/*
- * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
#include <stdio.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <errno.h>
-#define USE_SOCKETS
-#include "../ssl_locl.h"
+#include "../ssl_local.h"
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include "record_locl.h"
-
-#ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
-# define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
-#endif
+#include "record_local.h"
+#include "internal/packet.h"
#if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
!( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
{
- unsigned int pipes;
-
rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
/*
rl->packet = NULL;
rl->packet_length = 0;
rl->wnum = 0;
- memset(rl->alert_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->alert_fragment));
- rl->alert_fragment_len = 0;
memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
rl->wpend_tot = 0;
rl->wpend_buf = NULL;
SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
- for (pipes = 0; pipes < rl->numwpipes; pipes++)
- SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->wbuf[pipes]);
- rl->numwpipes = 0;
+ ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
rl->numrpipes = 0;
SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
}
+/* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
{
return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
}
-int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+/* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
+int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
{
- return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
- && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0;
-}
+ size_t curr_rec = 0, num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl);
+ const SSL3_RECORD *rr = rl->rrec;
-int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *buf,
- size_t len)
-{
- rl->packet_length = len;
- if (len != 0) {
- rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
- if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
- if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(rl->s))
- return 0;
- }
+ while (curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]))
+ curr_rec++;
- rl->packet = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl->rbuf);
- SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(&rl->rbuf, buf, len);
+ return curr_rec < num_recs;
+}
- return 1;
+int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+{
+ return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
+ && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0;
}
void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
/*
* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
* packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
- * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
+ * s->s3.rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
* s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
* s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
* if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
if (rb->buf == NULL)
- if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
+ if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return -1;
+ }
left = rb->left;
#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
/* else we need to read more data */
- if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) { /* does not happen */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) {
+ /* does not happen */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
- /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
- if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ /*
+ * Ktls always reads full records.
+ * Also, we always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS.
+ */
+ if (!BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && !s->rlayer.read_ahead
+ && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* ignore max parameter */
max = n;
- else {
+ } else {
if (max < n)
max = n;
if (max > rb->len - rb->offset)
int ret;
/*
- * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
+ * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3.rbuf.buf and
* need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
* possible)
*/
ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
if (ret >= 0)
bioread = ret;
+ if (ret <= 0
+ && !BIO_should_retry(s->rbio)
+ && BIO_eof(s->rbio)) {
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF) {
+ SSL_set_shutdown(s, SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
+ s->s3.warn_alert = SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY;
+ } else {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,
+ SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EOF_WHILE_READING);
+ }
+ }
} else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,
+ SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
ret = -1;
}
{
const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
size_t tot;
- size_t n, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
+ size_t n, max_send_fragment, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
- size_t max_send_fragment, nw;
+ size_t nw;
#endif
SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
int i;
tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
/*
* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
- * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
+ * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for
* non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
* this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
* possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
* promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
* report the error in a way the user will notice
*/
- if (len < s->rlayer.wnum) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ if ((len < s->rlayer.wnum)
+ || ((wb->left != 0) && (len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
+ && !early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return -1;
}
s->rlayer.wnum = 0;
- if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
+ /*
+ * If we are supposed to be sending a KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket then go
+ * into init unless we have writes pending - in which case we should finish
+ * doing that first.
+ */
+ if (wb->left == 0 && (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
+ || s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0))
+ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
+
+ /*
+ * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
+ * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
+ * messages yet.
+ */
+ if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)
+ && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING) {
i = s->handshake_func(s);
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
if (i < 0)
return i;
if (i == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
}
* will happen with non blocking IO
*/
if (wb->left != 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot,
&tmpwrit);
if (i <= 0) {
* compromise is considered worthy.
*/
if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
- len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
+ len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s)) &&
s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
- !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
+ !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
+ (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) == 0) &&
EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
unsigned char aad[13];
packlen *= 4;
if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return -1;
}
} else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
break;
}
- if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
+ if (s->s3.alert_dispatch) {
i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
if (i <= 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
return i;
}
i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit);
if (i <= 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
/* free jumbo buffer */
ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
tot += tmpwrit;
}
} else
-#endif
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK */
if (tot == len) { /* done? */
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
n = (len - tot);
- split_send_fragment = s->split_send_fragment;
+ max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
+ split_send_fragment = ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s);
/*
* If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
* 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
* We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
* shouldn't get here
*/
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
if (maxpipes == 0
& EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
|| !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
maxpipes = 1;
- if (s->max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment > s->max_send_fragment
- || split_send_fragment == 0) {
+ if (max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment == 0
+ || split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) {
/*
- * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
+ * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send
* fragments so we shouldn't get here
*/
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
if (numpipes > maxpipes)
numpipes = maxpipes;
- if (n / numpipes >= s->max_send_fragment) {
+ if (n / numpipes >= max_send_fragment) {
/*
* We have enough data to completely fill all available
* pipelines
*/
for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
- pipelens[j] = s->max_send_fragment;
+ pipelens[j] = max_send_fragment;
}
} else {
/* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0,
&tmpwrit);
if (i <= 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
/* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
return i;
* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
* in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
*/
- s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
+ s->s3.empty_fragment_done = 0;
- if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
- !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ if (tmpwrit == n
+ && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) != 0
+ && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
*written = tot + tmpwrit;
{
WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
+ WPACKET *thispkt;
+ SSL3_RECORD *thiswr;
unsigned char *recordstart;
int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
size_t prefix_len = 0;
* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
* will happen with non blocking IO
*/
- if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer))
+ if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
+ /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
+ }
/* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
- if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
+ if (s->s3.alert_dispatch) {
i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
- if (i <= 0)
- return (i);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
+ return i;
+ }
/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
}
- if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes)
- if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0))
+ if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes) {
+ if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return -1;
+ }
+ }
if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
return 0;
} else {
/* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
- if (mac_size < 0)
+ if (mac_size < 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
+ }
}
/*
* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
*/
- if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
+ if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3.empty_fragment_done) {
/*
* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
* http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
*/
- if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
+ if (s->s3.need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
/*
* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
* prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
int ret;
ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len);
- if (ret <= 0)
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
goto err;
+ }
if (prefix_len >
(SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
/* insufficient space */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
- s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
+ s->s3.empty_fragment_done = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) {
+ /*
+ * ktls doesn't modify the buffer, but to avoid a warning we need to
+ * discard the const qualifier.
+ * This doesn't leak memory because the buffers have been released when
+ * switching to ktls.
+ */
+ SSL3_BUFFER_set_buf(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], (unsigned char *)buf);
+ SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], 0);
+ SSL3_BUFFER_set_app_buffer(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], 1);
+ goto wpacket_init_complete;
}
if (create_empty_fragment) {
if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
|| !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
wpinited = 1;
} else if (prefix_len) {
wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
- if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
+ if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0],
+ SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
|| !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
+ prefix_len, NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
wpinited = 1;
} else {
for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
+ thispkt = &pkt[j];
+
wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
#endif
SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
- if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[j], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
+ if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
- || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[j], align, NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
wpinited++;
}
/* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
- if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)) {
int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
/* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
}
}
+ wpacket_init_complete:
+
totlen = 0;
/* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
- memset(wr, 0, sizeof wr);
+ memset(wr, 0, sizeof(wr));
for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
- unsigned int version = s->version;
+ unsigned int version = (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) ? TLS1_2_VERSION
+ : s->version;
unsigned char *compressdata = NULL;
size_t maxcomplen;
unsigned int rectype;
- SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type);
+ thispkt = &pkt[j];
+ thiswr = &wr[j];
+
/*
* In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
* record type
*/
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
+ if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)
+ && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL
+ && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
+ || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT))
rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
else
rectype = type;
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, rectype);
+
/*
* Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
* and record version number > TLS 1.0
*/
if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
- && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
+ && !s->renegotiate
+ && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION
+ && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
version = TLS1_VERSION;
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_rec_version(thiswr, version);
+
+ maxcomplen = pipelens[j];
+ if (s->compress != NULL)
+ maxcomplen += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
- maxcomplen = pipelens[j] + (s->compress != NULL
- ? SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD : 0);
- /* write the header */
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&pkt[j], rectype)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&pkt[j], version)
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&pkt[j])
+ /*
+ * When using offload kernel will write the header.
+ * Otherwise write the header now
+ */
+ if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)
+ && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt)
|| (eivlen > 0
- && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[j], eivlen, NULL))
+ && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL))
|| (maxcomplen > 0
- && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(&pkt[j], maxcomplen,
- &compressdata))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen,
+ &compressdata)))) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* lets setup the record stuff. */
- SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], compressdata);
- SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr[j], pipelens[j]);
- SSL3_RECORD_set_input(&wr[j], (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata);
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]);
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
totlen += pipelens[j];
/*
- * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
+ * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
+ * thiswr->data
*/
/* first we compress */
if (s->compress != NULL) {
- /*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): Make sure we prevent compression!!!
- */
- if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, &wr[j])
- || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[j], wr[j].length, NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
+ if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr)
+ || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
} else {
- if (!WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt[j], wr[j].input, wr[j].length)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) {
+ SSL3_RECORD_reset_data(&wr[j]);
+ } else {
+ if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
}
- SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
}
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&pkt[j], type)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)
+ && !BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)
+ && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL
+ && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
+ || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
+ size_t rlen, max_send_fragment;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], 1);
- /*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): Padding goes here. Do we need an API to add this?
- * For now, use no padding
- */
+ SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1);
+
+ /* Add TLS1.3 padding */
+ max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
+ rlen = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
+ if (rlen < max_send_fragment) {
+ size_t padding = 0;
+ size_t max_padding = max_send_fragment - rlen;
+ if (s->record_padding_cb != NULL) {
+ padding = s->record_padding_cb(s, type, rlen, s->record_padding_arg);
+ } else if (s->block_padding > 0) {
+ size_t mask = s->block_padding - 1;
+ size_t remainder;
+
+ /* optimize for power of 2 */
+ if ((s->block_padding & mask) == 0)
+ remainder = rlen & mask;
+ else
+ remainder = rlen % s->block_padding;
+ /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */
+ if (remainder == 0)
+ padding = 0;
+ else
+ padding = s->block_padding - remainder;
+ }
+ if (padding > 0) {
+ /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */
+ if (padding > max_padding)
+ padding = max_padding;
+ if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt, 0, padding)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, padding);
+ }
+ }
}
/*
- * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
- * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
- * wb->buf
+ * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
+ * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
+ * in the wb->buf
*/
- if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
+ if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) && !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
unsigned char *mac;
- if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[j], mac_size, &mac)
- || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j], mac, 1)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
+ || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
* This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
* AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
*/
- if(!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(&pkt[j], SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE,
- NULL)
- /*
- * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
- * sub-packet
- */
- || !WPACKET_get_length(&pkt[j], &len)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) {
+ if (!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt,
+ SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ NULL)
+ /*
+ * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
+ * sub-packet
+ */
+ || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
- }
-
- /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
- recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt[j]) - len;
+ }
- SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], recordstart);
- SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
- SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr[j], len);
+ /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
+ recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len;
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart);
+ SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr);
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len);
+ }
}
- if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1)
- goto err;
+ if (s->statem.enc_write_state == ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS) {
+ /*
+ * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to
+ * send early data - so we need to use the tls13enc function.
+ */
+ if (tls13_enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) {
+ if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) {
+ if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) {
+ if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
size_t origlen;
+ thispkt = &pkt[j];
+ thiswr = &wr[j];
+
+ if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio))
+ goto mac_done;
+
/* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
- if (!WPACKET_get_length(&pkt[j], &origlen)
+ if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen)
/* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
- || origlen > wr[j].length
- || (wr[j].length > origlen
- && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[j],
- wr[j].length - origlen, NULL))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ || origlen > thiswr->length
+ || (thiswr->length > origlen
+ && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt,
+ thiswr->length - origlen,
+ NULL))) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
+ if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
unsigned char *mac;
- if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[j], mac_size, &mac)
- || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j], mac, 1)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
+ || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], mac_size);
+ SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size);
}
- if (!WPACKET_get_length(&pkt[j], &len)
- || !WPACKET_close(&pkt[j])) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)
+ || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (s->msg_callback) {
- recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt[j]) - len
+ recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len
- SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart,
SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
+ unsigned char ctype = type;
+
+ s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE,
+ &ctype, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ }
}
- if (!WPACKET_finish(&pkt[j])) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- /*
- * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
- * wr->length long
- */
- SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type); /* not needed but helps for
- * debugging */
+ /* header is added by the kernel when using offload */
SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
if (create_empty_fragment) {
*/
if (j > 0) {
/* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr);
+ *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
return 1;
}
+ mac_done:
+ /*
+ * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
+ * is thiswr->length long
+ */
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for
+ * debugging */
+
/* now let's set up wb */
SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
- prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j]));
+ prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr));
}
/*
return -1;
}
-/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
+/* if s->s3.wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
*
* Return values are as per SSL_write()
*/
size_t tmpwrit = 0;
if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
- || ((s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf) &&
- !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
+ || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)
+ && (s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf))
|| (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,
+ SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
return -1;
}
clear_sys_error();
if (s->wbio != NULL) {
s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+
+ /*
+ * To prevent coalescing of control and data messages,
+ * such as in buffer_write, we flush the BIO
+ */
+ if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
+ i = BIO_flush(s->wbio);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ return i;
+ }
+
+ if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)
+ && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
+ BIO_set_ktls_ctrl_msg(s->wbio, type);
+ }
/* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)
&(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])
if (i >= 0)
tmpwrit = i;
} else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,
+ SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
i = -1;
}
if (i > 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
*/
SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
}
- return (i);
+ return i;
}
SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes)
{
- int al, i, j, ret;
+ int i, j, ret;
size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf;
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
+ int is_tls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s);
rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
/* Not initialized yet */
- if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
+ if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return -1;
+ }
}
if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
&& (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
&& (type !=
SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
/* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
i = s->handshake_func(s);
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
if (i < 0)
return i;
- if (i == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ if (i == 0)
return -1;
- }
}
start:
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
/* get new records if necessary */
if (num_recs == 0) {
ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
return ret;
+ }
num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
if (num_recs == 0) {
/* Shouldn't happen */
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
}
}
/* Skip over any records we have already read */
} while (num_recs == 0);
rr = &rr[curr_rec];
+ if (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0
+ && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
+ && SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
/*
* Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
* record that isn't an alert.
/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
- if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
- * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
+ if (s->s3.change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
+ * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
&& (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
+ return -1;
}
/*
if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
|| (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
- && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) {
+ && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL
+ && !is_tls13)) {
/*
* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
* SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
*/
if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
+ return -1;
}
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&& SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
&& s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+ return -1;
}
if (recvd_type != NULL)
*recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
- if (len == 0)
+ if (len == 0) {
+ /*
+ * Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to
+ * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
+ * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
+ */
+ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
return 0;
+ }
totalbytes = 0;
do {
* initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
* |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
*/
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
}
if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
&& (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
/*
* If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
- * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
- * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
- * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
+ * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing
+ * with. We shouldn't be receiving anything other than a ClientHello
+ * if we are a server.
*/
s->version = rr->rec_version;
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /*
- * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
- * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
- */
- {
- size_t dest_maxlen = 0;
- unsigned char *dest = NULL;
- size_t *dest_len = NULL;
-
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
- dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
- dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
- dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
- } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
- dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
- dest = s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
- dest_len = &s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len;
- }
-
- if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
- n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
- n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
-
- /* now move 'n' bytes: */
- while (n-- > 0) {
- dest[(*dest_len)++] =
- SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)];
- SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1);
- SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1);
- }
-
- if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) {
- SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
- goto start; /* fragment was too small */
- }
- }
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return -1;
}
/*-
* s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
- * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
* (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
*/
- /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
- if ((!s->server) &&
- (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
- (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
- (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
- s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len = 0;
-
- if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
- (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
- (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
- goto f_err;
+ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
+ unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr;
+ unsigned char *alert_bytes = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)
+ + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr);
+ PACKET alert;
+
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
+ || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level)
+ || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT);
+ return -1;
}
if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
- s->rlayer.handshake_fragment, 4, s,
- s->msg_callback_arg);
-
- if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
- !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
- !s->s3->renegotiate) {
- ssl3_renegotiate(s);
- if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
- i = s->handshake_func(s);
- if (i < 0)
- return i;
- if (i == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
- if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
- /* no read-ahead left? */
- BIO *bio;
- /*
- * In the case where we try to read application data,
- * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
- * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
- * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
- */
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
- BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- /*
- * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
- * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
- */
- goto start;
- }
- /*
- * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
- * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
- * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
- */
- if (s->server &&
- SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
- !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
- (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
- (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
- (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
- (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
- !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
- SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
- SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
- goto start;
- }
- if (s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
- int alert_level = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[0];
- int alert_descr = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[1];
-
- s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len = 0;
-
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
- s->rlayer.alert_fragment, 2, s,
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
}
- if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
- s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
+ if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING
+ || (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED)) {
+ s->s3.warn_alert = alert_descr;
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
s->rlayer.alert_count++;
if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
+ return -1;
}
+ }
- if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
- s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
- * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
- * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
- * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
- * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
- * the peer refused it where we carry on.
- */
- else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
- goto f_err;
- }
-#ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
- else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
- return (0);
-#endif
- } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
+ /*
+ * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
+ * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
+ */
+ if (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED) {
+ goto start;
+ } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
+ && (is_tls13 || alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)) {
+ s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+ return 0;
+ } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL || is_tls13) {
char tmp[16];
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
+ s->s3.fatal_alert = alert_descr;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
return 0;
- } else {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
+ } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
+ /*
+ * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
+ * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
+ * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
+ * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
+ * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
+ * the peer refused it where we carry on.
+ */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+ return -1;
+ } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
+ /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */
+ goto start;
}
- goto start;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
+ return -1;
}
- if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
- * shutdown */
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
- SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
- return 0;
+ if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
+ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+ BIO *rbio;
+
+ /*
+ * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are
+ * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other
+ * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them
+ * because we are unable to write any response due to having already
+ * sent close_notify.
+ */
+ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+
+ if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY) != 0)
+ goto start;
+
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
+ BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have
+ * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have
+ * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled
+ * above.
+ * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify
+ */
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we
+ * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the
+ * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data
+ * that we're just going to discard.
+ */
+ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+ size_t dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment);
+ unsigned char *dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
+ size_t *dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
+
+ n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
+ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
+ n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
+
+ /* now move 'n' bytes: */
+ memcpy(dest + *dest_len,
+ SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr), n);
+ SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
+ SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
+ *dest_len += n;
+ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+
+ if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
+ goto start; /* fragment was too small */
}
if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+ return -1;
}
/*
- * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
+ * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
+ * protocol violation)
*/
if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
- && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
- if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
- !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
- ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
- s->renegotiate = 1;
- s->new_session = 1;
- }
+ && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
+ int ined = (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING);
+
+ /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
+ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
+
i = s->handshake_func(s);
+ /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
if (i < 0)
return i;
if (i == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
+ /*
+ * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
+ * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
+ * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
+ */
+ if (ined)
+ return -1;
+
if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
/* no read-ahead left? */
* no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
* record types, using up resources processing them.
*/
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+ return -1;
case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
* SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
* that should not happen when type != rr->type
*/
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
/*
* At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
* started), we will indulge it.
*/
if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
- s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
+ s->s3.in_read_app_data = 2;
return -1;
+ } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
+ /*
+ * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
+ * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
+ * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
+ * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
+ * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
+ * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
+ * record.
+ */
+ if (!early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length,
+ EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return -1;
+ }
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+ goto start;
} else {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+ return -1;
}
}
- /* not reached */
-
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return -1;
}
void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff