/* v3_purp.c */
/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (shenson@bigfoot.com) for the OpenSSL
- * project 1999.
+ * project 2001.
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
#include <stdio.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-
+#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x);
-static int ca_check(X509 *x);
-static int check_purpose_ssl_client(X509_PURPOSE *xp, X509 *x, int ca);
-static int check_purpose_ssl_server(X509_PURPOSE *xp, X509 *x, int ca);
-static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(X509_PURPOSE *xp, X509 *x, int ca);
-static int purpose_smime(X509 *x, int ca);
-static int check_purpose_smime_sign(X509_PURPOSE *xp, X509 *x, int ca);
-static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(X509_PURPOSE *xp, X509 *x, int ca);
-static int check_purpose_crl_sign(X509_PURPOSE *xp, X509 *x, int ca);
-static int no_check(X509_PURPOSE *xp, X509 *x, int ca);
-
-static int xp_cmp(X509_PURPOSE **a, X509_PURPOSE **b);
+static int ca_check(const X509 *x);
+static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x);
+static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+
+static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE * const *a,
+ const X509_PURPOSE * const *b);
static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p);
static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = {
{X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_encrypt, "S/MIME encryption", "smimeencrypt", NULL},
{X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign, "CRL signing", "crlsign", NULL},
{X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, "Any Purpose", "any", NULL},
+ {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper, "OCSP helper", "ocsphelper", NULL},
};
#define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard)/sizeof(X509_PURPOSE))
static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL;
-static int xp_cmp(X509_PURPOSE **a, X509_PURPOSE **b)
+static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE * const *a,
+ const X509_PURPOSE * const *b)
{
return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose;
}
+/* As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509*
+ * I really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const
+ * things. */
int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca)
{
int idx;
- X509_PURPOSE *pt;
+ const X509_PURPOSE *pt;
if(!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) {
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca);
}
+int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose)
+{
+ if(X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) {
+ X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_SET, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *p = purpose;
+ return 1;
+}
+
int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void)
{
if(!xptable) return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
return -1;
}
-
int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose)
{
X509_PURPOSE tmp;
}
int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags,
- int (*ck)(X509_PURPOSE *, X509 *, int),
+ int (*ck)(const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int),
char *name, char *sname, void *arg)
{
int idx;
idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
/* Need a new entry */
if(idx == -1) {
- if(!(ptmp = Malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)))) {
+ if(!(ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)))) {
X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
} else ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
- /* Free existing name if dynamic */
+ /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */
if(ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
- Free(ptmp->name);
- Free(ptmp->sname);
+ OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name);
+ OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname);
}
/* dup supplied name */
ptmp->name = BUF_strdup(name);
if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC)
{
if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
- Free(p->name);
- Free(p->sname);
+ OPENSSL_free(p->name);
+ OPENSSL_free(p->sname);
}
- Free(p);
+ OPENSSL_free(p);
}
}
return xp->trust;
}
-#ifndef NO_SHA
+static int nid_cmp(int *a, int *b)
+ {
+ return *a - *b;
+ }
+
+int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex)
+ {
+ /* This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions:
+ * that is those which are used by the verify process. If
+ * an extension is critical and doesn't appear in this list
+ * then the verify process will normally reject the certificate.
+ * The list must be kept in numerical order because it will be
+ * searched using bsearch.
+ */
+
+ static int supported_nids[] = {
+ NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */
+ NID_key_usage, /* 83 */
+ NID_subject_alt_name, /* 85 */
+ NID_basic_constraints, /* 87 */
+ NID_ext_key_usage /* 126 */
+ };
+
+ int ex_nid;
+
+ ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex));
+
+ if (ex_nid == NID_undef)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (OBJ_bsearch((char *)&ex_nid, (char *)supported_nids,
+ sizeof(supported_nids)/sizeof(int), sizeof(int),
+ (int (*)(const void *, const void *))nid_cmp))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+
static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
{
BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs;
ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage;
ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns;
- STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *extusage;
+ EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage;
+ X509_EXTENSION *ex;
+
int i;
if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) return;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL);
+#endif
/* Does subject name match issuer ? */
if(!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x)))
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS;
case NID_ms_sgc:
case NID_ns_sgc:
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC;
+ break;
+
+ case NID_OCSP_sign:
+ x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN;
+ break;
+
+ case NID_time_stamp:
+ x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP;
+ break;
}
}
sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT;
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns);
}
+ x->skid =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
+ x->akid =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
+ for (i = 0; i < X509_get_ext_count(x); i++)
+ {
+ ex = X509_get_ext(x, i);
+ if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex))
+ continue;
+ if (!X509_supported_extension(ex))
+ {
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET;
}
-#endif
/* CA checks common to all purposes
* return codes:
#define ns_reject(x, usage) \
(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
-static int ca_check(X509 *x)
+static int ca_check(const X509 *x)
{
/* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */
if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) return 0;
else return 0;
} else {
if((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) return 3;
+ /* If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it */
+ else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) return 3;
else return 2;
}
}
+/* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */
+static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x)
+{
+ int ca_ret;
+ ca_ret = ca_check(x);
+ if(!ca_ret) return 0;
+ /* check nsCertType if present */
+ if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) {
+ if(x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA) return ca_ret;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if(ca_ret != 2) return ca_ret;
+ else return 0;
+}
+
-static int check_purpose_ssl_client(X509_PURPOSE *xp, X509 *x, int ca)
+static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
{
if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SSL_CLIENT)) return 0;
- if(ca) {
- int ca_ret;
- ca_ret = ca_check(x);
- if(!ca_ret) return 0;
- /* check nsCertType if present */
- if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) {
- if(x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA) return ca_ret;
- return 0;
- }
- if(ca_ret != 2) return ca_ret;
- else return 0;
- }
+ if(ca) return check_ssl_ca(x);
/* We need to do digital signatures with it */
if(ku_reject(x,KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) return 0;
/* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */
return 1;
}
-static int check_purpose_ssl_server(X509_PURPOSE *xp, X509 *x, int ca)
+static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
{
if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SSL_SERVER|XKU_SGC)) return 0;
- /* Otherwise same as SSL client for a CA */
- if(ca) return check_purpose_ssl_client(xp, x, 1);
+ if(ca) return check_ssl_ca(x);
if(ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER)) return 0;
/* Now as for keyUsage: we'll at least need to sign OR encipher */
}
-static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(X509_PURPOSE *xp, X509 *x, int ca)
+static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
{
int ret;
ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca);
}
/* common S/MIME checks */
-static int purpose_smime(X509 *x, int ca)
+static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca)
{
if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SMIME)) return 0;
if(ca) {
return 1;
}
-static int check_purpose_smime_sign(X509_PURPOSE *xp, X509 *x, int ca)
+static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
{
int ret;
ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
if(!ret || ca) return ret;
- if(ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) return 0;
+ if(ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_NON_REPUDIATION)) return 0;
return ret;
}
-static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(X509_PURPOSE *xp, X509 *x, int ca)
+static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
{
int ret;
ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
return ret;
}
-static int check_purpose_crl_sign(X509_PURPOSE *xp, X509 *x, int ca)
+static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
{
if(ca) {
int ca_ret;
return 1;
}
-static int no_check(X509_PURPOSE *xp, X509 *x, int ca)
+/* OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that
+ * each CA is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain.
+ */
+
+static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
+{
+ /* Must be a valid CA */
+ if(ca) {
+ int ca_ret;
+ ca_ret = ca_check(x);
+ if(ca_ret != 2) return ca_ret;
+ if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) {
+ if(x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA) return ca_ret;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
{
return 1;
}
+
+/* Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second.
+ * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates
+ * which have been looked up using some simple method such as by
+ * subject name.
+ * These are:
+ * 1. Check issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer)
+ * 2. If akid(subject) exists check it matches issuer
+ * 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports certificate signing
+ * returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch, reasons match
+ * codes for X509_verify_cert()
+ */
+
+int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
+{
+ if(X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer),
+ X509_get_issuer_name(subject)))
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
+ x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer);
+ x509v3_cache_extensions(subject);
+ if(subject->akid) {
+ /* Check key ids (if present) */
+ if(subject->akid->keyid && issuer->skid &&
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(subject->akid->keyid, issuer->skid) )
+ return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH;
+ /* Check serial number */
+ if(subject->akid->serial &&
+ ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer),
+ subject->akid->serial))
+ return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
+ /* Check issuer name */
+ if(subject->akid->issuer) {
+ /* Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes
+ * SEQUENCE OF GeneralName. So look for a DirName.
+ * There may be more than one but we only take any
+ * notice of the first.
+ */
+ GENERAL_NAMES *gens;
+ GENERAL_NAME *gen;
+ X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
+ int i;
+ gens = subject->akid->issuer;
+ for(i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
+ gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
+ if(gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
+ nm = gen->d.dirn;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if(nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer)))
+ return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
+ }
+ }
+ if(ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN;
+ return X509_V_OK;
+}
+
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff