* OTHERWISE.
*/
-#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
-#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include "kssl_lcl.h"
-#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
+#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
# include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-# include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
-#endif
#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
+static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
+ int num, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp, int sslv2format);
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
-{
- if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
- return (SSLv3_server_method());
- else
- return (NULL);
-}
-IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
- ssl3_accept,
- ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
{
/* init things to blank */
s->in_handshake++;
- if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
- SSL_clear(s);
-
- if (s->cert == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
- return (-1);
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
+ if (!SSL_clear(s))
+ return -1;
}
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
/*
* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
- if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
+ if ((s->version >> 8 != 3) && s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
BUF_MEM_free(buf);
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
s->init_buf = buf;
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
s->init_num = 0;
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
- s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
/*
* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
*/
*/
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
} else {
/*
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
}
ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+
if (s->hit) {
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
- }
-#else
- if (s->hit)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
-#endif
- else
+ } else {
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
+ }
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
- /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
- if (!
- (s->s3->tmp.
- new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 |
- SSL_aSRP))
-&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ /* normal PSK or SRP */
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
+ (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+
if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
else
skip = 1;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
-#else
- } else
- skip = 1;
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
-#endif
s->init_num = 0;
break;
* provided
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
+ /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
+ || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
+ /* For other PSK always send SKE */
+ || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
/* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
* RFC 2246):
*/
((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
- /*
- * ... except when the application insists on
- * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
- * this for SSL 3)
- */
- !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
/*
- * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
+ * ... except when the application insists on
+ * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
+ * this for SSL 3)
*/
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
+ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
/* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
/*
* With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
* are omitted
*/
- || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
/* no cert request */
skip = 1;
s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
- return -1;
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return -1;
+ }
} else {
s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
-#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
-#else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
-#endif
s->init_num = 0;
}
break;
* not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
* its key from the certificate for key exchange.
*/
-#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#else
- if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#endif
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num = 0;
} else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
break;
if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
/*
* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
- * extms we've done this already.
+ * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
*/
- if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
- return -1;
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return -1;
}
} else {
int offset = 0;
* CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
* step
*/
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
- return -1;
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return -1;
+ }
for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
int dgst_size;
dgst_size =
EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
if (dgst_size < 0) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
- /*
- * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
- * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
- * to set this here because we don't know if we're
- * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
- */
- if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
- /* we should decide if we expected this one */
ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
-#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#else
- if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#endif
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
- /*
- * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
- * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
- * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
- * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
- * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
- * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
- * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
- * the client's Finished message is read.
- */
- if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
-
ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
break;
#endif
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_change_cipher_spec(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#else
+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#endif
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
- /*
- * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
- * In a full handshake, we end up here through
- * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
- * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
- * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
- * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
- * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
- * the client's Finished message is read.
- */
- if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (s->hit)
s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-#endif
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
s->init_num = 0;
break;
-#endif
-
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
{
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
goto end;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
if (s->hit) {
-#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#else
- if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
- } else
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#endif
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A;
} else
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
s->init_num = 0;
goto end;
/* break; */
+ case SSL_ST_ERR:
default:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
ret = -1;
{
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
- ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
+ if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
}
int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
- int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
- unsigned int cookie_len;
+ int i, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
+ unsigned int j, cipherlen, complen;
+ unsigned int cookie_len = 0;
long n;
unsigned long id;
- unsigned char *p, *d;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- unsigned char *q;
+ unsigned char *q = NULL;
SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
#endif
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
+ int protverr = 1;
+ PACKET pkt;
+ unsigned char *sess, *cdata;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
goto retry_cert;
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
s->first_packet = 0;
- d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n);
- /*
- * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
- * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
- */
- s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
- p += 2;
-
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
- s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
- : (s->client_version < s->version)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
- !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
+ /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
+ if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
+ unsigned int version;
+ unsigned int mt;
+ /*-
+ * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
+ * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
+ * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
+ * the rest right through. Its format is:
+ * Byte Content
+ * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
+ * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
+ * 3-4 version
+ * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
+ * 7-8 session_id_length
+ * 9-10 challenge_length
+ * ... ...
+ */
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &mt)
+ || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+ /*
+ * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
+ * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
+ * in the first place
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &version)) {
+ /* No protocol version supplied! */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (version == 0x0002) {
+ /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
+ goto err;
+ } else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
+ /* SSLv3/TLS */
+ s->client_version = version;
+ } else {
+ /* No idea what protocol this is */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
+ * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
+ */
+ if(!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable */
+ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
+ if (s->client_version >= s->version) {
+ protverr = 0;
+ }
+ } else if (s->client_version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
+ switch(s->client_version) {
+ default:
+ case TLS1_2_VERSION:
+ if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) {
+ s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+ s->method = TLSv1_2_server_method();
+ protverr = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Deliberately fall through */
+ case TLS1_1_VERSION:
+ if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) {
+ s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+ s->method = TLSv1_1_server_method();
+ protverr = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Deliberately fall through */
+ case TLS1_VERSION:
+ if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) {
+ s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
+ s->method = TLSv1_server_method();
+ protverr = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Deliberately fall through */
+ case SSL3_VERSION:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+ if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
+ s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
+ s->method = SSLv3_server_method();
+ protverr = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (s->client_version <= s->version
+ || s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
+ /*
+ * For DTLS we just check versions are potentially compatible. Version
+ * negotiation comes later.
+ */
+ protverr = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (protverr) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
+ if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
/*
* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
* number
goto f_err;
}
- /*
- * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
- * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
- * cookie length...
- */
- if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
- unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
-
- session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
+ if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
+ /*
+ * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
+ * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
+ * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
+ */
+ unsigned int csl, sil, cl;
- if (cookie_length == 0)
- return 1;
- }
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &csl)
+ || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &sil)
+ || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &cl)) {
+ }
- /* load the client random */
- memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+ if (csl == 0) {
+ /* we need at least one cipher */
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
- /* get the session-id */
- j = *(p++);
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &cdata, csl)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
- s->hit = 0;
- /*
- * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
- * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
- * ignore resumption requests with flag
- * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
- * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
- * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
- * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
- * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
- * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
- * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
- */
- if ((s->new_session
- && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
+ if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, cdata, csl, &(ciphers), 1) == NULL) {
goto err;
- } else {
- i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
+ }
+
/*
- * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
- * version.
- * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
- * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
- * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
- * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
- * will abort the handshake with an error.
+ * Ignore any session id. We don't allow resumption in a backwards
+ * compatible ClientHello
*/
- if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
- * session */
- s->hit = 1;
- } else if (i == -1)
+ if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, sil)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->hit = 0;
+
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
goto err;
- else { /* i == 0 */
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
- goto err;
+ /* Load the client random */
+ i = (cl > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : cl;
+ memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ if (!PACKET_peek_copy_bytes(&pkt, s->s3->client_random, i)
+ || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, cl)
+ || !PACKET_remaining(&pkt) == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
}
- }
- p += j;
+ /* No compression, so set complen to 0 */
+ complen = 0;
+ } else {
+ /* If we get here we've got SSLv3+ in an SSLv3+ record */
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /* cookie stuff */
- cookie_len = *(p++);
+ /* load the client random and get the session-id */
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
+ || !PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &j)
+ || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &sess, j)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
/*
- * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
- * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
- * does not cause an overflow.
+ * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
+ * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
+ * cookie length...
*/
- if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
- /* too much data */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
+ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
+
+ if (!PACKET_peek_1(&pkt, &cookie_len)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (cookie_len == 0)
+ return 1;
}
- /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
- if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
- memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
+ s->hit = 0;
+ /*
+ * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
+ * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
+ * ignore resumption requests with flag
+ * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
+ * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
+ * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
+ * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
+ * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
+ * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
+ * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
+ * ignored.
+ */
+ if ((s->new_session
+ && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &pkt, sess, j);
+ /*
+ * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
+ * version.
+ * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
+ * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
+ * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
+ * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
+ * will abort the handshake with an error.
+ */
+ if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
+ /* previous session */
+ s->hit = 1;
+ } else if (i == -1)
+ goto err;
+ else {
+ /* i == 0 */
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
- if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
- if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
- cookie_len) == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* else cookie verification succeeded */
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &cookie_len)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
}
- /* default verification */
- else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
- s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ /*
+ * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
+ * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
+ * does not cause an overflow.
+ */
+ if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
+ /* too much data */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
- /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
- ret = -2;
- }
- p += cookie_len;
- if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
- /* Select version to use */
- if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
- s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
- s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
- } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
- s->version = s->client_version;
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
- } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
- s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
- s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
+ /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
+ if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
+ && cookie_len > 0) {
+ /* Get cookie */
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
+ cookie_len)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
+ if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
+ cookie_len) == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* else cookie verification succeeded */
+ }
+ /* default verification */
+ else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
+ s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
+ ret = -2;
} else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- s->version = s->client_version;
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
+ /* Skip over cookie */
+ if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, cookie_len)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
+ /* Select version to use */
+ if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
+ s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
+ s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
+ } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
+ s->version = s->client_version;
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
+ s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
+ s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ s->version = s->client_version;
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
}
- s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
}
- }
- n2s(p, i);
- if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) {
- /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if ((p + i) >= (d + n)) {
- /* not enough data */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers))
- == NULL)) {
- goto err;
- }
- p += i;
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &cipherlen)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (cipherlen == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
- /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
- if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) {
- j = 0;
- id = s->session->cipher->id;
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &cdata, cipherlen)) {
+ /* not enough data */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, cdata, cipherlen, &(ciphers), 0) == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
+ if (s->hit) {
+ j = 0;
+ id = s->session->cipher->id;
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
+ fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
#endif
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
- c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
- i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
+ fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
+ i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
#endif
- if (c->id == id) {
- j = 1;
- break;
+ if (c->id == id) {
+ j = 1;
+ break;
+ }
}
- }
- /*
- * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
- * CVE-2010-4180.
- */
-#if 0
- if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
- && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
/*
- * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
- * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
- * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
- * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
- * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
+ * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
+ * attack:
+ * CVE-2010-4180.
*/
- c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
- if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
- s->session->cipher = c;
- j = 1;
+#if 0
+ if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
+ && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
+ /*
+ * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
+ * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
+ * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
+ * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
+ * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
+ */
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
+ if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
+ s->session->cipher = c;
+ j = 1;
+ }
}
- }
#endif
- if (j == 0) {
- /*
- * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
- * to reuse it
- */
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
+ if (j == 0) {
+ /*
+ * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
+ * to reuse it
+ */
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* compression */
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &complen)
+ || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &cdata, complen)) {
+ /* not enough data */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
- }
- /* compression */
- i = *(p++);
- if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
- /* not enough data */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- q = p;
+ q = cdata;
#endif
- for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
- if (p[j] == 0)
- break;
- }
+ for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
+ if (cdata[j] == 0)
+ break;
+ }
- p += i;
- if (j >= i) {
- /* no compress */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
- goto f_err;
+ if (j >= complen) {
+ /* no compress */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+
/* TLS extensions */
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
- if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
+ if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
}
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
-
- if (s->cipher_list)
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
-
- if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
-
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
}
}
-#endif
/*
* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
- * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
+ * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
* algorithms from the client, starting at q.
*/
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
/* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
+ unsigned int k;
/* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
/* Can't disable compression */
if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
goto f_err;
}
/* Look for resumed method in compression list */
- for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
- if (q[m] == comp_id)
+ for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) {
+ if (q[k] == comp_id)
break;
}
- if (m >= i) {
+ if (k >= complen) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
comp = NULL;
else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
/* See if we have a match */
- int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
+ int m, nn, v, done = 0;
+ unsigned int o;
nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
v = comp->id;
- for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
+ for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) {
if (v == q[o]) {
done = 1;
break;
#else
s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
#endif
- if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
if (ciphers == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
ciphers = NULL;
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
} else {
/* Session-id reuse */
-#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
- SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
- SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
-
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
- sk = s->session->ciphers;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
- c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
- if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
- nc = c;
- if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
- ec = c;
- }
- if (nc != NULL)
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
- else if (ec != NULL)
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
- else
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
- } else
-#endif
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
}
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
goto f_err;
}
if (0) {
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- }
err:
- if (ciphers != NULL)
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ }
+
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
}
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- p = s->s3->server_random;
- if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
- return -1;
-#endif
+
/* Do the message type and length last */
d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
*(p++) = s->version >> 8;
*(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
- /* Random stuff */
+ /*
+ * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
+ * ssl3_get_client_hello()
+ */
memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
sl = s->session->session_id_length;
if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
*(p++) = sl;
else
*(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+
if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
if ((p =
&al)) == NULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
-#endif
+
/* do the header */
l = (p - d);
- ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
+ if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
}
{
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
- ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
+ if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
int encodedlen = 0;
r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
n = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (type & SSL_PSK) {
+ /*
+ * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
+ */
+ n += 2;
+ if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
+ n += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ }
+ /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
+ if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
+ } else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (type & SSL_kDHE) {
+ if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
if (dhp == NULL) {
r[2] = dh->pub_key;
} else
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
const EC_GROUP *group;
ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
* additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
* structure.
*/
- n = 4 + encodedlen;
+ n += 4 + encodedlen;
/*
* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
r[2] = NULL;
r[3] = NULL;
} else
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
- /*
- * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
- */
- n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
- } else
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
n += 2 + nr[i];
}
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
- && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
+ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
== NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
}
d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (type & SSL_PSK) {
+ /* copy PSK identity hint */
+ if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) {
+ s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
+ strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
+ strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
+ p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ } else {
+ s2n(0, p);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
p += nr[i];
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
/*
* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
* this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
p += 1;
*p = encodedlen;
p += 1;
- memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
- (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
+ memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen);
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
encodedPoint = NULL;
p += encodedlen;
}
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
- /* copy PSK identity hint */
- s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
- strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
- strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
- p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
- }
-#endif
-
/* not anonymous */
if (pkey != NULL) {
/*
}
}
- ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
+ if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
}
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (encodedPoint != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
s2n(nl, p);
- ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
-
-#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
- if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
- /* do the header */
- *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
- *(p++) = 0;
- *(p++) = 0;
- *(p++) = 0;
- s->init_num += 4;
+ if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
}
-#endif
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
return ssl_do_write(s);
err:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
BIGNUM *pub = NULL;
DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
+ if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
+ unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
+ size_t psklen;
+ if (n < 2) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ n2s(p, i);
+ if (i + 2 > n) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
+ s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
+
+ if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
+ psk, sizeof(psk));
+
+ if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else if (psklen == 0) {
+ /*
+ * PSK related to the given identity not found
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+ al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
+ s->s3->tmp.psk = BUF_memdup(psk, psklen);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
+
+ n -= i + 2;
+ p += i;
+ }
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+ /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
+ if (n != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
+ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
int decrypt_len;
unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
* fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
*/
- /*
- * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
- */
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
+ if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
goto err;
decrypt_len =
rand_premaster_secret[j]);
}
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- p,
- sizeof
- (rand_premaster_secret));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
+ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
int idx = -1;
EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
- if (n)
+ if (n > 1) {
n2s(p, i);
- else
+ } else {
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
i = 0;
+ }
if (n && n != i + 2) {
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
i = (int)n;
}
}
- if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
- idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
- idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
- if (idx >= 0) {
- skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
- if ((skey == NULL) ||
- (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
- } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- } else
- dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
-
- if (n == 0L) {
- /* Get pubkey from cert */
- EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
- if (clkey) {
- if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
- dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
- }
- if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
- EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
- pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
- } else
- pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
- if (pub == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
-
- if (i <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- BN_clear_free(pub);
- goto err;
- }
-
- DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
- s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
- if (dh_clnt)
- DH_free(dh_clnt);
- else
- BN_clear_free(pub);
- pub = NULL;
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- p, i);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
- if (dh_clnt)
- return 2;
- } else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
- krb5_error_code krb5rc;
- krb5_data enc_ticket;
- krb5_data authenticator;
- krb5_data enc_pms;
- KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
- const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
- int padl, outl;
- krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
- krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
-
- if (!kssl_ctx)
- kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
-
- n2s(p, i);
- enc_ticket.length = i;
-
- if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
- p += enc_ticket.length;
-
- n2s(p, i);
- authenticator.length = i;
-
- if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- authenticator.data = (char *)p;
- p += authenticator.length;
-
- n2s(p, i);
- enc_pms.length = i;
- enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
- p += enc_pms.length;
-
- /*
- * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
- */
- if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
- enc_pms.length + 6)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
- &kssl_err)) != 0) {
-# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
- krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
- if (kssl_err.text)
- fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
-# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
- * return authtime == 0.
- */
- if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
- &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
-# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
- krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
- if (kssl_err.text)
- fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
-# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
- goto err;
- }
-# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
-# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
- if (enc == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
-
- if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
- (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- outl += padl;
- if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
- && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
- /*
- * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
- * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
- * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
- * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
- * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
- * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
- * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
- * cipher)
- */
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
+ idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
+ idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
+ if (idx >= 0) {
+ skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
+ if ((skey == NULL) ||
+ (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
+ goto f_err;
}
- }
+ dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
+ } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else
+ dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
+ if (n == 0L) {
+ /* Get pubkey from cert */
+ EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+ if (clkey) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
+ dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
+ }
+ if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
+ pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
+ } else
+ pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
+ if (pub == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- pms, outl);
+ i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
- if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
- size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
- if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
- s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
- memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
- len);
- }
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ BN_clear_free(pub);
+ goto err;
}
- /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
- * but it caused problems for apache.
- * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
- * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
- */
+ DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
+ s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
+ if (dh_clnt)
+ DH_free(dh_clnt);
+ else
+ BN_clear_free(pub);
+ pub = NULL;
+ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, p, i, 0)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (dh_clnt)
+ return 2;
} else
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
int ret = 1;
int field_size = 0;
const EC_KEY *tkey;
if (n == 0L) {
/* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
- if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
- /* Compute the master secret */
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- p, i);
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
- return (ret);
- } else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
- unsigned char *t = NULL;
- unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
- unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
- int psk_err = 1;
- char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
-
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-
- n2s(p, i);
- if (n != i + 2) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto psk_err;
- }
- if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto psk_err;
- }
- if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
- goto psk_err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
- */
- memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
- memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
- psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
- psk_or_pre_ms,
- sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
-
- if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
+ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, p, i, 0)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto psk_err;
- } else if (psk_len == 0) {
- /*
- * PSK related to the given identity not found
- */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
- al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
- goto psk_err;
- }
-
- /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
- pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
- t = psk_or_pre_ms;
- memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
- s2n(psk_len, t);
- memset(t, 0, psk_len);
- t += psk_len;
- s2n(psk_len, t);
-
- if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
- s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
- if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto psk_err;
- }
-
- if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
- s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
- if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
- s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto psk_err;
- }
-
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- psk_or_pre_ms,
- pre_ms_len);
- psk_err = 0;
- psk_err:
- OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
- if (psk_err != 0)
goto f_err;
+ }
+ return (ret);
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
- if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
- if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- if ((s->session->master_key_length =
- SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
+ if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
goto gerr;
}
/* Generate master secret */
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- premaster_secret, 32);
+ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
+ sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
- else
- goto err;
+ goto err;
} else {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
return (1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
err:
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
- if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
- EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
+ EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
+ s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
+#endif
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char *sig, *data;
int al, ok, ret = 0;
long n;
int type = 0, i, j;
+ unsigned int len;
X509 *peer;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
+ PACKET pkt;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
+ /*
+ * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
+ * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
+ * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
+ * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
+ * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
+ * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
+ */
+ if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
+ ret = 1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
- -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
+ SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
- if (s->session->peer != NULL) {
- peer = s->session->peer;
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
- type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
- } else {
- peer = NULL;
- pkey = NULL;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
- if (peer != NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- ret = 1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (peer == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- goto f_err;
- }
+ peer = s->session->peer;
+ pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
+ type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
goto f_err;
}
- if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
-
- /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
/* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
/*
* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
*/
if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
- i = 64;
+ len = 64;
} else {
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
+ int rv;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &sig, 2)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
if (rv == -1) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
- p += 2;
- n -= 2;
}
- n2s(p, i);
- n -= 2;
- if (i > n) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &len)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
}
j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
- if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
+ if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(&pkt) > j) || (n <= 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, len)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
long hdatalen = 0;
goto f_err;
}
- if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
+ if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
- MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, data, len,
pkey->pkey.rsa);
if (i < 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
- SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, data, len, pkey->pkey.dsa);
if (j <= 0) {
/* bad signature */
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
}
} else
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
- SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, data, len, pkey->pkey.ec);
if (j <= 0) {
/* bad signature */
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
int idx;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
- if (i != 64) {
- fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
+ if (len != 64) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", len);
}
for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
- signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
+ signature[63 - idx] = data[idx];
}
j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
32);
if (0) {
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
}
end:
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
- BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
- s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
- }
+ BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
+ s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return (ret);
{
int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
X509 *x = NULL;
- unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
- const unsigned char *p, *q;
- unsigned char *d;
+ unsigned long l, llen, n;
+ const unsigned char *certstart;
+ unsigned char *certbytes;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
+ PACKET pkt, spkt;
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
- p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
+ goto done;
}
- n2l3(p, llen);
- if (llen + 3 != n) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&pkt, &llen)
+ || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &spkt, llen)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
- for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
- n2l3(p, l);
- if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
+
+ while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
+ || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
- q = p;
- x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
+ certstart = certbytes;
+ x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
if (x == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto err;
+ goto done;
}
- if (p != (q + l)) {
+ if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
}
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
+ goto done;
}
x = NULL;
- nc += l + 3;
}
if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
goto f_err;
}
/* No client certificate so digest cached records */
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
- if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
- X509_free(s->session->peer);
+ X509_free(s->session->peer);
s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
- /*
- * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
- * arrive here.
