* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
# include "internal/dane.h"
# include "internal/refcount.h"
# include "internal/tsan_assist.h"
+# include "internal/bio.h"
# ifdef OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL
# undef OPENSSL_EXTERN
(c)[1]=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
(c)[2]=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)),(c)+=3)
+# define TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL TLS1_3_VERSION
+# define DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL DTLS1_2_VERSION
+
/*
* DTLS version numbers are strange because they're inverted. Except for
* DTLS1_BAD_VER, which should be considered "lower" than the rest.
|| (s)->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY \
|| (s)->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
-# define SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(S) ((s)->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 \
- || (s)->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0)
+# define SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(S) ((s)->s3.tmp.finish_md_len == 0 \
+ || (s)->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0)
/* See if we need explicit IV */
# define SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) \
# define GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(session) \
(512U << (session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode - 1))
-# define SSL_READ_ETM(s) (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ)
-# define SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE)
+# define SSL_READ_ETM(s) (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ)
+# define SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE)
/* Mostly for SSLv3 */
# define SSL_PKEY_RSA 0
size_t ecpointformats_len;
unsigned char *ecpointformats; /* peer's list */
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
- size_t supportedgroups_len;
- uint16_t *supportedgroups; /* peer's list */
- /* RFC4507 info */
+ /* RFC4507 info */
unsigned char *tick; /* Session ticket */
size_t ticklen; /* Session ticket length */
/* Session lifetime hint in seconds */
unsigned long tick_lifetime_hint;
uint32_t tick_age_add;
- int tick_identity;
/* Max number of bytes that can be sent as early data */
uint32_t max_early_data;
/* The ALPN protocol selected for this session */
/* EC extension values inherited by SSL structure */
size_t ecpointformats_len;
unsigned char *ecpointformats;
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
size_t supportedgroups_len;
uint16_t *supportedgroups;
-# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
/*
* ALPN information (we are in the process of transitioning from NPN to
/* Do we advertise Post-handshake auth support? */
int pha_enabled;
+
+ /* Callback for SSL async handling */
+ SSL_async_callback_fn async_cb;
+ void *async_cb_arg;
};
+typedef struct cert_pkey_st CERT_PKEY;
+
struct ssl_st {
/*
* protocol version (one of SSL2_VERSION, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_VERSION,
* ssl3_get_message() */
size_t init_num; /* amount read/written */
size_t init_off; /* amount read/written */
- struct ssl3_state_st *s3; /* SSLv3 variables */
+
+ struct {
+ long flags;
+ size_t read_mac_secret_size;
+ unsigned char read_mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ size_t write_mac_secret_size;
+ unsigned char write_mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char server_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
+ unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
+ /* flags for countermeasure against known-IV weakness */
+ int need_empty_fragments;
+ int empty_fragment_done;
+ /* used during startup, digest all incoming/outgoing packets */
+ BIO *handshake_buffer;
+ /*
+ * When handshake digest is determined, buffer is hashed and
+ * freed and MD_CTX for the required digest is stored here.
+ */
+ EVP_MD_CTX *handshake_dgst;
+ /*
+ * Set whenever an expected ChangeCipherSpec message is processed.
+ * Unset when the peer's Finished message is received.
+ * Unexpected ChangeCipherSpec messages trigger a fatal alert.
+ */
+ int change_cipher_spec;
+ int warn_alert;
+ int fatal_alert;
+ /*
+ * we allow one fatal and one warning alert to be outstanding, send close
+ * alert via the warning alert
+ */
+ int alert_dispatch;
+ unsigned char send_alert[2];
+ /*
+ * This flag is set when we should renegotiate ASAP, basically when there
+ * is no more data in the read or write buffers
+ */
+ int renegotiate;
+ int total_renegotiations;
+ int num_renegotiations;
+ int in_read_app_data;
+ struct {
+ /* actually only need to be 16+20 for SSLv3 and 12 for TLS */
+ unsigned char finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
+ size_t finish_md_len;
+ unsigned char peer_finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
+ size_t peer_finish_md_len;
+ size_t message_size;
+ int message_type;
+ /* used to hold the new cipher we are going to use */
+ const SSL_CIPHER *new_cipher;
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey; /* holds short lived DH/ECDH key */
+# endif
+ /* used for certificate requests */
+ int cert_req;
+ /* Certificate types in certificate request message. */
+ uint8_t *ctype;
+ size_t ctype_len;
+ /* Certificate authorities list peer sent */
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *peer_ca_names;
+ size_t key_block_length;
+ unsigned char *key_block;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *new_sym_enc;
+ const EVP_MD *new_hash;
+ int new_mac_pkey_type;
+ size_t new_mac_secret_size;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ const SSL_COMP *new_compression;
+# else
+ char *new_compression;
+# endif
+ int cert_request;
+ /* Raw values of the cipher list from a client */
+ unsigned char *ciphers_raw;
+ size_t ciphers_rawlen;
+ /* Temporary storage for premaster secret */
+ unsigned char *pms;
+ size_t pmslen;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ /* Temporary storage for PSK key */
+ unsigned char *psk;
+ size_t psklen;
+# endif
+ /* Signature algorithm we actually use */
+ const struct sigalg_lookup_st *sigalg;
+ /* Pointer to certificate we use */
+ CERT_PKEY *cert;
+ /*
+ * signature algorithms peer reports: e.g. supported signature
+ * algorithms extension for server or as part of a certificate
+ * request for client.
+ * Keep track of the algorithms for TLS and X.509 usage separately.
+ */
+ uint16_t *peer_sigalgs;
+ uint16_t *peer_cert_sigalgs;
+ /* Size of above arrays */
+ size_t peer_sigalgslen;
+ size_t peer_cert_sigalgslen;
+ /* Sigalg peer actually uses */
+ const struct sigalg_lookup_st *peer_sigalg;
+ /*
+ * Set if corresponding CERT_PKEY can be used with current
+ * SSL session: e.g. appropriate curve, signature algorithms etc.
+ * If zero it can't be used at all.
+ */
+ uint32_t valid_flags[SSL_PKEY_NUM];
+ /*
+ * For servers the following masks are for the key and auth algorithms
+ * that are supported by the certs below. For clients they are masks of
+ * *disabled* algorithms based on the current session.
+ */
+ uint32_t mask_k;
+ uint32_t mask_a;
+ /*
+ * The following are used by the client to see if a cipher is allowed or
+ * not. It contains the minimum and maximum version the client's using
+ * based on what it knows so far.
+ */
+ int min_ver;
+ int max_ver;
+ } tmp;
+
+ /* Connection binding to prevent renegotiation attacks */
+ unsigned char previous_client_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ size_t previous_client_finished_len;
+ unsigned char previous_server_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ size_t previous_server_finished_len;
+ int send_connection_binding; /* TODOEKR */
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ /*
+ * Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from our peer.
+ */
+ int npn_seen;
+# endif
+
+ /*
+ * ALPN information (we are in the process of transitioning from NPN to
+ * ALPN.)
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * In a server these point to the selected ALPN protocol after the
+ * ClientHello has been processed. In a client these contain the protocol
+ * that the server selected once the ServerHello has been processed.
+ */
+ unsigned char *alpn_selected;
+ size_t alpn_selected_len;
+ /* used by the server to know what options were proposed */
+ unsigned char *alpn_proposed;
+ size_t alpn_proposed_len;
+ /* used by the client to know if it actually sent alpn */
+ int alpn_sent;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ /*
+ * This is set to true if we believe that this is a version of Safari
+ * running on OS X 10.6 or newer. We wish to know this because Safari on
+ * 10.8 .. 10.8.3 has broken ECDHE-ECDSA support.
+ */
+ char is_probably_safari;
+# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+ /* For clients: peer temporary key */
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
+ /* The group_id for the DH/ECDH key */
+ uint16_t group_id;
+ EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp;
+# endif
+
+ } s3;
+
struct dtls1_state_st *d1; /* DTLSv1 variables */
/* callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages */
void (*msg_callback) (int write_p, int version, int content_type,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_write_ctx; /* cryptographic state */
unsigned char write_iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; /* TLSv1.3 static write IV */
EVP_MD_CTX *write_hash; /* used for mac generation */
- /* Count of how many KeyUpdate messages we have received */
- unsigned int key_update_count;
/* session info */
/* client cert? */
/* This is used to hold the server certificate used */
size_t supportedgroups_len;
/* our list */
uint16_t *supportedgroups;
+
+ size_t peer_supportedgroups_len;
+ /* peer's list */
+ uint16_t *peer_supportedgroups;
+
/* TLS Session Ticket extension override */
TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT *session_ticket;
/* TLS Session Ticket extension callback */
* as this extension is optional on server side.
*/
uint8_t max_fragment_len_mode;
+
+ /*
+ * On the client side the number of ticket identities we sent in the
+ * ClientHello. On the server side the identity of the ticket we
+ * selected.
+ */
+ int tick_identity;
} ext;
/*
/* Callback to determine if early_data is acceptable or not */
SSL_allow_early_data_cb_fn allow_early_data_cb;
void *allow_early_data_cb_data;
+
+ /* Callback for SSL async handling */
+ SSL_async_callback_fn async_cb;
+ void *async_cb_arg;
};
/*
typedef struct tls_group_info_st {
int nid; /* Curve NID */
int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
- uint16_t flags; /* Flags: currently just group type */
+ uint32_t flags; /* For group type and applicable TLS versions */
+ uint16_t group_id; /* Group ID */
} TLS_GROUP_INFO;
/* flags values */
-# define TLS_CURVE_TYPE 0x3 /* Mask for group type */
-# define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
-# define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
-# define TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM 0x2
+# define TLS_GROUP_TYPE 0x0000000FU /* Mask for group type */
+# define TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME 0x00000001U
+# define TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2 0x00000002U
+# define TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CUSTOM 0x00000004U
+# define TLS_GROUP_FFDHE 0x00000008U
+# define TLS_GROUP_ONLY_FOR_TLS1_3 0x00000010U
-typedef struct cert_pkey_st CERT_PKEY;
+# define TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3 (TLS_GROUP_FFDHE|TLS_GROUP_ONLY_FOR_TLS1_3)
/*
* Structure containing table entry of certificate info corresponding to
* CERT_PKEY entries
*/
typedef struct {
- int nid; /* NID of pubic key algorithm */
+ int nid; /* NID of public key algorithm */
uint32_t amask; /* authmask corresponding to key type */
} SSL_CERT_LOOKUP;
-typedef struct ssl3_state_st {
- long flags;
- size_t read_mac_secret_size;
- unsigned char read_mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- size_t write_mac_secret_size;
- unsigned char write_mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned char server_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
- unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
- /* flags for countermeasure against known-IV weakness */
- int need_empty_fragments;
- int empty_fragment_done;
- /* used during startup, digest all incoming/outgoing packets */
- BIO *handshake_buffer;
- /*
- * When handshake digest is determined, buffer is hashed and
- * freed and MD_CTX for the required digest is stored here.
- */
- EVP_MD_CTX *handshake_dgst;
- /*
- * Set whenever an expected ChangeCipherSpec message is processed.
- * Unset when the peer's Finished message is received.
- * Unexpected ChangeCipherSpec messages trigger a fatal alert.
- */
- int change_cipher_spec;
- int warn_alert;
- int fatal_alert;
- /*
- * we allow one fatal and one warning alert to be outstanding, send close
- * alert via the warning alert
- */
- int alert_dispatch;
- unsigned char send_alert[2];
- /*
- * This flag is set when we should renegotiate ASAP, basically when there
- * is no more data in the read or write buffers
- */
- int renegotiate;
- int total_renegotiations;
- int num_renegotiations;
- int in_read_app_data;
- struct {
- /* actually only need to be 16+20 for SSLv3 and 12 for TLS */
- unsigned char finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
- size_t finish_md_len;
- unsigned char peer_finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
- size_t peer_finish_md_len;
- size_t message_size;
- int message_type;
- /* used to hold the new cipher we are going to use */
- const SSL_CIPHER *new_cipher;
-# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
- EVP_PKEY *pkey; /* holds short lived DH/ECDH key */
-# endif
- /* used for certificate requests */
- int cert_req;
- /* Certificate types in certificate request message. */
- uint8_t *ctype;
- size_t ctype_len;
- /* Certificate authorities list peer sent */
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *peer_ca_names;
- size_t key_block_length;
- unsigned char *key_block;
- const EVP_CIPHER *new_sym_enc;
- const EVP_MD *new_hash;
- int new_mac_pkey_type;
- size_t new_mac_secret_size;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- const SSL_COMP *new_compression;
-# else
- char *new_compression;
-# endif
- int cert_request;
- /* Raw values of the cipher list from a client */
- unsigned char *ciphers_raw;
- size_t ciphers_rawlen;
- /* Temporary storage for premaster secret */
- unsigned char *pms;
- size_t pmslen;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- /* Temporary storage for PSK key */
- unsigned char *psk;
- size_t psklen;
-# endif
- /* Signature algorithm we actually use */
- const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
- /* Pointer to certificate we use */
- CERT_PKEY *cert;
- /*
- * signature algorithms peer reports: e.g. supported signature
- * algorithms extension for server or as part of a certificate
- * request for client.
- * Keep track of the algorithms for TLS and X.509 usage separately.
- */
- uint16_t *peer_sigalgs;
- uint16_t *peer_cert_sigalgs;
- /* Size of above arrays */
- size_t peer_sigalgslen;
- size_t peer_cert_sigalgslen;
- /* Sigalg peer actually uses */
- const SIGALG_LOOKUP *peer_sigalg;
- /*
- * Set if corresponding CERT_PKEY can be used with current
- * SSL session: e.g. appropriate curve, signature algorithms etc.
- * If zero it can't be used at all.
- */
- uint32_t valid_flags[SSL_PKEY_NUM];
- /*
- * For servers the following masks are for the key and auth algorithms
- * that are supported by the certs below. For clients they are masks of
- * *disabled* algorithms based on the current session.
- */
- uint32_t mask_k;
- uint32_t mask_a;
- /*
- * The following are used by the client to see if a cipher is allowed or
- * not. It contains the minimum and maximum version the client's using
- * based on what it knows so far.
- */
- int min_ver;
- int max_ver;
- } tmp;
-
- /* Connection binding to prevent renegotiation attacks */
- unsigned char previous_client_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- size_t previous_client_finished_len;
- unsigned char previous_server_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- size_t previous_server_finished_len;
- int send_connection_binding; /* TODOEKR */
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- /*
- * Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from our peer.
- */
- int npn_seen;
-# endif
-
- /*
- * ALPN information (we are in the process of transitioning from NPN to
- * ALPN.)
- */
-
- /*
- * In a server these point to the selected ALPN protocol after the
- * ClientHello has been processed. In a client these contain the protocol
- * that the server selected once the ServerHello has been processed.
- */
- unsigned char *alpn_selected;
- size_t alpn_selected_len;
- /* used by the server to know what options were proposed */
- unsigned char *alpn_proposed;
- size_t alpn_proposed_len;
- /* used by the client to know if it actually sent alpn */
- int alpn_sent;
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- /*
- * This is set to true if we believe that this is a version of Safari
- * running on OS X 10.6 or newer. We wish to know this because Safari on
- * 10.8 .. 10.8.3 has broken ECDHE-ECDSA support.
- */
- char is_probably_safari;
-# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
- /* For clients: peer temporary key */
-# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
- /* The group_id for the DH/ECDH key */
- uint16_t group_id;
- EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp;
-# endif
-
-} SSL3_STATE;
-
/* DTLS structures */
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
#define TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE 1
#define TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE 2
-/* An invalid index into the TLSv1.3 PSK identities */
-#define TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY -1
-
-#define SSL_USE_PSS(s) (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg != NULL && \
- s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
+#define SSL_USE_PSS(s) (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg != NULL && \
+ s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
/* A dummy signature value not valid for TLSv1.2 signature algs */
#define TLSEXT_signature_rsa_pss 0x0101
static ossl_inline void tls1_get_peer_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
size_t *pgroupslen)
{
- *pgroups = s->session->ext.supportedgroups;
- *pgroupslen = s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len;
+ *pgroups = s->ext.peer_supportedgroups;
+ *pgroupslen = s->ext.peer_supportedgroups_len;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_UNIT_TEST
__owur SSL_SESSION *lookup_sess_in_cache(SSL *s, const unsigned char *sess_id,
size_t sess_id_len);
__owur int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello);
-__owur SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket);
+__owur SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket);
__owur int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b);
DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id);
__owur int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap,
__owur const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher(unsigned int u);
int ssl3_renegotiate(SSL *ssl);
int ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL *ssl, int initok);
+void ssl3_digest_master_key_set_params(const SSL_SESSION *session,
+ OSSL_PARAM params[]);
__owur int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s);
__owur size_t ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *sender, size_t slen,
unsigned char *p);
SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n);
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-
__owur const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t curve_id);
__owur int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_curves);
__owur uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch);
int *curves, size_t ncurves);
__owur int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
const char *str);
+__owur EVP_PKEY *ssl_generate_pkey_group(SSL *s, uint16_t id);
+__owur int tls_valid_group(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int version);
+__owur EVP_PKEY *ssl_generate_param_group(uint16_t id);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
size_t *num_formats);
__owur int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long id);
-__owur EVP_PKEY *ssl_generate_pkey_group(SSL *s, uint16_t id);
-__owur EVP_PKEY *ssl_generate_param_group(uint16_t id);
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-__owur int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t curve, int op);
+__owur int tls_group_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t curve, int op);
void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
size_t *pgroupslen);
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff