static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
-static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid);
+static int idp_check_scope(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl);
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-const char *X509_version="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
+const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
-static STACK_OF(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS) *x509_store_ctx_method=NULL;
-static int x509_store_ctx_num=0;
-#if 0
-static int x509_store_num=1;
-static STACK *x509_store_method=NULL;
-#endif
static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
{
- return (ok);
+ return ok;
}
#if 0
static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
{
- return (X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b));
+ return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
}
#endif
{
X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
X509_NAME *xn;
+ int bad_chain = 0;
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
int depth,i,ok=0;
int num;
- int (*cb)();
+ int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
-
if (ctx->cert == NULL)
{
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
- return (-1);
+ return -1;
}
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
- if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback;
/* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
* present and that the first entry is in place */
num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
- depth=ctx->depth;
+ depth=param->depth;
for (;;)
ctx->current_cert=x;
ctx->error_depth=i-1;
if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
+ bad_chain = 1;
ok=cb(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
{
X509_free(xtmp);
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (0);
+ return 0;
}
num++;
}
}
ctx->error_depth=num-1;
+ bad_chain = 1;
ok=cb(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
/* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
- if (ctx->purpose > 0) ok = check_chain_purpose(ctx);
+ ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
/* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
- if (ctx->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
+ if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
/* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
- /* At this point, we have a chain and just need to verify it */
+ /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
+ * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
+ */
+
+ ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
+ if(!ok) goto end;
+
+ /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
if (ctx->verify != NULL)
ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
else
ok=internal_verify(ctx);
+ if(!ok) goto end;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+ /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
+ ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto end;
+ ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto end;
+#endif
+
+ /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
+ if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
+ ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
+ if(!ok) goto end;
if (0)
{
end:
}
if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
- return (ok);
+ return ok;
}
ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
if (ret == X509_V_OK)
return 1;
- else
- {
- ctx->error = ret;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
- if ((ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK) && ctx->verify_cb)
- return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- else
- return 0;
- }
+ /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
+ return 0;
+
+ ctx->error = ret;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
+ return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
return 0;
}
* with the supplied purpose
*/
-static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
-#ifdef NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
return 1;
#else
- int i, ok=0;
+ int i, ok=0, must_be_ca;
X509 *x;
- int (*cb)();
+ int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
+ int proxy_path_length = 0;
+ int allow_proxy_certs =
+ !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
- if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback;
+
+ /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
+ -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
+ use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
+ 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
+ used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
+ 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
+ all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
+ */
+ must_be_ca = -1;
+
+ /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
+ happy */
+ if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
+ allow_proxy_certs = 1;
+
/* Check all untrusted certificates */
for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
{
+ int ret;
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
- if (!X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->purpose, i))
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+ && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ok=cb(0,ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto end;
+ }
+ if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
{
- if (i)
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ok=cb(0,ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto end;
+ }
+ ret = X509_check_ca(x);
+ switch(must_be_ca)
+ {
+ case -1:
+ if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+ && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
+ {
+ ret = 0;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
+ }
else
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ if (ret != 0)
+ {
+ ret = 0;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
+ }
+ else
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ if ((ret == 0)
+ || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+ && (ret != 1)))
+ {
+ ret = 0;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
+ }
+ else
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (ret == 0)
+ {
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok=cb(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
+ if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
+ {
+ ret = X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->param->purpose,
+ must_be_ca > 0);
+ if ((ret == 0)
+ || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+ && (ret != 1)))
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ok=cb(0,ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto end;
+ }
+ }
/* Check pathlen */
if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
- && (i > (x->ex_pathlen + 1)))
+ && (i > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
{
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ok=cb(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
+ /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
+ certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
+ certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
+ CA certificate. */
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
+ {
+ if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
+ {
+ ctx->error =
+ X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ok=cb(0,ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto end;
+ }
+ proxy_path_length++;
+ must_be_ca = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ must_be_ca = 1;
}
ok = 1;
end:
- return (ok);
+ return ok;
#endif
}
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
-#ifdef NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
return 1;
#else
int i, ok;
X509 *x;
- int (*cb)();
+ int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
- if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback;
/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
- ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->trust, 0);
+ ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
return 1;
- ctx->error_depth = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
else
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
- return (ok);
+ return ok;
#endif
}
+static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ int i, last, ok;
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
+ return 1;
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
+ last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+ else
+ last = 0;
+ for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
+ {
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ok = check_cert(ctx);
+ if (!ok) return ok;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
+ X509 *x;
+ int ok, cnum;
+ cnum = ctx->error_depth;
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
+ ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
+ /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
+ * notify callback
+ */
+ if(!ok)
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ctx->current_crl = crl;
+ ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
+ if (!ok) goto err;
+ ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
+ err:
+ ctx->current_crl = NULL;
+ X509_CRL_free(crl);
+ return ok;
+
+ }
+
+/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
+
+static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
+ {
+ time_t *ptime;
+ int i;
+ ctx->current_crl = crl;
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
+ ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
+ else
+ ptime = NULL;
+
+ i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
+ if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (i > 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
+ if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
+ {
+ i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
+
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
+ if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
+ if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ctx->current_crl = NULL;
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+/* Based on a set of possible CRLs decide which one is best suited
+ * to handle the current certificate. This is determined by a number
+ * of criteria. If any of the "must" criteria is not satisfied then
+ * the candidate CRL is rejected. If all "must" and all "should" are
+ * satisfied the CRL is accepted. If no CRL satisfies all criteria then
+ * a "best CRL" is used to provide some meaningful error information.
+ *
+ * CRL issuer name must match "nm" if not NULL.
+ * If IDP is present:
+ * a. it must be consistent.
+ * b. onlyuser, onlyCA, onlyAA should match certificate being checked.
+ * c. indirectCRL must be FALSE.
+ * d. onlysomereason must be absent.
+ * e. if name present a DP in certificate CRLDP must match.
+ * If AKID present it should match certificate AKID.
+ * Check time should fall between lastUpdate and nextUpdate.
+ */
+
+/* IDP name field matches CRLDP or IDP name not present */
+#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 4
+/* AKID present and matches cert, or AKID not present */
+#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 2
+/* times OK */
+#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 1
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_ALL 7
+
+/* IDP flags which cause a CRL to be rejected */
+
+#define IDP_REJECT (IDP_INVALID|IDP_INDIRECT|IDP_REASONS)
+
+static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl,
+ X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
+ {
+ int i, crl_score, best_score = -1;
+ X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
+ {
+ crl_score = 0;
+ crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
+ if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
+ continue;
+ if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
+
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_PRESENT)
+ {
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REJECT)
+ continue;
+ if (idp_check_scope(ctx->current_cert, crl))
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
+ }
+ else
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
+
+ if (crl->akid)
+ {
+ if (crl_akid_check(ctx, crl->akid))
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
+ }
+ else
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
+
+ if (crl_score == CRL_SCORE_ALL)
+ {
+ *pcrl = crl;
+ CRYPTO_add(&crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (crl_score > best_score)
+ {
+ best_crl = crl;
+ best_score = crl_score;
+ }
+ }
+ if (best_crl)
+ {
+ *pcrl = best_crl;
+ CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+static int crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid)
+ {
+ int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
+ if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
+ cidx++;
+ if (X509_check_akid(sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx), akid) == X509_V_OK)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+
+/* Check IDP name matches at least one CRLDP name */
+
+static int idp_check_scope(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl)
+ {
+ int i, j, k;
+ GENERAL_NAMES *inames, *dnames;
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
+ return 0;
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
+ {
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!crl->idp->distpoint)
+ return 1;
+ if (crl->idp->distpoint->type != 0)
+ return 1;
+ if (!x->crldp)
+ return 0;
+ inames = crl->idp->distpoint->name.fullname;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(inames); i++)
+ {
+ GENERAL_NAME *igen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(inames, i);
+ for (j = 0; j < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); j++)
+ {
+ DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, j);
+ /* We don't handle these at present */
+ if (dp->reasons || dp->CRLissuer)
+ continue;
+ if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 0))
+ continue;
+ dnames = dp->distpoint->name.fullname;
+ for (k = 0; k < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dnames); k++)
+ {
+ GENERAL_NAME *cgen =
+ sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dnames, k);
+ if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(igen, cgen))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. Currently only
+ * one CRL is retrieved. Multiple CRLs may be needed if we handle
+ * CRLs partitioned on reason code later.
+ */
+
+static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x)
+ {
+ int ok;
+ X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
+ X509_NAME *nm;
+ nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+ ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, nm, ctx->crls);
+ if (ok)
+ {
+ *pcrl = crl;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Lookup CRLs from store */
+
+ skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
+
+ /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
+ if (!skcrl)
+ {
+ if (crl)
+ {
+ *pcrl = crl;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, NULL, skcrl);
+
+ sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
+
+ /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
+ if (crl)
+ {
+ *pcrl = crl;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+/* Check CRL validity */
+static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
+ {
+ X509 *issuer = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
+ int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
+ cnum = ctx->error_depth;
+ chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+ /* Find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
+ * is next certificate in chain.
+ */
+ if(cnum < chnum)
+ issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
+ else
+ {
+ issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
+ /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
+ if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if(!ok) goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(issuer)
+ {
+ /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
+ if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
+ !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if(!ok) goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_PRESENT)
+ {
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if(!ok) goto err;
+ }
+ if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_REASONS|IDP_INDIRECT))
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_FEATURE;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if(!ok) goto err;
+ }
+ if (!idp_check_scope(ctx->current_cert, crl))
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if(!ok) goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
+ ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
+
+ if(!ikey)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Verify CRL signature */
+ if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+
+ ok = 1;
+
+ err:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
+ return ok;
+ }
+
+/* Check certificate against CRL */
+static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
+ {
+ int ok;
+ /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
+ * If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than
+ * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
+ */
+ if (X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(crl, NULL, X509_get_serialNumber(x)) > 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
+ {
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+ return 1;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if(!ok)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ int ret;
+ ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
+ ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
+ if (ret == -1)
+ {
+ /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
+ * callback.
+ */
+ X509 *x;
+ int i;
+ for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
+ {
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
+ continue;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
+ ret = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (ret == -2)
+ {
+ ctx->current_cert = NULL;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
+ return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
+ {
+ ctx->current_cert = NULL;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+ {
+ time_t *ptime;
+ int i;
+
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
+ ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
+ else
+ ptime = NULL;
+
+ i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
+ ctx->current_cert=x;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (i > 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
+ ctx->current_cert=x;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
+ ctx->current_cert=x;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
+ ctx->current_cert=x;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- int i,ok=0,n;
+ int ok=0,n;
X509 *xs,*xi;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
- time_t *ptime;
- int (*cb)();
+ int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
- if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback;
n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
ctx->error_depth=n-1;
n--;
xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
- if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
- ptime = &ctx->check_time;
- else
- ptime = NULL;
+
if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
xs=xi;
else
ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
- if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
+ else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
+ /* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert,
+ * this is a waste of time. That check should
+ * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
+ * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but
+ * we don't verify again and again in SSL
+ * handshakes and the like once the cert has
+ * been declared trusted. */
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
ctx->current_cert=xs;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
pkey=NULL;
-
- i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(xs), ptime);
- if (i == 0)
- {
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
- ctx->current_cert=xs;
- ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
- if (!ok) goto end;
- }
- if (i > 0)
- {
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
- ctx->current_cert=xs;
- ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
- if (!ok) goto end;
- }
- xs->valid=1;
}
- i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(xs), ptime);
- if (i == 0)
- {
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
- ctx->current_cert=xs;
- ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
- if (!ok) goto end;
- }
+ xs->valid = 1;
- if (i < 0)
- {
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
- ctx->current_cert=xs;
- ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
- if (!ok) goto end;
- }
-
- /* CRL CHECK */
+ ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
/* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
+ ctx->current_issuer=xi;
ctx->current_cert=xs;
ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
ok=1;
end:
- return (ok);
+ return ok;
}
-int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm)
+int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
{
return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
}
-int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
+int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
{
char *str;
ASN1_TIME atm;
- time_t offset;
+ long offset;
char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
int i,j;
str=(char *)ctm->data;
if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
{
- if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return (0);
+ if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
memcpy(p,str,10);
p+=10;
str+=10;
offset=0;
else
{
- if ((*str != '+') && (str[5] != '-'))
- return (0);
+ if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
+ return 0;
offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
if (*str == '-')
atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
- X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time);
+ if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
+ return 0;
if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
{
j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
if (j < 50) j+=100;
- if (i < j) return (-1);
- if (i > j) return (1);
+ if (i < j) return -1;
+ if (i > j) return 1;
}
i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
- return (-1);
+ return -1;
else
- return (i);
+ return i;
}
ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm)
{
time_t t;
+ int type = -1;
if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
else time(&t);
t+=adj;
- if (!s) return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t);
- if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return (ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t));
- return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t);
+ if (s) type = s->type;
+ if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t);
+ if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t);
+ return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t);
}
int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
int i,j;
- if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return (1);
+ if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
{
if (ktmp == NULL)
{
X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
- return (0);
+ return 0;
}
if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
break;
if (ktmp == NULL)
{
X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
- return (0);
+ return 0;
}
/* first, populate the other certs */
if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
- return (1);
+ return 1;
}
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
- {
- x509_store_ctx_num++;
- return (CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(x509_store_ctx_num-1,
- &x509_store_ctx_method,
- argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func));
- }
+ {
+ /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
+ * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
+ new_func, dup_func, free_func);
+ }
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
{
- return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data));
+ return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
}
void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
{
- return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx));
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
}
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- return (ctx->error);
+ return ctx->error;
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- return (ctx->error_depth);
+ return ctx->error_depth;
}
X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- return (ctx->current_cert);
+ return ctx->current_cert;
}
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- return (ctx->chain);
+ return ctx->chain;
}
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
}
- return (chain);
+ return chain;
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
ctx->untrusted=sk;
}
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
+ {
+ ctx->crls=sk;
+ }
+
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
{
return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
}
}
- if (purpose) ctx->purpose = purpose;
- if (trust) ctx->trust = trust;
+ if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
+ if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
return 1;
}
{
X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
- if (ctx) memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
+ if (!ctx)
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
return ctx;
}
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
-void X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
+int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
+ int ret = 1;
ctx->ctx=store;
ctx->current_method=0;
ctx->cert=x509;
ctx->untrusted=chain;
+ ctx->crls = NULL;
ctx->last_untrusted=0;
- ctx->purpose=0;
- ctx->trust=0;
- ctx->check_time=0;
- ctx->flags=0;
ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
ctx->valid=0;
ctx->chain=NULL;
- ctx->depth=9;
ctx->error=0;
+ ctx->explicit_policy=0;
ctx->error_depth=0;
ctx->current_cert=NULL;
ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
- ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
- ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
- ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
- ctx->verify = store->verify;
- ctx->cleanup = 0;
- memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
+ ctx->tree = NULL;
+
+ ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+
+ if (!ctx->param)
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
+ * use defaults.
+ */
+
+
+ if (store)
+ ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
+ else
+ ctx->param->flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
+
+ if (store)
+ {
+ ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
+ ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
+ }
+ else
+ ctx->cleanup = 0;
+
+ if (ret)
+ ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
+
+ if (ret == 0)
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (store && store->check_issued)
+ ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
+ else
+ ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
+
+ if (store && store->get_issuer)
+ ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
+ else
+ ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
+
+ if (store && store->verify_cb)
+ ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
+ else
+ ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
+
+ if (store && store->verify)
+ ctx->verify = store->verify;
+ else
+ ctx->verify = internal_verify;
+
+ if (store && store->check_revocation)
+ ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
+ else
+ ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
+
+ if (store && store->get_crl)
+ ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
+ else
+ ctx->get_crl = get_crl;
+
+ if (store && store->check_crl)
+ ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
+ else
+ ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
+
+ if (store && store->cert_crl)
+ ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
+ else
+ ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
+
+ if (store && store->lookup_certs)
+ ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
+ else
+ ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
+
+ if (store && store->lookup_crls)
+ ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
+ else
+ ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
+
+ ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
+
+
+ /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
+ * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
+ * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
+ /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
+ if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
+ &(ctx->ex_data)))
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
}
/* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
+ if (ctx->param != NULL)
+ {
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
+ ctx->param=NULL;
+ }
+ if (ctx->tree != NULL)
+ {
+ X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
+ ctx->tree=NULL;
+ }
if (ctx->chain != NULL)
{
sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
ctx->chain=NULL;
}
- CRYPTO_free_ex_data(x509_store_ctx_method,ctx,&(ctx->ex_data));
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
}
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags)
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
+ {
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
+ }
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
+ {
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
+ }
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
+ {
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
+ }
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
+ {
+ ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
+ }
+
+X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ return ctx->tree;
+ }
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ return ctx->explicit_policy;
+ }
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
+ {
+ const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+ param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
+ if (!param)
+ return 0;
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
+ }
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- ctx->flags |= flags;
+ return ctx->param;
}
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags, time_t t)
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
{
- ctx->check_time = t;
- ctx->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME;
+ if (ctx->param)
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
+ ctx->param = param;
}
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff