/*
- * ! \file ssl/ssl_cert.c
- */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
+
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
#endif
#include "internal/o_dir.h"
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-# include <openssl/dh.h>
-#endif
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
-static int ssl_security_default_callback(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op,
+static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op,
int bits, int nid, void *other,
void *ex);
-int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void)
-{
- static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = -1;
- int got_write_lock = 0;
-
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-
- if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) {
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- got_write_lock = 1;
+static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_x509_store_ctx_once = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = -1;
- if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) {
- ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx =
- X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0, "SSL for verify callback",
+static void ssl_x509_store_ctx_init(void)
+{
+ ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0,
+ "SSL for verify callback",
NULL, NULL, NULL);
- }
- }
+}
- if (got_write_lock)
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- else
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void)
+{
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(&ssl_x509_store_ctx_once, ssl_x509_store_ctx_init);
return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
}
if (ret == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (NULL);
+ return NULL;
}
ret->key = &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
ret->sec_cb = ssl_security_default_callback;
ret->sec_level = OPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL;
ret->sec_ex = NULL;
- return (ret);
+ ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+ if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
}
CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
if (ret == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (NULL);
+ return NULL;
}
ret->references = 1;
ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - cert->pkeys];
+ ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+ if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) {
if (cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
rpk->privatekey = cpk->privatekey;
- CRYPTO_add(&cpk->privatekey->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+ EVP_PKEY_up_ref(cpk->privatekey);
}
if (cpk->chain) {
ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg;
if (cert->verify_store) {
- CRYPTO_add(&cert->verify_store->references, 1,
- CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+ X509_STORE_up_ref(cert->verify_store);
ret->verify_store = cert->verify_store;
}
if (cert->chain_store) {
- CRYPTO_add(&cert->chain_store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+ X509_STORE_up_ref(cert->chain_store);
ret->chain_store = cert->chain_store;
}
goto err;
}
#endif
- return (ret);
+ return ret;
err:
ssl_cert_free(ret);
if (c == NULL)
return;
- i = CRYPTO_add(&c->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
-#ifdef REF_PRINT
- REF_PRINT("CERT", c);
-#endif
+ CRYPTO_atomic_add(&c->references, -1, &i, c->lock);
+ REF_PRINT_COUNT("CERT", c);
if (i > 0)
return;
-#ifdef REF_CHECK
- if (i < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "ssl_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
- abort(); /* ok */
- }
-#endif
+ REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
EVP_PKEY_free(c->dh_tmp);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
OPENSSL_free(c->psk_identity_hint);
#endif
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(c->lock);
OPENSSL_free(c);
}
CERT_PKEY *cpk = s ? s->cert->key : ctx->cert->key;
if (!cpk)
return 0;
- sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
r = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, sk_X509_value(chain, i), 0, 0);
if (r != 1) {
return 0;
}
}
+ sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
cpk->chain = chain;
return 1;
}
int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
{
X509 *x;
- int i;
+ int i = 0;
X509_STORE *verify_store;
- X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
+ X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = NULL;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+ if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0))
+ return 0;
+
if (s->cert->verify_store)
verify_store = s->cert->verify_store;
else
verify_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
- if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0))
- return (0);
+ ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
- if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, verify_store, x, sk)) {
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, verify_store, x, sk)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
- return (0);
+ goto end;
}
- param = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx);
+ param = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx);
+ /*
+ * XXX: Separate @AUTHSECLEVEL and @TLSSECLEVEL would be useful at some
+ * point, for now a single @SECLEVEL sets the same policy for TLS crypto
+ * and PKI authentication.
+ */
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(param, SSL_get_security_level(s));
/* Set suite B flags if needed */
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, tls1_suiteb(s));
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, tls1_suiteb(s));
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s)) {
+ goto end;
+ }
/* Verify via DANE if enabled */
if (DANETLS_ENABLED(&s->dane))
- X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(&ctx, &s->dane);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(ctx, &s->dane);
/*
* We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by
* vice versa.
*/
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx, s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(ctx, s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
/*
* Anything non-default in "s->param" should overwrite anything in the ctx.
*/
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(param, s->param);
if (s->verify_callback)
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, s->verify_callback);
if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL)
- i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg);
- else {
- i = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
-# if 0
- /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
-# endif
- if (i > 0)
- i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, ctx.chain, NULL, 1);
+ i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg);
+ else
+ i = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
+
+ s->verify_result = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(s->verified_chain, X509_free);
+ s->verified_chain = NULL;
+ if (X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(ctx) != NULL) {
+ s->verified_chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(ctx);
+ if (s->verified_chain == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ i = 0;
+ }
}
- s->verify_result = ctx.error;
-
/* Move peername from the store context params to the SSL handle's */
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername(s->param, param);
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
- return (i);
+end:
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return i;
}
static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,
X509_NAME *name;
ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DUP_CA_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
name = X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i));
- if ((name == NULL) || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) {
+ if (name == NULL || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) {
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
- return (NULL);
+ X509_NAME_free(name);
+ return NULL;
}
}
return (ret);
return (add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA), x));
}
-static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
+static int xname_sk_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
{
return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
}
+static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
+{
+ return X509_NAME_cmp(a, b);
+}
+
+static unsigned long xname_hash(const X509_NAME *a)
+{
+ return X509_NAME_hash((X509_NAME *)a);
+}
+
/**
* Load CA certs from a file into a ::STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed;
* it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use
*/
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file)
{
- BIO *in;
+ BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
X509 *x = NULL;
X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL, *sk;
-
- sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp);
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL;
+ LHASH_OF(X509_NAME) *name_hash =
+ lh_X509_NAME_new(xname_hash, xname_cmp);
- in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
-
- if ((sk == NULL) || (in == NULL)) {
+ if ((name_hash == NULL) || (in == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
if (xn == NULL)
goto err;
- if (sk_X509_NAME_find(sk, xn) >= 0)
+ if (lh_X509_NAME_retrieve(name_hash, xn) != NULL) {
+ /* Duplicate. */
X509_NAME_free(xn);
- else {
- sk_X509_NAME_push(sk, xn);
- sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, xn);
+ xn = NULL;
+ } else {
+ lh_X509_NAME_insert(name_hash, xn);
+ if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, xn))
+ goto err;
}
}
goto done;
err:
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
ret = NULL;
done:
- sk_X509_NAME_free(sk);
BIO_free(in);
X509_free(x);
+ lh_X509_NAME_free(name_hash);
if (ret != NULL)
ERR_clear_error();
return (ret);
int ret = 1;
int (*oldcmp) (const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
- oldcmp = sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, xname_cmp);
+ oldcmp = sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, xname_sk_cmp);
in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
if (xn == NULL)
goto err;
- if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, xn) >= 0)
+ if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, xn) >= 0) {
+ /* Duplicate. */
X509_NAME_free(xn);
- else
- sk_X509_NAME_push(stack, xn);
+ } else if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(stack, xn)) {
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
+ goto err;
+ }
}
ERR_clear_error();
goto done;
err:
- ret = 0;
+ ret = 0;
done:
BIO_free(in);
X509_free(x);
const char *filename;
int ret = 0;
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
-
/* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
while ((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir))) {
err:
if (d)
OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
+
return ret;
}
unsigned char *p;
n = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (int)(n + (*l) + 3))) {
+ if (n < 0 || !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (int)(n + (*l) + 3))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
return 0;
}
p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
l2n3(n, p);
- i2d_X509(x, &p);
+ n = i2d_X509(x, &p);
+ if (n < 0) {
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
*l += n + 3;
return 1;
}
-/* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM strcuture */
+/* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM structure */
int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l)
{
BUF_MEM *buf = s->init_buf;
- int i;
-
+ int i, chain_count;
X509 *x;
STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
X509_STORE *chain_store;
/* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
if (chain_store) {
- X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
+ X509_STORE_CTX* xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
- if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
+ if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
return (0);
}
* ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
* the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
*/
- X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
+ (void) X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
/* Don't leave errors in the queue */
ERR_clear_error();
- i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, xs_ctx.chain, NULL, 0);
+ chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
+ i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
if (i != 1) {
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+#if 0
+ /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
+#endif
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
return 0;
}
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++) {
- x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
+ chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
+ for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) {
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
return 0;
}
}
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
} else {
i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
if (i != 1) {
CERT *c = s ? s->cert : ctx->cert;
CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
X509_STORE *chain_store = NULL;
- X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
+ X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL, *untrusted = NULL;
X509 *x;
int i, rv = 0;
untrusted = cpk->chain;
}
- if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, chain_store, cpk->x509, untrusted)) {
+ xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+ if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, cpk->x509, untrusted)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* Set suite B flags if needed */
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&xs_ctx,
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(xs_ctx,
c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS);
- i = X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
+ i = X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
if (i <= 0 && flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR) {
if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CLEAR_ERROR)
ERR_clear_error();
rv = 2;
}
if (i > 0)
- chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&xs_ctx);
+ chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(xs_ctx);
if (i <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
- i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&xs_ctx);
+ i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(xs_ctx);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
goto err;
}
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
/* Remove EE certificate from chain */
x = sk_X509_shift(chain);
X509_free(x);
err:
if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK)
X509_STORE_free(chain_store);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
return rv;
}
X509_STORE_free(*pstore);
*pstore = store;
if (ref && store)
- CRYPTO_add(&store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+ X509_STORE_up_ref(store);
return 1;
}
-static int ssl_security_default_callback(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op,
+static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op,
int bits, int nid, void *other,
void *ex)
{
level = SSL_CTX_get_security_level(ctx);
else
level = SSL_get_security_level(s);
- /* Level 0: anything goes */
- if (level <= 0)
+
+ if (level <= 0) {
+ /*
+ * No EDH keys weaker than 1024-bits even at level 0, otherwise,
+ * anything goes.
+ */
+ if (op == SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH && bits < 80)
+ return 0;
return 1;
+ }
if (level > 5)
level = 5;
minbits = minbits_table[level - 1];
return 1;
}
-int ssl_security(SSL *s, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other)
+int ssl_security(const SSL *s, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other)
{
return s->cert->sec_cb(s, NULL, op, bits, nid, other, s->cert->sec_ex);
}
-int ssl_ctx_security(SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other)
+int ssl_ctx_security(const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other)
{
return ctx->cert->sec_cb(NULL, ctx, op, bits, nid, other,
ctx->cert->sec_ex);
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff