#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include "kssl_lcl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
# include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif
+static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s);
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
#endif
+static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
+ unsigned char *p,
+ int (*put_cb) (const SSL_CIPHER *,
+ unsigned char *));
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
-{
- if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
- return (SSLv3_client_method());
- else
- return (NULL);
-}
-IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
- ssl_undefined_function,
- ssl3_connect, ssl3_get_client_method)
-#endif
int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
- if ((s->version & 0xff00) != 0x0300) {
+ if ((s->version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
+ && s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
- if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
+ if (s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION &&
+ !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
return -1;
}
return (ret);
}
+/*
+ * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if
+ * the version is currently set to (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION.
+ * Returns 1 on success
+ * Returns 0 on error
+ */
+static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned long mask, options = s->options;
+
+ if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
+ /*
+ * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are
+ * some protocols below X enabled. This is required in order
+ * to maintain "version capability" vector contiguous. So
+ * that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favour of
+ * TLS1>=1, it would be insufficient to pass SSL_NO_TLSv1, the
+ * answer is SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3.
+ */
+ mask = SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 | SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
+ | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
+#endif
+ ;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT)
+ if (options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2) {
+ if ((options & mask) != mask) {
+ s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+ }
+#else
+ if ((options & mask) == mask) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+#endif
+
+ mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
+ if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1) && (options & mask) != mask)
+ s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
+ mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
+ if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1) && (options & mask) != mask)
+ s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
+#endif
+
+ if (s->version != TLS1_2_VERSION && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION,
+ SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && FIPS_mode()) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ } else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
+ /* Determine which DTLS version to use */
+ /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
+ if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) {
+ if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION,
+ SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
+ */
+ if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
+ */
+ s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
+ s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * We only support one version: update method
+ */
+ if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)
+ s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
+ s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
+ }
+ }
+
+ s->client_version = s->version;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
+
+ /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
+ if (ssl_set_version(s) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
!sess->session_id_length ||
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
goto err;
}
- if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
- /* Determine which DTLS version to use */
- int options = s->options;
- /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
- if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) {
- if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
- goto err;
- }
- /*
- * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
- */
- if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
- goto err;
- }
- /*
- * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
- */
- s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
- s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
- } else {
- /*
- * We only support one version: update method
- */
- if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)
- s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
- s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
- }
- s->client_version = s->version;
- }
/* else use the pre-loaded session */
p = s->s3->client_random;
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
- CERT *ct = s->cert;
unsigned char *p, *d;
int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ok;
unsigned int j;
}
d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
- if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
+
+ if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
+ int sversion = (p[0] << 8) | p[1];
+
+#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
+#error Code needs updating for new TLS version
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+ if ((sversion == SSL3_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->method = SSLv3_client_method();
+ } else
+#endif
+ if ((sversion == TLS1_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) {
+ s->method = TLSv1_client_method();
+ } else if ((sversion == TLS1_1_VERSION) &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) {
+ s->method = TLSv1_1_client_method();
+ } else if ((sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION) &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) {
+ s->method = TLSv1_2_client_method();
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version;
+
+ if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
/* Work out correct protocol version to use */
int hversion = (p[0] << 8) | p[1];
int options = s->options;
goto f_err;
}
s->version = s->method->version;
- }
-
- if ((p[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
+ } else if ((p[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | p[1];
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
}
/* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
- ct->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
+ s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
else
- ct->mask_ssl = 0;
+ s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
/*
* If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
* return an error.
int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
{
- int al, i, ok, ret = -1;
+ int al, i, ok, ret = -1, exp_idx;
unsigned long n, nc, llen, l;
X509 *x = NULL;
const unsigned char *q, *p;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
SESS_CERT *sc;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth ==
- * KRB5 */
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
- if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
- ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) &&
- (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE))) {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
return (1);
}
}
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
- if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
- ) {
+ if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
- /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
- need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
- ? 0 : 1;
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey, x);
- fprintf(stderr, "ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x, pkey));
- fprintf(stderr, "cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n",
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))) {
+ if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
}
i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
- if (need_cert && i < 0) {
+ if (i < 0) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
goto f_err;
}
- if (need_cert) {
- int exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
- if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx) {
- x = NULL;
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- sc->peer_cert_type = i;
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- /*
- * Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
- * of lines ago.
- */
- X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
- sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = x;
- sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
-
- X509_free(s->session->peer);
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- s->session->peer = x;
- } else {
- sc->peer_cert_type = i;
- sc->peer_key = NULL;
-
- X509_free(s->session->peer);
- s->session->peer = NULL;
+ exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+ if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx) {
+ x = NULL;
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
}
+ sc->peer_cert_type = i;
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ /*
+ * Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
+ * of lines ago.
+ */
+ X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
+ sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = x;
+ sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
+
+ X509_free(s->session->peer);
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ s->session->peer = x;
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
x = NULL;
}
param_len += i;
- if (!(s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ if ((s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
param_len += i;
- if (!(s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ if ((s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
param_len += i;
- if (!(s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ if ((s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
param_len += i;
- if (!(s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ if ((s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
param_len += i;
- if (!(rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->n))) {
+ if ((rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->n)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
param_len += i;
- if (!(rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->e))) {
+ if ((rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->e)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
param_len += i;
- if (!(dh->p = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ if ((dh->p = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
param_len += i;
- if (!(dh->g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ if ((dh->g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
param_len += i;
- if (!(dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ if ((dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
/* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
- s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
- s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
+ s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
+ s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
}
if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, p, llen)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
unsigned char *q;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
}
}
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
- krb5_error_code krb5rc;
- KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
- /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
- krb5_data *enc_ticket;
- krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
- const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
-
-# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
- alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
-# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- authp = NULL;
-# ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
- if (KRB5SENDAUTH)
- authp = &authenticator;
-# endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
-
- krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp, &kssl_err);
- enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
- if (enc == NULL)
- goto err;
-# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
- if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
- fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n",
- kssl_err.text);
- }
-# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (krb5rc) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*-
- * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
- * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
- *
- * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
- * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
- * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
- * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
- * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
- *
- * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
- * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
- * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
- * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
- * Example:
- * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
- * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
- * optional authenticator omitted.
- */
-
- /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
- s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
- memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
- p += enc_ticket->length;
- n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
-
- /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
- if (authp && authp->length) {
- s2n(authp->length, p);
- memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
- p += authp->length;
- n += authp->length + 2;
-
- free(authp->data);
- authp->data = NULL;
- authp->length = 0;
- } else {
- s2n(0, p); /* null authenticator length */
- n += 2;
- }
-
- pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
- pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
- if (!pms)
- goto memerr;
-
- pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
- pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
- if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- /*-
- * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
- * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
- * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
- * kssl_ctx->length);
- * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
- */
-
- memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
- EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);
- EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, pms, pmslen);
- EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl);
- outl += padl;
- if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
-
- /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
- s2n(outl, p);
- memcpy(p, epms, outl);
- p += outl;
- n += outl + 2;
- OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
- }
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
/* Encoded point will be copied here */
p += 1;
/* copy the point */
- memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
+ memcpy(p, encodedPoint, n);
/* increment n to account for length field */
n += 1;
}
#endif
/* If we haven't written everything save PMS */
if (n <= 0) {
- s->cert->pms = pms;
- s->cert->pmslen = pmslen;
+ s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
+ s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
} else {
/* If we don't have a PMS restore */
if (pms == NULL) {
- pms = s->cert->pms;
- pmslen = s->cert->pmslen;
+ pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
+ pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
}
if (pms == NULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
session->master_key,
pms, pmslen);
OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
- s->cert->pms = NULL;
+ s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
err:
OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
- s->cert->pms = NULL;
+ s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
long hdatalen = 0;
void *hdata;
- const EVP_MD *md = s->cert->key->digest;
+ const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
return 0;
/* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->cert->key->digest)
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])
return 0;
/*
* If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
return (1);
} else {
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return 0;
+ }
}
}
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
/* we don't have a certificate */
- if ((alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
+ if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
return (1);
sc = s->session->sess_cert;
i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
return i;
}
+
+int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
+ unsigned char *p,
+ int (*put_cb) (const SSL_CIPHER *,
+ unsigned char *))
+{
+ int i, j = 0;
+ SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ unsigned char *q;
+ int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
+ /* Set disabled masks for this session */
+ ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
+
+ if (sk == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ q = p;
+ if (put_cb == NULL)
+ put_cb = s->method->put_cipher_by_char;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
+ /* Skip disabled ciphers */
+ if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
+ continue;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
+ if (c->id == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
+ if (!empty_reneg_info_scsv)
+ continue;
+ else
+ empty_reneg_info_scsv = 0;
+ }
+#endif
+ j = put_cb(c, p);
+ p += j;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
+ * applicable SCSVs.
+ */
+ if (p != q) {
+ if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
+ static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
+ 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+ };
+ j = put_cb(&scsv, p);
+ p += j;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
+#endif
+ }
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
+ static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
+ 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+ };
+ j = put_cb(&scsv, p);
+ p += j;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (p - q);
+}