#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
+#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
+static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
+ int num, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp, int sslv2format);
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
-{
- if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
- return (SSLv3_server_method());
- else
- return (NULL);
-}
-IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
- ssl3_accept,
- ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
{
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
- if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
+ if ((s->version >> 8 != 3) && s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
s->init_num = 0;
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
- s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
/*
* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
*/
ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+
if (s->hit) {
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
- }
-#else
- if (s->hit)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
-#endif
- else
+ } else {
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
+ }
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
/* normal PSK or SRP */
- if (!
- (s->s3->tmp.
- new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
-&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
+ (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+
if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
else
skip = 1;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
-#else
- } else
- skip = 1;
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
-#endif
s->init_num = 0;
break;
* provided
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
+ /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
+ || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
+ /* For other PSK always send SKE */
+ || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
/* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
* With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
* are omitted
*/
- || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
/* no cert request */
skip = 1;
s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return -1;
}
} else {
s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
* not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
* its key from the certificate for key exchange.
*/
-#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#else
- if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#endif
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num = 0;
} else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
}
/*
* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
- * extms we've done this already.
+ * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
*/
- if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return -1;
}
} else {
int offset = 0;
* CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
* step
*/
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return -1;
}
for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
-#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#else
- if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#endif
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
- /*
- * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
- * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
- * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
- * cautious.
- * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
- * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
- * the client's Finished message is read.
- */
- if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
-
ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
break;
#endif
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_change_cipher_spec(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#else
+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#endif
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
- /*
- * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has
- * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
- * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
- * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
- * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
- * the client's Finished message is read.
- */
- if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (s->hit)
s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-#endif
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
s->init_num = 0;
break;
-#endif
-
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
goto end;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
if (s->hit) {
-#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#else
- if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
- } else
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#endif
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A;
} else
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
s->init_num = 0;
int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
- int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
- unsigned int cookie_len;
+ int i, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
+ unsigned int j, complen = 0;
long n;
unsigned long id;
- unsigned char *p, *d;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- unsigned char *q;
SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
#endif
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
+ int protverr = 1;
+ PACKET pkt, cipher_suite, compression;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
goto retry_cert;
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
s->first_packet = 0;
- d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-
- /*
- * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
- * for session id length
- */
- if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
- /*
- * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
- * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
- */
- s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
- p += 2;
-
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
- s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
- : (s->client_version < s->version)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
- !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
+ /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
+ if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
+ unsigned int version;
+ unsigned int mt;
+ /*-
+ * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
+ * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
+ * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
+ * the rest right through. Its format is:
+ * Byte Content
+ * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
+ * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
+ * 3-4 version
+ * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
+ * 7-8 session_id_length
+ * 9-10 challenge_length
+ * ... ...
+ */
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &mt)
+ || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+ /*
+ * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
+ * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
+ * in the first place
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &version)) {
+ /* No protocol version supplied! */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (version == 0x0002) {
+ /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
+ goto err;
+ } else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
+ /* SSLv3/TLS */
+ s->client_version = version;
+ } else {
+ /* No idea what protocol this is */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
+ * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
+ */
+ if(!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable */
+ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
+ if (s->client_version >= s->version) {
+ protverr = 0;
+ }
+ } else if (s->client_version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
+ switch(s->client_version) {
+ default:
+ case TLS1_2_VERSION:
+ if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) {
+ s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+ s->method = TLSv1_2_server_method();
+ protverr = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Deliberately fall through */
+ case TLS1_1_VERSION:
+ if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) {
+ s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+ s->method = TLSv1_1_server_method();
+ protverr = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Deliberately fall through */
+ case TLS1_VERSION:
+ if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) {
+ s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
+ s->method = TLSv1_server_method();
+ protverr = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Deliberately fall through */
+ case SSL3_VERSION:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+ if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
+ s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
+ s->method = SSLv3_server_method();
+ protverr = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (s->client_version <= s->version
+ || s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
+ /*
+ * For DTLS we just check versions are potentially compatible. Version
+ * negotiation comes later.
+ */
+ protverr = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (protverr) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
+ if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
/*
* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
* number
goto f_err;
}
- /*
- * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
- * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
- * cookie length...
- */
- if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
- unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
-
- session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
+ /*
+ * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
+ * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
+ * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
+ */
+ unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
- if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &cipher_len)
+ || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &session_id_len)
+ || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &challenge_len)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
- cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
-
- if (cookie_length == 0)
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* load the client random */
- memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
- /* get the session-id */
- j = *(p++);
+ if (cipher_len == 0) {
+ /* we need at least one cipher */
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
- if (p + j > d + n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
+ if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &cipher_suite, cipher_len)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
- s->hit = 0;
- /*
- * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
- * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
- * ignore resumption requests with flag
- * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
- * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
- * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
- * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
- * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
- * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
- * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
- */
- if ((s->new_session
- && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
+ if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, PACKET_data(&cipher_suite),
+ cipher_len, &(ciphers), 1) == NULL) {
goto err;
- } else {
- i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
+ }
+
/*
- * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
- * version.
- * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
- * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
- * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
- * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
- * will abort the handshake with an error.
+ * Ignore any session id. We don't allow resumption in a backwards
+ * compatible ClientHello
*/
- if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
- * session */
- s->hit = 1;
- } else if (i == -1)
- goto err;
- else { /* i == 0 */
-
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
- goto err;
+ if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, session_id_len)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
}
- }
+ s->hit = 0;
- p += j;
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
+ goto err;
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /* cookie stuff */
- if (p + 1 > d + n) {
+ /* Load the client random */
+ i = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
+ memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ if (!PACKET_peek_copy_bytes(&pkt,
+ s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - i,
+ i)
+ || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, challenge_len)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
- cookie_len = *(p++);
-
- if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
+ } else {
+ /* If we get here we've got SSLv3+ in an SSLv3+ record */
+ PACKET session_id;
+ unsigned int cookie_len;
+ /* load the client random and get the session-id */
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &session_id)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
/*
- * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
- * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
- * does not cause an overflow.
+ * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
+ * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
+ * cookie length...
*/
- if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
- /* too much data */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
+ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
+
+ if (!PACKET_peek_1(&pkt, &cookie_len)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (cookie_len == 0)
+ return 1;
}
- /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
- if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
- memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
+ s->hit = 0;
+ /*
+ * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
+ * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
+ * ignore resumption requests with flag
+ * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
+ * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
+ * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
+ * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
+ * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
+ * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
+ * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
+ * ignored.
+ */
+ if ((s->new_session
+ && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * TODO(openssl-team): ssl_get_prev_session passes a non-const
+ * 'unsigned char*' session id to a user callback. Grab a copy of
+ * the data?
+ */
+ i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &pkt, PACKET_data(&session_id),
+ PACKET_remaining(&session_id));
+ /*
+ * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
+ * version.
+ * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
+ * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
+ * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
+ * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
+ * will abort the handshake with an error.
+ */
+ if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
+ /* previous session */
+ s->hit = 1;
+ } else if (i == -1)
+ goto err;
+ else {
+ /* i == 0 */
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
- if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
- if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
- cookie_len) == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* else cookie verification succeeded */
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ PACKET cookie;
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &cookie)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
}
- /* default verification */
- else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
- s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookie);
+ /*
+ * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
+ * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
+ * does not cause an overflow.
+ */
+ if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
+ /* too much data */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
- /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
- ret = -2;
- }
- p += cookie_len;
- if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
- /* Select version to use */
- if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
- s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
- s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
- } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
- s->version = s->client_version;
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
- } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
- s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
- s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
- } else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- s->version = s->client_version;
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
+ /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
+ if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
+ && cookie_len > 0) {
+ /* Get cookie */
+ /*
+ * TODO(openssl-team): rcvd_cookie appears unused outside this
+ * function. Remove the field?
+ */
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookie, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, cookie_len)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
+ if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
+ cookie_len) == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* else cookie verification succeeded */
+ }
+ /* default verification */
+ else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
+ s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
+ ret = -2;
+ }
+ if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
+ /* Select version to use */
+ if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
+ s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
+ s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
+ } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
+ s->version = s->client_version;
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
+ s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
+ s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ s->version = s->client_version;
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
}
- s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
}
- }
- if (p + 2 > d + n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- n2s(p, i);
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &cipher_suite)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
- if (i == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
- goto f_err;
- }
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&cipher_suite) == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
- /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
- if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
- /* not enough data */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) {
- goto err;
- }
- p += i;
+ if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, PACKET_data(&cipher_suite),
+ PACKET_remaining(&cipher_suite),
+ &(ciphers), 0) == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
- /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
- if (s->hit) {
- j = 0;
- id = s->session->cipher->id;
+ /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
+ if (s->hit) {
+ j = 0;
+ id = s->session->cipher->id;
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
+ fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
#endif
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
- c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
- i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
+ fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
+ i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
#endif
- if (c->id == id) {
- j = 1;
- break;
+ if (c->id == id) {
+ j = 1;
+ break;
+ }
}
- }
- /*
- * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
- * CVE-2010-4180.
