* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
*
- * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*
* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include "kssl_lcl.h"
+#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
+# include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
+# include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
- {
- if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
- return(SSLv3_server_method());
- else
- return(NULL);
- }
+{
+ if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
+ return (SSLv3_server_method());
+ else
+ return (NULL);
+}
+IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
+ ssl3_accept,
+ ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
- {
- int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
-
- *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-
- if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
- (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
- {
- if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
- {
- /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
- we do so if There is no srp login name */
- ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
- *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
- }
- else
- {
- ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
- }
- }
- return ret;
- }
+{
+ int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
+
+ *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+
+ if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
+ (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
+ if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
+ * login name
+ */
+ ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+ *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+ } else {
+ ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
+ }
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
#endif
-IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
- ssl3_accept,
- ssl_undefined_function,
- ssl3_get_server_method)
-
int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
- {
- BUF_MEM *buf;
- unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
- void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
- int ret= -1;
- int new_state,state,skip=0;
-
- RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
- ERR_clear_error();
- clear_sys_error();
-
- if (s->info_callback != NULL)
- cb=s->info_callback;
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
- cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
-
- /* init things to blank */
- s->in_handshake++;
- if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
-
- if (s->cert == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
- return(-1);
- }
-
+{
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+ unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
+ int ret = -1;
+ int new_state, state, skip = 0;
+
+ RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ clear_sys_error();
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ /* init things to blank */
+ s->in_handshake++;
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
+ SSL_clear(s);
+
+ if (s->cert == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
+ return (-1);
+ }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
- * already got and don't await it anymore, because
- * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
- */
- if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
- {
- s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
- s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
- }
+ /*
+ * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
+ * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
+ * handshakes anyway.
+ */
+ if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
+ s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
+ s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
+ }
#endif
- for (;;)
- {
- state=s->state;
-
- switch (s->state)
- {
- case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
- s->renegotiate=1;
- /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
-
- case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
- case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
- case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
- case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
-
- s->server=1;
- if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
-
- if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
-
- if (s->init_buf == NULL)
- {
- if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
- {
- ret= -1;
- goto end;
- }
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
- {
- ret= -1;
- goto end;
- }
- s->init_buf=buf;
- }
-
- if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
- {
- ret= -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- s->init_num=0;
- s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
-
- if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
- {
- /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
- * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
- */
- if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
-
- ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
- s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
- }
- else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
- {
- /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
- * client that doesn't support secure
- * renegotiation.
- */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- else
- {
- /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
- * we will just send a HelloRequest */
- s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
-
- s->shutdown=0;
- ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- s->init_num=0;
-
- ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
- s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
-
- s->shutdown=0;
- if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
- {
- ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- }
+ for (;;) {
+ state = s->state;
+
+ switch (s->state) {
+ case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
+ s->renegotiate = 1;
+ /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
+
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
+ case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+ case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+
+ s->server = 1;
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
+
+ if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
+
+ if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
+ if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->init_buf = buf;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
+ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ /*
+ * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
+ */
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
+
+ if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
+ /*
+ * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
+ * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
+ */
+ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
+ } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
+ !(s->options &
+ SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
+ /*
+ * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
+ * support secure renegotiation.
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
+ SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
+ * HelloRequest
+ */
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
+
+ s->shutdown = 0;
+ ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
+
+ s->shutdown = 0;
+ if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
+ ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- {
- int al;
- if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
- {
- /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
- s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
- goto end;
- }
- if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
- {
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
- /* This is not really an error but the only means to
- for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
- if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- ret= -1;
- goto end;
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- s->renegotiate = 2;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
- s->init_num=0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
- ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ {
+ int al;
+ if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
+ /*
+ * callback indicates firther work to be done
+ */
+ s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ /*
+ * This is not really an error but the only means to for
+ * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
+ */
+ if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ s->renegotiate = 2;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
+ ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (s->hit)
- {
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
- else
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
- }
+ if (s->hit) {
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ }
#else
- if (s->hit)
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
#endif
- else
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
- s->init_num=0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
- /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
- /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP))
- && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
- {
- ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
+ /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
+ /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
+ if (!
+ (s->s3->tmp.
+ new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 |
+ SSL_aSRP))
+&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
- else
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
- }
- else
- {
- skip = 1;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
- }
+ if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ } else {
+ skip = 1;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
#else
- }
- else
- skip=1;
+ } else
+ skip = 1;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
#endif
- s->init_num=0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-
- /* clear this, it may get reset by
- * send_server_key_exchange */
- if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
- )
- /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
- * even when forbidden by protocol specs
- * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
- * be able to handle this) */
- s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
- else
- s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
-
-
- /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
- * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
- *
- * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
- *
- * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
- * message only if the cipher suite is either
- * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
- * server certificate contains the server's
- * public key for key exchange.
- */
- if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
- /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
- * hint if provided */
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+ /*
+ * clear this, it may get reset by
+ * send_server_key_exchange
+ */
+ s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
+ * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
+ * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
+ * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
+ * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
+ * key exchange.
+ */
+ if (0
+ /*
+ * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
+ * provided
+ */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
+ || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
- || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
+ /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
+ || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
#endif
- || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
- || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
- || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
- && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
- || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
- && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
- )
- )
- )
- )
- {
- ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- }
- else
- skip=1;
-
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
- s->init_num=0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
- if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
- !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
- /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
- * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
- ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
- (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
- /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
- * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
- * and in RFC 2246): */
- ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
- /* ... except when the application insists on verification
- * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
- !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
- /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
- /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
- /* With normal PSK Certificates and
- * Certificate Requests are omitted */
- || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
- {
- /* no cert request */
- skip=1;
- s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
- return -1;
- }
- else
- {
- s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
- ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kEDH))
+ || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
+ || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
+ && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
+ || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
+ && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
+ [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
+ 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
+ )
+ )
+ )
+ ) {
+ ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ } else
+ skip = 1;
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
+ if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
+ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
+ /*
+ * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
+ * during re-negotiation:
+ */
+ ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
+ (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
+ /*
+ * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
+ * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
+ * RFC 2246):
+ */
+ ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
+ /*
+ * ... except when the application insists on
+ * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
+ * this for SSL 3)
+ */
+ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
+ /*
+ * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
+ */
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
+ /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
+ /*
+ * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
+ * are omitted
+ */
+ || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ /* no cert request */
+ skip = 1;
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ return -1;
+ } else {
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
+ ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
#else
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
#endif
- s->init_num=0;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
- ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- s->init_num=0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
-
- /* This code originally checked to see if
- * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
- * and then flushed. This caused problems
- * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
- * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
- * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
- * still exist. So instead we just flush
- * unconditionally.
- */
-
- s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
- if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
- {
- ret= -1;
- goto end;
- }
- s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-
- s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
- /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
- ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- if (ret == 2)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
- else {
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
- {
- ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- }
- s->init_num=0;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
- ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- if (ret == 2)
- {
- /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
- * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
- * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
- * message is not sent.
- * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
- * the client uses its key from the certificate
- * for key exchange.
- */
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
+ ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
+
+ /*
+ * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
+ * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
+ * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
+ * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
+ * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
+ * unconditionally.
+ */
+
+ s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+ if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+
+ s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
+ /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
+ ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ if (ret == 2)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
+ else {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+ ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ if (ret == 2) {
+ /*
+ * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
+ * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
+ * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
+ * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
+ */
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#else
- if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
- else
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#endif
- s->init_num = 0;
- }
- else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
- {
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
- s->init_num=0;
- if (!s->session->peer)
- break;
- /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
- * at this point and digest cached records.
- */
- if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
- return -1;
- }
- else
- {
- int offset=0;
- int dgst_num;
-
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
- s->init_num=0;
-
- /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
- * a client cert, it can be verified
- * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
- * should be generalized. But it is next step
- */
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
- return -1;
- for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
- if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
- {
- int dgst_size;
-
- s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
- dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
- if (dgst_size < 0)
- {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- offset+=dgst_size;
- }
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
-
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
- /* we should decide if we expected this one */
- ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ } else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ if (!s->session->peer)
+ break;
+ /*
+ * For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer at this point and
+ * digest cached records.
+ */
+ if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ return -1;
+ } else {
+ int offset = 0;
+ int dgst_num;
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
+ * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
+ * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
+ * step
+ */
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ return -1;
+ for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
+ int dgst_size;
+
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+ EVP_MD_CTX_type
+ (s->
+ s3->handshake_dgst
+ [dgst_num]),
+ &(s->s3->
+ tmp.cert_verify_md
+ [offset]));
+ dgst_size =
+ EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
+ if (dgst_size < 0) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ offset += dgst_size;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
+ /*
+ * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
+ * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
+ * to set this here because we don't know if we're
+ * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
+ */
+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ /* we should decide if we expected this one */
+ ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#else
- if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
- else
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#endif
- s->init_num=0;
- break;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
- ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- s->init_num = 0;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
- break;
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
+ /*
+ * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
+ * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
+ * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
+ * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
+ * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
+ * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
+ * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
+ * the client's Finished message is read.
+ */
+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+
+ ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ break;
#endif
- case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
- ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
- SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- if (s->hit)
- s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
+ /*
+ * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
+ * In a full handshake, we end up here through
+ * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
+ * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
+ * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
+ * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
+ * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
+ * the client's Finished message is read.
+ */
+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
#endif
- else
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
- s->init_num=0;
- break;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
- ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
- s->init_num=0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
- ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
- s->init_num=0;
- break;
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
+ ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
+ ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
#endif
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
-
- s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
- { ret= -1; goto end; }
-
- ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
- SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
-
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
- s->init_num=0;
-
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
- SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
- {
- ret= -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
- ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
- SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
- s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
- s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- if (s->hit)
- {
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
+
+ s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
+
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
+ {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
+ ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
+ s->method->
+ ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
+ s->method->
+ ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ if (s->hit) {
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#else
- if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
- {
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
- s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
- }
- else
- s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+ } else
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#endif
- }
- else
- s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
- s->init_num=0;
- break;
-
- case SSL_ST_OK:
- /* clean a few things up */
- ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-
- BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
- s->init_buf=NULL;
-
- /* remove buffering on output */
- ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
-
- s->init_num=0;
-
- if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
- {
- s->renegotiate=0;
- s->new_session=0;
-
- ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
-
- s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
- /* s->server=1; */
- s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
-
- if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
- }
-
- ret = 1;
- goto end;
- /* break; */
-
- default:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
- ret= -1;
- goto end;
- /* break; */
- }
-
- if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
- {
- if (s->debug)
- {
- if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
- goto end;
- }
-
-
- if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
- {
- new_state=s->state;
- s->state=state;
- cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
- s->state=new_state;
- }
- }
- skip=0;
- }
-end:
- /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
-
- s->in_handshake--;
- if (cb != NULL)
- cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
- return(ret);
- }
+ } else
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ST_OK:
+ /* clean a few things up */
+ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+ BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+ s->init_buf = NULL;
+
+ /* remove buffering on output */
+ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
+ * HelloRequest */
+ s->renegotiate = 0;
+ s->new_session = 0;
+
+ ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
+
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
+ /* s->server=1; */
+ s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
+
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+
+ default:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+ }
+
+ if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
+ if (s->debug) {
+ if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
+ new_state = s->state;
+ s->state = state;
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
+ s->state = new_state;
+ }
+ }
+ skip = 0;
+ }
+ end:
+ /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
+
+ s->in_handshake--;
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
+ return (ret);
+}
int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
- {
- unsigned char *p;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
- {
- p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
- *(p++)=0;
- *(p++)=0;
- *(p++)=0;
-
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
- /* number of bytes to write */
- s->init_num=4;
- s->init_off=0;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
- return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
- }
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ *(p++) = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ *(p++) = 0;
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num = 4;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
+ return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+}
int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
- {
- int ok;
- long n;
-
- /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
- * so permit appropriate message length */
- n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
- -1,
- s->max_cert_list,
- &ok);
- if (!ok) return((int)n);
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
- {
- /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
- * negotiation. */
- if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
- return -1;
- }
- /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
- * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
+{
+ int ok;
+ long n;
+
+ /*
+ * this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
+ * so permit appropriate message length
+ */
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
+ -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
+ if (!ok)
+ return ((int)n);
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+ /*
+ * We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
+ * negotiation.
+ */
+ if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
+ * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
+ */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
- {
- DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
- s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
- }
+ if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
+ DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
+ s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
+ }
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
- {
- EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
- s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
- }
+ if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
+ EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
+ s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
+ }
#endif
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
- return 2;
- }
- return 1;
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
+ return 2;
+ }
+ return 1;
}
int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
- {
- int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
- unsigned int cookie_len;
- long n;
- unsigned long id;
- unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
- SSL_CIPHER *c;
+{
+ int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1;
+ unsigned int cookie_len;
+ long n;
+ unsigned long id;
+ unsigned char *p, *d, *q;
+ SSL_CIPHER *c;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
+ SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
#endif
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
-
- /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
- * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
- * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
- * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
- * TLSv1.
- */
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
- )
- {
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
- }
- s->first_packet=1;
- n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
- SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
- &ok);
-
- if (!ok) return((int)n);
- s->first_packet=0;
- d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-
- /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
- * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
- s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
- p+=2;
-
- if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
- (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
- !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
- {
- /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
- s->version = s->client_version;
- }
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
- * contain one, just return since we do not want to
- * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
- */
- if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
- {
- unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
-
- session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
-
- if (cookie_length == 0)
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* load the client random */
- memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
- /* get the session-id */
- j= *(p++);
-
- s->hit=0;
- /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
- * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
- * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
- * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
- * won't even compile against older library versions).
- *
- * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
- * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
- * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
- * setting will be ignored.
- */
- if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
- {
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
- goto err;
- }
- else
- {
- i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
- if (i == 1)
- { /* previous session */
- s->hit=1;
- }
- else if (i == -1)
- goto err;
- else /* i == 0 */
- {
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- p+=j;
-
- if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
- {
- /* cookie stuff */
- cookie_len = *(p++);
-
- /*
- * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
- * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
- * does not cause an overflow.
- */
- if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
- {
- /* too much data */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
- if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
- cookie_len > 0)
- {
- memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
-
- if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
- {
- if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
- cookie_len) == 0)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* else cookie verification succeeded */
- }
- else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
- s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
- {
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- ret = 2;
- }
-
- p += cookie_len;
- }
-
- n2s(p,i);
- if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
- {
- /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
- al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
- {
- /* not enough data */
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
- == NULL))
- {
- goto err;
- }
- p+=i;
-
- /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
- if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
- {
- j=0;
- id=s->session->cipher->id;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
+ * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
+ * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
+ * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
+ */
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+ }
+ s->first_packet = 1;
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
+ SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return ((int)n);
+ s->first_packet = 0;
+ d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ /*
+ * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
+ * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
+ */
+ s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
+ p += 2;
+
+ if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
+ (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
+ !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
+ /*
+ * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
+ * number
+ */
+ s->version = s->client_version;
+ }
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
+ * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
+ * cookie length...
+ */
+ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
+ unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
+
+ session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
+
+ if (cookie_length == 0)
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* load the client random */
+ memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ /* get the session-id */
+ j = *(p++);
+
+ s->hit = 0;
+ /*
+ * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
+ * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
+ * ignore resumption requests with flag
+ * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
+ * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
+ * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
+ * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
+ * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
+ * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
+ * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
+ */
+ if ((s->new_session
+ && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
+ /*
+ * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
+ * version.
+ * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
+ * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
+ * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
+ * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
+ * will abort the handshake with an error.
+ */
+ if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
+ * session */
+ s->hit = 1;
+ } else if (i == -1)
+ goto err;
+ else { /* i == 0 */
+
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ p += j;
+
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ /* cookie stuff */
+ cookie_len = *(p++);
+
+ /*
+ * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
+ * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
+ * does not cause an overflow.
+ */
+ if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
+ /* too much data */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
+ if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
+ memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
+
+ if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
+ if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
+ cookie_len) == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* else cookie verification succeeded */
+ }
+ /* default verification */
+ else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
+ s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ ret = 2;
+ }
+
+ p += cookie_len;
+ }
+
+ n2s(p, i);
+ if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) {
+ /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if ((p + i) >= (d + n)) {
+ /* not enough data */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers))
+ == NULL)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += i;
+
+ /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
+ if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) {
+ j = 0;
+ id = s->session->cipher->id;
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
+ fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
#endif
- for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
- {
- c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
- i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
+ fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
+ i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
#endif
- if (c->id == id)
- {
- j=1;
- break;
- }
- }
-/* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
- * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
- */
+ if (c->id == id) {
+ j = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
+ * CVE-2010-4180.
+ */
#if 0
- if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
- {
- /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
- * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
- * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
- * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
- * enabled, though. */
- c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
- if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
- {
- s->session->cipher = c;
- j = 1;
- }
- }
+ if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
+ && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
+ /*
+ * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
+ * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
+ * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
+ * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
+ * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
+ */
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
+ if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
+ s->session->cipher = c;
+ j = 1;
+ }
+ }
#endif
- if (j == 0)
- {
- /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
- * list if we are asked to reuse it */
- al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- /* compression */
- i= *(p++);
- if ((p+i) > (d+n))
- {
- /* not enough data */
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- q=p;
- for (j=0; j<i; j++)
- {
- if (p[j] == 0) break;
- }
-
- p+=i;
- if (j >= i)
- {
- /* no compress */
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
+ if (j == 0) {
+ /*
+ * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
+ * to reuse it
+ */
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* compression */
+ i = *(p++);
+ if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
+ /* not enough data */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ q = p;
+ for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
+ if (p[j] == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ p += i;
+ if (j >= i) {
+ /* no compress */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- /* TLS extensions*/
- if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
- {
- if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
- {
- /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
- * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
- * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
- * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
- {
- unsigned char *pos;
- pos=s->s3->server_random;
- if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
- {
- SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
-
- s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
- if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
- ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
- {
- s->hit=1;
- s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
- s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
-
- ciphers=NULL;
-
- /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
- pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
- if (pref_cipher == NULL)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
-
- if (s->cipher_list)
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
-
- if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
-
- s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
- s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
- }
- }
+ /* TLS extensions */
+ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
+ if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) {
+ /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
+ * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
+ * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
+ * processing to use it in key derivation.
+ */
+ {
+ unsigned char *pos;
+ pos = s->s3->server_random;
+ if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
+ SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
+
+ s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
+ if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
+ &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
+ &pref_cipher,
+ s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
+ s->hit = 1;
+ s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
+ s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
+
+ ciphers = NULL;
+
+ /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
+ pref_cipher =
+ pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
+ s->
+ session->ciphers,
+ SSL_get_ciphers
+ (s));
+ if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
+
+ if (s->cipher_list)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
+
+ if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+
+ s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
+ s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
+ }
+ }
#endif
- /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
- * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
- * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
- s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
+ /*
+ * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
+ * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
+ * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
+ */
+ s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
- if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
- {
- int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
- /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
- /* Can't disable compression */
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* Look for resumed compression method */
- for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
- {
- comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
- if (comp_id == comp->id)
- {
- s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
- for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
- {
- if (q[m] == comp_id)
- break;
- }
- if (m >= i)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- else if (s->hit)
- comp = NULL;
- else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
- { /* See if we have a match */
- int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
-
- nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
- for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
- {
- comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
- v=comp->id;
- for (o=0; o<i; o++)
- {
- if (v == q[o])
- {
- done=1;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (done) break;
- }
- if (done)
- s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
- else
- comp=NULL;
- }
+ /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
+ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
+ int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
+ /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
+ /* Can't disable compression */
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* Look for resumed compression method */
+ for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
+ comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
+ if (comp_id == comp->id) {
+ s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
+ for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
+ if (q[m] == comp_id)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (m >= i) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else if (s->hit)
+ comp = NULL;
+ else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
+ /* See if we have a match */
+ int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
+
+ nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
+ for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
+ comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
+ v = comp->id;
+ for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
+ if (v == q[o]) {
+ done = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (done)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (done)
+ s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
+ else
+ comp = NULL;
+ }
#else
- /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
- * using compression.
- */
- if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
- goto f_err;
- }
+ /*
+ * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
+ * using compression.
+ */
+ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
#endif
- /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
- * pick a cipher */
+ /*
+ * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
+ */
- if (!s->hit)
- {
+ if (!s->hit) {
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- s->session->compress_meth=0;
+ s->session->compress_meth = 0;
#else
- s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
+ s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
#endif
- if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
- s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
- if (ciphers == NULL)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
- goto f_err;
- }
- ciphers=NULL;
- c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
- SSL_get_ciphers(s));
-
- if (c == NULL)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
- goto f_err;
- }
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
- }
- else
- {
- /* Session-id reuse */
+ if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
+ s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
+ if (ciphers == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ ciphers = NULL;
+ c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
+
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
+ } else {
+ /* Session-id reuse */
#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
- SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
- SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
-
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
- {
- sk=s->session->ciphers;
- for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
- {
- c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
- if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
- nc=c;
- if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
- ec=c;
- }
- if (nc != NULL)
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
- else if (ec != NULL)
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
- else
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
- }
- else
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+ SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
+ SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
+
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
+ sk = s->session->ciphers;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
+ if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
+ nc = c;
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
+ ec = c;
+ }
+ if (nc != NULL)
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
+ else if (ec != NULL)
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
+ else
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
+ } else
#endif
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
- }
-
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
- {
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
- {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- /* we now have the following setup.
- * client_random
- * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
- * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
- * compression - basically ignored right now
- * ssl version is set - sslv3
- * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
- * s->hit - session reuse flag
- * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
- */
-
- /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
- if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
- {
- if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (ret < 0) ret=1;
- if (0)
- {
-f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
- }
-err:
- if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
- return(ret);
- }
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
+ }
+
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION
+ || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*-
+ * we now have the following setup.
+ * client_random
+ * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
+ * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
+ * compression - basically ignored right now
+ * ssl version is set - sslv3
+ * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
+ * s->hit - session reuse flag
+ * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
+ */
+
+ /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
+ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
+ if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ret < 0)
+ ret = 1;
+ if (0) {
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ }
+ err:
+ if (ciphers != NULL)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
+ return (ret);
+}
int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
- {
- unsigned char *buf;
- unsigned char *p,*d;
- int i,sl;
- unsigned long l;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
- {
- buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char *p, *d;
+ int i, sl;
+ unsigned long l;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
+ buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- p=s->s3->server_random;
- if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
- return -1;
+ p = s->s3->server_random;
+ if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
+ return -1;
#endif
- /* Do the message type and length last */
- d=p= &(buf[4]);
-
- *(p++)=s->version>>8;
- *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
-
- /* Random stuff */
- memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
- /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
- * back in the server hello:
- * - For session reuse from the session cache,
- * we send back the old session ID.
- * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
- * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
- * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
- * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
- * session ID.
- * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
- * we send back a 0-length session ID.
- * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
- * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
- * to send back.
- */
- if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
- && !s->hit)
- s->session->session_id_length=0;
-
- sl=s->session->session_id_length;
- if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- *(p++)=sl;
- memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
- p+=sl;
-
- /* put the cipher */
- i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
- p+=i;
-
- /* put the compression method */
+ /* Do the message type and length last */
+ d = p = &(buf[4]);
+
+ *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
+ *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
+
+ /* Random stuff */
+ memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ /*-
+ * There are several cases for the session ID to send
+ * back in the server hello:
+ * - For session reuse from the session cache,
+ * we send back the old session ID.
+ * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
+ * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
+ * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
+ * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
+ * session ID.
+ * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
+ * we send back a 0-length session ID.
+ * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
+ * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
+ * to send back.
+ */
+ if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
+ && !s->hit)
+ s->session->session_id_length = 0;
+
+ sl = s->session->session_id_length;
+ if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *(p++) = sl;
+ memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
+ p += sl;
+
+ /* put the cipher */
+ i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
+ p += i;
+
+ /* put the compression method */
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- *(p++)=0;
+ *(p++) = 0;
#else
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
- *(p++)=0;
- else
- *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ else
+ *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
- return -1;
- }
- if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
+ if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if ((p =
+ ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p,
+ buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) ==
+ NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
#endif
- /* do the header */
- l=(p-d);
- d=buf;
- *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
- l2n3(l,d);
-
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
- /* number of bytes to write */
- s->init_num=p-buf;
- s->init_off=0;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
- return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
- }
+ /* do the header */
+ l = (p - d);
+ d = buf;
+ *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
+ l2n3(l, d);
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num = p - buf;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
+ return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+}
int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
- {
- unsigned char *p;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
- {
- p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-
- /* do the header */
- *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
- *(p++)=0;
- *(p++)=0;
- *(p++)=0;
-
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
- /* number of bytes to write */
- s->init_num=4;
- s->init_off=0;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
- return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
- }
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+ /* do the header */
+ *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ *(p++) = 0;
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num = 4;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
+ return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+}
int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
- {
+{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- unsigned char *q;
- int j,num;
- RSA *rsa;
- unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- unsigned int u;
+ unsigned char *q;
+ int j, num;
+ RSA *rsa;
+ unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned int u;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
+ DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
- unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
- int encodedlen = 0;
- int curve_id = 0;
- BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+ EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
+ unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
+ int encodedlen = 0;
+ int curve_id = 0;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
- const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
- unsigned char *p,*d;
- int al,i;
- unsigned long type;
- int n;
- CERT *cert;
- BIGNUM *r[4];
- int nr[4],kn;
- BUF_MEM *buf;
- EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
- {
- type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- cert=s->cert;
-
- buf=s->init_buf;
-
- r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
- n=0;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ unsigned char *p, *d;
+ int al, i;
+ unsigned long type;
+ int n;
+ CERT *cert;
+ BIGNUM *r[4];
+ int nr[4], kn;
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+ EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
+ type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ cert = s->cert;
+
+ buf = s->init_buf;
+
+ r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
+ n = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (type & SSL_kRSA)
- {
- rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
- if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
- {
- rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
- SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
- SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
- if(rsa == NULL)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
- RSA_up_ref(rsa);
- cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
- }
- if (rsa == NULL)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
- r[0]=rsa->n;
- r[1]=rsa->e;
- s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
- }
- else
+ if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
+ rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
+ if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
+ rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
+ SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
+ tmp.new_cipher),
+ SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
+ tmp.new_cipher));
+ if (rsa == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ RSA_up_ref(rsa);
+ cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
+ }
+ if (rsa == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ r[0] = rsa->n;
+ r[1] = rsa->e;
+ s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
+ } else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (type & SSL_kEDH)
- {
- dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
- if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
- dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
- SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
- SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
- if (dhp == NULL)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
- if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
- dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
- (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
- {
- if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- else
- {
- dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
- dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
- if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
- (dh->priv_key == NULL))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- r[0]=dh->p;
- r[1]=dh->g;
- r[2]=dh->pub_key;
- }
- else
+ if (type & SSL_kEDH) {
+ dhp = cert->dh_tmp;
+ if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
+ dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
+ SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
+ tmp.new_cipher),
+ SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
+ tmp.new_cipher));
+ if (dhp == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.dh = dh;
+ if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
+ dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
+ if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
+ dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
+ if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ r[0] = dh->p;
+ r[1] = dh->g;
+ r[2] = dh->pub_key;
+ } else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
- {
- const EC_GROUP *group;
-
- ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
- if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
- {
- ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
- SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
- SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
- }
- if (ecdhp == NULL)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
- if (ecdhp == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
- if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
- (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
- (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
- {
- if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
- (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
- (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
- (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
- * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
- * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
- */
- if ((curve_id =
- tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
- == 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Encode the public key.
- * First check the size of encoding and
- * allocate memory accordingly.
- */
- encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
- POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
- NULL, 0, NULL);
-
- encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
- OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
- bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
-
- encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
- POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
- encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
-
- if (encodedlen == 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
-
- /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
- * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
- * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
- * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
- * structure.
- */
- n = 4 + encodedlen;
-
- /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
- * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
- */
- r[0]=NULL;
- r[1]=NULL;
- r[2]=NULL;
- r[3]=NULL;
- }
- else
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+ if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+
+ ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
+ if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
+ ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
+ SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
+ tmp.new_cipher),
+ SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
+ s3->tmp.new_cipher));
+ }
+ if (ecdhp == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
+ if (ecdhp == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
+ if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
+ if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+ (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
+ * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
+ * non-zero.
+ */
+ if ((curve_id =
+ tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
+ == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
+ * allocate memory accordingly.
+ */
+ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+ encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
+ OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
+ bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
+
+ if (encodedlen == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ bn_ctx = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
+ * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
+ * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
+ * structure.
+ */
+ n = 4 + encodedlen;
+
+ /*
+ * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
+ * can set these to NULLs
+ */
+ r[0] = NULL;
+ r[1] = NULL;
+ r[2] = NULL;
+ r[3] = NULL;
+ } else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- if (type & SSL_kPSK)
- {
- /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
- n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
- }
- else
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+ if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
+ /*
+ * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
+ */
+ n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ } else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (type & SSL_kSRP)
- {
- if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
- (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
- (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
- (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
- goto err;
- }
- r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N;
- r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g;
- r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s;
- r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B;
- }
- else
+ if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
+ if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
+ (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
+ (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
+ r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
+ r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
+ r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
+ } else
#endif
- {
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
- {
- nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
+ {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
- n+=1+nr[i];
- else
+ if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
+ n += 1 + nr[i];
+ else
#endif
- n+=2+nr[i];
- }
-
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
- && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
- {
- if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
- == NULL)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
- }
- else
- {
- pkey=NULL;
- kn=0;
- }
-
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
- goto err;
- }
- d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- p= &(d[4]);
-
- for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
- {
+ n += 2 + nr[i];
+ }
+
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
+ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
+ == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+ } else {
+ pkey = NULL;
+ kn = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + 4 + kn)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p = &(d[4]);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
- {
- *p = nr[i];
- p++;
- }
- else
+ if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
+ *p = nr[i];
+ p++;
+ } else
#endif
- s2n(nr[i],p);
- BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
- p+=nr[i];
- }
+ s2n(nr[i], p);
+ BN_bn2bin(r[i], p);
+ p += nr[i];
+ }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
- {
- /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
- * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
- * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
- * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
- * the actual encoded point itself
- */
- *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
- p += 1;
- *p = 0;
- p += 1;
- *p = curve_id;
- p += 1;
- *p = encodedlen;
- p += 1;
- memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
- (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
- encodedlen);
- OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- encodedPoint = NULL;
- p += encodedlen;
- }
+ if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
+ /*
+ * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
+ * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
+ * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
+ * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
+ */
+ *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
+ p += 1;
+ *p = 0;
+ p += 1;
+ *p = curve_id;
+ p += 1;
+ *p = encodedlen;
+ p += 1;
+ memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
+ (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
+ OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ encodedPoint = NULL;
+ p += encodedlen;
+ }
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- if (type & SSL_kPSK)
- {
- /* copy PSK identity hint */
- s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
- strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
- p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
- }
+ if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
+ /* copy PSK identity hint */
+ s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
+ strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
+ strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
+ p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ }
#endif
- /* not anonymous */
- if (pkey != NULL)
- {
- /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
- * and p points to the space at the end. */
+ /* not anonymous */
+ if (pkey != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
+ * points to the space at the end.
+ */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
- && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
- {
- q=md_buf;
- j=0;
- for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
- {
- EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
- EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
- ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
- (unsigned int *)&i);
- q+=i;
- j+=i;
- }
- if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
- &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
- goto err;
- }
- s2n(u,p);
- n+=u+2;
- }
- else
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
+ && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ q = md_buf;
+ j = 0;
+ for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
+ EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
+ ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
+ q += i;
+ j += i;
+ }
+ if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
+ &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(u, p);
+ n += u + 2;
+ } else
#endif
- if (md)
- {
- /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
- * algorithm */
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
- {
- if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
- {
- /* Should never happen */
- al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
- p+=2;
- }
+ if (md) {
+ /*
+ * For TLS1.2 and later send signature algorithm
+ */
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
+ /* Should never happen */
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ p += 2;
+ }
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
- EVP_MD_name(md));
+ fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
- EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
- EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
- if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
- (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
- goto err;
- }
- s2n(i,p);
- n+=i+2;
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
- n+= 2;
- }
- else
- {
- /* Is this error check actually needed? */
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
- l2n3(n,d);
-
- /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
- * it off */
- s->init_num=n+4;
- s->init_off=0;
- }
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-err:
+ EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n);
+ if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
+ (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(i, p);
+ n += i + 2;
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+ n += 2;
+ } else {
+ /* Is this error check actually needed? */
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
+ l2n3(n, d);
+
+ /*
+ * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
+ */
+ s->init_num = n + 4;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ }
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ if (encodedPoint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
#endif
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- return(-1);
- }
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ return (-1);
+}
int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
- {
- unsigned char *p,*d;
- int i,j,nl,off,n;
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
- X509_NAME *name;
- BUF_MEM *buf;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
- {
- buf=s->init_buf;
-
- d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
-
- /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
- p++;
- n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
- d[0]=n;
- p+=n;
- n++;
-
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
- {
- nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
- s2n(nl, p);
- p += nl + 2;
- n += nl + 2;
- }
-
- off=n;
- p+=2;
- n+=2;
-
- sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
- nl=0;
- if (sk != NULL)
- {
- for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
- {
- name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
- j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
- {
- s2n(j,p);
- i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
- n+=2+j;
- nl+=2+j;
- }
- else
- {
- d=p;
- i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
- j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
- n+=j;
- nl+=j;
- }
- }
- }
- /* else no CA names */
- p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
- s2n(nl,p);
-
- d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
- *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
- l2n3(n,d);
-
- /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
- * it off */
-
- s->init_num=n+4;
- s->init_off=0;
+{
+ unsigned char *p, *d;
+ int i, j, nl, off, n;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *name;
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
+ buf = s->init_buf;
+
+ d = p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
+
+ /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
+ p++;
+ n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
+ d[0] = n;
+ p += n;
+ n++;
+
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
+ s2n(nl, p);
+ p += nl + 2;
+ n += nl + 2;
+ }
+
+ off = n;
+ p += 2;
+ n += 2;
+
+ sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
+ nl = 0;
+ if (sk != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
+ name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
+ j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 4 + n + j + 2)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + n]);
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) {
+ s2n(j, p);
+ i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
+ n += 2 + j;
+ nl += 2 + j;
+ } else {
+ d = p;
+ i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
+ j -= 2;
+ s2n(j, d);
+ j += 2;
+ n += j;
+ nl += j;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* else no CA names */
+ p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + off]);
+ s2n(nl, p);
+
+ d = (unsigned char *)buf->data;
+ *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
+ l2n3(n, d);
+
+ /*
+ * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
+ */
+
+ s->init_num = n + 4;
+ s->init_off = 0;
#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
-
- /* do the header */
- *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
- *(p++)=0;
- *(p++)=0;
- *(p++)=0;
- s->init_num += 4;
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
+
+ /* do the header */
+ *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ s->init_num += 4;
#endif
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
- }
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
+ }
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
- return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-err:
- return(-1);
- }
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
+ return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ err:
+ return (-1);
+}
int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
- {
- int i,al,ok;
- long n;
- unsigned long alg_k;
- unsigned char *p;
+{
+ int i, al, ok;
+ long n;
+ unsigned long alg_k;
+ unsigned char *p;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- RSA *rsa=NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
- DH *dh_srvr;
+ BIGNUM *pub = NULL;
+ DH *dh_srvr;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+ KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
- EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
- BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+ EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
- n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
- SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
- SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- 2048, /* ??? */
- &ok);
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
+ SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
- if (!ok) return((int)n);
- p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ if (!ok)
+ return ((int)n);
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
- alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
- {
- /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
- if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
- {
- if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
- rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
- /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
- * be sent already */
- if (rsa == NULL)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
- goto f_err;
-
- }
- }
- else
- {
- pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
- if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
- (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
- (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
- {
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
- }
-
- /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
- if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
- {
- n2s(p,i);
- if (n != i+2)
- {
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
- goto err;
- }
- else
- p-=2;
- }
- else
- n=i;
- }
-
- i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
-
- al = -1;
-
- if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
- }
-
- if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
- {
- /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
- * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
- * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
- * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
- * version instead if the server does not support the requested
- * protocol version.
- * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
- if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
- (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
- {
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
-
- /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
- * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
- * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
- * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
- * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
- * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
- * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
- }
- }
-
- if (al != -1)
- {
- /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
- * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
- * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
- ERR_clear_error();
- i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
- p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
- p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
- goto err;
- }
-
- s->session->master_key_length=
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key,
- p,i);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
- }
- else
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+ unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ int decrypt_len;
+ unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
+ size_t j;
+
+ /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
+ if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
+ rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
+ /*
+ * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
+ */
+ if (rsa == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
+ goto f_err;
+
+ }
+ } else {
+ pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
+ if ((pkey == NULL) ||
+ (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
+ }
+
+ /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ n2s(p, i);
+ if (n != i + 2) {
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else
+ p -= 2;
+ } else
+ n = i;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
+ * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
+ * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
+ * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
+ * bound is sufficient to be safe.
+ */
+ if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
+ * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
+ * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
+ * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
+ * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
+ */
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
+ sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ decrypt_len =
+ RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ /*
+ * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
+ * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
+ */
+ decrypt_good =
+ constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
+
+ /*
+ * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
+ * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
+ * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
+ * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
+ * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
+ * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
+ */
+ version_good =
+ constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
+ version_good &=
+ constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
+
+ /*
+ * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
+ * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
+ * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
+ * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
+ * version instead if the server does not support the requested
+ * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
+ * clients.
+ */
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
+ unsigned char workaround_good;
+ workaround_good =
+ constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
+ workaround_good &=
+ constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
+ version_good |= workaround_good;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
+ * remain non-zero (0xff).
+ */
+ decrypt_good &= version_good;
+
+ /*
+ * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
+ * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
+ * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
+ * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
+ */
+ for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
+ p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
+ rand_premaster_secret[j]);
+ }
+
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ p,
+ sizeof
+ (rand_premaster_secret));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
+ } else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
- {
- n2s(p,i);
- if (n != i+2)
- {
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
- goto err;
- }
- else
- {
- p-=2;
- i=(int)n;
- }
- }
-
- if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
- {
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
- goto f_err;
- }
- else
- {
- if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
- else
- dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
- }
-
- pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
- if (pub == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
-
- if (i <= 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- BN_clear_free(pub);
- goto err;
- }
-
- DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
- s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
-
- BN_clear_free(pub);
- pub=NULL;
- s->session->master_key_length=
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key,p,i);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
- }
- else
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
+ n2s(p, i);
+ if (n != i + 2) {
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ p -= 2;
+ i = (int)n;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (n == 0L) { /* the parameters are in the cert */
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else
+ dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
+ }
+
+ pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
+ if (pub == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
+
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ BN_clear_free(pub);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
+ s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
+
+ BN_clear_free(pub);
+ pub = NULL;
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ p, i);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
+ } else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
- {
- krb5_error_code krb5rc;
- krb5_data enc_ticket;
- krb5_data authenticator;
- krb5_data enc_pms;
- KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
- const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
- + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
- int padl, outl;
- krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
- krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
-
- if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
-
- n2s(p,i);
- enc_ticket.length = i;
-
- if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
- p+=enc_ticket.length;
-
- n2s(p,i);
- authenticator.length = i;
-
- if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- authenticator.data = (char *)p;
- p+=authenticator.length;
-
- n2s(p,i);
- enc_pms.length = i;
- enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
- p+=enc_pms.length;
-
- /* Note that the length is checked again below,
- ** after decryption
- */
- if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
- enc_pms.length + 6))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
- &kssl_err)) != 0)
- {
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
- krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
- if (kssl_err.text)
- printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- kssl_err.reason);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
- ** but will return authtime == 0.
- */
- if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
- &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
- {
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
- krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
- if (kssl_err.text)
- printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- kssl_err.reason);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
- goto err;
- }
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
- if (enc == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
-
- if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
- (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- outl += padl;
- if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
- {
- /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
- * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
- * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
- * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
- * the protocol version.
- * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
- * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
- */
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
-
- s->session->master_key_length=
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
-
- if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
- {
- size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
- if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
- {
- s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
- memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
- }
- }
-
-
- /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
- ** but it caused problems for apache.
- ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
- ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
- */
- }
- else
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
+ krb5_error_code krb5rc;
+ krb5_data enc_ticket;
+ krb5_data authenticator;
+ krb5_data enc_pms;
+ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+ int padl, outl;
+ krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
+ krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
+
+ if (!kssl_ctx)
+ kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
+
+ n2s(p, i);
+ enc_ticket.length = i;
+
+ if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
+ p += enc_ticket.length;
+
+ n2s(p, i);
+ authenticator.length = i;
+
+ if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ authenticator.data = (char *)p;
+ p += authenticator.length;
+
+ n2s(p, i);
+ enc_pms.length = i;
+ enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
+ p += enc_pms.length;
+
+ /*
+ * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
+ */
+ if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
+ enc_pms.length + 6)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
+ &kssl_err)) != 0) {
+# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
+ krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
+ if (kssl_err.text)
+ fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
+ * return authtime == 0.
+ */
+ if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
+ &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
+# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
+ krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
+ if (kssl_err.text)
+ fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
+ goto err;
+ }
+# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
+# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
+ if (enc == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
+
+ if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
+ (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ outl += padl;
+ if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
+ && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
+ /*
+ * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
+ * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
+ * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
+ * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
+ * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
+ * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
+ * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
+ * cipher)
+ */
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
+
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ pms, outl);
+
+ if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
+ size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
+ if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
+ s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
+ memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
+ len);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
+ * but it caused problems for apache.
+ * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
+ * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
+ */
+ } else
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
- {
- int ret = 1;
- int field_size = 0;
- const EC_KEY *tkey;
- const EC_GROUP *group;
- const BIGNUM *priv_key;
-
- /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
- if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Let's get server private key and group information */
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
- {
- /* use the certificate */
- tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
- }
- else
- {
- /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
- * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
- */
- tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
- }
-
- group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
- priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
-
- if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
- !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Let's get client's public key */
- if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (n == 0L)
- {
- /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
-
- if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
- == NULL) ||
- (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
- {
- /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
- * authentication using ECDH certificates
- * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
- * never executed. When that support is
- * added, we ought to ensure the key
- * received in the certificate is
- * authorized for key agreement.
- * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
- * the two ECDH shares are for the same
- * group.
- */
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
- }
- else
- {
- /* Get client's public key from encoded point
- * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
- */
- if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Get encoded point length */
- i = *p;
- p += 1;
- if (n != 1 + i)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
- clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
- * currently, so set it to the start
- */
- p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- }
-
- /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
- field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
- if (field_size <= 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
- if (i <= 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
- EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
- EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
- s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
-
- /* Compute the master secret */
- s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
- generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
- return (ret);
- }
- else
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
+ int ret = 1;
+ int field_size = 0;
+ const EC_KEY *tkey;
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+ const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+
+ /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
+ if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Let's get server private key and group information */
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
+ /* use the certificate */
+ tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
+ * ServerKeyExchange msg.
+ */
+ tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
+ }
+
+ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
+ priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
+
+ if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
+ !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Let's get client's public key */
+ if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (n == 0L) {
+ /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
+
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
+ == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
+ /*
+ * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
+ * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
+ * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
+ * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
+ * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
+ * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
+ */
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
+ pkey.ec)) == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
+ * ClientKeyExchange message.
+ */
+ if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Get encoded point length */
+ i = *p;
+ p += 1;
+ if (n != 1 + i) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
+ * to the start
+ */
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ }
+
+ /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
+ field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
+ if (field_size <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
+ NULL);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
+ EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
+ EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
+ s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
+
+ /* Compute the master secret */
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ p, i);
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
+ return (ret);
+ } else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
- {
- unsigned char *t = NULL;
- unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
- unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
- int psk_err = 1;
- char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
-
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-
- n2s(p,i);
- if (n != i+2)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto psk_err;
- }
- if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto psk_err;
- }
- if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
- goto psk_err;
- }
-
- /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
- * string for the callback */
- memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
- memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
- psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
- psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
-
- if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto psk_err;
- }
- else if (psk_len == 0)
- {
- /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
- al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
- goto psk_err;
- }
-
- /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
- pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
- t = psk_or_pre_ms;
- memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
- s2n(psk_len, t);
- memset(t, 0, psk_len);
- t+=psk_len;
- s2n(psk_len, t);
-
- if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
- s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
- if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto psk_err;
- }
-
- if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
- s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
- if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
- s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto psk_err;
- }
-
- s->session->master_key_length=
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
- psk_err = 0;
- psk_err:
- OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
- if (psk_err != 0)
- goto f_err;
- }
- else
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+ unsigned char *t = NULL;
+ unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
+ unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
+ int psk_err = 1;
+ char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
+
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+
+ n2s(p, i);
+ if (n != i + 2) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+ if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+ if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
+ */
+ memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
+ memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
+ psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
+ psk_or_pre_ms,
+ sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
+
+ if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto psk_err;
+ } else if (psk_len == 0) {
+ /*
+ * PSK related to the given identity not found
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+ al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
+ pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
+ t = psk_or_pre_ms;
+ memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
+ s2n(psk_len, t);
+ memset(t, 0, psk_len);
+ t += psk_len;
+ s2n(psk_len, t);
+
+ if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
+ s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
+ if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ psk_or_pre_ms,
+ pre_ms_len);
+ psk_err = 0;
+ psk_err:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+ if (psk_err != 0)
+ goto f_err;
+ } else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
- {
- int param_len;
-
- n2s(p,i);
- param_len=i+2;
- if (param_len > n)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
- || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A))
- {
- al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
- s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
- if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- p+=i;
- }
- else
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
- if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
- {
- int ret = 0;
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
- EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
- unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
- size_t outlen=32, inlen;
- unsigned long alg_a;
- int Ttag, Tclass;
- long Tlen;
-
- /* Get our certificate private key*/
- alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
- pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
- else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
- pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
-
- pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
- EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
- /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
- * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
- * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
- * a client certificate for authorization only. */
- client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
- if (client_pub_pkey)
- {
- if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
- /* Decrypt session key */
- if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
- Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
- Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto gerr;
- }
- start = p;
- inlen = Tlen;
- if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
-
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto gerr;
- }
- /* Generate master secret */
- s->session->master_key_length=
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
- /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
- ret = 2;
- else
- ret = 1;
- gerr:
- EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- else
- goto err;
- }
- else
- {
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- return(1);
-f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
+ int param_len;
+
+ n2s(p, i);
+ param_len = i + 2;
+ if (param_len > n) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
+ || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
+ s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
+ if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((s->session->master_key_length =
+ SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p += i;
+ } else
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
+ int ret = 0;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
+ EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
+ unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
+ size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
+ unsigned long alg_a;
+ int Ttag, Tclass;
+ long Tlen;
+
+ /* Get our certificate private key */
+ alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
+ pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
+ pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
+
+ pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
+ EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
+ /*
+ * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
+ * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
+ * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
+ * client certificate for authorization only.
+ */
+ client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+ if (client_pub_pkey) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+ /* Decrypt session key */
+ if (ASN1_get_object
+ ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
+ n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
+ || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto gerr;
+ }
+ start = p;
+ inlen = Tlen;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
+ (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto gerr;
+ }
+ /* Generate master secret */
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ premaster_secret, 32);
+ /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
+ (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
+ ret = 2;
+ else
+ ret = 1;
+ gerr:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ else
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ return (1);
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
-err:
+ err:
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
- EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
- if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
- EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
+ EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
+ if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
#endif
- return(-1);
- }
+ return (-1);
+}
int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
- {
- EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
- unsigned char *p;
- int al,ok,ret=0;
- long n;
- int type=0,i,j;
- X509 *peer;
- const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
- EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
-
- n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
- -1,
- SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
- &ok);
-
- if (!ok) return((int)n);
-
- if (s->session->peer != NULL)
- {
- peer=s->session->peer;
- pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
- type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
- }
- else
- {
- peer=NULL;
- pkey=NULL;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
- {
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
- if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
- {
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- ret=1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (peer == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
- al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
- p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
- /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
- /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
- * signature without length field */
- if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
- pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
- {
- i=64;
- }
- else
- {
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
- {
- int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
- /* Should never happen */
- if (sigalg == -1)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
- if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
- if (md == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int al, ok, ret = 0;
+ long n;
+ int type = 0, i, j;
+ X509 *peer;
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
+
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
+ -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return ((int)n);
+
+ if (s->session->peer != NULL) {
+ peer = s->session->peer;
+ pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
+ type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
+ } else {
+ peer = NULL;
+ pkey = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ if (peer != NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (peer == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+ SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
+ /*
+ * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
+ * length field
+ */
+ if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
+ pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
+ i = 64;
+ } else {
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
+ /* Should never happen */
+ if (sigalg == -1) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
+ if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
+ if (md == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
-fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
- p += 2;
- n -= 2;
- }
- n2s(p,i);
- n-=2;
- if (i > n)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
- if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
- {
- long hdatalen = 0;
- void *hdata;
- hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
- if (hdatalen <= 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
+ p += 2;
+ n -= 2;
+ }
+ n2s(p, i);
+ n -= 2;
+ if (i > n) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+ if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ long hdatalen = 0;
+ void *hdata;
+ hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
+ if (hdatalen <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
- EVP_MD_name(md));
+ fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
+ EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
- if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
- || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- else
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
- {
- i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
- MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
- pkey->pkey.rsa);
- if (i < 0)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (i == 0)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- else
+ if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
+ || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+ i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
+ pkey->pkey.rsa);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (i == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
- {
- j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
- &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
- SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
- if (j <= 0)
- {
- /* bad signature */
- al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- else
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
+ j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
+ &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
+ if (j <= 0) {
+ /* bad signature */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
- {
- j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
- &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
- SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
- if (j <= 0)
- {
- /* bad signature */
- al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
- SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- else
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
+ &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
+ if (j <= 0) {
+ /* bad signature */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else
#endif
- if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
- { unsigned char signature[64];
- int idx;
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
- EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
- if (i!=64) {
- fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
- }
- for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
- signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
- }
- j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
- if (j<=0)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
- SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- else
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
-
- ret=1;
- if (0)
- {
-f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
- }
-end:
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
- {
- BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
- s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
- }
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- return(ret);
- }
+ if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
+ || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
+ unsigned char signature[64];
+ int idx;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
+ EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
+ if (i != 64) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
+ }
+ for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
+ signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
+ }
+ j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
+ 32);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ if (j <= 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ if (0) {
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ }
+ end:
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
+ BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
+ s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
+ s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ return (ret);
+}
int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
- {
- int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
- X509 *x=NULL;
- unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
- const unsigned char *p,*q;
- unsigned char *d;
- STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
-
- n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
- -1,
- s->max_cert_list,
- &ok);
-
- if (!ok) return((int)n);
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
- {
- if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
- (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
- if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- goto f_err;
- }
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
- return(1);
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-
- if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- n2l3(p,llen);
- if (llen+3 != n)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
- {
- n2l3(p,l);
- if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- q=p;
- x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
- if (x == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (p != (q+l))
- {
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- x=NULL;
- nc+=l+3;
- }
-
- if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
- {
- /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
- else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
- (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
- {
- al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- else
- {
- i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
- if (i <= 0)
- {
- al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
- X509_free(s->session->peer);
- s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
- s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
-
- /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
- * when we arrive here. */
- if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
- {
- s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
- if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
- sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
- s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
- /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
- * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
-
- sk=NULL;
-
- ret=1;
- if (0)
- {
-f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
- }
-err:
- if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
- if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
- return(ret);
- }
+{
+ int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
+ const unsigned char *p, *q;
+ unsigned char *d;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
+
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
+ -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return ((int)n);
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+ if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
+ (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
+ */
+ if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ n2l3(p, llen);
+ if (llen + 3 != n) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
+ n2l3(p, l);
+ if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ q = p;
+ x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (p != (q + l)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ x = NULL;
+ nc += l + 3;
+ }
+
+ if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
+ /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
+ else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
+ (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
+ X509_free(s->session->peer);
+ s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
+ s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
+
+ /*
+ * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
+ * arrive here.
+ */
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
+ s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
+ sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
+ s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
+ /*
+ * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
+ * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
+ */
+
+ sk = NULL;
+
+ ret = 1;
+ if (0) {
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ }
+ err:
+ if (x != NULL)
+ X509_free(x);
+ if (sk != NULL)
+ sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
+ return (ret);
+}
int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
- {
- unsigned long l;
- X509 *x;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
- {
- x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
- if (x == NULL)
- {
- /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
- if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return(0);
- }
- }
-
- l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
- s->init_num=(int)l;
- s->init_off=0;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
- return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
- }
+{
+ unsigned long l;
+ X509 *x;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
+ x = ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
+ if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ l = ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, x);
+ if (!l) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
+ s->init_num = (int)l;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
+ return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
- {
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
- {
- unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
- const unsigned char *const_p;
- int len, slen_full, slen;
- SSL_SESSION *sess;
- unsigned int hlen;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
- HMAC_CTX hctx;
- SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- unsigned char key_name[16];
-
- /* get session encoding length */
- slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
- /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
- * too long
- */
- if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
- return -1;
- senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
- if (!senc)
- return -1;
- p = senc;
- i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
-
- /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
- const_p = senc;
- sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
- if (sess == NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(senc);
- return -1;
- }
- sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
-
- slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
- if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
- {
- OPENSSL_free(senc);
- return -1;
- }
- p = senc;
- i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
- SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
-
- /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
- * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
- * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
- * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
- * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
- * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
- */
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
- 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
- EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
- return -1;
-
- p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- /* do the header */
- *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
- /* Skip message length for now */
- p += 3;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
- /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
- * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
- * from parent ctx.
- */
- if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
- {
- if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
- &hctx, 1) < 0)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(senc);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- else
- {
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
- EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
- tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
- HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
- tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
- memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
- }
-
- /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
- * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
- * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
- * as their sessions. */
- l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
-
- /* Skip ticket length for now */
- p += 2;
- /* Output key name */
- macstart = p;
- memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
- p += 16;
- /* output IV */
- memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
- p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
- /* Encrypt session data */
- EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
- p += len;
- EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
- p += len;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
- HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
- HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-
- p += hlen;
- /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
- /* Total length */
- len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
- l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
- p += 4;
- s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
-
- /* number of bytes to write */
- s->init_num= len;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
- s->init_off=0;
- OPENSSL_free(senc);
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
- return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
- }
+{
+ unsigned char *senc = NULL;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ HMAC_CTX hctx;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
+ unsigned char *p, *macstart;
+ const unsigned char *const_p;
+ int len, slen_full, slen;
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ unsigned int hlen;
+ SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char key_name[16];
+
+ /* get session encoding length */
+ slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
+ /*
+ * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
+ * long
+ */
+ if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00)
+ return -1;
+ senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
+ if (!senc)
+ return -1;
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+
+ p = senc;
+ if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
+ */
+ const_p = senc;
+ sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
+ if (sess == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
+
+ slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
+ if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p = senc;
+ if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+
+ /*-
+ * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+ * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
+ * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
+ * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
+ * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
+ * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
+ */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
+ 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
+ goto err;
+
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ /* do the header */
+ *(p++) = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
+ /* Skip message length for now */
+ p += 3;
+ /*
+ * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
+ * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
+ */
+ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
+ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
+ &hctx, 1) < 0)
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+ tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
+ goto err;
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+ tlsext_tick_md(), NULL))
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
+ * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
+ * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
+ */
+ l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
+
+ /* Skip ticket length for now */
+ p += 2;
+ /* Output key name */
+ macstart = p;
+ memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
+ p += 16;
+ /* output IV */
+ memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
+ p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+ /* Encrypt session data */
+ if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
+ goto err;
+ p += len;
+ if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
+ goto err;
+ p += len;
+
+ if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
+ goto err;
+ if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
+ goto err;
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+
+ p += hlen;
+ /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
+ /* Total length */
+ len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
+ l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
+ p += 4;
+ s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
+
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num = len;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ OPENSSL_free(senc);
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
+ return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ err:
+ if (senc)
+ OPENSSL_free(senc);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ return -1;
+}
int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
- {
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
- {
- unsigned char *p;
- /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
- * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
- * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
- * + (ocsp response)
- */
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
- return -1;
-
- p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-
- /* do the header */
- *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
- /* message length */
- l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
- /* status type */
- *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
- /* length of OCSP response */
- l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
- /* actual response */
- memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
- /* number of bytes to write */
- s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
- s->init_off = 0;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
- return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
- }
+{
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
+ unsigned char *p;
+ /*-
+ * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+ * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
+ * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
+ * + (ocsp response)
+ */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
+ return -1;
+
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+ /* do the header */
+ *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
+ /* message length */
+ l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
+ /* status type */
+ *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
+ /* length of OCSP response */
+ l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
+ /* actual response */
+ memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
+ return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
- * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
+/*
+ * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
+ * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
+ */
int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
- {
- int ok;
- int proto_len, padding_len;
- long n;
- const unsigned char *p;
-
- /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
- * extension in their ClientHello */
- if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
- return -1;
- }
-
- n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
- SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
- SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
- 514, /* See the payload format below */
- &ok);
-
- if (!ok)
- return((int)n);
-
- /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
- * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
- * by ssl3_get_finished). */
- if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (n < 2)
- return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
-
- p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-
- /* The payload looks like:
- * uint8 proto_len;
- * uint8 proto[proto_len];
- * uint8 padding_len;
- * uint8 padding[padding_len];
- */
- proto_len = p[0];
- if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
- return 0;
- padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
- if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
- return 0;
-
- s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
- if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
- s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
-
- return 1;
- }
+{
+ int ok;
+ int proto_len, padding_len;
+ long n;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+
+ /*
+ * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
+ * extension in their ClientHello
+ */
+ if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
+ SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* See the payload format below */
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
+ SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return ((int)n);
+
+ /*
+ * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
+ * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
+ * ssl3_get_finished).
+ */
+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (n < 2)
+ return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
+
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ /*-
+ * The payload looks like:
+ * uint8 proto_len;
+ * uint8 proto[proto_len];
+ * uint8 padding_len;
+ * uint8 padding[padding_len];
+ */
+ proto_len = p[0];
+ if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
+ return 0;
+ padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
+ if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
+ return 0;
+
+ s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
+ if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
+ s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
+
+ return 1;
+}
# endif
#endif
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff