-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
*
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
-#include "e_os.h"
-#ifndef NO_SYS_TYPES_H
-# include <sys/types.h>
-#endif
-
+#include "internal/nelem.h"
#include "internal/o_dir.h"
-#include <openssl/lhash.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/store.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "internal/refcount.h"
+#include "ssl_local.h"
+#include "ssl_cert_table.h"
+#include "internal/thread_once.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+# ifdef _WIN32
+# define stat _stat
+# endif
+# ifndef S_ISDIR
+# define S_ISDIR(a) (((a) & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR)
+# endif
+#endif
+
-static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op,
- int bits, int nid, void *other,
+static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int op, int bits, int nid, void *other,
void *ex);
static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_x509_store_ctx_once = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = -1;
-static void ssl_x509_store_ctx_init(void)
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ssl_x509_store_ctx_init)
{
ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0,
- "SSL for verify callback",
- NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ "SSL for verify callback",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx >= 0;
}
int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void)
{
- CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(&ssl_x509_store_ctx_once, ssl_x509_store_ctx_init);
+ if (!RUN_ONCE(&ssl_x509_store_ctx_once, ssl_x509_store_ctx_init))
+ return -1;
return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
}
-CERT *ssl_cert_new(void)
+CERT *ssl_cert_new(size_t ssl_pkey_num)
{
- CERT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+ CERT *ret = NULL;
- if (ret == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ /* Should never happen */
+ if (!ossl_assert(ssl_pkey_num >= SSL_PKEY_NUM))
+ return NULL;
+
+ ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ret->ssl_pkey_num = ssl_pkey_num;
+ ret->pkeys = OPENSSL_zalloc(ret->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(CERT_PKEY));
+ if (ret->pkeys == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
- ret->key = &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
- ret->references = 1;
+ ret->key = &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA]);
ret->sec_cb = ssl_security_default_callback;
ret->sec_level = OPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL;
ret->sec_ex = NULL;
- ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
- if (ret->lock == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (!CRYPTO_NEW_REF(&ret->references, 1)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ret->pkeys);
OPENSSL_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
{
CERT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
- int i;
+ size_t i;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
+ int j;
+#endif
- if (ret == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ret->ssl_pkey_num = cert->ssl_pkey_num;
+ ret->pkeys = OPENSSL_zalloc(ret->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(CERT_PKEY));
+ if (ret->pkeys == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
- ret->references = 1;
ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - cert->pkeys];
- ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
- if (ret->lock == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (!CRYPTO_NEW_REF(&ret->references, 1)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ret->pkeys);
OPENSSL_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) {
ret->dh_tmp = cert->dh_tmp;
EVP_PKEY_up_ref(ret->dh_tmp);
}
+
ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
ret->dh_tmp_auto = cert->dh_tmp_auto;
-#endif
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ret->ssl_pkey_num; i++) {
CERT_PKEY *cpk = cert->pkeys + i;
CERT_PKEY *rpk = ret->pkeys + i;
+
if (cpk->x509 != NULL) {
rpk->x509 = cpk->x509;
X509_up_ref(rpk->x509);
if (cpk->chain) {
rpk->chain = X509_chain_up_ref(cpk->chain);
if (!rpk->chain) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
- if (cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo != NULL) {
+ if (cpk->serverinfo != NULL) {
/* Just copy everything. */
- ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo =
- OPENSSL_malloc(cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length);
- if (ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ rpk->serverinfo = OPENSSL_memdup(cpk->serverinfo, cpk->serverinfo_length);
