Workaround for irrelevant problem.
[openssl.git] / ssl / s23_srvr.c
index 968bf7c1f67430a9cbd47a77a726499dbc994318..33634efdcb3537e9187ddde05af80563d70e5a7a 100644 (file)
@@ -189,9 +189,10 @@ end:
 int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
        {
        char buf_space[11]; /* Request this many bytes in initial read.
-                            * We can detect SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 Client Hellos only
-                            * when the following is in a single record
-                            * (not guaranteed by protocol specs):
+                            * We can detect SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 Client Hellos
+                            * ('type == 3') correctly only when the following
+                            * is in a single record, which is not guaranteed by
+                            * the protocol specification:
                             * Byte  Content
                             *  0     type            \
                             *  1/2   version          > record header
@@ -277,6 +278,7 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
                                         * throw this away and implement it in a way
                                         * that makes sense */
                                        {
+#if 0
                                        STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
                                        SSL_CIPHER *c;
                                        int ne2,ne3;
@@ -326,20 +328,33 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
                                                        goto next_bit;
                                                        }
                                                }
+#else
+                                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_OPTION);
+                                       goto err;
+#endif
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                else if ((p[0] == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) &&
                         (p[1] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) &&
                         (p[5] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
-                        (p[9] == p[1]))
+                        ((p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 5 /* silly record length? */)
+                               || (p[9] == p[1])))
                        {
                        /*
                         * SSLv3 or tls1 header
                         */
                        
-                       /* we must look at client_version inside the client hello: */
-                       v[0]=p[9]; v[1]=p[10];
+                       v[0]=p[1]; /* major version */
+                       /* We must look at client_version inside the Client Hello message
+                        * to get the correct minor version: */
+                       v[1]=p[10];
+                       /* However if we have only a pathologically small fragment of the
+                        * Client Hello message, we simply use the version from the
+                        * record header -- this is incorrect but unlikely to fail in
+                        * practice */
+                       if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6)
+                               v[1]=p[2];
                        if (v[1] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR)
                                {
                                if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
@@ -413,7 +428,7 @@ next_bit:
                *(d++) = v[1];
 
                /* lets populate the random area */
-               /* get the chalenge_length */
+               /* get the challenge_length */
                i=(cl > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)?SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE:cl;
                memset(d,0,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
                memcpy(&(d[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-i]),&(p[csl+sil]),i);
@@ -453,7 +468,7 @@ next_bit:
        if (type == 1)
                {
 #ifdef NO_SSL2
-               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
                goto err;
 #else
                /* we are talking sslv2 */