- */
-#if 0
- if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
- && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
/*
- * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
- * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
- * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
- * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
- * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
+ * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
+ * attack:
+ * CVE-2010-4180.
*/
- c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
- if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
- s->session->cipher = c;
- j = 1;
+#if 0
+ if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
+ && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
+ /*
+ * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
+ * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
+ * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
+ * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
+ * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
+ */
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
+ if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
+ s->session->cipher = c;
+ j = 1;
+ }
}
- }
#endif
- if (j == 0) {
+ if (j == 0) {
+ /*
+ * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
+ * to reuse it
+ */
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* compression */
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &compression)) {
+ /* not enough data */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
/*
- * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
- * to reuse it
+ * TODO(openssl-team):
+ * SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT and SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH are used
+ * interchangeably. Pick one.
*/
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
- }
- /* compression */
- i = *(p++);
- if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
- /* not enough data */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- q = p;
-#endif
- for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
- if (p[j] == 0)
- break;
- }
+ complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression);
+ for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
+ if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0)
+ break;
+ }
- p += i;
- if (j >= i) {
- /* no compress */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
- goto f_err;
+ if (j >= complen) {
+ /* no compress */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+
/* TLS extensions */
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
- if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
+ if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
}
}
-#endif
/*
* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
- * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
+ * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
* algorithms from the client, starting at q.
*/
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
/* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
+ unsigned int k;
/* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
/* Can't disable compression */
if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
goto f_err;
}
/* Look for resumed method in compression list */
- for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
- if (q[m] == comp_id)
+ for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) {
+ if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id)
break;
}
- if (m >= i) {
+ if (k >= complen) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
comp = NULL;
else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
/* See if we have a match */
- int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
+ int m, nn, v, done = 0;
+ unsigned int o;
nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
v = comp->id;
- for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
- if (v == q[o]) {
+ for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) {
+ if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) {
done = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
goto f_err;
}
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- p = s->s3->server_random;
- if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
-#endif
+
/* Do the message type and length last */
d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
*(p++) = s->version >> 8;
*(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
- /* Random stuff */
+ /*
+ * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
+ * ssl3_get_client_hello()
+ */
memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
else
*(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+
if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
-#endif
+
/* do the header */
l = (p - d);
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) {
r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
n = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (type & SSL_PSK) {
+ /*
+ * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
+ */
+ n += 2;
+ if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
+ n += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
+ }
+ /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
+ if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
+ } else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (type & SSL_kDHE) {
+ if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
if (dhp == NULL) {
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
+ if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
const EC_GROUP *group;
ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
* additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
* structure.
*/
- n = 4 + encodedlen;
+ n += 4 + encodedlen;
/*
* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
r[3] = NULL;
} else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
- /*
- * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
- */
- n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
- } else
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
n += 2 + nr[i];
}
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
- && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
+ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
== NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
}
d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (type & SSL_PSK) {
+ /* copy PSK identity hint */
+ if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) {
+ s2n(strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint), p);
+ strncpy((char *)p, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
+ strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint));
+ p += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
+ } else {
+ s2n(0, p);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
+ if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
/*
* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
* this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
}
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
- /* copy PSK identity hint */
- s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
- strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
- strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
- p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
- }
-#endif
-
/* not anonymous */
if (pkey != NULL) {
/*
int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
- int i, al, ok;
+ unsigned int i;
+ int al, ok;
long n;
unsigned long alg_k;
- unsigned char *p;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
BIGNUM *pub = NULL;
DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
#endif
-
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
+ PACKET pkt, enc_premaster;
+ unsigned char *data, *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
+ if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
+ unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
+ size_t psklen;
+ PACKET psk_identity;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &psk_identity)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
+ psk, sizeof(psk));
+
+ if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else if (psklen == 0) {
+ /*
+ * PSK related to the given identity not found
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+ al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
+ s->s3->tmp.psk = BUF_memdup(psk, psklen);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
+ }
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+ /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
+ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
int decrypt_len;
unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
}
- /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
- if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
- n2s(p, i);
- if (n != i + 2) {
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
+ /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ enc_premaster = pkt;
+ } else {
+ PACKET orig = pkt;
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &enc_premaster)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
+ /* Try SSLv3 behaviour for TLS. */
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG) {
+ enc_premaster = orig;
+ } else {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
- } else
- p -= 2;
- } else
- n = i;
+ }
+ }
}
/*
- * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
- * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
- * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
- * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
- * bound is sufficient to be safe.
+ * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
+ * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
+ * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
+ * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
*/
- if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+ RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
+ if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
*/
if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
- sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
+ sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
goto err;
- decrypt_len =
- RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ }
+
+ decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
+ PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
+ rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
ERR_clear_error();
/*
* constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
*/
version_good =
- constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
+ constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0],
+ (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
version_good &=
- constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
+ constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1],
+ (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
/*
* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
unsigned char workaround_good;
workaround_good =
- constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
+ constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
workaround_good &=
- constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
+ constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1],
+ (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
version_good |= workaround_good;
}
* it is still sufficiently large to read from.
*/
for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
- p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
- rand_premaster_secret[j]);
- }
-
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- p,
- sizeof
- (rand_premaster_secret));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
- if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
+ rsa_decrypt[j] =
+ constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, rsa_decrypt[j],
+ rand_premaster_secret[j]);
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt,
+ sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
+ OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
+ rsa_decrypt = NULL;
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
int idx = -1;
EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
- if (n > 1) {
- n2s(p, i);
- } else {
- if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
+ PACKET bookmark = pkt;
+ unsigned char shared[(OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS + 7) / 8];
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &i)) {
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
}
i = 0;
}
- if (n && n != i + 2) {
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != i) {
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto err;
} else {
- p -= 2;
- i = (int)n;
+ pkt = bookmark;
+ i = PACKET_remaining(&pkt);
}
}
if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
}
EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
- } else
- pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
+ } else {
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, i)) {
+ /* We already checked we have enough data */
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ pub = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
+ }
if (pub == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
- i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
+ i = DH_compute_key(shared, pub, dh_srvr);
if (i <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
else
BN_clear_free(pub);
pub = NULL;
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- p, i);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
- if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
+ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, shared, i, 0)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
int ret = 1;
int field_size = 0;
const EC_KEY *tkey;
const EC_GROUP *group;
const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+ unsigned char *shared;
/* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
if (n == 0L) {
/* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
- if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
}
/* Get encoded point length */
- i = *p;
- p += 1;
- if (n != 1 + i) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &i)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, i)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
- if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
+ if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, data, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
- /*
- * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
- * to the start
- */
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
}
/* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
- i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
- NULL);
+ shared = OPENSSL_malloc((field_size + 7) / 8);
+ if (shared == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ i = ECDH_compute_key(shared, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint,
+ srvr_ecdh, NULL);
if (i <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ OPENSSL_free(shared);
goto err;
}
EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
- /* Compute the master secret */
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- p, i);
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
- if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
+ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, shared, i, 1)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
return (ret);
} else
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
- unsigned char *t = NULL;
- unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
- unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
- int psk_err = 1;
- char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
-
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-
- n2s(p, i);
- if (n != i + 2) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto psk_err;
- }
- if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto psk_err;
- }
- if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
- goto psk_err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
- */
- memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
- memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
- psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
- psk_or_pre_ms,
- sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
-
- if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto psk_err;
- } else if (psk_len == 0) {
- /*
- * PSK related to the given identity not found
- */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
- al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
- goto psk_err;
- }
-
- /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
- pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
- t = psk_or_pre_ms;
- memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
- s2n(psk_len, t);
- memset(t, 0, psk_len);
- t += psk_len;
- s2n(psk_len, t);
-
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
- s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
- if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto psk_err;
- }
-
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
- s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
- if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
- s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto psk_err;
- }
-
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- psk_or_pre_ms,
- pre_ms_len);
- if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto psk_err;
- }
- psk_err = 0;
- psk_err:
- OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
- if (psk_err != 0)
- goto f_err;
- } else
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
- int param_len;
-
- n2s(p, i);
- param_len = i + 2;
- if (param_len > n) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &i)
+ || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, i)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
- if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
+ if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
goto err;
}
- if ((s->session->master_key_length =
- SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
+ if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
-
- p += i;
} else
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
/* Get our certificate private key */
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
- pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
- else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
ERR_clear_error();
}
/* Decrypt session key */
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, n)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
if (ASN1_get_object
- ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
+ ((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
|| Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto gerr;
}
- start = p;
+ start = data;
inlen = Tlen;
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
goto gerr;
}
/* Generate master secret */
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- premaster_secret, 32);
- if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
+ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
+ sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
+ s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
#endif
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char *sig, *data;
int al, ok, ret = 0;
long n;
int type = 0, i, j;
+ unsigned int len;
X509 *peer;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
+ PACKET pkt;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
/*
}
/* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
/* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
/*
* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
* length field
*/
- if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
- pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
- i = 64;
+ if (n == 64 && pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
+ len = 64;
} else {
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
+ int rv;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &sig, 2)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
if (rv == -1) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
- p += 2;
- n -= 2;
}
- n2s(p, i);
- n -= 2;
- if (i > n) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &len)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
}
j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
- if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
+ if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(&pkt) > j) || (n <= 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, len)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
long hdatalen = 0;
goto f_err;
}
- if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
+ if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
- MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, data, len,
pkey->pkey.rsa);
if (i < 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
- SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, data, len, pkey->pkey.dsa);
if (j <= 0) {
/* bad signature */
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
- SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, data, len, pkey->pkey.ec);
if (j <= 0) {
/* bad signature */
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
}
} else
#endif
- if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
- || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
+ if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
unsigned char signature[64];
int idx;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
- if (i != 64) {
- fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
+ if (len != 64) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", len);
}
for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
- signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
+ signature[63 - idx] = data[idx];
}
j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
32);
end:
BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return (ret);
{
int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
X509 *x = NULL;
- unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
- const unsigned char *p, *q;
- unsigned char *d;
+ unsigned long l, llen, n;
+ const unsigned char *certstart;
+ unsigned char *certbytes;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
+ PACKET pkt, spkt;
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
- p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto done;
}
- n2l3(p, llen);
- if (llen + 3 != n) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&pkt, &llen)
+ || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &spkt, llen)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
- for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
- n2l3(p, l);
- if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
+
+ while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
+ || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
- q = p;
- x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
+ certstart = certbytes;
+ x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
if (x == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto done;
}
- if (p != (q + l)) {
+ if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto done;
}
x = NULL;
- nc += l + 3;
}
if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
goto f_err;
}
/* No client certificate so digest cached records */
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
- /*
- * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
- * arrive here.
- */
- if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
- s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
- if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto done;
- }
- }
- sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
- s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
+ sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
+ s->session->peer_chain = sk;
/*
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
* certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
return ssl_do_write(s);
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
{
return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/*
* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
* It sets the next_proto member in s if found
int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
{
int ok;
- int proto_len, padding_len;
long n;
- const unsigned char *p;
+ PACKET pkt, next_proto, padding;
+ size_t next_proto_len;
/*
* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
}
if (n < 2) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
+ goto err; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
}
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
/*-
* The payload looks like:
* uint8 padding_len;
* uint8 padding[padding_len];
*/
- proto_len = p[0];
- if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return 0;
- }
- padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
- if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return 0;
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &next_proto)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &padding)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) > 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
}
- s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
- if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return 0;
+ if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated,
+ &next_proto_len)) {
+ s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
+ goto err;
}
- memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
- s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
+
+ s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
return 1;
+err:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return 0;
}
-# endif
+#endif
+
+#define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
+ int num,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
+ int sslv2format)
+{
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+ int i, n;
+
+ if (s->s3)
+ s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
+
+ if(sslv2format) {
+ n = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN;
+ } else {
+ n = TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
+ }
+ if (n == 0 || (num % n) != 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
+ SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
+ sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
+ if(sk == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ sk = *skp;
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw);
+ s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = BUF_memdup(p, num);
+ if (s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = (size_t)num;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num; i += n) {
+ /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
+ if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
+ (p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
+ (p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
+ /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
+ if (s->renegotiate) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
+ SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
+ p += n;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n");
#endif
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
+ if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
+ (p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
+ (p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
+ /*
+ * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
+ * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
+ * downgrade.
+ */
+ if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
+ SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ if (s->s3)
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
+ SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += n;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if(sslv2format) {
+ /*
+ * We only support SSLv2 format ciphers in SSLv3+ using a
+ * SSLv2 backward compatible ClientHello. In this case the first
+ * byte is always 0 for SSLv3 compatible ciphers. Anything else
+ * is an SSLv2 cipher and we ignore it
+ */
+ if(p[0] == 0)
+ c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &p[1]);
+ else
+ c = NULL;
+ } else {
+ c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
+ }
+ p += n;
+ if (c != NULL) {
+ if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (skp != NULL)
+ *skp = sk;
+ return (sk);
+ err:
+ if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
+ return (NULL);
+}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff