Correct most of the unsigned vs. signed warnings (or int vs. size_t),

[openssl.git] / ssl / kssl.c

diff --git a/ssl/kssl.c b/ssl/kssl.c
index cd9144f2be041aeecdde61edb68dfe60894ec553..f1733048edeb0e293175dc3299a8e67eaef79e96 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/kssl.c
+++ b/ssl/kssl.c
@@ -818,7 +818,7 @@ int         kssl_test_confound(unsigned char *p)
 **      what the highest assigned CKSUMTYPE_ constant is.  As of 1.2.2
 **      it is 0x000c (CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3).  So we will use 0x0010.
 */
-int    *populate_cksumlens(void)
+size_t  *populate_cksumlens(void)
        {
        int             i, j, n;
        static size_t   *cklens = NULL;
@@ -858,8 +858,9 @@ int         *populate_cksumlens(void)
 */
 unsigned char  *kssl_skip_confound(krb5_enctype etype, unsigned char *a)
        {
-       int             i, cklen, conlen;
-       static int      *cksumlens = NULL;
+       int             i, conlen;
+       size_t          cklen;
+       static size_t   *cksumlens = NULL;
        unsigned char   *test_auth;
 
        conlen = (etype)? 8: 0;
@@ -1107,7 +1108,7 @@ kssl_cget_tkt(    /* UPDATE */    KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,
                        }
 
                arlen = krb5_app_req.length;
-               p = krb5_app_req.data;
+               p = (unsigned char *)krb5_app_req.data;
                ap_req = (KRB5_APREQBODY *) d2i_KRB5_APREQ(NULL, &p, arlen);
                if (ap_req)
                        {
@@ -1116,9 +1117,9 @@ kssl_cget_tkt(    /* UPDATE */    KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,
                        if (authenp->length  && 
                                (authenp->data = malloc(authenp->length)))
                                {
-                               unsigned char   *p = authenp->data;
+                               unsigned char   *adp = (unsigned char *)authenp->data;
                                authenp->length = i2d_KRB5_ENCDATA(
-                                               ap_req->authenticator, &p);
+                                               ap_req->authenticator, &adp);
                                }
                        }
 
@@ -1377,7 +1378,7 @@ kssl_sget_tkt(    /* UPDATE */    KSSL_CTX                *kssl_ctx,
        **                      &ap_option, &krb5ticket)) != 0)  { Error }
        */
 
-       p = indata->data;
+       p = (unsigned char *)indata->data;
        if ((asn1ticket = (KRB5_TKTBODY *) d2i_KRB5_TICKET(NULL, &p,
                                                (long) indata->length)) == NULL)
                {
@@ -1825,15 +1826,15 @@ void kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(krb5_context context, krb5_data *data)
 **  Return pointer to the (partially) filled in struct tm on success,
 **  return NULL on failure.
 */
-struct tm      *k_gmtime(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *ctime, struct tm *k_tm)
+struct tm      *k_gmtime(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *gtime, struct tm *k_tm)
        {
        char            c, *p;
 
        if (!k_tm)  return NULL;
-       if (ctime == NULL  ||  ctime->length < 14)  return NULL;
-       if (ctime->data == NULL)  return NULL;
+       if (gtime == NULL  ||  gtime->length < 14)  return NULL;
+       if (gtime->data == NULL)  return NULL;
 
-       p = &ctime->data[14];
+       p = (char *)&gtime->data[14];
 
        c = *p;  *p = '\0';  p -= 2;  k_tm->tm_sec  = atoi(p);      *(p+2) = c;
        c = *p;  *p = '\0';  p -= 2;  k_tm->tm_min  = atoi(p);      *(p+2) = c;
@@ -1963,7 +1964,7 @@ krb5_error_code  kssl_check_authent(
                goto err;
                }
 
-       p = authentp->data;
+       p = (unsigned char *)authentp->data;
        if ((dec_authent = d2i_KRB5_ENCDATA(NULL, &p,
                                        (long) authentp->length)) == NULL) 
                {