#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "vpm_int.h"
+
+/* CRL score values */
+
+/* No unhandled critical extensions */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
+
+/* certificate is within CRL scope */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
+
+/* CRL times valid */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
+
+/* Issuer name matches certificate */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
+
+/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
+
+/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
+
+/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
+
+/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
+
+/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
unsigned int *preasons,
X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
+static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+ X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
+static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
+ X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
}
#endif
+/* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
+static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
+ {
+ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
+ return 1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+/* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
+
+static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+ {
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
+ X509 *xtmp = NULL;
+ int i;
+ /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
+ certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
+ if (certs == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ /* Look for exact match */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++)
+ {
+ xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+ if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
+ CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ else
+ xtmp = NULL;
+ sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+ return xtmp;
+ }
int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
- X509_NAME *xn;
int bad_chain = 0;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
int depth,i,ok=0;
*/
/* If we are self signed, we break */
- xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
- if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
+ if (cert_self_signed(x))
+ break;
+ /* If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first */
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
+ {
+ ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
+ if (ok < 0)
+ return ok;
+ /* If successful for now free up cert so it
+ * will be picked up again later.
+ */
+ if (ok > 0)
+ {
+ X509_free(xtmp);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
/* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
- xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
- if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
+ if (cert_self_signed(x))
{
/* we have a self signed certificate */
if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
if (depth < num) break;
/* If we are self signed, we break */
- xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
- if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
+ if (cert_self_signed(x))
+ break;
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
}
/* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
- xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
- /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
- if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
+ i = check_trust(ctx);
+
+ /* If explicitly rejected error */
+ if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
+ goto end;
+ /* If not explicitly trusted then indicate error */
+ if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
{
if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
{
if (!ok) goto end;
- /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
-
- if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
+ ok = check_id(ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
if(!ok) goto end;
+ i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
+ ctx->param->flags);
+ if (i != X509_V_OK)
+ {
+ ctx->error = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
+ ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+ }
+
/* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
if (ctx->verify != NULL)
ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
{
int ret;
ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
+ if (ret == X509_V_OK)
+ {
+ int i;
+ X509 *ch;
+ /* Special case: single self signed certificate */
+ if (cert_self_signed(x) && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
+ return 1;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
+ {
+ ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ if (ch == issuer || !X509_cmp(ch, issuer))
+ {
+ ret = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
if (ret == X509_V_OK)
return 1;
/* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
return 1;
}
+static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
+ {
+ ctx->error = errcode;
+ ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
+ ctx->error_depth = 0;
+ return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ }
+
+static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
+ X509 *x = ctx->cert;
+ if (id->host && !X509_check_host(x, id->host, id->hostlen, 0))
+ {
+ if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (id->email && !X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0))
+ {
+ if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (id->ip && !X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0))
+ {
+ if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
- return 1;
-#else
int i, ok;
- X509 *x;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
-/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
- i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
- ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
- if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
- return 1;
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
- else
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
- ok = cb(0, ctx);
- return ok;
-#endif
+ /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
+ for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
+ {
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
+ /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
+ if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
+ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+ /* If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if
+ * not overridden.
+ */
+ if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
+ {
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
+ ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+ }
+ }
+ /* If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted
+ * certificate return success.
+ */
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
+ {
+ X509 *mx;
+ if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
+ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
+ mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
+ if (mx)
+ {
+ (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
+ X509_free(x);
+ ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
+ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and
+ * allow standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
+ */
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
}
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
else
+ {
+ /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
+ if (ctx->parent)
+ return 1;
last = 0;
+ }
for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
{
ctx->error_depth = i;
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
+ X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
X509 *x;
int ok, cnum;
+ unsigned int last_reasons;
cnum = ctx->error_depth;
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
ctx->current_cert = x;
ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
+ ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
ctx->current_reasons = 0;
while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
{
+ last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
/* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
- ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
+ if (ctx->get_crl)
+ ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
+ else
+ ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
/* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
* notify callback
*/
ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
if (!ok)
goto err;
- ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
- if (!ok)
- goto err;
+
+ if (dcrl)
+ {
+ ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+ ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ ok = 1;
+
+ /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
+ if (ok != 2)
+ {
+ ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
X509_CRL_free(crl);
+ X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
crl = NULL;
+ dcrl = NULL;
+ /* If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by
+ * another iteration, so exit loop.
