Fix bug where early_data does not work if no SNI callback is present
[openssl.git] / ssl / statem / extensions.c
index b4d85d958c5f1cb430a970c14631e01dc8d4c8a6..b5091ac5d6e93b595d686626ab8dabeb06ea3cec 100644 (file)
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
  */
 
 #include <string.h>
+#include "internal/nelem.h"
 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
 #include "statem_locl.h"
 
@@ -111,6 +112,9 @@ typedef struct extensions_definition_st {
  * extension is relevant to a particular protocol or protocol version.
  *
  * TODO(TLS1.3): Make sure we have a test to check the consistency of these
+ *
+ * NOTE: WebSphere Application Server 7+ cannot handle empty extensions at
+ * the end, keep these extensions before signature_algorithm.
  */
 #define INVALID_EXTENSION { 0x10000, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }
 static const EXTENSION_DEFINITION ext_defs[] = {
@@ -168,13 +172,6 @@ static const EXTENSION_DEFINITION ext_defs[] = {
         tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket, tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket,
         tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket, NULL
     },
-    {
-        TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,
-        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
-        init_sig_algs, tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs,
-        tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs, tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs,
-        tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs, final_sig_algs
-    },
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
     {
         TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,
@@ -250,6 +247,13 @@ static const EXTENSION_DEFINITION ext_defs[] = {
         init_ems, tls_parse_ctos_ems, tls_parse_stoc_ems,
         tls_construct_stoc_ems, tls_construct_ctos_ems, final_ems
     },
+    {
+        TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,
+        SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+        init_sig_algs, tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs,
+        tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs, tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs,
+        tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs, final_sig_algs
+    },
     {
         TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions,
         SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY
@@ -462,6 +466,7 @@ int tls_collect_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *packet, unsigned int context,
         return 0;
     }
 
+    i = 0;
     while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
         unsigned int type, idx;
         PACKET extension;
@@ -518,6 +523,12 @@ int tls_collect_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *packet, unsigned int context,
             thisex->data = extension;
             thisex->present = 1;
             thisex->type = type;
+            thisex->received_order = i++;
+            if (s->ext.debug_cb)
+                s->ext.debug_cb(s, !s->server, thisex->type,
+                                PACKET_data(&thisex->data),
+                                PACKET_remaining(&thisex->data),
+                                s->ext.debug_arg);
         }
     }
 
@@ -569,12 +580,6 @@ int tls_parse_extension(SSL *s, TLSEXT_INDEX idx, int context,
     if (!currext->present)
         return 1;
 
-    if (s->ext.debug_cb)
-        s->ext.debug_cb(s, !s->server, currext->type,
-                        PACKET_data(&currext->data),
-                        PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
-                        s->ext.debug_arg);
-
     /* Skip if we've already parsed this extension */
     if (currext->parsed)
         return 1;
@@ -698,11 +703,11 @@ int tls_construct_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
     if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
                /*
                 * If extensions are of zero length then we don't even add the
-                * extensions length bytes to a ClientHello/ServerHello in SSLv3
+                * extensions length bytes to a ClientHello/ServerHello
+                * (for non-TLSv1.3).
                 */
             || ((context &
                  (SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO)) != 0
-                && s->version == SSL3_VERSION
                 && !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt,
                                      WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH))) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@@ -719,7 +724,7 @@ int tls_construct_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
 
     /* Add custom extensions first */
     if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) {
-        /* On the server side with initiase during ClientHello parsing */
+        /* On the server side with initialise during ClientHello parsing */
         custom_ext_init(&s->cert->custext);
     }
     if (!custom_ext_add(s, context, pkt, x, chainidx, max_version, &tmpal)) {
@@ -819,6 +824,7 @@ static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent,
 {
     int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
     int altmp = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+    int was_ticket = (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) == 0;
 
     if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->ext.servername_cb != 0)
         ret = s->ctx->ext.servername_cb(s, &altmp,
@@ -828,6 +834,40 @@ static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent,
         ret = s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb(s, &altmp,
                                        s->session_ctx->ext.servername_arg);
 
+    if (!sent) {
+        OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.hostname);
+        s->session->ext.hostname = NULL;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If we're expecting to send a ticket, and tickets were previously enabled,
+     * and now tickets are disabled, then turn off expected ticket.
+     * Also, if this is not a resumption, create a new session ID
+     */
+    if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK && s->ext.ticket_expected
+            && was_ticket && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0) {
+        s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
+        if (!s->hit) {
+            SSL_SESSION* ss = SSL_get_session(s);
+
+            if (ss != NULL) {
+                OPENSSL_free(ss->ext.tick);
+                ss->ext.tick = NULL;
+                ss->ext.ticklen = 0;
+                ss->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = 0;
+                ss->ext.tick_age_add = 0;
+                ss->ext.tick_identity = 0;
+                if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, ss)) {
+                    ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+                    altmp = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                }
+            } else {
+                ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+                altmp = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
     switch (ret) {
     case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
         *al = altmp;
@@ -839,6 +879,8 @@ static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent,
 
     case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
         s->servername_done = 0;
+        if (s->server && s->session->ext.hostname != NULL)
+            s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
         return 1;
 
     default:
@@ -938,40 +980,20 @@ static int init_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
 
 static int final_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al)
 {
-    const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
-    unsigned char selected_len = 0;
+    if (!s->server && !sent && s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL)
+            s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
 
-    if (!s->server)
+    if (!s->server || !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
         return 1;
 
-    if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
-        int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
-                                           s->s3->alpn_proposed,
-                                           (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
-                                           s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
-
-        if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
-            OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
-            s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
-            if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
-                *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-                return 0;
-            }
-            s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-            /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
-            s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
-#endif
-        } else if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
-            /* Behave as if no callback was present. */
-            return 1;
-        } else {
-            *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
-            return 0;
-        }
-    }
-
-    return 1;
+    /*
+     * Call alpn_select callback if needed.  Has to be done after SNI and
+     * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
+     * we also have to do this before we decide whether to accept early_data.
+     * In TLSv1.3 we've already negotiated our cipher so we do this call now.
+     * For < TLSv1.3 we defer it until after cipher negotiation.
+     */
+    return tls_handle_alpn(s, al);
 }
 
 static int init_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
@@ -1150,36 +1172,25 @@ static int final_key_share(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al)
                 && (!s->hit
                     || (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)
                        != 0)) {
-            const unsigned char *pcurves, *pcurvestmp, *clntcurves;
-            size_t num_curves, clnt_num_curves, i;
+            const uint16_t *pgroups, *clntgroups;
+            size_t num_groups, clnt_num_groups, i;
             unsigned int group_id = 0;
 
             /* Check if a shared group exists */
 
             /* Get the clients list of supported groups. */
-            if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &clntcurves, &clnt_num_curves)) {
-                *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-                SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-                return 0;
-            }
-
-            /* Get our list of available groups */
-            if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
-                *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-                SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-                return 0;
-            }
+            tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &clntgroups, &clnt_num_groups);
+            tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
 
             /* Find the first group we allow that is also in client's list */
-            for (i = 0, pcurvestmp = pcurves; i < num_curves;
-                 i++, pcurvestmp += 2) {
-                group_id = bytestogroup(pcurvestmp);
+            for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
+                group_id = pgroups[i];
 
-                if (check_in_list(s, group_id, clntcurves, clnt_num_curves, 1))
+                if (check_in_list(s, group_id, clntgroups, clnt_num_groups, 1))
                     break;
             }
 
-            if (i < num_curves) {
+            if (i < num_groups) {
                 /* A shared group exists so send a HelloRetryRequest */
                 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
                 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
@@ -1225,21 +1236,68 @@ static int init_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
 
 int tls_psk_do_binder(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *msgstart,
                       size_t binderoffset, const unsigned char *binderin,
-                      unsigned char *binderout,
-                      SSL_SESSION *sess, int sign)
+                      unsigned char *binderout, SSL_SESSION *sess, int sign,
+                      int external)
 {
     EVP_PKEY *mackey = NULL;
     EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
     unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], binderkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
     unsigned char finishedkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], tmpbinder[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned char tmppsk[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned char *early_secret, *psk;
     const char resumption_label[] = "res binder";
-    size_t bindersize, hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
+    const char external_label[] = "ext binder";
+    const char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
+    const char *label;
+    size_t bindersize, labelsize, hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
     int ret = -1;
+    int usepskfored = 0;
 
-    /* Generate the early_secret */
-    if (!tls13_generate_secret(s, md, NULL, sess->master_key,
-                               sess->master_key_length,
-                               (unsigned char *)&s->early_secret)) {
+    if (external
+            && s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
+            && s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0
+            && sess->ext.max_early_data > 0)
+        usepskfored = 1;
+
+    if (external) {
+        label = external_label;
+        labelsize = sizeof(external_label) - 1;
+    } else {
+        label = resumption_label;
+        labelsize = sizeof(resumption_label) - 1;
+    }
+
+    if (sess->master_key_length != hashsize) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (external) {
+        psk = sess->master_key;
+    } else {
+        psk = tmppsk;
+        if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, sess->master_key,
+                               (const unsigned char *)nonce_label,
+                               sizeof(nonce_label) - 1, sess->ext.tick_nonce,
+                               sess->ext.tick_nonce_len, psk, hashsize)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Generate the early_secret. On the server side we've selected a PSK to
+     * resume with (internal or external) so we always do this. On the client
+     * side we do this for a non-external (i.e. resumption) PSK or external PSK
+     * that will be used for early_data so that it is in place for sending early
+     * data. For client side external PSK not being used for early_data we
+     * generate it but store it away for later use.
+     */
+    if (s->server || !external || usepskfored)
+        early_secret = (unsigned char *)s->early_secret;
+    else
+        early_secret = (unsigned char *)sess->early_secret;
+    if (!tls13_generate_secret(s, md, NULL, psk, hashsize, early_secret)) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
         goto err;
     }
@@ -1257,10 +1315,8 @@ int tls_psk_do_binder(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *msgstart,
     }
 
     /* Generate the binder key */
-    if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->early_secret,
-                           (unsigned char *)resumption_label,
-                           sizeof(resumption_label) - 1, hash, binderkey,
-                           hashsize)) {
+    if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, early_secret, (unsigned char *)label,
+                           labelsize, hash, hashsize, binderkey, hashsize)) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
         goto err;
     }
@@ -1358,19 +1414,31 @@ int tls_psk_do_binder(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *msgstart,
 
 static int final_early_data(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al)
 {
-    if (!s->server || !sent)
+    if (!sent)
         return 1;
 
+    if (!s->server) {
+        if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
+                && sent
+                && !s->ext.early_data_ok) {
+            /*
+             * If we get here then the server accepted our early_data but we
+             * later realised that it shouldn't have done (e.g. inconsistent
+             * ALPN)
+             */
+            *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        return 1;
+    }
+
     if (s->max_early_data == 0
             || !s->hit
             || s->session->ext.tick_identity != 0
             || s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
             || !s->ext.early_data_ok
-            || s->hello_retry_request
-            || s->s3->alpn_selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
-            || (s->s3->alpn_selected_len > 0
-                && memcmp(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
-                          s->s3->alpn_selected_len) != 0)) {
+            || s->hello_retry_request) {
         s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
     } else {
         s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;