#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/pqueue.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+/* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
+static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1,const unsigned char *v2)
+{ int ret,sat,brw,i;
+
+ if (sizeof(long) == 8) do
+ { const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = {1};
+ long l;
+
+ if (is_endian.little) break;
+ /* not reached on little-endians */
+ /* following test is redundant, because input is
+ * always aligned, but I take no chances... */
+ if (((size_t)v1|(size_t)v2)&0x7) break;
+
+ l = *((long *)v1);
+ l -= *((long *)v2);
+ if (l>128) return 128;
+ else if (l<-128) return -128;
+ else return (int)l;
+ } while (0);
+
+ ret = (int)v1[7]-(int)v2[7];
+ sat = 0;
+ brw = ret>>8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */
+ if (ret & 0x80)
+ { for (i=6;i>=0;i--)
+ { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
+ sat |= ~brw;
+ brw >>= 8;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ { for (i=6;i>=0;i--)
+ { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
+ sat |= brw;
+ brw >>= 8;
+ }
+ }
+ brw <<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */
+
+ if (sat&0xff) return brw | 0x80;
+ else return brw + (ret&0xFF);
+}
static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
int len, int peek);
-static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap,
- unsigned long long *seq_num);
+static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset);
#endif
static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
- unsigned long long priority);
+ unsigned char *priority);
static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
-static unsigned long long bytes_to_long_long(unsigned char *bytes);
-static void long_long_to_bytes(unsigned long long num, unsigned char *bytes);
static void dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s);
-
/* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
static int
dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
static int
-dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned long long priority)
-{
- DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
+dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
+ {
+ DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
pitem *item;
+ /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
+ if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
+ return 0;
+
rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata);
if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return(0);
}
memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
- ssl3_setup_buffers(s);
+ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_free(rdata);
+ pitem_free(item);
+ return(0);
+ }
return(1);
- }
+ }
static int
dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s)
{
pitem *item;
- unsigned long long priority =
- (((unsigned long long)s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) |
- ((unsigned long long)s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off);
+ PQ_64BIT priority =
+ (((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) |
+ ((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off);
if ( ! SSL_in_init(s)) /* if we're not (re)negotiating,
nothing buffered */
static int
dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
{
- int i,al;
+ int i,al;
int clear=0;
- int enc_err;
+ int enc_err;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
- SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+ SSL3_RECORD *rr;
unsigned int mac_size;
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
- sess = s->session;
+ sess = s->session;
/* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
* and we have that many bytes in s->packet
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
{
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
/* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
-if ( (sess == NULL) ||
+ if ( (sess == NULL) ||
(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
(s->read_hash == NULL))
- clear=1;
+ clear=1;
if (!clear)
{
- mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
+ /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+ int t;
+ t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
+ mac_size=t;
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
{
#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
#else
goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
{
#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
#else
goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
}
rr->length-=mac_size;
i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
- if (memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
+ if (i < 0 || memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
{
goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
}
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH)
{
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
}
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
{
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
/* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
s->packet_length=0;
- dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of record. */
- return(1);
+ dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of record. */
+ return(1);
decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac:
/* Separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
* we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
* might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via logfile) */
al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned char *p;
- short version;
+ unsigned short version;
DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
- unsigned long long read_sequence;
- unsigned int is_next_epoch;
+ unsigned int is_next_epoch;
rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
sess=s->session;
- /* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
- * pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
- if ( ! dtls1_process_buffered_records(s))
- return 0;
+ /* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
+ * pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
+ if ( ! dtls1_process_buffered_records(s))
+ return 0;
/* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
ssl_minor= *(p++);
version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
- /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
+ /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
n2s(p,rr->epoch);
- read_sequence = 0;
- n2l6(p, read_sequence);
- long_long_to_bytes(read_sequence, s->s3->read_sequence);
+ memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
+ p+=6;
+
n2s(p,rr->length);
/* Lets check version */
- if (s->first_packet)
- {
- s->first_packet=0;
- }
- else
+ if (!s->first_packet)
{
if (version != s->version)
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- /* Send back error using their
- * version number :-) */
- s->version=version;
- al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
+ /* unexpected version, silently discard */
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ goto again;
}
}
- if ((version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00))
+ if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00))
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- goto err;
+ /* wrong version, silently discard record */
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ goto again;
}
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
{
- al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
+ /* record too long, silently discard it */
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ goto again;
}
/* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if ( n != i)
{
+ rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
/* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
if ( bitmap == NULL)
- {
- s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
- goto again; /* get another record */
+ {
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
+ goto again; /* get another record */
}
/* check whether this is a repeat, or aged record */
- if ( ! dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap, &(rr->seq_num)))
+ if ( ! dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
{
+ rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
/* just read a 0 length packet */
if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
- /* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), buffer it
- * since it cannot be processed at this time.
- * Records from the next epoch are marked as received even though they are
- * not processed, so as to prevent any potential resource DoS attack */
- if (is_next_epoch)
- {
- dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
- dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num);
- s->packet_length = 0;
- goto again;
- }
+ /* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
+ * buffer it since it cannot be processed at this time. Records
+ * from the next epoch are marked as received even though they
+ * are not processed, so as to prevent any potential resource
+ * DoS attack */
+ if (is_next_epoch)
+ {
+ dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
+ dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num);
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ goto again;
+ }
- if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
- return(0);
+ if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
+ return(0);
dtls1_clear_timeouts(s); /* done waiting */
return(1);
(type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
(peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
if (i < 0) return(i);
if (i == 0)
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return(-1);
}
}
* s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
+ /* We are not handshaking and have no data yet,
+ * so process data buffered during the last handshake
+ * in advance, if any.
+ */
+ if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0)
+ {
+ pitem *item;
+ item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
+ if (item)
+ {
+ dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(item->data);
+ pitem_free(item);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check for timeout */
+ if (dtls1_is_timer_expired(s))
+ {
+ if (dtls1_read_failed(s, -1) > 0);
+ goto start;
+ }
+
/* get new packet if necessary */
if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
{
* reset by ssl3_get_finished */
&& (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
{
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
- goto err;
+ /* We now have application data between CCS and Finished.
+ * Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so
+ * buffer the application data for later processing rather
+ * than dropping the connection.
+ */
+ dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), 0);
+ rr->length = 0;
+ goto start;
}
/* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
goto f_err;
}
* fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
*/
{
- unsigned int i, dest_maxlen = 0;
+ unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
unsigned char *dest = NULL;
unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
}
- else /* else it's a CCS message */
- OPENSSL_assert(rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+ /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
+ else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
+ {
+ /* Application data while renegotiating
+ * is allowed. Try again reading.
+ */
+ if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
+ {
+ BIO *bio;
+ s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
+ bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+ BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
if (dest_maxlen > 0)
{
* may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */
if ( rr->length < dest_maxlen)
{
+#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
+ /*
+ * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
+ * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
+ * non-existing alert...
+ */
+ FIX ME
+#endif
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
rr->length = 0;
goto start;
}
/* now move 'n' bytes: */
- for ( i = 0; i < dest_maxlen; i++)
+ for ( k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++)
{
- dest[i] = rr->data[rr->off++];
+ dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
rr->length--;
}
*dest_len = dest_maxlen;
(s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
goto err;
}
if (i < 0) return(i);
if (i == 0)
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return(-1);
}
n2s(p, seq);
n2l3(p, frag_off);
- dtls1_retransmit_message(s, seq, frag_off, &found);
+ dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
+ dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, 0),
+ frag_off, &found);
if ( ! found && SSL_in_init(s))
{
/* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
else
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
}
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
- {
- struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
+ {
+ struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
+ unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
- if ( ccs_hdr.seq == s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ ccs_hdr_len = 3;
+
+ /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
+ * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
+ /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
+ if ( (rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) ||
+ (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
{
- /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
- * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
- /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
- if ( (rr->length != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH) ||
- (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
- {
- i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
- goto err;
- }
-
- rr->length=0;
-
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
- rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
- s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
- if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
- goto err;
-
- /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
- dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
-
- /* handshake read seq is reset upon handshake completion */
- s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
-
- goto start;
+ i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+ goto err;
}
- else
+
+ rr->length=0;
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
+ rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ /* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake
+ * messages are still missing, so just drop it.
+ */
+ if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok)
{
- rr->length = 0;
goto start;
}
+
+ s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
+
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
+ if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
+ dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
+
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
+
+ goto start;
}
/* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
goto start;
}
+ /* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the
+ * client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
+ */
+ if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
+ {
+ dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
+ rr->length = 0;
+ goto start;
+ }
+
if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
{
if (i < 0) return(i);
if (i == 0)
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return(-1);
}
}
#endif
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
goto f_err;
case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
* of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
* should not happen when type != rr->type */
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
/* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
else
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
goto f_err;
}
}
if (i < 0) return(i);
if (i == 0)
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
}
return i;
}
- if ( s->s3->wnum + i == len)
+ if ( (int)s->s3->wnum + i == len)
s->s3->wnum = 0;
else
s->s3->wnum += i;
- return tot + i;
+ return i;
}
-int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
- unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
+int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
{
unsigned char *p,*pseq;
int i,mac_size,clear=0;
if ( (sess == NULL) ||
(s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
- (s->write_hash == NULL))
+ (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
clear=1;
if (clear)
mac_size=0;
else
- mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
+ {
+ mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+ if (mac_size < 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
/* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
#if 0
/* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done
- && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
{
/* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
* (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
{
/* insufficient space */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
}
#endif
-
p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
/* write the header */
{
if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
if (mac_size != 0)
{
- s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + bs]),1);
+ if(s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + bs]),1) < 0)
+ goto err;
wr->length+=mac_size;
}
/* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
- wr->length += bs; /* bs != 0 in case of CBC. The enc fn provides
- * the randomness */
+ if (bs) /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */
+ {
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,bs);
+ /* master IV and last CBC residue stand for
+ * the rest of randomness */
+ wr->length += bs;
+ }
+
s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
/* record length after mac and block padding */
/* else
s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */
- l2n6(bytes_to_long_long(s->s3->write_sequence), pseq);
+ memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
+ pseq+=6;
s2n(wr->length,pseq);
/* we should now have
/* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */
if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length,
- *((unsigned long long *)&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])));
+ *((PQ_64BIT *)&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])));
#endif
ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
-static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap,
- unsigned long long *seq_num)
+static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
{
- unsigned long long mask = 0x0000000000000001LL;
- unsigned long long rcd_num;
+ int cmp;
+ unsigned int shift;
+ const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
- rcd_num = bytes_to_long_long(s->s3->read_sequence);
-
- if (rcd_num >= bitmap->max_seq_num)
+ cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
+ if (cmp > 0)
{
- *seq_num = rcd_num;
- return 1; /* this record is new */
+ memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
+ return 1; /* this record in new */
}
-
- if (bitmap->max_seq_num - rcd_num > bitmap->length)
- return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
-
- mask <<= (bitmap->max_seq_num - rcd_num - 1);
- if (bitmap->map & mask)
+ shift = -cmp;
+ if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
+ return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
+ else if (bitmap->map & (1UL<<shift))
return 0; /* record previously received */
-
- *seq_num = rcd_num;
+
+ memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
return 1;
}
static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
{
+ int cmp;
unsigned int shift;
- unsigned long long mask = 0x0000000000000001L;
- unsigned long long rcd_num;
-
- rcd_num = bytes_to_long_long(s->s3->read_sequence);
+ const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
- if (rcd_num >= bitmap->max_seq_num)
+ cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
+ if (cmp > 0)
{
- shift = rcd_num - bitmap->max_seq_num + 1;
- bitmap->max_seq_num = rcd_num + 1;
- bitmap->map <<= shift;
- bitmap->map |= 0x0000000000000001LL;
+ shift = cmp;
+ if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
+ bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL;
+ else
+ bitmap->map = 1UL;
+ memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num,seq,8);
}
- else
- {
- mask <<= (bitmap->max_seq_num - rcd_num - 1);
- bitmap->map |= mask;
+ else {
+ shift = -cmp;
+ if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
+ bitmap->map |= 1UL<<shift;
}
}
{
int i,j;
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
- char buf[2 + 2 + 3]; /* alert level + alert desc + message seq +frag_off */
- char *ptr = &buf[0];
+ unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
*ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
*ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
+#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
{
s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr);
#endif
l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr);
}
+#endif
i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0);
if (i <= 0)
}
else
{
- if ( s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL ||
- s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
+ if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
+#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
+ || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
+#endif
+ )
(void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
if (s->msg_callback)
return &s->d1->bitmap;
/* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
- else if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch + 1 &&
+ else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
(rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT))
{
else
{
seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
+ memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
s->d1->w_epoch++;
}
}
-static unsigned long long
-bytes_to_long_long(unsigned char *bytes)
- {
- unsigned long long num;
-
- num = (((unsigned long long)bytes[0]) << 56) |
- (((unsigned long long)bytes[1]) << 48) |
- (((unsigned long long)bytes[2]) << 40) |
- (((unsigned long long)bytes[3]) << 32) |
- (((unsigned long long)bytes[4]) << 24) |
- (((unsigned long long)bytes[5]) << 16) |
- (((unsigned long long)bytes[6]) << 8) |
- (((unsigned long long)bytes[7]) );
-
- return num;
- }
-
-static void
-long_long_to_bytes(unsigned long long num, unsigned char *bytes)
- {
- bytes[0] = (unsigned char)((num >> 56)&0xff);
- bytes[1] = (unsigned char)((num >> 48)&0xff);
- bytes[2] = (unsigned char)((num >> 40)&0xff);
- bytes[3] = (unsigned char)((num >> 32)&0xff);
- bytes[4] = (unsigned char)((num >> 24)&0xff);
- bytes[5] = (unsigned char)((num >> 16)&0xff);
- bytes[6] = (unsigned char)((num >> 8)&0xff);
- bytes[7] = (unsigned char)((num )&0xff);
- }
-
static void
dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s)
{
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff