* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver);
int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s);
static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver)
- {
+{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
- if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
- return(SSLv3_server_method());
+ if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
+ return (SSLv3_server_method());
#endif
- if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
- return(TLSv1_server_method());
- else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
- return(TLSv1_1_server_method());
- else if (ver == TLS1_2_VERSION)
- return(TLSv1_2_server_method());
- else
- return(NULL);
- }
-
-IMPLEMENT_ssl23_meth_func(SSLv23_server_method,
- ssl23_accept,
- ssl_undefined_function,
- ssl23_get_server_method)
+ if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
+ return (TLSv1_server_method());
+ else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
+ return (TLSv1_1_server_method());
+ else if (ver == TLS1_2_VERSION)
+ return (TLSv1_2_server_method());
+ else
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
int ssl23_accept(SSL *s)
- {
- BUF_MEM *buf;
- unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
- void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
- int ret= -1;
- int new_state,state;
-
- RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
- ERR_clear_error();
- clear_sys_error();
-
- if (s->info_callback != NULL)
- cb=s->info_callback;
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
- cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
-
- s->in_handshake++;
- if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
-
- for (;;)
- {
- state=s->state;
-
- switch(s->state)
- {
- case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
- case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
- case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
- case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
-
- s->server=1;
- if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
-
- /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
- s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
-
- if (s->init_buf == NULL)
- {
- if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
- {
- ret= -1;
- goto end;
- }
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
- {
- BUF_MEM_free(buf);
- ret= -1;
- goto end;
- }
- s->init_buf=buf;
- }
-
- ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
-
- s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
- s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
- s->init_num=0;
- break;
-
- case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
- case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
-
- s->shutdown=0;
- ret=ssl23_get_client_hello(s);
- if (ret >= 0) cb=NULL;
- goto end;
- /* break; */
-
- default:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
- ret= -1;
- goto end;
- /* break; */
- }
-
- if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
- {
- new_state=s->state;
- s->state=state;
- cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
- s->state=new_state;
- }
- }
-end:
- s->in_handshake--;
- if (cb != NULL)
- cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
- return(ret);
- }
+{
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+ unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
+ int ret = -1;
+ int new_state, state;
+
+ RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ clear_sys_error();
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ s->in_handshake++;
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
+ if (!SSL_clear(s))
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ for (;;) {
+ state = s->state;
+
+ switch (s->state) {
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
+ case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+ case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+
+ s->server = 1;
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
+
+ /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
+ s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
+
+ if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
+ if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->init_buf = buf;
+ }
+
+ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+
+ s->state = SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
+
+ s->shutdown = 0;
+ ret = ssl23_get_client_hello(s);
+ if (ret >= 0)
+ cb = NULL;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+
+ default:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+ }
+
+ if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
+ new_state = s->state;
+ s->state = state;
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
+ s->state = new_state;
+ }
+ }
+ end:
+ s->in_handshake--;
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
+ return (ret);
+}
int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
- {
- char buf_space[11]; /* Request this many bytes in initial read.
- * We can detect SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 Client Hellos
- * ('type == 3') correctly only when the following
- * is in a single record, which is not guaranteed by
- * the protocol specification:
- * Byte Content
- * 0 type \
- * 1/2 version > record header
- * 3/4 length /
- * 5 msg_type \
- * 6-8 length > Client Hello message
- * 9/10 client_version /
- */
- char *buf= &(buf_space[0]);
- unsigned char *p,*d,*d_len,*dd;
- unsigned int i;
- unsigned int csl,sil,cl;
- int n=0,j;
- int type=0;
- int v[2];
-
- if (s->state == SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
- {
- /* read the initial header */
- v[0]=v[1]=0;
-
- if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) goto err;
-
- n=ssl23_read_bytes(s, sizeof buf_space);
- if (n != sizeof buf_space) return(n); /* n == -1 || n == 0 */
-
- p=s->packet;
-
- memcpy(buf,p,n);
-
- if ((p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO))
- {
- /*
- * SSLv2 header
- */
- if ((p[3] == 0x00) && (p[4] == 0x02))
- {
- v[0]=p[3]; v[1]=p[4];
- /* SSLv2 */
- }
- else if (p[3] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
- {
- v[0]=p[3]; v[1]=p[4];
- /* SSLv3/TLSv1 */
- if (p[4] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR)
- {
- if (p[4] >= TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
- {
- s->version=TLS1_2_VERSION;
- s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
- }
- else if (p[4] >= TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
- {
- s->version=TLS1_1_VERSION;
- /* type=2; */ /* done later to survive restarts */
- s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
- }
- else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
- {
- s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
- /* type=2; */ /* done later to survive restarts */
- s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
- }
- else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
- {
- s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
- /* type=2; */
- s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
- }
- }
- else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
- {
- s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
- /* type=2; */
- s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
- }
- }
- }
- else if ((p[0] == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) &&
- (p[1] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) &&
- (p[5] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
- ((p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 5 /* silly record length? */)
- || (p[9] >= p[1])))
- {
- /*
- * SSLv3 or tls1 header
- */
-
- v[0]=p[1]; /* major version (= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) */
- /* We must look at client_version inside the Client Hello message
- * to get the correct minor version.
- * However if we have only a pathologically small fragment of the
- * Client Hello message, this would be difficult, and we'd have
- * to read more records to find out.
- * No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like this,
- * so we simply reject such connections to avoid
- * protocol version downgrade attacks. */
- if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
- goto err;
- }
- /* if major version number > 3 set minor to a value
- * which will use the highest version 3 we support.
- * If TLS 2.0 ever appears we will need to revise
- * this....
- */
- if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
- v[1]=0xff;
- else
- v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */
- if (v[1] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR)
- {
- if (v[1] >= TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
- {
- s->version=TLS1_2_VERSION;
- type=3;
- }
- else if (v[1] >= TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
- {
- s->version=TLS1_1_VERSION;
- type=3;
- }
- else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
- {
- s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
- type=3;
- }
- else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
- {
- s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
- type=3;
- }
- }
- else
- {
- /* client requests SSL 3.0 */
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
- {
- s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
- type=3;
- }
- else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
- {
- /* we won't be able to use TLS of course,
- * but this will send an appropriate alert */
- s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
- type=3;
- }
- }
- }
- else if ((strncmp("GET ", (char *)p,4) == 0) ||
- (strncmp("POST ",(char *)p,5) == 0) ||
- (strncmp("HEAD ",(char *)p,5) == 0) ||
- (strncmp("PUT ", (char *)p,4) == 0))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
- goto err;
- }
- else if (strncmp("CONNECT",(char *)p,7) == 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
- OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
-
- if (s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION && tls1_suiteb(s))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (FIPS_mode() && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (s->state == SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B)
- {
- /* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 in an SSLv2 header
- * (other cases skip this state) */
-
- type=2;
- p=s->packet;
- v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
- v[1] = p[4];
-
- /*-
- * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
- * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
- * record. It's format is:
- * Byte Content
- * 0-1 msg_length
- * 2 msg_type
- * 3-4 version
- * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
- * 7-8 session_id_length
- * 9-10 challenge_length
- * ... ...
- */
- n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1];
- if (n > (1024*4))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (n < 9)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
-
- j=ssl23_read_bytes(s,n+2);
- /* We previously read 11 bytes, so if j > 0, we must have
- * j == n+2 == s->packet_length. We have at least 11 valid
- * packet bytes. */
- if (j <= 0) return(j);
-
- ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2);
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* CLIENT-HELLO */
-
- p=s->packet;
- p+=5;
- n2s(p,csl);
- n2s(p,sil);
- n2s(p,cl);
- d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- if ((csl+sil+cl+11) != s->packet_length) /* We can't have TLS extensions in SSL 2.0 format
- * Client Hello, can we? Error condition should be
- * '>' otherweise */
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* record header: msg_type ... */
- *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
- /* ... and length (actual value will be written later) */
- d_len = d;
- d += 3;
-
- /* client_version */
- *(d++) = SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR; /* == v[0] */
- *(d++) = v[1];
-
- /* lets populate the random area */
- /* get the challenge_length */
- i=(cl > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)?SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE:cl;
- memset(d,0,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- memcpy(&(d[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-i]),&(p[csl+sil]),i);
- d+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
- /* no session-id reuse */
- *(d++)=0;
-
- /* ciphers */
- j=0;
- dd=d;
- d+=2;
- for (i=0; i<csl; i+=3)
- {
- if (p[i] != 0) continue;
- *(d++)=p[i+1];
- *(d++)=p[i+2];
- j+=2;
- }
- s2n(j,dd);
-
- /* COMPRESSION */
- *(d++)=1;
- *(d++)=0;
-
+{
+ /*-
+ * Request this many bytes in initial read.
+ * We can detect SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 Client Hellos
+ * ('type == 3') correctly only when the following
+ * is in a single record, which is not guaranteed by
+ * the protocol specification:
+ * Byte Content
+ * 0 type \
+ * 1/2 version > record header
+ * 3/4 length /
+ * 5 msg_type \
+ * 6-8 length > Client Hello message
+ * 9/10 client_version /
+ */
+ unsigned char buf_space[11];
+ unsigned char *buf = &(buf_space[0]);
+ unsigned char *p, *d, *d_len, *dd;
+ unsigned int i;
+ unsigned int csl, sil, cl;
+ int n = 0, j;
+ int type = 0;
+ int v[2];
+
+ if (s->state == SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
+ /* read the initial header */
+ v[0] = v[1] = 0;
+
+ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
+ goto err;
+
+ n = ssl23_read_bytes(s, sizeof buf_space);
+ if (n != sizeof buf_space)
+ return (n); /* n == -1 || n == 0 */
+
+ p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer);
+
+ memcpy(buf, p, n);
+
+ if ((p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) {
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 header
+ */
+ if ((p[3] == 0x00) && (p[4] == 0x02)) {
+ v[0] = p[3];
+ v[1] = p[4];
+ /* SSLv2 */
+ } else if (p[3] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+ v[0] = p[3];
+ v[1] = p[4];
+ /* SSLv3/TLSv1 */
+ if (p[4] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR) {
+ if (p[4] >= TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) {
+ s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+ s->state = SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+ } else if (p[4] >= TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) {
+ s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+ /*
+ * type=2;
+ *//*
+ * done later to survive restarts
+ */
+ s->state = SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+ } else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) {
+ s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
+ /*
+ * type=2;
+ *//*
+ * done later to survive restarts
+ */
+ s->state = SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+ } else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
+ s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
+ /* type=2; */
+ s->state = SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+ }
+ } else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
+ s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
+ /* type=2; */
+ s->state = SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* p[4] < 5 ... silly record length? */
+ else if ((p[0] == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) &&
+ (p[1] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) &&
+ (p[5] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && ((p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 5)
+ || (p[9] >= p[1]))) {
+ /*
+ * SSLv3 or tls1 header
+ */
+
+ v[0] = p[1]; /* major version (= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) */
+ /*
+ * We must look at client_version inside the Client Hello message
+ * to get the correct minor version. However if we have only a
+ * pathologically small fragment of the Client Hello message, this
+ * would be difficult, and we'd have to read more records to find
+ * out. No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like this,
+ * so we simply reject such connections to avoid protocol version
+ * downgrade attacks.
+ */
+ if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * if major version number > 3 set minor to a value which will
+ * use the highest version 3 we support. If TLS 2.0 ever appears
+ * we will need to revise this....
+ */
+ if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ v[1] = 0xff;
+ else
+ v[1] = p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */
+ if (v[1] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR) {
+ if (v[1] >= TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) {
+ s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+ type = 3;
+ } else if (v[1] >= TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) {
+ s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+ type = 3;
+ } else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) {
+ s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
+ type = 3;
+ } else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
+ s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
+ type = 3;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* client requests SSL 3.0 */
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
+ s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
+ type = 3;
+ } else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) {
+ /*
+ * we won't be able to use TLS of course, but this will
+ * send an appropriate alert
+ */
+ s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
+ type = 3;
+ }
+ }
+ } else if ((strncmp("GET ", (char *)p, 4) == 0) ||
+ (strncmp("POST ", (char *)p, 5) == 0) ||
+ (strncmp("HEAD ", (char *)p, 5) == 0) ||
+ (strncmp("PUT ", (char *)p, 4) == 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
+ goto err;
+ } else if (strncmp("CONNECT", (char *)p, 7) == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
+
+ if (s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (FIPS_mode() && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->state == SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B) {
+ /*
+ * we have SSLv3/TLSv1 in an SSLv2 header (other cases skip this
+ * state)
+ */
+
+ type = 2;
+ p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer);
+ v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
+ v[1] = p[4];
+
+ /*-
+ * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
+ * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
+ * record. It's format is:
+ * Byte Content
+ * 0-1 msg_length
+ * 2 msg_type
+ * 3-4 version
+ * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
+ * 7-8 session_id_length
+ * 9-10 challenge_length
+ * ... ...
+ */
+ n = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1];
+ if (n > (1024 * 4)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (n < 9) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ j = ssl23_read_bytes(s, n + 2);
+ /*
+ * We previously read 11 bytes, so if j > 0, we must have j == n+2 ==
+ * s->packet_length. We have at least 11 valid packet bytes.
+ */
+ if (j <= 0)
+ return (j);
+
+ ssl3_finish_mac(s, RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer) + 2,
+ RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) - 2);
+
+ /* CLIENT-HELLO */
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0,
+ RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer) + 2,
+ RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) - 2, s,
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer);
+ p += 5;
+ n2s(p, csl);
+ n2s(p, sil);
+ n2s(p, cl);
+ d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ if ((csl + sil + cl + 11)
+ != RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer)) {
+ /* We can't have TLS
+ * extensions in SSL
+ * 2.0 format *
+ * Client Hello, can
+ * we? Error
+ * condition should
+ * be * '>'
+ * otherweise */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* record header: msg_type ... */
+ *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ /* ... and length (actual value will be written later) */
+ d_len = d;
+ d += 3;
+
+ /* client_version */
+ *(d++) = SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR; /* == v[0] */
+ *(d++) = v[1];
+
+ /* lets populate the random area */
+ /* get the challenge_length */
+ i = (cl > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : cl;
+ memset(d, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ memcpy(&(d[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - i]), &(p[csl + sil]), i);
+ d += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ /* no session-id reuse */
+ *(d++) = 0;
+
+ /* ciphers */
+ j = 0;
+ dd = d;
+ d += 2;
+ for (i = 0; i < csl; i += 3) {
+ if (p[i] != 0)
+ continue;
+ *(d++) = p[i + 1];
+ *(d++) = p[i + 2];
+ j += 2;
+ }
+ s2n(j, dd);
+
+ /* COMPRESSION */
+ *(d++) = 1;
+ *(d++) = 0;
+
#if 0
- /* copy any remaining data with may be extensions */
- p = p+csl+sil+cl;
- while (p < s->packet+s->packet_length)
- {
- *(d++)=*(p++);
- }
+ /* copy any remaining data with may be extensions */
+ p = p + csl + sil + cl;
+ while (p < s->packet + s->packet_length) {
+ *(d++) = *(p++);
+ }
#endif
- i = (d-(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data) - 4;
- l2n3((long)i, d_len);
-
- /* get the data reused from the init_buf */
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
- s->s3->tmp.message_type=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
- s->s3->tmp.message_size=i;
- }
-
- /* imaginary new state (for program structure): */
- /* s->state = SSL23_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C */
-
- if ((type == 2) || (type == 3))
- {
- /* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 (type 2: SSL2 style, type 3: SSL3/TLS style) */
- const SSL_METHOD *new_method;
- new_method = ssl23_get_server_method(s->version);
- if (new_method == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
- goto err;
- }
- s->method = new_method;
-
- if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) goto err;
-
- /* we are in this state */
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
-
- if (type == 3)
- {
- /* put the 'n' bytes we have read into the input buffer
- * for SSLv3 */
- s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
- s->packet_length=n;
- if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL)
- if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
- goto err;
-
- s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
- memcpy(s->packet,buf,n);
- s->s3->rbuf.left=n;
- s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
- }
- else
- {
- s->packet_length=0;
- s->s3->rbuf.left=0;
- s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
- }
-#if 0 /* ssl3_get_client_hello does this */
- s->client_version=(v[0]<<8)|v[1];
-#endif
- s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept;
- }
- else
- {
- /* bad, very bad */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
- goto err;
- }
- s->init_num=0;
-
- if (buf != buf_space) OPENSSL_free(buf);
- return(SSL_accept(s));
-err:
- if (buf != buf_space) OPENSSL_free(buf);
- return(-1);
- }
+ i = (d - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data) - 4;
+ l2n3((long)i, d_len);
+
+ /* get the data reused from the init_buf */
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ s->s3->tmp.message_type = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ s->s3->tmp.message_size = i;
+ }
+
+ /* imaginary new state (for program structure): */
+ /* s->state = SSL23_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C */
+
+ if ((type == 2) || (type == 3)) {
+ /*
+ * we have SSLv3/TLSv1 (type 2: SSL2 style, type 3: SSL3/TLS style)
+ */
+ const SSL_METHOD *new_method;
+ new_method = ssl23_get_server_method(s->version);
+ if (new_method == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->method = new_method;
+
+ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* we are in this state */
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+
+ if (type == 3) {
+ /*
+ * put the 'n' bytes we have read into the input buffer for SSLv3
+ */
+ if (!RECORD_LAYER_set_data(&s->rlayer, buf, n))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (!RECORD_LAYER_set_data(&s->rlayer, NULL, 0))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_accept;
+ } else {
+ /* bad, very bad */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ if (buf != buf_space)
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ return (SSL_accept(s));
+ err:
+ if (buf != buf_space)
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ return (-1);
+}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff