#include <openssl/objects.h>
static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
+static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
+static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
const char *X509_version="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
-static STACK *x509_store_ctx_method=NULL;
+static STACK_OF(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS) *x509_store_ctx_method=NULL;
static int x509_store_ctx_num=0;
-#if 0
-static int x509_store_num=1;
-static STACK *x509_store_method=NULL;
-#endif
+
static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
{
- return(ok);
+ return ok;
}
#if 0
static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
{
- return(X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b));
+ return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
}
#endif
{
X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
X509_NAME *xn;
- X509_OBJECT obj;
int depth,i,ok=0;
int num;
int (*cb)();
if (ctx->cert == NULL)
{
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
- return(-1);
+ return -1;
}
- cb=ctx->ctx->verify_cb;
+ cb=ctx->verify_cb;
if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback;
/* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
/* If we are self signed, we break */
xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x),xn) == 0)
- break;
+ if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
/* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
{
- xtmp=X509_find_by_subject(sktmp,xn);
+ xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
if (xtmp != NULL)
{
if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
* certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
* if possible, otherwise we complain. */
+ /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
+ * is self signed.
+ */
+
i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(xn,X509_get_issuer_name(x))
- == 0)
+ if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
{
/* we have a self signed certificate */
if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
* we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
* match to avoid possible impersonation.
*/
- ok=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx,X509_LU_X509,xn,&obj);
- if ((ok != X509_LU_X509) || X509_cmp(x, obj.data.x509))
+ ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
+ if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
ctx->current_cert=x;
ctx->error_depth=i-1;
- if(ok == X509_LU_X509) X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
+ if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
ok=cb(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
* so we get any trust settings.
*/
X509_free(x);
- x = obj.data.x509;
+ x = xtmp;
sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
ctx->last_untrusted=0;
}
}
else
{
- /* worry more about this one elsewhere */
+ /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
ctx->last_untrusted--;
num--;
/* If we are self signed, we break */
xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x),xn) == 0)
- break;
+ if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
- ok=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx,X509_LU_X509,xn,&obj);
- if (ok != X509_LU_X509)
- {
- if (ok == X509_LU_RETRY)
- {
- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
- X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_SHOULD_RETRY);
- return(ok);
- }
- else if (ok != X509_LU_FAIL)
- {
- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
- /* not good :-(, break anyway */
- return(ok);
- }
- break;
- }
- x=obj.data.x509;
- if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,obj.data.x509))
+ ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
+
+ if (ok < 0) return ok;
+ if (ok == 0) break;
+
+ x = xtmp;
+ if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
{
- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
+ X509_free(xtmp);
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return(0);
+ return 0;
}
num++;
}
/* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x),xn) != 0)
+
+ /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
+ if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
{
- if ((chain_ss == NULL) || (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(chain_ss),xn) != 0))
+ if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
{
if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
}
/* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
- if(ctx->chain_purpose > 0) ok = check_chain_purpose(ctx);
+ if (ctx->purpose > 0) ok = check_chain_purpose(ctx);
- if(!ok) goto end;
+ if (!ok) goto end;
/* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
- if(ctx->trust_purpose > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
+ if (ctx->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
- if(!ok) goto end;
+ if (!ok) goto end;
/* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
/* At this point, we have a chain and just need to verify it */
- if (ctx->ctx->verify != NULL)
- ok=ctx->ctx->verify(ctx);
+ if (ctx->verify != NULL)
+ ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
else
ok=internal_verify(ctx);
if (0)
}
if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
- return(ok);
+ return ok;
}
+
+/* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
+ */
+
+static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
+{
+ int i;
+ X509 *issuer;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
+ {
+ issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
+ if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
+ return issuer;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
+
+static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
+{
+ int ret;
+ ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
+ if (ret == X509_V_OK)
+ return 1;
+ /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
+ if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
+ return 0;
+
+ ctx->error = ret;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
+ if (ctx->verify_cb)
+ return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
+
+static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+ *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
+ if (*issuer)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ else
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
/* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
* with the supplied purpose
*/
int i, ok=0;
X509 *x;
int (*cb)();
- cb=ctx->ctx->verify_cb;
+ cb=ctx->verify_cb;
if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback;
/* Check all untrusted certificates */
- for(i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
+ {
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
- if(!X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->chain_purpose, i)) {
- if(i) ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
- else ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
+ if (!X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->purpose, i))
+ {
+ if (i)
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
+ else
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok=cb(0,ctx);
- if(!ok) goto end;
- }
+ if (!ok) goto end;
+ }
/* Check pathlen */
- if((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
- && (i > (x->ex_pathlen + 1))) {
+ if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
+ && (i > (x->ex_pathlen + 1)))
+ {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok=cb(0,ctx);
- if(!ok) goto end;
+ if (!ok) goto end;
+ }
}
- }
ok = 1;
- end:
- return(ok);
+ end:
+ return ok;
#endif
}
int i, ok;
X509 *x;
int (*cb)();
- cb=ctx->ctx->verify_cb;
+ cb=ctx->verify_cb;
if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback;
/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
- ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->trust_purpose, 0);
- if(ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) return 1;
+ ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->trust, 0);
+ if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
+ return 1;
ctx->error_depth = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
ctx->current_cert = x;
- if(ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
- else ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
+ if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
+ else
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
- return(ok);
+ return ok;
#endif
}
int i,ok=0,n;
X509 *xs,*xi;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+ time_t *ptime;
int (*cb)();
- cb=ctx->ctx->verify_cb;
+ cb=ctx->verify_cb;
if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback;
n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
ctx->error_depth=n-1;
n--;
xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(xi),
- X509_get_issuer_name(xi)) == 0)
+ if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
+ ptime = &ctx->check_time;
+ else
+ ptime = NULL;
+ if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
xs=xi;
else
{
}
if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
{
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
ctx->current_cert=xs;
ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
- if (!ok) goto end;
+ if (!ok)
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ goto end;
+ }
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
pkey=NULL;
- i=X509_cmp_current_time(X509_get_notBefore(xs));
+ i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(xs), ptime);
if (i == 0)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
xs->valid=1;
}
- i=X509_cmp_current_time(X509_get_notAfter(xs));
+ i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(xs), ptime);
if (i == 0)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
}
ok=1;
end:
- return(ok);
+ return ok;
}
-int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_UTCTIME *ctm)
+int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm)
+{
+ return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
+}
+
+int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
{
char *str;
- ASN1_UTCTIME atm;
+ ASN1_TIME atm;
time_t offset;
char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
int i,j;
p=buff1;
i=ctm->length;
str=(char *)ctm->data;
- if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return(0);
- memcpy(p,str,10);
- p+=10;
- str+=10;
+ if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
+ {
+ if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
+ memcpy(p,str,10);
+ p+=10;
+ str+=10;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (i < 13) return 0;
+ memcpy(p,str,12);
+ p+=12;
+ str+=12;
+ }
if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
{ *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
- else { *(p++)= *(str++); *(p++)= *(str++); }
+ else
+ {
+ *(p++)= *(str++);
+ *(p++)= *(str++);
+ /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
+ if (*str == '.')
+ {
+ str++;
+ while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
+ }
+
+ }
*(p++)='Z';
*(p++)='\0';
else
{
if ((*str != '+') && (str[5] != '-'))
- return(0);
+ return 0;
offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
if (*str == '-')
offset= -offset;
}
- atm.type=V_ASN1_UTCTIME;
+ atm.type=ctm->type;
atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
- X509_gmtime_adj(&atm,-offset);
+ X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time);
- i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
- if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
- j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
- if (j < 50) j+=100;
+ if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
+ {
+ i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
+ if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
+ j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
+ if (j < 50) j+=100;
- if (i < j) return (-1);
- if (i > j) return (1);
+ if (i < j) return -1;
+ if (i > j) return 1;
+ }
i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
- return(-1);
+ return -1;
else
- return(i);
+ return i;
}
-ASN1_UTCTIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, long adj)
+ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
+{
+ return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
+}
+
+ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm)
{
time_t t;
+ int type = -1;
+
+ if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
+ else time(&t);
- time(&t);
t+=adj;
- return(ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t));
+ if (s) type = s->type;
+ if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t);
+ if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t);
+ return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t);
}
int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
int i,j;
- if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return(1);
+ if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
{
if (ktmp == NULL)
{
X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
- return(0);
+ return 0;
}
if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
break;
if (ktmp == NULL)
{
X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
- return(0);
+ return 0;
}
/* first, populate the other certs */
if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
- return(1);
- }
-
-int X509_STORE_add_cert(X509_STORE *ctx, X509 *x)
- {
- X509_OBJECT *obj,*r;
- int ret=1;
-
- if (x == NULL) return(0);
- obj=(X509_OBJECT *)Malloc(sizeof(X509_OBJECT));
- if (obj == NULL)
- {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return(0);
- }
- obj->type=X509_LU_X509;
- obj->data.x509=x;
-
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
-
- X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(obj);
-
- r=(X509_OBJECT *)lh_insert(ctx->certs,(char *)obj);
- if (r != NULL)
- { /* oops, put it back */
- lh_delete(ctx->certs,(char *)obj);
- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(obj);
- Free(obj);
- lh_insert(ctx->certs,(char *)r);
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT,X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE);
- ret=0;
- }
-
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
-
- return(ret);
+ return 1;
}
-int X509_STORE_add_crl(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_CRL *x)
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
{
- X509_OBJECT *obj,*r;
- int ret=1;
-
- if (x == NULL) return(0);
- obj=(X509_OBJECT *)Malloc(sizeof(X509_OBJECT));
- if (obj == NULL)
- {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CRL,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return(0);
- }
- obj->type=X509_LU_CRL;
- obj->data.crl=x;
-
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
-
- X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(obj);
-
- r=(X509_OBJECT *)lh_insert(ctx->certs,(char *)obj);
- if (r != NULL)
- { /* oops, put it back */
- lh_delete(ctx->certs,(char *)obj);
- X509_OBJECT_free_contents(obj);
- Free(obj);
- lh_insert(ctx->certs,(char *)r);
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CRL,X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE);
- ret=0;
- }
-
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
-
- return(ret);
- }
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, char *argp, int (*new_func)(),
- int (*dup_func)(), void (*free_func)())
- {
- x509_store_ctx_num++;
- return(CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(x509_store_ctx_num-1,
+ /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
+ * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
+ * That function uses locking, so we don't (usually)
+ * have to worry about locking here. For the whole cruel
+ * truth, see crypto/ex_data.c */
+ x509_store_ctx_num++;
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(x509_store_ctx_num-1,
&x509_store_ctx_method,
- argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func));
- }
+ argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func);
+ }
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
{
- return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data));
+ return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
}
void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
{
- return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx));
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
}
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- return(ctx->error);
+ return ctx->error;
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- return(ctx->error_depth);
+ return ctx->error_depth;
}
X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- return(ctx->current_cert);
+ return ctx->current_cert;
}
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- return(ctx->chain);
+ return ctx->chain;
+ }
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ int i;
+ X509 *x;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
+ if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
+ {
+ x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ }
+ return chain;
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
ctx->untrusted=sk;
}
-int X509_STORE_CTX_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
{
- return X509_set_purpose_and_trust(purpose,
- &ctx->chain_purpose, &ctx->trust_purpose);
+ return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
}
-void X509_STORE_CTX_trust_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
{
- ctx->trust_purpose = purpose;
+ return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
}
-int X509_set_purpose_and_trust(int id, int *purp, int *trust)
+/* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
+ * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
+ * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
+ * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
+ * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
+ * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
+ * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
+ * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
+ */
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
+ int purpose, int trust)
{
- X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
int idx;
- idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
- if(idx == -1) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_SET_PURPOSE_AND_TRUST,
- X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
- return 0;
- }
- ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_iget(idx);
- if(purp) *purp = id;
- if(trust) *trust = ptmp->trust_id;
+ /* If purpose not set use default */
+ if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
+ /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
+ if (purpose)
+ {
+ X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
+ idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
+ if (idx == -1)
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
+ X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+ if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
+ {
+ idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
+ if (idx == -1)
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
+ X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+ }
+ /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
+ if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
+ }
+ if (trust)
+ {
+ idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
+ if (idx == -1)
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
+ X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (purpose) ctx->purpose = purpose;
+ if (trust) ctx->trust = trust;
return 1;
}
+X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
+{
+ X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+ ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
+ if (ctx) memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+ {
+ ctx->ctx=store;
+ ctx->current_method=0;
+ ctx->cert=x509;
+ ctx->untrusted=chain;
+ ctx->last_untrusted=0;
+ ctx->purpose=0;
+ ctx->trust=0;
+ ctx->check_time=0;
+ ctx->flags=0;
+ ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
+ ctx->valid=0;
+ ctx->chain=NULL;
+ ctx->depth=9;
+ ctx->error=0;
+ ctx->error_depth=0;
+ ctx->current_cert=NULL;
+ ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
+ ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
+ ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
+ ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
+ ctx->verify = store->verify;
+ ctx->cleanup = 0;
+ memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
+ }
+
+/* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
+ * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
+ */
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
+{
+ ctx->other_ctx = sk;
+ ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
+ if (ctx->chain != NULL)
+ {
+ sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
+ ctx->chain=NULL;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(x509_store_ctx_method,ctx,&(ctx->ex_data));
+ memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
+ }
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags)
+ {
+ ctx->flags |= flags;
+ }
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags, time_t t)
+ {
+ ctx->check_time = t;
+ ctx->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME;
+ }
+
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff