#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
-#define _XOPEN_SOURCE /* glibc2 needs this to declare strptime() */
+#define _XOPEN_SOURCE 500 /* glibc2 needs this to declare strptime() */
#include <time.h>
+#if 0 /* Experimental */
+#undef _XOPEN_SOURCE /* To avoid clashes with anything else... */
+#endif
#include <string.h>
+#define KRB5_PRIVATE 1
+
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+#ifndef ENOMEM
+#define ENOMEM KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC
+#endif
+
/*
* When OpenSSL is built on Windows, we do not want to require that
* the Kerberos DLLs be available in order for the OpenSSL DLLs to
HANDLE hKRB5_32;
krb5_loaded++;
- hKRB5_32 = LoadLibrary("KRB5_32");
+ hKRB5_32 = LoadLibrary(TEXT("KRB5_32"));
if (!hKRB5_32)
return;
return ((string == NULL)? null: string);
}
-#define MAXKNUM 255
-char
-*knumber(int len, krb5_octet *contents)
- {
- static char buf[MAXKNUM+1];
- int i;
-
- BIO_snprintf(buf, MAXKNUM, "[%d] ", len);
-
- for (i=0; i < len && MAXKNUM > strlen(buf)+3; i++)
- {
- BIO_snprintf(&buf[strlen(buf)], 3, "%02x", contents[i]);
- }
-
- return (buf);
- }
-
-
/* Given KRB5 enctype (basically DES or 3DES),
** return closest match openssl EVP_ encryption algorithm.
** Return NULL for unknown or problematic (krb5_dk_encrypt) enctypes.
int i;
printf("%s[%d] ", label, kdata->length);
- for (i=0; i < kdata->length; i++)
+ for (i=0; i < (int)kdata->length; i++)
{
if (0 && isprint((int) kdata->data[i]))
printf( "%c ", kdata->data[i]);
printf("%s, authdata==0\n", label);
return;
}
- printf("%s [%p]\n", label, adata);
+ printf("%s [%p]\n", label, (void *)adata);
#if 0
{
int i;
#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
printf("%s\n\t[et%d:%d]: ", label, keyblk->keytype,
keyblk->keyvalue->length);
- for (i=0; i < keyblk->keyvalue->length; i++)
+ for (i=0; i < (int)keyblk->keyvalue->length; i++)
{
printf("%02x",(unsigned char *)(keyblk->keyvalue->contents)[i]);
}
printf("\n");
#else
printf("%s\n\t[et%d:%d]: ", label, keyblk->enctype, keyblk->length);
- for (i=0; i < keyblk->length; i++)
+ for (i=0; i < (int)keyblk->length; i++)
{
printf("%02x",keyblk->contents[i]);
}
printf("%s principal Realm: ", label);
if (princ == NULL) return;
- for (ui=0; ui < princ->realm.length; ui++) putchar(princ->realm.data[ui]);
+ for (ui=0; ui < (int)princ->realm.length; ui++) putchar(princ->realm.data[ui]);
printf(" (nametype %d) has %d strings:\n", princ->type,princ->length);
- for (i=0; i < princ->length; i++)
+ for (i=0; i < (int)princ->length; i++)
{
printf("\t%d [%d]: ", i, princ->data[i].length);
- for (uj=0; uj < princ->data[i].length; uj++) {
+ for (uj=0; uj < (int)princ->data[i].length; uj++) {
putchar(princ->data[i].data[uj]);
}
printf("\n");
if (authenp)
{
krb5_data krb5in_data;
- unsigned char *p;
+ const unsigned char *p;
long arlen;
KRB5_APREQBODY *ap_req;
static krb5_auth_context krb5auth_context = NULL;
krb5_ticket *krb5ticket = NULL;
KRB5_TKTBODY *asn1ticket = NULL;
- unsigned char *p;
+ const unsigned char *p;
krb5_keytab krb5keytab = NULL;
krb5_keytab_entry kt_entry;
krb5_principal krb5server;
"bad ticket from krb5_rd_req.\n");
}
else if (kssl_ctx_setprinc(kssl_ctx, KSSL_CLIENT,
- &krb5ticket->enc_part2->client->realm,
- krb5ticket->enc_part2->client->data))
+ &krb5ticket->enc_part2->client->realm,
+ krb5ticket->enc_part2->client->data,
+ krb5ticket->enc_part2->client->length))
{
kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET,
"kssl_ctx_setprinc() fails.\n");
{
if (kssl_ctx == NULL) return kssl_ctx;
- if (kssl_ctx->key) memset(kssl_ctx->key, 0,
+ if (kssl_ctx->key) OPENSSL_cleanse(kssl_ctx->key,
kssl_ctx->length);
if (kssl_ctx->key) free(kssl_ctx->key);
if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) free(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
}
-/* Given a (krb5_data *) entity (and optional realm),
+/* Given an array of (krb5_data *) entity (and optional realm),
** set the plain (char *) client_princ or service_host member
** of the kssl_ctx struct.
*/
krb5_error_code
kssl_ctx_setprinc(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, int which,
- krb5_data *realm, krb5_data *entity)
+ krb5_data *realm, krb5_data *entity, int nentities)
{
char **princ;
int length;
+ int i;
if (kssl_ctx == NULL || entity == NULL) return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
}
if (*princ) free(*princ);
- length = entity->length + ((realm)? realm->length + 2: 1);
+ /* Add up all the entity->lengths */
+ length = 0;
+ for (i=0; i < nentities; i++)
+ {
+ length += entity[i].length;
+ }
+ /* Add in space for the '/' character(s) (if any) */
+ length += nentities-1;
+ /* Space for the ('@'+realm+NULL | NULL) */
+ length += ((realm)? realm->length + 2: 1);
+
if ((*princ = calloc(1, length)) == NULL)
return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
else
- {
- strncpy(*princ, entity->data, entity->length);
- (*princ)[entity->length]='\0';
+ {
+ for (i = 0; i < nentities; i++)
+ {
+ strncat(*princ, entity[i].data, entity[i].length);
+ if (i < nentities-1)
+ {
+ strcat (*princ, "/");
+ }
+ }
if (realm)
{
strcat (*princ, "@");
(void) strncat(*princ, realm->data, realm->length);
- (*princ)[entity->length+1+realm->length]='\0';
}
}
if (kssl_ctx->key)
{
- memset(kssl_ctx->key, 0, kssl_ctx->length);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(kssl_ctx->key, kssl_ctx->length);
free(kssl_ctx->key);
}
return;
}
else
- printf("%p\n", kssl_ctx);
+ printf("%p\n", (void *)kssl_ctx);
printf("\tservice:\t%s\n",
(kssl_ctx->service_name)? kssl_ctx->service_name: "NULL");
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- unsigned char *p, *unenc_authent;
- int padl, outl, unencbufsize;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char *unenc_authent;
+ int outl, unencbufsize;
struct tm tm_time, *tm_l, *tm_g;
time_t now, tl, tg, tr, tz_offset;
}
#endif
enc = kssl_map_enc(enctype);
- memset(iv, 0, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH); /* per RFC 1510 */
+ memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
if (enc == NULL)
{
*/
goto err;
}
- if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv))
- {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
- "EVP_DecryptInit_ex error decrypting authenticator.\n");
- krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, unenc_authent, &outl,
- dec_authent->cipher->data, dec_authent->cipher->length))
- {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
- "EVP_DecryptUpdate error decrypting authenticator.\n");
- krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
- goto err;
- }
- if (outl > unencbufsize)
- {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
- "Buffer overflow decrypting authenticator.\n");
- krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(unenc_authent[outl]), &padl))
- {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
- "EVP_DecryptFinal_ex error decrypting authenticator.\n");
- krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
- goto err;
- }
- outl += padl;
- if (outl > unencbufsize)
- {
- kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
- "Buffer overflow decrypting authenticator.\n");
- krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
- goto err;
- }
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
+
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit(&ciph_ctx,enc,kssl_ctx->key,iv,0))
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+ "EVP_CipherInit error decrypting authenticator.\n");
+ krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ outl = dec_authent->cipher->length;
+ if (!EVP_Cipher(&ciph_ctx,unenc_authent,dec_authent->cipher->data,outl))
+ {
+ kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+ "EVP_Cipher error decrypting authenticator.\n");
+ krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf("kssl_check_authent: decrypted authenticator[%d] =\n", outl);
if (auth) KRB5_AUTHENT_free((KRB5_AUTHENT *) auth);
if (dec_authent) KRB5_ENCDATA_free(dec_authent);
if (unenc_authent) free(unenc_authent);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
return krb5rc;
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff