-/* ssl/ssl_cert.c */
+/*! \file ssl/ssl_cert.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ */
#include <stdio.h>
-#include "objects.h"
-#include "bio.h"
-#include "pem.h"
+
+#include "openssl/e_os.h"
+
+#ifndef NO_SYS_TYPES_H
+# include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(WIN32) && !defined(VSM) && !defined(NeXT) && !defined(MAC_OS_pre_X)
+#include <dirent.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef NeXT
+#include <sys/dir.h>
+#define dirent direct
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
-CERT *ssl_cert_new()
+int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void)
+ {
+ static int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx= -1;
+
+ if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0)
+ {
+ ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx=X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(
+ 0,"SSL for verify callback",NULL,NULL,NULL);
+ }
+ return(ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx);
+ }
+
+CERT *ssl_cert_new(void)
{
CERT *ret;
return(NULL);
}
memset(ret,0,sizeof(CERT));
-/*
- ret->valid=0;
- ret->mask=0;
- ret->export_mask=0;
- ret->cert_type=0;
- ret->key->x509=NULL;
- ret->key->publickey=NULL;
- ret->key->privatekey=NULL; */
ret->key= &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
ret->references=1;
return(ret);
}
-void ssl_cert_free(c)
-CERT *c;
+CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
+ {
+ CERT *ret;
+ int i;
+
+ ret = (CERT *)Malloc(sizeof(CERT));
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+ memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
+
+ ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - &cert->pkeys[0]];
+ /* or ret->key = ret->pkeys + (cert->key - cert->pkeys),
+ * if you find that more readable */
+
+ ret->valid = cert->valid;
+ ret->mask = cert->mask;
+ ret->export_mask = cert->export_mask;
+
+#ifndef NO_RSA
+ if (cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ {
+ ret->rsa_tmp = cert->rsa_tmp;
+ CRYPTO_add(&ret->rsa_tmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ }
+ ret->rsa_tmp_cb = cert->rsa_tmp_cb;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef NO_DH
+ if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
+ {
+ /* DH parameters don't have a reference count */
+ ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp);
+ if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (cert->dh_tmp->priv_key)
+ {
+ BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->priv_key);
+ if (!b)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret->dh_tmp->priv_key = b;
+ }
+ if (cert->dh_tmp->pub_key)
+ {
+ BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->pub_key);
+ if (!b)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret->dh_tmp->pub_key = b;
+ }
+ }
+ ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
+#endif
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+ {
+ if (cert->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+ {
+ ret->pkeys[i].x509 = cert->pkeys[i].x509;
+ CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].x509->references, 1,
+ CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ }
+
+ if (cert->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
+ {
+ ret->pkeys[i].privatekey = cert->pkeys[i].privatekey;
+ CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].privatekey->references, 1,
+ CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+
+ switch(i)
+ {
+ /* If there was anything special to do for
+ * certain types of keys, we'd do it here.
+ * (Nothing at the moment, I think.) */
+
+ case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
+ case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
+ /* We have an RSA key. */
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
+ /* We have a DSA key. */
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
+ case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
+ /* We have a DH key. */
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ /* Can't happen. */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* ret->extra_certs *should* exist, but currently the own certificate
+ * chain is held inside SSL_CTX */
+
+ ret->references=1;
+
+ return(ret);
+
+err:
+#ifndef NO_RSA
+ if (ret->rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ RSA_free(ret->rsa_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef NO_DH
+ if (ret->dh_tmp != NULL)
+ DH_free(ret->dh_tmp);
+#endif
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+ {
+ if (ret->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+ X509_free(ret->pkeys[i].x509);
+ if (ret->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ret->pkeys[i].privatekey);
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+
+void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c)
{
int i;
+ if(c == NULL)
+ return;
+
i=CRYPTO_add(&c->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
#ifdef REF_PRINT
REF_PRINT("CERT",c);
EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].publickey);
#endif
}
- if (c->cert_chain != NULL)
- sk_pop_free(c->cert_chain,X509_free);
Free(c);
}
-int ssl_set_cert_type(c, type)
-CERT *c;
-int type;
+int ssl_cert_inst(CERT **o)
+ {
+ /* Create a CERT if there isn't already one
+ * (which cannot really happen, as it is initially created in
+ * SSL_CTX_new; but the earlier code usually allows for that one
+ * being non-existant, so we follow that behaviour, as it might
+ * turn out that there actually is a reason for it -- but I'm
+ * not sure that *all* of the existing code could cope with
+ * s->cert being NULL, otherwise we could do without the
+ * initialization in SSL_CTX_new).
+ */
+
+ if (o == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ if (*o == NULL)
+ {
+ if ((*o = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ }
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+
+SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void)
+ {
+ SESS_CERT *ret;
+
+ ret = Malloc(sizeof *ret);
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ memset(ret, 0 ,sizeof *ret);
+ ret->peer_key = &(ret->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
+ ret->references = 1;
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc)
+ {
+ int i;
+
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ i = CRYPTO_add(&sc->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT);
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+ REF_PRINT("SESS_CERT", sc);
+#endif
+ if (i > 0)
+ return;
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,"ssl_sess_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
+ abort(); /* ok */
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* i == 0 */
+ if (sc->cert_chain != NULL)
+ sk_X509_pop_free(sc->cert_chain, X509_free);
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+ {
+ if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+ X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
+#if 0 /* We don't have the peer's private key. These lines are just
+ * here as a reminder that we're still using a not-quite-appropriate
+ * data structure. */
+ if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey);
+#endif
+ }
+
+#ifndef NO_RSA
+ if (sc->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ RSA_free(sc->peer_rsa_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef NO_DH
+ if (sc->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
+ DH_free(sc->peer_dh_tmp);
+#endif
+
+ Free(sc);
+ }
+
+int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *sc,int type)
{
- c->cert_type=type;
+ sc->peer_cert_type = type;
return(1);
}
-int ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk)
-SSL *s;
-STACK *sk;
+int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
{
X509 *x;
int i;
X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
- if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_num(sk) == 0))
+ if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0))
return(0);
- x=(X509 *)sk_value(sk,0);
+ x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,sk);
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_app_data(&ctx,(char *)s);
+ if (SSL_get_verify_depth(s) >= 0)
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx,SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(),s);
+ /* We need to set the verify purpose. The purpose can be determined by
+ * the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates
+ * or vice versa.
+ */
+
+ if(s->server) i = X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT;
+ else i = X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER;
+
+ X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(&ctx, i, s->purpose, s->trust);
if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL)
- i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx);
+ i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx); /* should pass app_verify_arg */
else
+ {
+#ifndef NO_X509_VERIFY
i=X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
+#else
+ i=0;
+ ctx.error=X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK);
+#endif
+ }
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
s->verify_result=ctx.error;
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return(i);
}
-static void set_client_CA_list(ca_list,list)
-STACK **ca_list;
-STACK *list;
+static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list)
{
if (*ca_list != NULL)
- sk_pop_free(*ca_list,X509_NAME_free);
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list,X509_NAME_free);
*ca_list=list;
}
-STACK *SSL_dup_CA_list(sk)
-STACK *sk;
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk)
{
int i;
- STACK *ret;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret;
X509_NAME *name;
- ret=sk_new_null();
- for (i=0; i<sk_num(sk); i++)
+ ret=sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+ for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
{
- name=X509_NAME_dup((X509_NAME *)sk_value(sk,i));
- if ((name == NULL) || !sk_push(ret,(char *)name))
+ name=X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i));
+ if ((name == NULL) || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret,name))
{
- sk_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free);
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free);
return(NULL);
}
}
return(ret);
}
-void SSL_set_client_CA_list(s,list)
-SSL *s;
-STACK *list;
+void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list)
{
set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA),list);
}
-void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx,list)
-SSL_CTX *ctx;
-STACK *list;
+void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list)
{
set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA),list);
}
-STACK *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(ctx)
-SSL_CTX *ctx;
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
return(ctx->client_CA);
}
-STACK *SSL_get_client_CA_list(s)
-SSL *s;
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(SSL *s)
{
if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT)
{ /* we are in the client */
}
}
-static int add_client_CA(sk,x)
-STACK **sk;
-X509 *x;
+static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk,X509 *x)
{
X509_NAME *name;
if (x == NULL) return(0);
- if ((*sk == NULL) && ((*sk=sk_new_null()) == NULL))
+ if ((*sk == NULL) && ((*sk=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL))
return(0);
if ((name=X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x))) == NULL)
return(0);
- if (!sk_push(*sk,(char *)name))
+ if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk,name))
{
X509_NAME_free(name);
return(0);
return(1);
}
-int SSL_add_client_CA(ssl,x)
-SSL *ssl;
-X509 *x;
+int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl,X509 *x)
{
return(add_client_CA(&(ssl->client_CA),x));
}
-int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(ctx,x)
-SSL_CTX *ctx;
-X509 *x;
+int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509 *x)
{
return(add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA),x));
}
-static int name_cmp(a,b)
-X509_NAME **a,**b;
+static int xname_cmp(X509_NAME **a,X509_NAME **b)
{
return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b));
}
#ifndef NO_STDIO
-STACK *SSL_load_client_CA_file(file)
-char *file;
+/*!
+ * Load CA certs from a file into a ::STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed;
+ * it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use
+ * for a stack of CAs is to send it to the client). Actually, it doesn't have
+ * much to do with CAs, either, since it will load any old cert.
+ * \param file the file containing one or more certs.
+ * \return a ::STACK containing the certs.
+ */
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file)
{
BIO *in;
X509 *x=NULL;
X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
- STACK *ret,*sk;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret,*sk;
- ret=sk_new(NULL);
- sk=sk_new(name_cmp);
+ ret=sk_X509_NAME_new(NULL);
+ sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp);
in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
for (;;)
{
- if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL) == NULL)
+ if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL)
break;
if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err;
/* check for duplicates */
xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn);
if (xn == NULL) goto err;
- if (sk_find(sk,(char *)xn) >= 0)
+ if (sk_X509_NAME_find(sk,xn) >= 0)
X509_NAME_free(xn);
else
{
- sk_push(sk,(char *)xn);
- sk_push(ret,(char *)xn);
+ sk_X509_NAME_push(sk,xn);
+ sk_X509_NAME_push(ret,xn);
}
}
if (0)
{
err:
- if (ret != NULL) sk_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free);
+ if (ret != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free);
ret=NULL;
}
- if (sk != NULL) sk_free(sk);
+ if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_free(sk);
if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
return(ret);
}
#endif
+/*!
+ * Add a file of certs to a stack.
+ * \param stack the stack to add to.
+ * \param file the file to add from. All certs in this file that are not
+ * already in the stack will be added.
+ * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
+ * certs may have been added to \c stack.
+ */
+
+int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+ const char *file)
+ {
+ BIO *in;
+ X509 *x=NULL;
+ X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
+ int ret=1;
+ int (*oldcmp)(X509_NAME **a, X509_NAME **b);
+
+ oldcmp=sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,xname_cmp);
+
+ in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+
+ if (in == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!BIO_read_filename(in,file))
+ goto err;
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL)
+ break;
+ if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err;
+ xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn);
+ if (xn == NULL) goto err;
+ if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack,xn) >= 0)
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
+ else
+ sk_X509_NAME_push(stack,xn);
+ }
+
+ if (0)
+ {
+err:
+ ret=0;
+ }
+ if(in != NULL)
+ BIO_free(in);
+ if(x != NULL)
+ X509_free(x);
+
+ sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,oldcmp);
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+/*!
+ * Add a directory of certs to a stack.
+ * \param stack the stack to append to.
+ * \param dir the directory to append from. All files in this directory will be
+ * examined as potential certs. Any that are acceptable to
+ * SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() that are not already in the stack will be
+ * included.
+ * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
+ * certs may have been added to \c stack.
+ */
+
+#ifndef WIN32
+#ifndef VMS /* XXXX This may be fixed in the future */
+#ifndef MAC_OS_pre_X
+
+int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+ const char *dir)
+ {
+ DIR *d;
+ struct dirent *dstruct;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
+ d = opendir(dir);
+
+ /* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
+ if(!d)
+ {
+ SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error());
+ ERR_add_error_data(3, "opendir('", dir, "')");
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ while((dstruct=readdir(d)))
+ {
+ char buf[1024];
+
+ if(strlen(dir)+strlen(dstruct->d_name)+2 > sizeof buf)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ sprintf(buf,"%s/%s",dir,dstruct->d_name);
+ if(!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack,buf))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+
+err:
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+#endif
+#endif
+#endif
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff