-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
/*
* Clear the contents of an SSL3_RECORD but retain any memory allocated
*/
-void SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD *r)
+void SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD *r, unsigned int num_recs)
{
- unsigned char *comp = r->comp;
+ unsigned char *comp;
+ unsigned int i;
- memset(r, 0, sizeof(*r));
- r->comp = comp;
-}
+ for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) {
+ comp = r[i].comp;
-void SSL3_RECORD_release(SSL3_RECORD *r)
-{
- OPENSSL_free(r->comp);
- r->comp = NULL;
+ memset(&r[i], 0, sizeof(*r));
+ r[i].comp = comp;
+ }
}
-int SSL3_RECORD_setup(SSL3_RECORD *r)
+void SSL3_RECORD_release(SSL3_RECORD *r, unsigned int num_recs)
{
- if (r->comp == NULL)
- r->comp = (unsigned char *)
- OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
- if (r->comp == NULL)
- return 0;
- return 1;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) {
+ OPENSSL_free(r[i].comp);
+ r[i].comp = NULL;
+ }
}
void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num)
memcpy(r->seq_num, seq_num, SEQ_NUM_SIZE);
}
+
+/*
+ * Peeks ahead into "read_ahead" data to see if we have a whole record waiting
+ * for us in the buffer.
+ */
+static int ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(SSL *s)
+{
+ SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf;
+ int left, len;
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
+
+ p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(rbuf);
+ if (p == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ left = SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf);
+
+ if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
+ return 0;
+
+ p += SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(rbuf);
+
+ /*
+ * We only check the type and record length, we will sanity check version
+ * etc later
+ */
+ if (*p != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
+ return 0;
+
+ p += 3;
+ n2s(p, len);
+
+ if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + len)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
/*
* MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that
* will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an
#define SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH 2
/*-
- * Call this to get a new input record.
+ * Call this to get new input records.
* It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
* or non-blocking IO.
- * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
- * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
- * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
- * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
+ * When it finishes, |numrpipes| records have been decoded. For each record 'i':
+ * rr[i].type - is the type of record
+ * rr[i].data, - data
+ * rr[i].length, - number of bytes
+ * Multiple records will only be returned if the record types are all
+ * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA. The number of records returned will always be <=
+ * |max_pipelines|
*/
/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al;
int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+ SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
short version;
unsigned mac_size;
- unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
+ unsigned int num_recs = 0;
+ unsigned int max_recs;
+ unsigned int j;
rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
+ rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
+ max_recs = s->max_pipelines;
+ if (max_recs == 0)
+ max_recs = 1;
sess = s->session;
- again:
- /* check if we have the header */
- if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
- (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
- n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
- SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0);
- if (n <= 0)
- return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
- RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY);
+ do {
+ /* check if we have the header */
+ if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
+ (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer)
+ < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
+ n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
+ SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf), 0, num_recs == 0 ? 1 : 0);
+ if (n <= 0)
+ return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
+ RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY);
- p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer);
+ p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer);
- /*
- * Check whether this is a regular record or an SSLv2 style record. The
- * latter is only used in an initial ClientHello for old clients. We
- * check s->read_hash and s->enc_read_ctx to ensure this does not apply
- * during renegotiation
- */
- if (s->first_packet && s->server && !s->read_hash && !s->enc_read_ctx
- && (p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) {
- /* SSLv2 style record */
- rr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
- rr->rec_version = SSL2_VERSION;
-
- rr->length = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1];
-
- if (rr->length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf)
- - SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
- }
+ /*
+ * The first record received by the server may be a V2ClientHello.
+ */
+ if (s->server && RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer)
+ && (p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) {
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 style record
+ *
+ * |num_recs| here will actually always be 0 because
+ * |num_recs > 0| only ever occurs when we are processing
+ * multiple app data records - which we know isn't the case here
+ * because it is an SSLv2ClientHello. We keep it using
+ * |num_recs| for the sake of consistency
+ */
+ rr[num_recs].type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
+ rr[num_recs].rec_version = SSL2_VERSION;
+
+ rr[num_recs].length = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1];
+
+ if (rr[num_recs].length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf)
+ - SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
- if (rr->length < MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- } else {
- /* SSLv3+ style record */
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s,
- s->msg_callback_arg);
-
- /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
- rr->type = *(p++);
- ssl_major = *(p++);
- ssl_minor = *(p++);
- version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
- rr->rec_version = version;
- n2s(p, rr->length);
-
- /* Lets check version */
- if (!s->first_packet && version != s->version) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)
- && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
- if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
+ if (rr[num_recs].length < MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* SSLv3+ style record */
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s,
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
+ rr[num_recs].type = *(p++);
+ ssl_major = *(p++);
+ ssl_minor = *(p++);
+ version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
+ rr[num_recs].rec_version = version;
+ n2s(p, rr[num_recs].length);
+
+ /* Lets check version */
+ if (!s->first_packet && version != s->version) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)
+ && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
+ if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
+ /*
+ * The record is using an incorrect version number,
+ * but what we've got appears to be an alert. We
+ * haven't read the body yet to check whether its a
+ * fatal or not - but chances are it is. We probably
+ * shouldn't send a fatal alert back. We'll just
+ * end.
+ */
+ goto err;
+ }
/*
- * The record is using an incorrect version number, but
- * what we've got appears to be an alert. We haven't
- * read the body yet to check whether its a fatal or
- * not - but chances are it is. We probably shouldn't
- * send a fatal alert back. We'll just end.
+ * Send back error using their minor version number :-)
*/
- goto err;
+ s->version = (unsigned short)version;
}
- /*
- * Send back error using their minor version number :-)
- */
- s->version = (unsigned short)version;
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
}
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
- }
- if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
- if (s->first_packet) {
- /* Go back to start of packet, look at the five bytes
- * that we have. */
- p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer);
- if (strncmp((char *)p, "GET ", 4) == 0 ||
- strncmp((char *)p, "POST ", 5) == 0 ||
- strncmp((char *)p, "HEAD ", 5) == 0 ||
- strncmp((char *)p, "PUT ", 4) == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
- goto err;
- } else if (strncmp((char *)p, "CONNE", 5) == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
+ if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+ if (RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer)) {
+ /* Go back to start of packet, look at the five bytes
+ * that we have. */
+ p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer);
+ if (strncmp((char *)p, "GET ", 4) == 0 ||
+ strncmp((char *)p, "POST ", 5) == 0 ||
+ strncmp((char *)p, "HEAD ", 5) == 0 ||
+ strncmp((char *)p, "PUT ", 4) == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
+ goto err;
+ } else if (strncmp((char *)p, "CONNE", 5) == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Doesn't look like TLS - don't send an alert */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
goto err;
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
}
}
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- goto err;
- }
- if (rr->length >
- SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf)
- - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
+ if (rr[num_recs].length >
+ SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
}
+
+ /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
}
- /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
- }
+ /*
+ * s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data.
+ * Calculate how much more data we need to read for the rest of the
+ * record
+ */
+ if (rr[num_recs].rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
+ i = rr[num_recs].length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ } else {
+ i = rr[num_recs].length;
+ }
+ if (i > 0) {
+ /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
- /*
- * s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data.
- * Calculate how much more data we need to read for the rest of the record
- */
- if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
- i = rr->length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
- } else {
- i = rr->length;
- }
- if (i > 0) {
- /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
+ n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1, 0);
+ if (n <= 0)
+ return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */
+ }
- n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
- if (n <= 0)
- return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */
- }
+ /* set state for later operations */
+ RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER);
- /* set state for later operations */
- RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER);
+ /*
+ * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length,
+ * or s->packet_length == SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length
+ * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
+ */
+ if (rr[num_recs].rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
+ rr[num_recs].input =
+ &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+ } else {
+ rr[num_recs].input =
+ &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+ }
- /*
- * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length,
- * or s->packet_length == SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length
- * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
- */
- if(rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
- rr->input = &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
- } else {
- rr->input = &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
- }
+ /*
+ * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
+ * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
+ * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
+ * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
+ */
- /*
- * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
- * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
- * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
- * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
- */
+ /*
+ * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
+ * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
+ */
- /*
- * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
- * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
- */
+ /* check is not needed I believe */
+ if (rr[num_recs].length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
+ al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
+ rr[num_recs].data = rr[num_recs].input;
+ rr[num_recs].orig_len = rr[num_recs].length;
+
+ /* Mark this record as not read by upper layers yet */
+ rr[num_recs].read = 0;
+
+ num_recs++;
+
+ /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
+ RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
+ RECORD_LAYER_clear_first_record(&s->rlayer);
+ } while (num_recs < max_recs
+ && rr[num_recs-1].type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
+ && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
+ && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL
+ && (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx))
+ & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
+ && ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(s));
- /* check is not needed I believe */
- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
- rr->data = rr->input;
- rr->orig_len = rr->length;
/*
* If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All
* the details below are public so no timing details can leak.
unsigned char *mac;
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
- if (rr->length < mac_size) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- rr->length -= mac_size;
- mac = rr->data + rr->length;
- i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
- if (i < 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
- goto f_err;
+ for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
+ if (rr[j].length < mac_size) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ rr[j].length -= mac_size;
+ mac = rr[j].data + rr[j].length;
+ i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &rr[j], md, 0 /* not send */ );
+ if (i < 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
}
}
- enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
+ enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, num_recs, 0);
/*-
* enc_err is:
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
/* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
unsigned char *mac = NULL;
unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
- /*
- * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
- * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
- * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
- * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
- */
- if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
- /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
- (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
- rr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+ for (j=0; j < num_recs; j++) {
/*
- * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
- * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
- * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
- * contents of the padding bytes.
- */
- mac = mac_tmp;
- ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
- rr->length -= mac_size;
- } else {
- /*
- * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals
- * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
- * |mac_size| above.
+ * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
+ * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
+ * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
+ * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
*/
- rr->length -= mac_size;
- mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
- }
+ if (rr[j].orig_len < mac_size ||
+ /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
+ (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+ rr[j].orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
- i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
- if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
- || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
- enc_err = -1;
- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
- enc_err = -1;
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+ /*
+ * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
+ * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
+ * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
+ * contents of the padding bytes.
+ */
+ mac = mac_tmp;
+ ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, &rr[j], mac_size);
+ rr[j].length -= mac_size;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals
+ * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
+ * |mac_size| above.
+ */
+ rr[j].length -= mac_size;
+ mac = &rr[j].data[rr[j].length];
+ }
+
+ i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &rr[j], md, 0 /* not send */ );
+ if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
+ || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
+ enc_err = -1;
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
+ enc_err = -1;
+ }
}
if (enc_err < 0) {
goto f_err;
}
- /* r->length is now just compressed */
- if (s->expand != NULL) {
- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
+ for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
+ /* rr[j].length is now just compressed */
+ if (s->expand != NULL) {
+ if (rr[j].length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) {
+ al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, &rr[j])) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
}
- if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
+
+ if (rr[j].length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
+ al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
- }
-
- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- rr->off = 0;
- /*-
- * So at this point the following is true
- * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
- * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
- * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
- * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
- * after use :-).
- */
- /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
- RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
+ rr[j].off = 0;
+ /*-
+ * So at this point the following is true
+ * rr[j].type is the type of record
+ * rr[j].length == number of bytes in record
+ * rr[j].off == offset to first valid byte
+ * rr[j].data == where to take bytes from, increment after use :-).
+ */
- /* just read a 0 length packet */
- if (rr->length == 0) {
- empty_record_count++;
- if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
- goto f_err;
+ /* just read a 0 length packet */
+ if (rr[j].length == 0) {
+ RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer);
+ if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer)
+ > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ RECORD_LAYER_reset_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer);
}
- goto again;
}
- return (1);
+ RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, num_recs);
+ return 1;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
- return (ret);
+ return ret;
}
-int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
+int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rr)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
int i;
- SSL3_RECORD *rr;
- rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&ssl->rlayer);
+ if (rr->comp == NULL) {
+ rr->comp = (unsigned char *)
+ OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
+ }
+ if (rr->comp == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp,
SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data,
(int)rr->length);
if (i < 0)
- return (0);
+ return 0;
else
rr->length = i;
rr->data = rr->comp;
#endif
- return (1);
+ return 1;
}
-int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
+int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
int i;
- SSL3_RECORD *wr;
- wr = RECORD_LAYER_get_wrec(&ssl->rlayer);
i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data,
SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
wr->input, (int)wr->length);
}
/*-
- * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| records in |inrecs|
*
* Returns:
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
* -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error
* occurred.
*/
-int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
+int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, unsigned int n_recs, int send)
{
SSL3_RECORD *rec;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
int bs, i, mac_size = 0;
const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
+ rec = inrecs;
+ /*
+ * We shouldn't ever be called with more than one record in the SSLv3 case
+ */
+ if (n_recs != 1)
+ return 0;
if (send) {
ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
- rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_wrec(&s->rlayer);
if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
enc = NULL;
else
enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
} else {
ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
- rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
enc = NULL;
else
}
/*-
- * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|.
*
* Returns:
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
* -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
* an internal error occurred.
*/
-int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
+int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, unsigned int n_recs, int send)
{
- SSL3_RECORD *rec;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
- unsigned long l;
+ size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
+ unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN];
int bs, i, j, k, pad = 0, ret, mac_size = 0;
const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
+ unsigned int ctr;
if (send) {
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) {
OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
}
ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
- rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_wrec(&s->rlayer);
if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
enc = NULL;
else {
else
ivlen = 0;
if (ivlen > 1) {
- if (rec->data != rec->input)
- /*
- * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever
- * happen?? (steve)
- */
- fprintf(stderr, "tls1_enc(): rec->data != rec->input\n");
- else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0)
- return -1;
+ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+ if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) {
+ /*
+ * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever
+ * happen?? (steve)
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ } else if (RAND_bytes(recs[ctr].input, ivlen) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
}
}
} else {
OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
}
ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
- rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
enc = NULL;
else
}
if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) {
- memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
- rec->input = rec->data;
+ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+ memmove(recs[ctr].data, recs[ctr].input, recs[ctr].length);
+ recs[ctr].input = recs[ctr].data;
+ }
ret = 1;
} else {
- l = rec->length;
- bs = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ds);
+ bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds));
+
+ if (n_recs > 1) {
+ if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds))
+ & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)) {
+ /*
+ * We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the
+ * cipher doesn't support pipelining
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+ reclen[ctr] = recs[ctr].length;
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds))
+ & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
+ unsigned char *seq;
+
+ seq = send ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer)
+ : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ /* DTLS does not support pipelining */
+ unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq;
+
+ s2n(send ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) :
+ DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer), p);
+ memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
+ memcpy(buf[ctr], dtlsseq, 8);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(buf[ctr], seq, 8);
+ for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */
+ ++seq[i];
+ if (seq[i] != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
- if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
- unsigned char buf[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN], *seq;
+ buf[ctr][8] = recs[ctr].type;
+ buf[ctr][9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
+ buf[ctr][10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
+ buf[ctr][11] = recs[ctr].length >> 8;
+ buf[ctr][12] = recs[ctr].length & 0xff;
+ pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
+ EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf[ctr]);
+ if (pad <= 0)
+ return -1;
- seq = send ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer)
- : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+ if (send) {
+ reclen[ctr] += pad;
+ recs[ctr].length += pad;
+ }
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq;
+ } else if ((bs != 1) && send) {
+ i = bs - ((int)reclen[ctr] % bs);
- s2n(send ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) :
- DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer), p);
- memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
- memcpy(buf, dtlsseq, 8);
- } else {
- memcpy(buf, seq, 8);
- for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */
- ++seq[i];
- if (seq[i] != 0)
- break;
- }
- }
+ /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
- buf[8] = rec->type;
- buf[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
- buf[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
- buf[11] = rec->length >> 8;
- buf[12] = rec->length & 0xff;
- pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
- EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf);
- if (pad <= 0)
- return -1;
- if (send) {
- l += pad;
- rec->length += pad;
+ /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */
+ j = i - 1;
+ for (k = (int)reclen[ctr]; k < (int)(reclen[ctr] + i); k++)
+ recs[ctr].input[k] = j;
+ reclen[ctr] += i;
+ recs[ctr].length += i;
}
- } else if ((bs != 1) && send) {
- i = bs - ((int)l % bs);
-
- /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
- /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */
- j = i - 1;
- for (k = (int)l; k < (int)(l + i); k++)
- rec->input[k] = j;
- l += i;
- rec->length += i;
+ if (!send) {
+ if (reclen[ctr] == 0 || reclen[ctr] % bs != 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
}
+ if (n_recs > 1) {
+ unsigned char *data[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
- if (!send) {
- if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0)
- return 0;
+ /* Set the output buffers */
+ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+ data[ctr] = recs[ctr].data;
+ }
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS,
+ n_recs, data) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
+ }
+ /* Set the input buffers */
+ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+ data[ctr] = recs[ctr].input;
+ }
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS,
+ n_recs, data) <= 0
+ || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS,
+ n_recs, reclen) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
}
- i = EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l);
- if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
+ i = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input, reclen[0]);
+ if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds))
+ & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
? (i < 0)
: (i == 0))
return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
if (send == 0) {
if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
- rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+ recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ recs[ctr].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ recs[ctr].length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ }
} else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
- rec->data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- rec->input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- rec->length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+ recs[ctr].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ recs[ctr].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ recs[ctr].length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ }
}
}
ret = 1;
if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
- if ((bs != 1) && !send)
- ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
- if (pad && !send)
- rec->length -= pad;
+ if ((bs != 1) && !send) {
+ int tmpret;
+ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+ tmpret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, &recs[ctr], bs, mac_size);
+ /*
+ * If tmpret == 0 then this means publicly invalid so we can
+ * short circuit things here. Otherwise we must respect constant
+ * time behaviour.
+ */
+ if (tmpret == 0)
+ return 0;
+ ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_eq_int(tmpret, 1),
+ ret, -1);
+ }
+ }
+ if (pad && !send) {
+ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+ recs[ctr].length -= pad;
+ }
+ }
}
return ret;
}
-int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
+int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send)
{
- SSL3_RECORD *rec;
unsigned char *mac_sec, *seq;
const EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
unsigned char *p, rec_char;
int t;
if (send) {
- rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_wrec(&ssl->rlayer);
mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
hash = ssl->write_hash;
} else {
- rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&ssl->rlayer);
mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
hash = ssl->read_hash;
return (md_size);
}
-int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
+int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send)
{
- SSL3_RECORD *rec;
unsigned char *seq;
EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
size_t md_size;
int t;
if (send) {
- rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_wrec(&ssl->rlayer);
seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
hash = ssl->write_hash;
} else {
- rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&ssl->rlayer);
seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
hash = ssl->read_hash;
}
return -1;
}
if (!send && !SSL_USE_ETM(ssl) && FIPS_mode())
- tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx,
- mac_ctx, rec->input,
- rec->length, rec->orig_len);
+ if (!tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx,
+ mac_ctx, rec->input,
+ rec->length, rec->orig_len)) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
+ return -1;
+ }
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
* maximum amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record
* is public information so we can use it.)
*/
- to_check = 255; /* maximum amount of padding. */
- if (to_check > rec->length - 1)
- to_check = rec->length - 1;
+ to_check = 256; /* maximum amount of padding, inc length byte. */
+ if (to_check > rec->length)
+ to_check = rec->length;
for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++) {
unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8(padding_length, i);
rr->data = rr->input;
rr->orig_len = rr->length;
- enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
+ enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, 1, 0);
/*-
* enc_err is:
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
}
- i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
+ i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
|| CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
enc_err = -1;
SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
- if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) {
+ if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, rr)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
n = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
- SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0);
+ SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0, 1);
/* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
if (n <= 0)
return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
/* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
i = rr->length;
- n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
+ n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1, 1);
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if (n != i) {
rr->length = 0;
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff