=head1 SYNOPSIS
B<openssl> B<verify>
-[B<-CApath directory>]
[B<-CAfile file>]
-[B<-purpose purpose>]
-[B<-untrusted file>]
+[B<-CApath directory>]
+[B<-attime timestamp>]
+[B<-check_ss_sig>]
+[B<-crl_check>]
+[B<-crl_check_all>]
+[B<-explicit_policy>]
+[B<-extended_crl>]
[B<-help>]
+[B<-ignore_critical>]
+[B<-inhibit_any>]
+[B<-inhibit_map>]
[B<-issuer_checks>]
+[B<-partial_chain>]
+[B<-policy arg>]
+[B<-policy_check>]
+[B<-policy_print>]
+[B<-purpose purpose>]
+[B<-suiteB_128>]
+[B<-suiteB_128_only>]
+[B<-suiteB_192>]
+[B<-trusted_first>]
+[B<-untrusted file>]
+[B<-use_deltas>]
[B<-verbose>]
+[B<-verify_depth num>]
+[B<-verify_email email>]
+[B<-verify_hostname hostname>]
+[B<-verify_ip ip>]
+[B<-verify_name name>]
+[B<-x509_strict>]
[B<->]
[certificates]
=over 4
+=item B<-CAfile file>
+
+A file of trusted certificates. The file should contain multiple certificates
+in PEM format concatenated together.
+
=item B<-CApath directory>
A directory of trusted certificates. The certificates should have names
of the B<x509> utility). Under Unix the B<c_rehash> script will automatically
create symbolic links to a directory of certificates.
-=item B<-CAfile file>
+=item B<-attime timestamp>
-A file of trusted certificates. The file should contain multiple certificates
-in PEM format concatenated together.
+Perform validation checks using time specified by B<timestamp> and not
+current system time. B<timestamp> is the number of seconds since
+01.01.1970 (UNIX time).
-=item B<-untrusted file>
+=item B<-check_ss_sig>
-A file of untrusted certificates. The file should contain multiple certificates
+Verify the signature on the self-signed root CA. This is disabled by default
+because it doesn't add any security.
-=item B<-purpose purpose>
+=item B<-crl_check>
-the intended use for the certificate. Without this option no chain verification
-will be done. Currently accepted uses are B<sslclient>, B<sslserver>,
-B<nssslserver>, B<smimesign>, B<smimeencrypt>. See the B<VERIFY OPERATION>
-section for more information.
+Checks end entity certificate validity by attempting to look up a valid CRL.
+If a valid CRL cannot be found an error occurs.
+
+=item B<-crl_check_all>
+
+Checks the validity of B<all> certificates in the chain by attempting
+to look up valid CRLs.
+
+=item B<-explicit_policy>
+
+Set policy variable require-explicit-policy (see RFC5280).
+
+=item B<-extended_crl>
+
+Enable extended CRL features such as indirect CRLs and alternate CRL
+signing keys.
=item B<-help>
-prints out a usage message.
+Print out a usage message.
-=item B<-verbose>
+=item B<-ignore_critical>
+
+Normally if an unhandled critical extension is present which is not
+supported by OpenSSL the certificate is rejected (as required by RFC5280).
+If this option is set critical extensions are ignored.
+
+=item B<-inhibit_any>
-print extra information about the operations being performed.
+Set policy variable inhibit-any-policy (see RFC5280).
+
+=item B<-inhibit_map>
+
+Set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping (see RFC5280).
=item B<-issuer_checks>
-print out diagnostics relating to searches for the issuer certificate
-of the current certificate. This shows why each candidate issuer
-certificate was rejected. However the presence of rejection messages
-does not itself imply that anything is wrong: during the normal
-verify process several rejections may take place.
+Print out diagnostics relating to searches for the issuer certificate of the
+current certificate. This shows why each candidate issuer certificate was
+rejected. The presence of rejection messages does not itself imply that
+anything is wrong; during the normal verification process, several
+rejections may take place.
+
+=item B<-partial_chain>
+
+Allow partial certificate chain if at least one certificate is in trusted store.
+
+=item B<-policy arg>
+
+Enable policy processing and add B<arg> to the user-initial-policy-set (see
+RFC5280). The policy B<arg> can be an object name an OID in numeric form.
+This argument can appear more than once.
+
+=item B<-policy_check>
+
+Enables certificate policy processing.
+
+=item B<-policy_print>
+
+Print out diagnostics related to policy processing.
+
+=item B<-purpose purpose>
+
+The intended use for the certificate. If this option is not specified,
+B<verify> will not consider certificate purpose during chain verification.
+Currently accepted uses are B<sslclient>, B<sslserver>, B<nssslserver>,
+B<smimesign>, B<smimeencrypt>. See the B<VERIFY OPERATION> section for more
+information.
+
+=item B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_128>, B<-suiteB_192>
+
+enable the Suite B mode operation at 128 bit Level of Security, 128 bit or
+192 bit, or only 192 bit Level of Security respectively.
+See RFC6460 for details. In particular the supported signature algorithms are
+reduced to support only ECDSA and SHA256 or SHA384 and only the elliptic curves
+P-256 and P-384.
+
+=item B<-trusted_first>
+
+Use certificates in CA file or CA directory before certificates in untrusted
+file when building the trust chain to verify certificates.
+This is mainly useful in environments with Bridge CA or Cross-Certified CAs.
+
+=item B<-untrusted file>
+
+A file of untrusted certificates. The file should contain multiple certificates
+in PEM format concatenated together.
+
+=item B<-use_deltas>
+
+Enable support for delta CRLs.
+
+=item B<-verbose>
+
+Print extra information about the operations being performed.
+
+=item B<-verify_depth num>
+
+Limit the maximum depth of the certificate chain to B<num> certificates.
+
+=item B<-verify_email email>
+
+Verify if the B<email> matches the email address in Subject Alternative Name or
+the email the subject Distinguished Name.
+
+=item B<-verify_hostname hostname>
+
+Verify if the B<hostname> matches DNS name in Subject Alternative Name or
+Common Name in the subject certificate.
+
+=item B<-verify_ip ip>
+
+Verify if the B<ip> matches the IP address in Subject Alternative Name of
+the subject certificate.
+
+=item B<-verify_name name>
+
+Use default verification options like trust model and required certificate
+policies identified by B<name>.
+Supported usages include: default, pkcs7, smime_sign, ssl_client, ssl_server.
+
+=item B<-x509_strict>
+
+For strict X.509 compliance, disable non-compliant workarounds for broken
+certificates.
=item B<->
-marks the last option. All arguments following this are assumed to be
+Indicates the last option. All arguments following this are assumed to be
certificate files. This is useful if the first certificate filename begins
with a B<->.
=item B<certificates>
-one or more certificates to verify. If no certificate filenames are included
-then an attempt is made to read a certificate from standard input. They should
-all be in PEM format.
-
+One or more certificates to verify. If no certificates are given, B<verify>
+will attempt to read a certificate from standard input. Certificates must be
+in PEM format.
=back
=item B<2 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: unable to get issuer certificate>
-the issuer certificate could not be found: this occurs if the issuer certificate
-of an untrusted certificate cannot be found.
+the issuer certificate of a looked up certificate could not be found. This
+normally means the list of trusted certificates is not complete.
=item B<3 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: unable to get certificate CRL>
-the CRL of a certificate could not be found. Unused.
+the CRL of a certificate could not be found.
=item B<4 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: unable to decrypt certificate's signature>
=item B<8 X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: CRL signature failure>
-the signature of the certificate is invalid. Unused.
+the signature of the certificate is invalid.
=item B<9 X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: certificate is not yet valid>
=item B<11 X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: CRL is not yet valid>
-the CRL is not yet valid. Unused.
+the CRL is not yet valid.
=item B<12 X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: CRL has expired>
-the CRL has expired. Unused.
+the CRL has expired.
=item B<13 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: format error in certificate's notBefore field>
=item B<15 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: format error in CRL's lastUpdate field>
-the CRL lastUpdate field contains an invalid time. Unused.
+the CRL lastUpdate field contains an invalid time.
=item B<16 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: format error in CRL's nextUpdate field>
-the CRL nextUpdate field contains an invalid time. Unused.
+the CRL nextUpdate field contains an invalid time.
=item B<17 X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: out of memory>
=item B<20 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: unable to get local issuer certificate>
-the issuer certificate of a locally looked up certificate could not be found. This normally means
-the list of trusted certificates is not complete.
+the issuer certificate could not be found: this occurs if the issuer
+certificate of an untrusted certificate cannot be found.
=item B<21 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: unable to verify the first certificate>
=item B<23 X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: certificate revoked>
-the certificate has been revoked. Unused.
+the certificate has been revoked.
=item B<24 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: invalid CA certificate>
=head1 BUGS
-Although the issuer checks are a considerably improvement over the old technique they still
+Although the issuer checks are a considerable improvement over the old technique they still
suffer from limitations in the underlying X509_LOOKUP API. One consequence of this is that
trusted certificates with matching subject name must either appear in a file (as specified by the
B<-CAfile> option) or a directory (as specified by B<-CApath>. If they occur in both then only
Previous versions of OpenSSL assume certificates with matching subject name are identical and
mishandled them.
+Previous versions of this documentation swapped the meaning of the
+B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT> and
+B<20 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY> error codes.
+
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<x509(1)|x509(1)>
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff