto err;
+ }
- /* Generate the early_secret */
- if (!tls13_generate_secret(s, md, NULL, sess->master_key,
- sess->master_key_length,
- (unsigned char *)&s->early_secret)) {
+ if (external) {
+ psk = sess->master_key;
+ } else {
+ psk = tmppsk;
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, sess->master_key,
+ (const unsigned char *)nonce_label,
+ sizeof(nonce_label) - 1, sess->ext.tick_nonce,
+ sess->ext.tick_nonce_len, psk, hashsize)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Generate the early_secret. On the server side we've selected a PSK to
+ * resume with (internal or external) so we always do this. On the client
+ * side we do this for a non-external (i.e. resumption) PSK or external PSK
+ * that will be used for early_data so that it is in place for sending early
+ * data. For client side external PSK not being used for early_data we
+ * generate it but store it away for later use.
+ */
+ if (s->server || !external || usepskfored)
+ early_secret = (unsigned char *)s->early_secret;
+ else
+ early_secret = (unsigned char *)sess->early_secret;
+ if (!tls13_generate_secret(s, md, NULL, psk, hashsize, early_secret)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
/* Generate the binder key */
- if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->early_secret,
- (unsigned char *)resumption_label,
- sizeof(resumption_label) - 1, hash, binderkey,
- hashsize)) {
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, early_secret, (unsigned char *)label,
+ labelsize, hash, hashsize, binderkey, hashsize)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
static int final_early_data(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al)
{
- if (!s->server || !sent)
+ if (!sent)
return 1;
+ if (!s->server) {
+ if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
+ && sent
+ && !s->ext.early_data_ok) {
+ /*
+ * If we get here then the server accepted our early_data but we
+ * later realised that it shouldn't have done (e.g. inconsistent
+ * ALPN)
+ */
+ *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
if (s->max_early_data == 0
|| !s->hit
|| s->session->ext.tick_identity != 0
|| s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
|| !s->ext.early_data_ok
- || s->hello_retry_request
- || s->s3->alpn_selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
- || (s->s3->alpn_selected_len > 0
- && memcmp(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
- s->s3->alpn_selected_len) != 0)) {
+ || s->hello_retry_request) {
s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
} else {
s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;
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