+ */
+ if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons)
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ goto err;
+ }
}
err:
X509_CRL_free(crl);
+ X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
+
ctx->current_crl = NULL;
return ok;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
return 0;
}
-
- if (i < 0)
+ /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
+ if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
{
if (!notify)
return 0;
return 1;
}
-/* CRL score values */
-
-/* No unhandled critical extensions */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
-
-/* certificate is within CRL scope */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
-
-/* CRL times valid */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
-
-/* Issuer name matches certificate */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
-
-/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
-
-/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
-
-/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
-
-/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
-
-/* CRL is complete, not delta */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_COMPLETE 0x002
-
-static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 **pissuer,
- int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
+static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
+ X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
{
int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
- unsigned int reasons, best_reasons;
+ unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
- X509 *crl_issuer, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
+ X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
+
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
{
crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
*pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
*pscore = best_score;
*preasons = best_reasons;
- CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
+ if (*pdcrl)
+ {
+ X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
+ *pdcrl = NULL;
+ }
+ get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
}
-
if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
return 1;
return 0;
}
+/* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
+ * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
+ */
+
+static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
+ {
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
+ int i;
+ i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
+ if (i >= 0)
+ {
+ /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
+ if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
+ return 0;
+ exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
+ }
+ else
+ exta = NULL;
+
+ i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
+
+ if (i >= 0)
+ {
+
+ if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
+ return 0;
+ extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
+ }
+ else
+ extb = NULL;
+
+ if (!exta && !extb)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!exta || !extb)
+ return 0;
+
+
+ if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+/* See if a base and delta are compatible */
+
+static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
+ {
+ /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
+ if (!delta->base_crl_number)
+ return 0;
+ /* Base must have a CRL number */
+ if (!base->crl_number)
+ return 0;
+ /* Issuer names must match */
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
+ X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
+ return 0;
+ /* AKID and IDP must match */
+ if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
+ return 0;
+ if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
+ return 0;
+ /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
+ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
+ return 0;
+ /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
+ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+/* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
+ * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
+ */
+
+static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
+ X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
+ {
+ X509_CRL *delta;
+ int i;
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
+ return;
+ if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
+ {
+ delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
+ if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
+ {
+ if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
+ *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
+ CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
+ *dcrl = delta;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ *dcrl = NULL;
+ }
+
/* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
* The return value is a mask of several criteria.
* If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
return 0;
}
+ /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
+ else if (crl->base_crl_number)
+ return 0;
/* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
{
/* Verify CRL issuer */
ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
- if (!ret)
+ if (ret <= 0)
goto err;
/* Check chain is acceptable */
return 0;
}
-/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. Currently only
- * one CRL is retrieved. Multiple CRLs may be needed if we handle
- * CRLs partitioned on reason code later.
+/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
+ * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
*/
-static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x)
+static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+ X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
{
int ok;
X509 *issuer = NULL;
int crl_score = 0;
unsigned int reasons;
- X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
+ X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
- ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
+ ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
+ &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
+
if (ok)
goto done;
if (!skcrl && crl)
goto done;
- get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
+ get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
*pcrl = crl;
+ *pdcrl = dcrl;
return 1;
}
/* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
if (ctx->current_issuer)
issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
+
/* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
* is next certificate in chain.
*/
if(issuer)
{
- /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
- if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
- !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
+ /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
+ * been done
+ */
+ if (!crl->base_crl_number)
{
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if(!ok) goto err;
- }
+ /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
+ if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
+ !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if(!ok) goto err;
+ }
- if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
- {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if(!ok) goto err;
- }
+ if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if(!ok) goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
+ {
+ if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if(!ok) goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if(!ok) goto err;
+ }
- if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
- {
- ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
- if (!ok)
- goto err;
- }
- if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
- {
- if (!check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer))
- {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if(!ok) goto err;
}
- }
- if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
+ if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
{
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if(!ok) goto err;
+ ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
}
/* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
}
else
{
+ int rv;
+ rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
+ if (rv != X509_V_OK)
+ {
+ ctx->error=rv;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+ }
/* Verify CRL signature */
if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
{
static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
{
int ok;
- /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
- * If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than
- * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
+ X509_REVOKED *rev;
+ /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
+ * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
+ * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
+ * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
*/
- if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, NULL, x) > 0)
- {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- return 0;
- }
-
if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
{
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
if(!ok)
return 0;
}
+ /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
+ * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
+ */
+ if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
+ {
+ if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
+ return 2;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ return 0;
+ }
return 1;
}
xs=xi;
else
{
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN && n == 0)
+ {
+ xs = xi;
+ goto check_cert;
+ }
if (n <= 0)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
while (n >= 0)
{
ctx->error_depth=n;
- if (!xs->valid)
+
+ /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
+ * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
+ * just wastes time.
+ */
+ if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
{
if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
{
if (!ok) goto end;
}
else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
- /* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert,
- * this is a waste of time. That check should
- * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
- * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but
- * we don't verify again and again in SSL
- * handshakes and the like once the cert has
- * been declared trusted. */
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
ctx->current_cert=xs;
xs->valid = 1;
+ check_cert:
ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
if (!ok)
goto end;
offset= -offset;
}
atm.type=ctm->type;
+ atm.flags = 0;
atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
- if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
+ if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
return 0;
if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
}
-ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm)
+ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
+ {
+ return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
+ }
+
+ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
+ int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
{
time_t t;
- int type = -1;
if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
else time(&t);
- t+=adj;
- if (s) type = s->type;
- if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t);
- if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t);
- return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t);
+ if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
+ {
+ if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
+ return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
+ if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
+ return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
+ offset_sec);
+ }
+ return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
}
int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
return 1;
}
+/* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
+
+X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
+ EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
+ {
+ X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
+ int i;
+ STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
+ /* CRLs can't be delta already */
+ if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number)
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
+ if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number)
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* Issuer names must match */
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
+ X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* AKID and IDP must match */
+ if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier))
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
+ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0)
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* CRLs must verify */
+ if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
+ X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0))
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* Create new CRL */
+ crl = X509_CRL_new();
+ if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
+ goto memerr;
+ /* Set issuer name */
+ if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
+ goto memerr;
+
+ if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
+ goto memerr;
+ if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
+ goto memerr;
+
+ /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
+
+ if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
+ goto memerr;
+
+ /* Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set
+ * CRL number to correct value too.
+ */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++)
+ {
+ X509_EXTENSION *ext;
+ ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
+ if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
+ goto memerr;
+ }
+
+ /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
+
+ revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++)
+ {
+ X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
+ rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
+ /* Add only if not also in base.
+ * TODO: need something cleverer here for some more complex
+ * CRLs covering multiple CAs.
+ */
+ if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber))
+ {
+ rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
+ if (!rvtmp)
+ goto memerr;
+ if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp))
+ {
+ X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
+ goto memerr;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
+
+ if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
+ goto memerr;
+
+ return crl;
+
+ memerr:
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (crl)
+ X509_CRL_free(crl);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- int i;
- X509 *x;
- STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
- if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
- {
- x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- }
- return chain;
+ if (!ctx->chain)
+ return NULL;
+ return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
+ }
+
+X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ return ctx->current_issuer;
+ }
+
+X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ return ctx->current_crl;
+ }
+
+X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ return ctx->parent;
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
ctx->error_depth=0;
ctx->current_cert=NULL;
ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
+ ctx->current_crl=NULL;
+ ctx->current_crl_score=0;
+ ctx->current_reasons=0;
ctx->tree = NULL;
ctx->parent = NULL;
if (store)
ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
else
- ctx->param->flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
+ ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
if (store)
{
if (store && store->get_crl)
ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
else
- ctx->get_crl = get_crl;
+ ctx->get_crl = NULL;
if (store && store->check_crl)
ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff