Add 'void *' argument to app_verify_callback.
[openssl.git] / ssl / ssl_cert.c
index c1cb86e..1a873d2 100644 (file)
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* ssl/ssl_cert.c */
+/*! \file ssl/ssl_cert.c */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * copied and put under another distribution licence
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
-#include "objects.h"
-#include "bio.h"
-#include "pem.h"
+
+#include "e_os.h"
+#ifndef NO_SYS_TYPES_H
+# include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && !defined(NeXT) && !defined(MAC_OS_pre_X)
+#include <dirent.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(WIN32)
+#include <windows.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef NeXT
+#include <sys/dir.h>
+#define dirent direct
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
 #include "ssl_locl.h"
 
-CERT *ssl_cert_new()
+int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void)
+       {
+       static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx= -1;
+
+       if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0)
+               {
+               /* any write lock will do; usually this branch
+                * will only be taken once anyway */
+               CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+               
+               if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0)
+                       {
+                       ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx=X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(
+                               0,"SSL for verify callback",NULL,NULL,NULL);
+                       }
+               
+               CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+               }
+       return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
+       }
+
+CERT *ssl_cert_new(void)
        {
        CERT *ret;
 
-       ret=(CERT *)Malloc(sizeof(CERT));
+       ret=(CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
        if (ret == NULL)
                {
                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                return(NULL);
                }
        memset(ret,0,sizeof(CERT));
-/*
-       ret->valid=0;
-       ret->mask=0;
-       ret->export_mask=0;
-       ret->cert_type=0;
-       ret->key->x509=NULL;
-       ret->key->publickey=NULL;
-       ret->key->privatekey=NULL; */
 
        ret->key= &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
        ret->references=1;
@@ -88,11 +169,151 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_new()
        return(ret);
        }
 
-void ssl_cert_free(c)
-CERT *c;
+CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
+       {
+       CERT *ret;
+       int i;
+
+       ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
+       if (ret == NULL)
+               {
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+               return(NULL);
+               }
+
+       memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
+
+       ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - &cert->pkeys[0]];
+       /* or ret->key = ret->pkeys + (cert->key - cert->pkeys),
+        * if you find that more readable */
+
+       ret->valid = cert->valid;
+       ret->mask = cert->mask;
+       ret->export_mask = cert->export_mask;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+       if (cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
+               {
+               RSA_up_ref(cert->rsa_tmp);
+               ret->rsa_tmp = cert->rsa_tmp;
+               }
+       ret->rsa_tmp_cb = cert->rsa_tmp_cb;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+       if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
+               {
+               /* DH parameters don't have a reference count */
+               ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp);
+               if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL)
+                       {
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+                       goto err;
+                       }
+               if (cert->dh_tmp->priv_key)
+                       {
+                       BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->priv_key);
+                       if (!b)
+                               {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+                               goto err;
+                               }
+                       ret->dh_tmp->priv_key = b;
+                       }
+               if (cert->dh_tmp->pub_key)
+                       {
+                       BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->pub_key);
+                       if (!b)
+                               {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+                               goto err;
+                               }
+                       ret->dh_tmp->pub_key = b;
+                       }
+               }
+       ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
+#endif
+
+       for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+               {
+               if (cert->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+                       {
+                       ret->pkeys[i].x509 = cert->pkeys[i].x509;
+                       CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].x509->references, 1,
+                               CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+                       }
+               
+               if (cert->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
+                       {
+                       ret->pkeys[i].privatekey = cert->pkeys[i].privatekey;
+                       CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].privatekey->references, 1,
+                               CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+
+                       switch(i) 
+                               {
+                               /* If there was anything special to do for
+                                * certain types of keys, we'd do it here.
+                                * (Nothing at the moment, I think.) */
+
+                       case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
+                       case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
+                               /* We have an RSA key. */
+                               break;
+                               
+                       case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
+                               /* We have a DSA key. */
+                               break;
+                               
+                       case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
+                       case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
+                               /* We have a DH key. */
+                               break;
+                               
+                       default:
+                               /* Can't happen. */
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+                               }
+                       }
+               }
+       
+       /* ret->extra_certs *should* exist, but currently the own certificate
+        * chain is held inside SSL_CTX */
+
+       ret->references=1;
+
+       return(ret);
+       
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH /* avoid 'unreferenced label' warning if OPENSSL_NO_DH is defined */
+err:
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+       if (ret->rsa_tmp != NULL)
+               RSA_free(ret->rsa_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+       if (ret->dh_tmp != NULL)
+               DH_free(ret->dh_tmp);
+#endif
+
+       for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+               {
+               if (ret->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+                       X509_free(ret->pkeys[i].x509);
+               if (ret->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
+                       EVP_PKEY_free(ret->pkeys[i].privatekey);
+               }
+
+       return NULL;
+       }
+
+
+void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c)
        {
        int i;
 
+       if(c == NULL)
+           return;
+
        i=CRYPTO_add(&c->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
 #ifdef REF_PRINT
        REF_PRINT("CERT",c);
@@ -106,10 +327,10 @@ CERT *c;
                }
 #endif
 
-#ifndef NO_RSA
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
        if (c->rsa_tmp) RSA_free(c->rsa_tmp);
 #endif
-#ifndef NO_DH
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
        if (c->dh_tmp) DH_free(c->dh_tmp);
 #endif
 
@@ -124,97 +345,209 @@ CERT *c;
                        EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].publickey);
 #endif
                }
-       if (c->cert_chain != NULL)
-               sk_pop_free(c->cert_chain,X509_free);
-       Free(c);
+       OPENSSL_free(c);
        }
 
-int ssl_set_cert_type(c, type)
-CERT *c;
-int type;
+int ssl_cert_inst(CERT **o)
        {
-       c->cert_type=type;
+       /* Create a CERT if there isn't already one
+        * (which cannot really happen, as it is initially created in
+        * SSL_CTX_new; but the earlier code usually allows for that one
+        * being non-existant, so we follow that behaviour, as it might
+        * turn out that there actually is a reason for it -- but I'm
+        * not sure that *all* of the existing code could cope with
+        * s->cert being NULL, otherwise we could do without the
+        * initialization in SSL_CTX_new).
+        */
+       
+       if (o == NULL) 
+               {
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+               return(0);
+               }
+       if (*o == NULL)
+               {
+               if ((*o = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
+                       {
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                       return(0);
+                       }
+               }
        return(1);
        }
 
-int ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk)
-SSL *s;
-STACK *sk;
+
+SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void)
+       {
+       SESS_CERT *ret;
+
+       ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret);
+       if (ret == NULL)
+               {
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+               return NULL;
+               }
+
+       memset(ret, 0 ,sizeof *ret);
+       ret->peer_key = &(ret->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
+       ret->references = 1;
+
+       return ret;
+       }
+
+void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc)
+       {
+       int i;
+
+       if (sc == NULL)
+               return;
+
+       i = CRYPTO_add(&sc->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT);
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+       REF_PRINT("SESS_CERT", sc);
+#endif
+       if (i > 0)
+               return;
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+       if (i < 0)
+               {
+               fprintf(stderr,"ssl_sess_cert_free, bad reference count\n");
+               abort(); /* ok */
+               }
+#endif
+
+       /* i == 0 */
+       if (sc->cert_chain != NULL)
+               sk_X509_pop_free(sc->cert_chain, X509_free);
+       for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+               {
+               if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+                       X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
+#if 0 /* We don't have the peer's private key.  These lines are just
+          * here as a reminder that we're still using a not-quite-appropriate
+          * data structure. */
+               if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
+                       EVP_PKEY_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey);
+#endif
+               }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+       if (sc->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
+               RSA_free(sc->peer_rsa_tmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+       if (sc->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
+               DH_free(sc->peer_dh_tmp);
+#endif
+
+       OPENSSL_free(sc);
+       }
+
+int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *sc,int type)
+       {
+       sc->peer_cert_type = type;
+       return(1);
+       }
+
+int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
        {
        X509 *x;
        int i;
        X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
 
-       if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_num(sk) == 0))
+       if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0))
                return(0);
 
-       x=(X509 *)sk_value(sk,0);
-       X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,sk);
-       X509_STORE_CTX_set_app_data(&ctx,(char *)s);
+       x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
+       if(!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,sk))
+               {
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+               return(0);
+               }
+       if (SSL_get_verify_depth(s) >= 0)
+               X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
+       X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx,SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(),s);
+
+       /* We need to set the verify purpose. The purpose can be determined by
+        * the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates
+        * or vice versa.
+        */
+       if (s->server)
+               i = X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT;
+       else
+               i = X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER;
+
+       X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(&ctx, i, s->purpose, s->trust);
+
+       if (s->verify_callback)
+               X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback);
 
        if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL)
-               i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx);
+#if 1 /* new with OpenSSL 0.9.7 */
+               i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg); 
+#else
+               i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx); /* should pass app_verify_arg */
+#endif
        else
+               {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY
                i=X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
+#else
+               i=0;
+               ctx.error=X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION;
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK);
+#endif
+               }
 
-       X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
        s->verify_result=ctx.error;
+       X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 
        return(i);
        }
 
-static void set_client_CA_list(ca_list,list)
-STACK **ca_list;
-STACK *list;
+static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list)
        {
        if (*ca_list != NULL)
-               sk_pop_free(*ca_list,X509_NAME_free);
+               sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list,X509_NAME_free);
 
        *ca_list=list;
        }
 
-STACK *SSL_dup_CA_list(sk)
-STACK *sk;
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk)
        {
        int i;
-       STACK *ret;
+       STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret;
        X509_NAME *name;
 
-       ret=sk_new_null();
-       for (i=0; i<sk_num(sk); i++)
+       ret=sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+       for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
                {
-               name=X509_NAME_dup((X509_NAME *)sk_value(sk,i));
-               if ((name == NULL) || !sk_push(ret,(char *)name))
+               name=X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i));
+               if ((name == NULL) || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret,name))
                        {
-                       sk_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free);
+                       sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free);
                        return(NULL);
                        }
                }
        return(ret);
        }
 
-void SSL_set_client_CA_list(s,list)
-SSL *s;
-STACK *list;
+void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list)
        {
        set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA),list);
        }
 
-void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx,list)
-SSL_CTX *ctx;
-STACK *list;
+void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list)
        {
        set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA),list);
        }
 
-STACK *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(ctx)
-SSL_CTX *ctx;
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx)
        {
        return(ctx->client_CA);
        }
 
-STACK *SSL_get_client_CA_list(s)
-SSL *s;
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(SSL *s)
        {
        if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT)
                { /* we are in the client */
@@ -233,20 +566,18 @@ SSL *s;
                }
        }
 
-static int add_client_CA(sk,x)
-STACK **sk;
-X509 *x;
+static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk,X509 *x)
        {
        X509_NAME *name;
 
        if (x == NULL) return(0);
-       if ((*sk == NULL) && ((*sk=sk_new_null()) == NULL))
+       if ((*sk == NULL) && ((*sk=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL))
                return(0);
                
        if ((name=X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x))) == NULL)
                return(0);
 
-       if (!sk_push(*sk,(char *)name))
+       if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk,name))
                {
                X509_NAME_free(name);
                return(0);
@@ -254,37 +585,39 @@ X509 *x;
        return(1);
        }
 
-int SSL_add_client_CA(ssl,x)
-SSL *ssl;
-X509 *x;
+int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl,X509 *x)
        {
        return(add_client_CA(&(ssl->client_CA),x));
        }
 
-int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(ctx,x)
-SSL_CTX *ctx;
-X509 *x;
+int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509 *x)
        {
        return(add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA),x));
        }
 
-static int name_cmp(a,b)
-X509_NAME **a,**b;
+static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b)
        {
        return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b));
        }
 
-#ifndef NO_STDIO
-STACK *SSL_load_client_CA_file(file)
-char *file;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+/*!
+ * Load CA certs from a file into a ::STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed;
+ * it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use
+ * for a stack of CAs is to send it to the client). Actually, it doesn't have
+ * much to do with CAs, either, since it will load any old cert.
+ * \param file the file containing one or more certs.
+ * \return a ::STACK containing the certs.
+ */
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file)
        {
        BIO *in;
        X509 *x=NULL;
        X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
-       STACK *ret,*sk;
+       STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret,*sk;
 
-       ret=sk_new(NULL);
-       sk=sk_new(name_cmp);
+       ret=sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+       sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp);
 
        in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
 
@@ -299,31 +632,199 @@ char *file;
 
        for (;;)
                {
-               if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL) == NULL)
+               if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL)
                        break;
                if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err;
                /* check for duplicates */
                xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn);
                if (xn == NULL) goto err;
-               if (sk_find(sk,(char *)xn) >= 0)
+               if (sk_X509_NAME_find(sk,xn) >= 0)
                        X509_NAME_free(xn);
                else
                        {
-                       sk_push(sk,(char *)xn);
-                       sk_push(ret,(char *)xn);
+                       sk_X509_NAME_push(sk,xn);
+                       sk_X509_NAME_push(ret,xn);
                        }
                }
 
        if (0)
                {
 err:
-               if (ret != NULL) sk_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free);
+               if (ret != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free);
                ret=NULL;
                }
-       if (sk != NULL) sk_free(sk);
+       if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_free(sk);
        if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
        if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
        return(ret);
        }
 #endif
 
+/*!
+ * Add a file of certs to a stack.
+ * \param stack the stack to add to.
+ * \param file the file to add from. All certs in this file that are not
+ * already in the stack will be added.
+ * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
+ * certs may have been added to \c stack.
+ */
+
+int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+                                       const char *file)
+       {
+       BIO *in;
+       X509 *x=NULL;
+       X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
+       int ret=1;
+       int (*oldcmp)(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b);
+       
+       oldcmp=sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,xname_cmp);
+       
+       in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
+       
+       if (in == NULL)
+               {
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+               goto err;
+               }
+       
+       if (!BIO_read_filename(in,file))
+               goto err;
+       
+       for (;;)
+               {
+               if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL)
+                       break;
+               if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err;
+               xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn);
+               if (xn == NULL) goto err;
+               if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack,xn) >= 0)
+                       X509_NAME_free(xn);
+               else
+                       sk_X509_NAME_push(stack,xn);
+               }
+
+       if (0)
+               {
+err:
+               ret=0;
+               }
+       if(in != NULL)
+               BIO_free(in);
+       if(x != NULL)
+               X509_free(x);
+       
+       sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,oldcmp);
+
+       return ret;
+       }
+
+/*!
+ * Add a directory of certs to a stack.
+ * \param stack the stack to append to.
+ * \param dir the directory to append from. All files in this directory will be
+ * examined as potential certs. Any that are acceptable to
+ * SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() that are not already in the stack will be
+ * included.
+ * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
+ * certs may have been added to \c stack.
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS                /* XXXX This may be fixed in the future */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC /* XXXXX: Better scheme needed! */
+
+int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+                                      const char *dir)
+       {
+       DIR *d;
+       struct dirent *dstruct;
+       int ret = 0;
+
+       CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
+       d = opendir(dir);
+
+       /* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
+       if(!d)
+               {
+               SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error());
+               ERR_add_error_data(3, "opendir('", dir, "')");
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+               goto err;
+               }
+       
+       while((dstruct=readdir(d)))
+               {
+               char buf[1024];
+               int r;
+               
+               if(strlen(dir)+strlen(dstruct->d_name)+2 > sizeof buf)
+                       {
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
+                       goto err;
+                       }
+               
+               r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s/%s",dir,dstruct->d_name);
+               if (r <= 0 || r >= sizeof buf)
+                       goto err;
+               if(!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack,buf))
+                       goto err;
+               }
+       ret = 1;
+
+err:   
+       CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
+       return ret;
+       }
+
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#else
+
+int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+                                      const char *dir)
+       {
+       WIN32_FIND_DATA FindFileData;
+       HANDLE hFind;
+       int ret = 0;
+
+       CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
+       
+       hFind = FindFirstFile(dir, &FindFileData);
+       /* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
+       if(hFind == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
+               {
+               SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error());
+               ERR_add_error_data(3, "opendir('", dir, "')");
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+               goto err;
+               }
+       
+       do 
+               {
+               char buf[1024];
+               int r;
+               
+               if(strlen(dir)+strlen(FindFileData.cFileName)+2 > sizeof buf)
+                       {
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
+                       goto err;
+                       }
+               
+               r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s/%s",dir,FindFileData.cFileName);
+               if (r <= 0 || r >= sizeof buf)
+                       goto err;
+               if(!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack,buf))
+                       goto err;
+               }
+       while (FindNextFile(hFind, &FindFileData) != FALSE);
+       FindClose(hFind);
+       ret = 1;
+
+err:   
+       CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
+       return ret;
+       }
+
+#endif