+ if (rpk->serverinfo == NULL)
goto err;
+ rpk->serverinfo_length = cpk->serverinfo_length;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
+ for (j = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none; j < TLSEXT_comp_cert_limit; j++) {
+ if (cpk->comp_cert[j] != NULL) {
+ if (!OSSL_COMP_CERT_up_ref(cpk->comp_cert[j]))
+ goto err;
+ rpk->comp_cert[j] = cpk->comp_cert[j];
}
- ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length =
- cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length;
- memcpy(ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo,
- cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo,
- cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length);
}
+#endif
}
/* Configured sigalgs copied across */
if (cert->conf_sigalgs) {
- ret->conf_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->conf_sigalgslen);
+ ret->conf_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->conf_sigalgslen
+ * sizeof(*cert->conf_sigalgs));
if (ret->conf_sigalgs == NULL)
goto err;
- memcpy(ret->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgslen);
+ memcpy(ret->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgs,
+ cert->conf_sigalgslen * sizeof(*cert->conf_sigalgs));
ret->conf_sigalgslen = cert->conf_sigalgslen;
} else
ret->conf_sigalgs = NULL;
if (cert->client_sigalgs) {
- ret->client_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->client_sigalgslen);
+ ret->client_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->client_sigalgslen
+ * sizeof(*cert->client_sigalgs));
if (ret->client_sigalgs == NULL)
goto err;
memcpy(ret->client_sigalgs, cert->client_sigalgs,
- cert->client_sigalgslen);
+ cert->client_sigalgslen * sizeof(*cert->client_sigalgs));
ret->client_sigalgslen = cert->client_sigalgslen;
} else
ret->client_sigalgs = NULL;
- /* Shared sigalgs also NULL */
- ret->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
/* Copy any custom client certificate types */
- if (cert->ctypes) {
- ret->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->ctype_num);
- if (ret->ctypes == NULL)
+ if (cert->ctype) {
+ ret->ctype = OPENSSL_memdup(cert->ctype, cert->ctype_len);
+ if (ret->ctype == NULL)
goto err;
- memcpy(ret->ctypes, cert->ctypes, cert->ctype_num);
- ret->ctype_num = cert->ctype_num;
+ ret->ctype_len = cert->ctype_len;
}
ret->cert_flags = cert->cert_flags;
ret->sec_level = cert->sec_level;
ret->sec_ex = cert->sec_ex;
- if (!custom_exts_copy(&ret->cli_ext, &cert->cli_ext))
- goto err;
- if (!custom_exts_copy(&ret->srv_ext, &cert->srv_ext))
+ if (!custom_exts_copy(&ret->custext, &cert->custext))
goto err;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (cert->psk_identity_hint) {
void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c)
{
- int i;
+ size_t i;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
+ int j;
+#endif
+
if (c == NULL)
return;
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < c->ssl_pkey_num; i++) {
CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
X509_free(cpk->x509);
cpk->x509 = NULL;
EVP_PKEY_free(cpk->privatekey);
cpk->privatekey = NULL;
- sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
+ OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(cpk->chain);
cpk->chain = NULL;
OPENSSL_free(cpk->serverinfo);
cpk->serverinfo = NULL;
cpk->serverinfo_length = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
+ for (j = 0; j < TLSEXT_comp_cert_limit; j++) {
+ OSSL_COMP_CERT_free(cpk->comp_cert[j]);
+ cpk->comp_cert[j] = NULL;
+ cpk->cert_comp_used = 0;
+ }
+#endif
}
}
if (c == NULL)
return;
-
- CRYPTO_atomic_add(&c->references, -1, &i, c->lock);
+ CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&c->references, &i);
REF_PRINT_COUNT("CERT", c);
if (i > 0)
return;
REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
EVP_PKEY_free(c->dh_tmp);
-#endif
ssl_cert_clear_certs(c);
OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
- OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
- OPENSSL_free(c->ctypes);
+ OPENSSL_free(c->ctype);
X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store);
X509_STORE_free(c->chain_store);
- custom_exts_free(&c->cli_ext);
- custom_exts_free(&c->srv_ext);
+ custom_exts_free(&c->custext);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
OPENSSL_free(c->psk_identity_hint);
#endif
- CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(c->lock);
+ OPENSSL_free(c->pkeys);
+ CRYPTO_FREE_REF(&c->references);
OPENSSL_free(c);
}
-int ssl_cert_set0_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+int ssl_cert_set0_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
int i, r;
- CERT_PKEY *cpk = s ? s->cert->key : ctx->cert->key;
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = s != NULL ? s->cert->key : ctx->cert->key;
+
if (!cpk)
return 0;
- sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
- r = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, sk_X509_value(chain, i), 0, 0);
+ X509 *x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+
+ r = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, x, 0, 0);
if (r != 1) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_SET0_CHAIN, r);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, r);
return 0;
}
}
+ OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(cpk->chain);
cpk->chain = chain;
return 1;
}
-int ssl_cert_set1_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+int ssl_cert_set1_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *dchain;
+
if (!chain)
return ssl_cert_set0_chain(s, ctx, NULL);
dchain = X509_chain_up_ref(chain);
if (!dchain)
return 0;
if (!ssl_cert_set0_chain(s, ctx, dchain)) {
- sk_X509_pop_free(dchain, X509_free);
+ OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(dchain);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
-int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
int r;
CERT_PKEY *cpk = s ? s->cert->key : ctx->cert->key;
+
if (!cpk)
return 0;
r = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, x, 0, 0);
if (r != 1) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_ADD0_CHAIN_CERT, r);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, r);
return 0;
}
if (!cpk->chain)
return 1;
}
-int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
if (!ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(s, ctx, x))
return 0;
int ssl_cert_select_current(CERT *c, X509 *x)
{
- int i;
+ size_t i;
+
if (x == NULL)
return 0;
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < c->ssl_pkey_num; i++) {
CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
if (cpk->x509 == x && cpk->privatekey) {
c->key = cpk;
}
}
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < c->ssl_pkey_num; i++) {
CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
if (cpk->privatekey && cpk->x509 && !X509_cmp(cpk->x509, x)) {
c->key = cpk;
int ssl_cert_set_current(CERT *c, long op)
{
- int i, idx;
+ size_t i, idx;
+
if (!c)
return 0;
if (op == SSL_CERT_SET_FIRST)
idx = 0;
else if (op == SSL_CERT_SET_NEXT) {
- idx = (int)(c->key - c->pkeys + 1);
- if (idx >= SSL_PKEY_NUM)
+ idx = (size_t)(c->key - c->pkeys + 1);
+ if (idx >= c->ssl_pkey_num)
return 0;
} else
return 0;
- for (i = idx; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ for (i = idx; i < c->ssl_pkey_num; i++) {
CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
if (cpk->x509 && cpk->privatekey) {
c->key = cpk;
c->cert_cb_arg = arg;
}
-int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
+/*
+ * Verify a certificate chain/raw public key
+ * Return codes:
+ * 1: Verify success
+ * 0: Verify failure or error
+ * -1: Retry required
+ */
+static int ssl_verify_internal(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, EVP_PKEY *rpk)
{
X509 *x;
int i = 0;
X509_STORE *verify_store;
X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = NULL;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx;
+
+ /* Something must be passed in */
+ if ((sk == NULL || sk_X509_num(sk) == 0) && rpk == NULL)
+ return 0;
- if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0))
+ /* Only one can be set */
+ if (sk != NULL && rpk != NULL)
return 0;
+ sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
if (s->cert->verify_store)
verify_store = s->cert->verify_store;
else
- verify_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
+ verify_store = sctx->cert_store;
- ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+ ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq);
if (ctx == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
return 0;
}
- x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
- if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, verify_store, x, sk)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
- goto end;
+ if (sk != NULL) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, verify_store, x, sk)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init_rpk(ctx, verify_store, rpk)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
}
param = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx);
/*
* point, for now a single @SECLEVEL sets the same policy for TLS crypto
* and PKI authentication.
*/
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(param, SSL_get_security_level(s));
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(param,
+ SSL_get_security_level(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)));
/* Set suite B flags if needed */
X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, tls1_suiteb(s));
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s);
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx,
+ SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s)) {
+ goto end;
+ }
/* Verify via DANE if enabled */
if (DANETLS_ENABLED(&s->dane))
if (s->verify_callback)
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, s->verify_callback);
- if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL)
- i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg);
- else
+ if (sctx->app_verify_callback != NULL) {
+ i = sctx->app_verify_callback(ctx, sctx->app_verify_arg);
+ } else {
i = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
+ /* We treat an error in the same way as a failure to verify */
+ if (i < 0)
+ i = 0;
+ }
s->verify_result = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
- sk_X509_pop_free(s->verified_chain, X509_free);
+ OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(s->verified_chain);
s->verified_chain = NULL;
- if (X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(ctx) != NULL) {
+
+ if (sk != NULL && X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(ctx) != NULL) {
s->verified_chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(ctx);
if (s->verified_chain == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
i = 0;
}
}
/* Move peername from the store context params to the SSL handle's */
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername(s->param, param);
-end:
+ end:
X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
return i;
}
-static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+/*
+ * Verify a raw public key
+ * Return codes:
+ * 1: Verify success
+ * 0: Verify failure or error
+ * -1: Retry required
+ */
+int ssl_verify_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *s, EVP_PKEY *rpk)
+{
+ return ssl_verify_internal(s, NULL, rpk);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify a certificate chain
+ * Return codes:
+ * 1: Verify success
+ * 0: Verify failure or error
+ * -1: Retry required
+ */
+int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
+{
+ return ssl_verify_internal(s, sk, NULL);
+}
+
+static void set0_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
{
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list, X509_NAME_free);
*ca_list = name_list;
}
-STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk)
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk)
{
int i;
+ const int num = sk_X509_NAME_num(sk);
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret;
X509_NAME *name;
- ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
+ ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_reserve(NULL, num);
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
name = X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i));
- if ((name == NULL) || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) {
+ if (name == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
- return (NULL);
+ return NULL;
}
+ sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name); /* Cannot fail after reserve call */
}
- return (ret);
+ return ret;
}
-void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+void SSL_set0_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+{
+ SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
+
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ set0_CA_list(&sc->ca_names, name_list);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set0_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
{
- set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA), name_list);
+ set0_CA_list(&ctx->ca_names, name_list);
+}
+
+const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get0_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->ca_names;
+}
+
+const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get0_CA_list(const SSL *s)
+{
+ const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
+
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return sc->ca_names != NULL ? sc->ca_names : s->ctx->ca_names;
}
void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
{
- set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA), name_list);
+ set0_CA_list(&ctx->client_ca_names, name_list);
}
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
- return (ctx->client_CA);
+ return ctx->client_ca_names;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+{
+ SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
+
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ set0_CA_list(&sc->client_ca_names, name_list);
+}
+
+const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get0_peer_CA_list(const SSL *s)
+{
+ const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
+
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return sc->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
}
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s)
{
- if (!s->server) { /* we are in the client */
- if (((s->version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) && (s->s3 != NULL))
- return (s->s3->tmp.ca_names);
- else
- return (NULL);
- } else {
- if (s->client_CA != NULL)
- return (s->client_CA);
- else
- return (s->ctx->client_CA);
- }
+ const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
+
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (!sc->server)
+ return sc->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
+ return sc->client_ca_names != NULL ? sc->client_ca_names
+ : s->ctx->client_ca_names;
}
-static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk, X509 *x)
+static int add_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk, const X509 *x)
{
X509_NAME *name;
if (x == NULL)
- return (0);
- if ((*sk == NULL) && ((*sk = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL))
- return (0);
+ return 0;
+ if (*sk == NULL && ((*sk = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL))
+ return 0;
if ((name = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x))) == NULL)
- return (0);
+ return 0;
if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk, name)) {
X509_NAME_free(name);
- return (0);
+ return 0;
}
- return (1);
+ return 1;
}
+int SSL_add1_to_CA_list(SSL *ssl, const X509 *x)
+{
+ SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl);
+
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ return add_ca_name(&sc->ca_names, x);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add1_to_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const X509 *x)
+{
+ return add_ca_name(&ctx->ca_names, x);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following two are older names are to be replaced with
+ * SSL(_CTX)_add1_to_CA_list
+ */
int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x)
{
- return (add_client_CA(&(ssl->client_CA), x));
+ SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl);
+
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ return add_ca_name(&sc->client_ca_names, x);
}
int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
- return (add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA), x));
+ return add_ca_name(&ctx->client_ca_names, x);
}
-static int xname_sk_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
+static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
{
- return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
+ unsigned char *abuf = NULL, *bbuf = NULL;
+ int alen, blen, ret;
+
+ /* X509_NAME_cmp() itself casts away constness in this way, so
+ * assume it's safe:
+ */
+ alen = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, &abuf);
+ blen = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, &bbuf);
+
+ if (alen < 0 || blen < 0)
+ ret = -2;
+ else if (alen != blen)
+ ret = alen - blen;
+ else /* alen == blen */
+ ret = memcmp(abuf, bbuf, alen);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(abuf);
+ OPENSSL_free(bbuf);
+
+ return ret;
}
-static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
+static int xname_sk_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
{
- return X509_NAME_cmp(a, b);
+ return xname_cmp(*a, *b);
}
static unsigned long xname_hash(const X509_NAME *a)
{
- return X509_NAME_hash((X509_NAME *)a);
+ /* This returns 0 also if SHA1 is not available */
+ return X509_NAME_hash_ex((X509_NAME *)a, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
-/**
- * Load CA certs from a file into a ::STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed;
- * it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use
- * for a stack of CAs is to send it to the client). Actually, it doesn't have
- * much to do with CAs, either, since it will load any old cert.
- * \param file the file containing one or more certs.
- * \return a ::STACK containing the certs.
- */
-STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file)
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file_ex(const char *file,
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
+ const char *propq)
{
BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
X509 *x = NULL;
X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL;
- LHASH_OF(X509_NAME) *name_hash =
- lh_X509_NAME_new(xname_hash, xname_cmp);
+ LHASH_OF(X509_NAME) *name_hash = lh_X509_NAME_new(xname_hash, xname_cmp);
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *prev_libctx = NULL;
- if ((name_hash == NULL) || (in == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (name_hash == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (in == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
goto err;
}
- if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file))
+ x = X509_new_ex(libctx, propq);
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0)
goto err;
+ /* Internally lh_X509_NAME_retrieve() needs the libctx to retrieve SHA1 */
+ prev_libctx = OSSL_LIB_CTX_set0_default(libctx);
for (;;) {
if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
break;
if (ret == NULL) {
ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
if (ret == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
if (lh_X509_NAME_retrieve(name_hash, xn) != NULL) {
/* Duplicate. */
X509_NAME_free(xn);
+ xn = NULL;
} else {
lh_X509_NAME_insert(name_hash, xn);
- sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, xn);
+ if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, xn))
+ goto err;
}
}
goto done;
err:
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
ret = NULL;
done:
+ /* restore the old libctx */
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX_set0_default(prev_libctx);
BIO_free(in);
X509_free(x);
lh_X509_NAME_free(name_hash);
if (ret != NULL)
ERR_clear_error();
- return (ret);
+ return ret;
}
-/**
- * Add a file of certs to a stack.
- * \param stack the stack to add to.
- * \param file the file to add from. All certs in this file that are not
- * already in the stack will be added.
- * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
- * certs may have been added to \c stack.
- */
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file)
+{
+ return SSL_load_client_CA_file_ex(file, NULL, NULL);
+}
int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
const char *file)
in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (in == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
goto err;
}
- if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file))
+ if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0)
goto err;
for (;;) {
xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
if (xn == NULL)
goto err;
- if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, xn) >= 0)
+ if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, xn) >= 0) {
+ /* Duplicate. */
X509_NAME_free(xn);
- else
- sk_X509_NAME_push(stack, xn);
+ } else if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(stack, xn)) {
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
+ goto err;
+ }
}
ERR_clear_error();
goto done;
err:
- ret = 0;
+ ret = 0;
done:
BIO_free(in);
X509_free(x);
return ret;
}
-/**
- * Add a directory of certs to a stack.
- * \param stack the stack to append to.
- * \param dir the directory to append from. All files in this directory will be
- * examined as potential certs. Any that are acceptable to
- * SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() that are not already in the stack will be
- * included.
- * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
- * certs may have been added to \c stack.
- */
-
int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
const char *dir)
{
while ((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir))) {
char buf[1024];
int r;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
+ struct stat st;
- if (strlen(dir) + strlen(filename) + 2 > sizeof buf) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,
- SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
+#else
+ /* Cannot use stat so just skip current and parent directories */
+ if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 || strcmp(filename, "..") == 0)
+ continue;
+#endif
+ if (strlen(dir) + strlen(filename) + 2 > sizeof(buf)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s%s", dir, filename);
+ r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s%s", dir, filename);
#else
- r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", dir, filename);
+ r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", dir, filename);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
+ /* Skip subdirectories */
+ if (!stat(buf, &st) && S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
+ continue;
#endif
if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf))
goto err;
}
if (errno) {
- SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error());
- ERR_add_error_data(3, "OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx, '", dir, "')");
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SYS, get_last_sys_error(),
+ "calling OPENSSL_dir_read(%s)", dir);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
goto err;
}
return ret;
}
-/* Add a certificate to a BUF_MEM structure */
-
-static int ssl_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x)
+static int add_uris_recursive(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+ const char *uri, int depth)
{
- int n;
- unsigned char *p;
-
- n = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
- if (n < 0 || !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (int)(n + (*l) + 3))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
- p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
- l2n3(n, p);
- n = i2d_X509(x, &p);
- if (n < 0) {
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
- *l += n + 3;
+ int ok = 1;
+ OSSL_STORE_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
- return 1;
-}
+ if ((ctx = OSSL_STORE_open(uri, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
-/* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM structure */
-int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l)
-{
- BUF_MEM *buf = s->init_buf;
- int i, chain_count;
- X509 *x;
- STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
- STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
- X509_STORE *chain_store;
+ while (!OSSL_STORE_eof(ctx) && !OSSL_STORE_error(ctx)) {
+ OSSL_STORE_INFO *info = OSSL_STORE_load(ctx);
+ int infotype = info == 0 ? 0 : OSSL_STORE_INFO_get_type(info);
+
+ if (info == NULL)
+ continue;
+
+ if (infotype == OSSL_STORE_INFO_NAME) {
+ /*
+ * This is an entry in the "directory" represented by the current
+ * uri. if |depth| allows, dive into it.
+ */
+ if (depth > 0)
+ ok = add_uris_recursive(stack, OSSL_STORE_INFO_get0_NAME(info),
+ depth - 1);
+ } else if (infotype == OSSL_STORE_INFO_CERT) {
+ if ((x = OSSL_STORE_INFO_get0_CERT(info)) == NULL
+ || (xn = X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL
+ || (xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, xn) >= 0) {
+ /* Duplicate. */
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
+ } else if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(stack, xn)) {
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
- /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 10)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- return 0;
+ OSSL_STORE_INFO_free(info);
}
- if (!cpk || !cpk->x509)
- return 1;
-
- x = cpk->x509;
-
- /*
- * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
- */
- if (cpk->chain)
- extra_certs = cpk->chain;
- else
- extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ goto done;
- if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
- chain_store = NULL;
- else if (s->cert->chain_store)
- chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
- else
- chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
+ err:
+ ok = 0;
+ done:
+ OSSL_STORE_close(ctx);
- if (chain_store) {
- X509_STORE_CTX* xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+ return ok;
+}
- if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (0);
- }
- if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
- X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
- return (0);
- }
- /*
- * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
- * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
- * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
- * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
- */
- (void) X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
- /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
- ERR_clear_error();
- chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
- i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
- if (i != 1) {
-#if 0
- /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
-#endif
- X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
- return 0;
- }
- chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
- for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
- x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+int SSL_add_store_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+ const char *store)
+{
+ int (*oldcmp) (const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
+ = sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, xname_sk_cmp);
+ int ret = add_uris_recursive(stack, store, 1);
- if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) {
- X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
- } else {
- i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
- if (i != 1) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x))
- return 0;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
- x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
- if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x))
- return 0;
- }
- }
- return 1;
+ (void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, oldcmp);
+ return ret;
}
/* Build a certificate chain for current certificate */
-int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags)
+int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags)
{
- CERT *c = s ? s->cert : ctx->cert;
+ CERT *c = s != NULL ? s->cert : ctx->cert;
CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
X509_STORE *chain_store = NULL;
X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL, *untrusted = NULL;
X509 *x;
+ SSL_CTX *real_ctx = (s == NULL) ? ctx : SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
int i, rv = 0;
- unsigned long error;
- if (!cpk->x509) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
+ if (cpk->x509 == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
goto err;
}
/* Rearranging and check the chain: add everything to a store */
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(cpk->chain); i++) {
x = sk_X509_value(cpk->chain, i);
- if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, x)) {
- error = ERR_peek_last_error();
- if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 ||
- ERR_GET_REASON(error) !=
- X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE)
- goto err;
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
- }
- /* Add EE cert too: it might be self signed */
- if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, cpk->x509)) {
- error = ERR_peek_last_error();
- if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 ||
- ERR_GET_REASON(error) != X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE)
+ if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, x))
goto err;
- ERR_clear_error();
}
+ /* Add EE cert too: it might be self signed */
+ if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, cpk->x509))
+ goto err;
} else {
- if (c->chain_store)
+ if (c->chain_store != NULL)
chain_store = c->chain_store;
- else if (s)
- chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
else
- chain_store = ctx->cert_store;
+ chain_store = real_ctx->cert_store;
if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_UNTRUSTED)
untrusted = cpk->chain;
}
- xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+ xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(real_ctx->libctx, real_ctx->propq);
if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, cpk->x509, untrusted)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* Set suite B flags if needed */
if (i > 0)
chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(xs_ctx);
if (i <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(xs_ctx);
- ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
- X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED,
+ "Verify error:%s", X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));
goto err;
}
x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
rv = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, x, 0, 0);
if (rv != 1) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, rv);
- sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, rv);
+ OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(chain);
rv = 0;
goto err;
}
}
- sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
+ OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(cpk->chain);
cpk->chain = chain;
if (rv == 0)
rv = 1;
return 1;
}
-static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op,
- int bits, int nid, void *other,
- void *ex)
+int ssl_cert_get_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE **pstore, int chain)
{
- int level, minbits;
- static const int minbits_table[5] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
- if (ctx)
+ *pstore = (chain ? c->chain_store : c->verify_store);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_get_security_level_bits(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int *levelp)
+{
+ int level;
+ /*
+ * note that there's a corresponding minbits_table
+ * in crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c that's used for checking the security level
+ * of RSA and DSA keys
+ */
+ static const int minbits_table[5 + 1] = { 0, 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
+
+ if (ctx != NULL)
level = SSL_CTX_get_security_level(ctx);
else
level = SSL_get_security_level(s);
- if (level <= 0) {
+ if (level > 5)
+ level = 5;
+ else if (level < 0)
+ level = 0;
+
+ if (levelp != NULL)
+ *levelp = level;
+
+ return minbits_table[level];
+}
+
+static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int op, int bits, int nid, void *other,
+ void *ex)
+{
+ int level, minbits, pfs_mask;
+ const SSL_CONNECTION *sc;
+
+ minbits = ssl_get_security_level_bits(s, ctx, &level);
+
+ if (level == 0) {
/*
* No EDH keys weaker than 1024-bits even at level 0, otherwise,
* anything goes.
return 0;
return 1;
}
- if (level > 5)
- level = 5;
- minbits = minbits_table[level - 1];
switch (op) {
case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED:
case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SHARED:
/* SHA1 HMAC is 160 bits of security */
if (minbits > 160 && c->algorithm_mac & SSL_SHA1)
return 0;
- /* Level 2: no RC4 */
- if (level >= 2 && c->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
- return 0;
/* Level 3: forward secure ciphersuites only */
- if (level >= 3 && !(c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH)))
+ pfs_mask = SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK;
+ if (level >= 3 && c->min_tls != TLS1_3_VERSION &&
+ !(c->algorithm_mkey & pfs_mask))
return 0;
break;
}
case SSL_SECOP_VERSION:
- if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /* SSLv3 not allowed at level 2 */
- if (nid <= SSL3_VERSION && level >= 2)
- return 0;
- /* TLS v1.1 and above only for level 3 */
- if (nid <= TLS1_VERSION && level >= 3)
- return 0;
- /* TLS v1.2 only for level 4 and above */
- if (nid <= TLS1_1_VERSION && level >= 4)
+ if ((sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(sc)) {
+ /* SSLv3, TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1 only allowed at level 0 */
+ if (nid <= TLS1_1_VERSION && level > 0)
return 0;
} else {
- /* DTLS v1.2 only for level 4 and above */
- if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(nid, DTLS1_2_VERSION) && level >= 4)
+ /* DTLS v1.0 only allowed at level 0 */
+ if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(nid, DTLS1_2_VERSION) && level > 0)
return 0;
}
break;
return 1;
}
-int ssl_security(const SSL *s, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other)
+int ssl_security(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other)
{
- return s->cert->sec_cb(s, NULL, op, bits, nid, other, s->cert->sec_ex);
+ return s->cert->sec_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), NULL, op, bits, nid,
+ other, s->cert->sec_ex);
}
int ssl_ctx_security(const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other)
return ctx->cert->sec_cb(NULL, ctx, op, bits, nid, other,
ctx->cert->sec_ex);
}
+
+int ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(int nid, size_t *pidx, SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(ssl_cert_info); i++) {
+ if (ssl_cert_info[i].nid == nid) {
+ *pidx = i;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->sigalg_list_len; i++) {
+ if (ctx->ssl_cert_info[i].nid == nid) {
+ *pidx = SSL_PKEY_NUM + i;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(const EVP_PKEY *pk, size_t *pidx, SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ /* check classic pk types */
+ for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(ssl_cert_info); i++) {
+ const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *tmp_lu = &ssl_cert_info[i];
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, OBJ_nid2sn(tmp_lu->nid))
+ || EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, OBJ_nid2ln(tmp_lu->nid))) {
+ if (pidx != NULL)
+ *pidx = i;
+ return tmp_lu;
+ }
+ }
+ /* check provider-loaded pk types */
+ for (i = 0; ctx->sigalg_list_len; i++) {
+ SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *tmp_lu = &(ctx->ssl_cert_info[i]);
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, OBJ_nid2sn(tmp_lu->nid))
+ || EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, OBJ_nid2ln(tmp_lu->nid))) {
+ if (pidx != NULL)
+ *pidx = SSL_PKEY_NUM + i;
+ return &ctx->ssl_cert_info[i];
+ }
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(size_t idx, SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (idx >= (OSSL_NELEM(ssl_cert_info) + ctx->sigalg_list_len))
+ return NULL;
+ else if (idx >= (OSSL_NELEM(ssl_cert_info)))
+ return &(ctx->ssl_cert_info[idx - SSL_PKEY_NUM]);
+ return &ssl_cert_info[idx];
+}