- */
- if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
- s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
- if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
- sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
- s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
+ sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
+ s->session->peer_chain = sk;
/*
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
* certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
*/
-
sk = NULL;
-
ret = 1;
- if (0) {
+ goto done;
+
f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- }
- err:
- if (x != NULL)
- X509_free(x);
- if (sk != NULL)
- sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ done:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ X509_free(x);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
return (ret);
}
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
if (cpk == NULL) {
- /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
- if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return (0);
- }
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return (0);
}
if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (0);
}
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
return ssl_do_write(s);
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
{
+ unsigned char *senc = NULL;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ HMAC_CTX hctx;
+
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
- unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
+ unsigned char *p, *macstart;
const unsigned char *const_p;
int len, slen_full, slen;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned int hlen;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
- HMAC_CTX hctx;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char key_name[16];
* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
* long
*/
- if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
+ if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
+ }
senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
- if (!senc)
+ if (!senc) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
+ }
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+
p = senc;
- i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
+ if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
+ goto err;
/*
* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
*/
const_p = senc;
sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
- if (sess == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(senc);
- return -1;
- }
+ if (sess == NULL)
+ goto err;
sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
- if (slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
- OPENSSL_free(senc);
- return -1;
+ if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+ goto err;
}
p = senc;
- i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
+ if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+ goto err;
+ }
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
/*-
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
- return -1;
+ goto err;
+
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
/*
* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
* all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
*/
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
- &hctx, 1) < 0) {
- OPENSSL_free(senc);
- return -1;
- }
+ &hctx, 1) < 0)
+ goto err;
} else {
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
- EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
- tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
- HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
- EVP_sha256(), NULL);
+ if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+ tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
+ goto err;
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+ EVP_sha256(), NULL))
+ goto err;
memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
}
memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
/* Encrypt session data */
- EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
+ if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
+ goto err;
p += len;
- EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
+ if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
+ goto err;
p += len;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
- HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
+ if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
+ goto err;
+ if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
+ goto err;
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
p += hlen;
/* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
/* Total length */
len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
- ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
/* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
s2n(len - 6, p);
+ if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len))
+ goto err;
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
OPENSSL_free(senc);
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
return ssl_do_write(s);
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(senc);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return -1;
}
int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
* 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
* + (ocsp response)
*/
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
+ }
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/*
* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
* It sets the next_proto member in s if found
if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
*/
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
- if (n < 2)
+ if (n < 2) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
+ }
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
* uint8 padding[padding_len];
*/
proto_len = p[0];
- if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
+ if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return 0;
+ }
padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
- if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
+ if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return 0;
+ }
s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return 0;
}
memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
return 1;
}
-# endif
+#endif
+
+#define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
+ int num,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
+ int sslv2format)
+{
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+ int i, n;
+
+ if (s->s3)
+ s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
+
+ if(sslv2format) {
+ n = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN;
+ } else {
+ n = ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+ if (n == 0 || (num % n) != 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
+ SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
+ sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
+ if(sk == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ sk = *skp;
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw);
+ s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = BUF_memdup(p, num);
+ if (s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = (size_t)num;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num; i += n) {
+ /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
+ if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
+ (p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
+ (p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
+ /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
+ if (s->renegotiate) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
+ SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
+ p += n;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n");
#endif
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
+ if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
+ (p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
+ (p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
+ /*
+ * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
+ * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
+ * downgrade.
+ */
+ if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
+ SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ if (s->s3)
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
+ SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += n;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if(sslv2format) {
+ /*
+ * We only support SSLv2 format ciphers in SSLv3+ using a
+ * SSLv2 backward compatible ClientHello. In this case the first
+ * byte is always 0 for SSLv3 compatible ciphers. Anything else
+ * is an SSLv2 cipher and we ignore it
+ */
+ if(p[0] == 0)
+ c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &p[1]);
+ else
+ c = NULL;
+ } else {
+ c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
+ }
+ p += n;
+ if (c != NULL) {
+ if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (skp != NULL)
+ *skp = sk;
+ return (sk);
+ err:
+ if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
+ return (NULL);
+}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff