* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/lhash.h>
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <internal/dane.h>
+#include <internal/x509_int.h>
+#include "x509_lcl.h"
/* CRL score values */
/* No unhandled critical extensions */
-#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
+#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
/* certificate is within CRL scope */
-#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
+#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
/* CRL times valid */
-#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
+#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
/* Issuer name matches certificate */
-#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
+#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
-#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
+#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
-#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
+#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
-#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
+#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
-#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
+#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
-static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
+static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted);
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
+static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
- unsigned int *preasons,
- X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
+ unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
- X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
-static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
- X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
-static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
- X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
+ X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
+static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
+ int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
+ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
+static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
+ int *pcrl_score);
static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
- unsigned int *preasons);
+ unsigned int *preasons);
static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
- STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
- STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
+ STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
-
static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
- {
- return ok;
- }
-
-#if 0
-static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
- {
- return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
- }
-#endif
+{
+ return ok;
+}
-int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
- {
- X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
- X509_NAME *xn;
- int bad_chain = 0;
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
- int depth,i,ok=0;
- int num;
- int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
- STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
- if (ctx->cert == NULL)
- {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
- return -1;
- }
-
- cb=ctx->verify_cb;
-
- /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
- * present and that the first entry is in place */
- if (ctx->chain == NULL)
- {
- if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
- (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
- {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto end;
- }
- CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- ctx->last_untrusted=1;
- }
-
- /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
- if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
- && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
- {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto end;
- }
-
- num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
- x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
- depth=param->depth;
-
-
- for (;;)
- {
- /* If we have enough, we break */
- if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
- * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
- * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
- * code later.
- */
-
- /* If we are self signed, we break */
- xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
- if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
-
- /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
- if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
- {
- xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
- if (xtmp != NULL)
- {
- if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
- {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto end;
- }
- CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
- ctx->last_untrusted++;
- x=xtmp;
- num++;
- /* reparse the full chain for
- * the next one */
- continue;
- }
- }
- break;
- }
-
- /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
- * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
- * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
-
- /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
- * is self signed.
- */
-
- i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
- x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
- xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
- if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
- {
- /* we have a self signed certificate */
- if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
- {
- /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
- * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
- * match to avoid possible impersonation.
- */
- ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
- if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
- {
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
- ctx->current_cert=x;
- ctx->error_depth=i-1;
- if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
- bad_chain = 1;
- ok=cb(0,ctx);
- if (!ok) goto end;
- }
- else
- {
- /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
- * so we get any trust settings.
- */
- X509_free(x);
- x = xtmp;
- (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
- ctx->last_untrusted=0;
- }
- }
- else
- {
- /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
- chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
- ctx->last_untrusted--;
- num--;
- x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
- }
- }
-
- /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
- for (;;)
- {
- /* If we have enough, we break */
- if (depth < num) break;
-
- /* If we are self signed, we break */
- xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
- if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
-
- ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
-
- if (ok < 0) return ok;
- if (ok == 0) break;
-
- x = xtmp;
- if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
- {
- X509_free(xtmp);
- X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- num++;
- }
-
- /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
- xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
-
- /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
- if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
- {
- if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
- {
- if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
- else
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
- ctx->current_cert=x;
- }
- else
- {
-
- sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
- num++;
- ctx->last_untrusted=num;
- ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
- chain_ss=NULL;
- }
-
- ctx->error_depth=num-1;
- bad_chain = 1;
- ok=cb(0,ctx);
- if (!ok) goto end;
- }
-
- /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
- ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
-
- if (!ok) goto end;
-
- /* Check name constraints */
-
- ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
-
- if (!ok) goto end;
-
- /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
-
- if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
-
- if (!ok) goto end;
-
- /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
- X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
-
- /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
- * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
- */
-
- ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
- if(!ok) goto end;
-
- /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
- if (ctx->verify != NULL)
- ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
- else
- ok=internal_verify(ctx);
- if(!ok) goto end;
+/* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
+static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
+{
+ /*
+ * FIXME: x509v3_cache_extensions() needs to detect more failures and not
+ * set EXFLAG_SET when that happens. Especially, if the failures are
+ * parse errors, rather than memory pressure!
+ */
+ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
+ return 1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
+
+static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
+ X509 *xtmp = NULL;
+ int i;
+ /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
+ certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
+ if (certs == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ /* Look for exact match */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
+ xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+ if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
+ X509_up_ref(xtmp);
+ else
+ xtmp = NULL;
+ sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+ return xtmp;
+}
+
+static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx) = ctx->verify_cb;
+ int err;
+ int ok;
+
+ /*
+ * Before either returning with an error, or continuing with CRL checks,
+ * instantiate chain public key parameters.
+ */
+ if ((ok = build_chain(ctx)) == 0 ||
+ (ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx)) == 0 ||
+ (ok = check_name_constraints(ctx)) == 0 ||
+ (ok = check_id(ctx)) == 0 || 1)
+ X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
+ if (ok == 0 || (ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx)) == 0)
+ return ok;
+
+ err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
+ ctx->param->flags);
+ if (err != X509_V_OK) {
+ ctx->error = err;
+ ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
+ if ((ok = cb(0, ctx)) == 0)
+ return ok;
+ }
+
+ /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */
+ ok = (ctx->verify != NULL) ? ctx->verify(ctx) : internal_verify(ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ return ok;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
- /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
- ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
- if (!ok) goto end;
- ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
- if (!ok) goto end;
+ /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
+ if ((ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx)) == 0)
+ return ok;
+ if ((ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx)) == 0)
+ return ok;
#endif
- /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
- if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
- ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
- if(!ok) goto end;
- if (0)
- {
-end:
- X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
- }
- if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
- if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
- return ok;
- }
-
-
-/* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
+ /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)
+ ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
+ return ok;
+}
+
+int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ struct dane_st *dane = (struct dane_st *)ctx->dane;
+
+ if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
+ * cannot do another one.
+ */
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
+ * the first entry is in place
+ */
+ if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
+ (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
+ ctx->num_untrusted = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * If dane->trecs is an empty stack, we'll fail, since the user enabled
+ * DANE. If none of the TLSA records were usable, and it makes sense to
+ * keep going with an unauthenticated handshake, they can handle that in
+ * the verify callback, or not set SSL_VERIFY_PEER.
+ */
+ if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
+ return dane_verify(ctx);
+ return verify_chain(ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
*/
static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
{
- int i;
- X509 *issuer;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
- {
- issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
- if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
- return issuer;
- }
- return NULL;
+ int i;
+ X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL;;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
+ issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
+ if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) {
+ rv = issuer;
+ if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, 1))
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return rv;
}
/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
{
- int ret;
- ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
- if (ret == X509_V_OK)
- return 1;
- /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
- if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
- return 0;
-
- ctx->error = ret;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
- return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- return 0;
+ int ret;
+ if (x == issuer)
+ return cert_self_signed(x);
+ ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
+ if (ret == X509_V_OK) {
+ int i;
+ X509 *ch;
+ /* Special case: single self signed certificate */
+ if (cert_self_signed(x) && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
+ return 1;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
+ ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ if (ch == issuer || !X509_cmp(ch, issuer)) {
+ ret = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ret == X509_V_OK)
+ return 1;
+ /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
+ return 0;
+
+ ctx->error = ret;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
+ return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
}
/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
- *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
- if (*issuer)
- {
- CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- return 1;
- }
- else
- return 0;
+ *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
+ if (*issuer) {
+ X509_up_ref(*issuer);
+ return 1;
+ } else
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static STACK_OF(X509) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
+ X509 *x;
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->other_ctx); i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->other_ctx, i);
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0) {
+ if (sk == NULL)
+ sk = sk_X509_new_null();
+ if (sk == NULL || sk_X509_push(sk, x) == 0) {
+ sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ X509_up_ref(x);
+ }
+ }
+ return sk;
}
-
-/* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
- * with the supplied purpose
+/*
+ * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
+ * purpose
*/
static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
- return 1;
-#else
- int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
- X509 *x;
- int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
- int proxy_path_length = 0;
- int purpose;
- int allow_proxy_certs;
- cb=ctx->verify_cb;
-
- /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
- -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
- use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
- 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
- used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
- 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
- all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
- */
- must_be_ca = -1;
-
- /* CRL path validation */
- if (ctx->parent)
- {
- allow_proxy_certs = 0;
- purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
- }
- else
- {
- allow_proxy_certs =
- !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
- /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
- software happy */
- if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
- allow_proxy_certs = 1;
- purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
- }
-
- /* Check all untrusted certificates */
- for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
- {
- int ret;
- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
- if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
- && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
- {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- ok=cb(0,ctx);
- if (!ok) goto end;
- }
- if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
- {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- ok=cb(0,ctx);
- if (!ok) goto end;
- }
- ret = X509_check_ca(x);
- switch(must_be_ca)
- {
- case -1:
- if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
- && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
- {
- ret = 0;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
- }
- else
- ret = 1;
- break;
- case 0:
- if (ret != 0)
- {
- ret = 0;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
- }
- else
- ret = 1;
- break;
- default:
- if ((ret == 0)
- || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
- && (ret != 1)))
- {
- ret = 0;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
- }
- else
- ret = 1;
- break;
- }
- if (ret == 0)
- {
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- ok=cb(0,ctx);
- if (!ok) goto end;
- }
- if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
- {
- ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
- if ((ret == 0)
- || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
- && (ret != 1)))
- {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- ok=cb(0,ctx);
- if (!ok) goto end;
- }
- }
- /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
- if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
- && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
- && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
- {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- ok=cb(0,ctx);
- if (!ok) goto end;
- }
- /* Increment path length if not self issued */
- if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
- plen++;
- /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
- certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
- certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
- CA certificate. */
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
- {
- if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
- {
- ctx->error =
- X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- ok=cb(0,ctx);
- if (!ok) goto end;
- }
- proxy_path_length++;
- must_be_ca = 0;
- }
- else
- must_be_ca = 1;
- }
- ok = 1;
+ int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
+ X509 *x;
+ int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
+ int proxy_path_length = 0;
+ int purpose;
+ int allow_proxy_certs;
+ cb = ctx->verify_cb;
+
+ /*-
+ * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
+ * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
+ * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
+ * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
+ * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
+ * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
+ * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
+ */
+ must_be_ca = -1;
+
+ /* CRL path validation */
+ if (ctx->parent) {
+ allow_proxy_certs = 0;
+ purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
+ } else {
+ allow_proxy_certs =
+ ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
+ /*
+ * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
+ * happy
+ */
+ if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
+ allow_proxy_certs = 1;
+ purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
+ }
+
+ /* Check all untrusted certificates */
+ for (i = 0; i == 0 || i < ctx->num_untrusted; i++) {
+ int ret;
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+ && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ ret = X509_check_ca(x);
+ switch (must_be_ca) {
+ case -1:
+ if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+ && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
+ ret = 0;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
+ } else
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ ret = 0;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
+ } else
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ if ((ret == 0)
+ || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+ && (ret != 1))) {
+ ret = 0;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
+ } else
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
+ ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
+ if ((ret == 0)
+ || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+ && (ret != 1))) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
+ if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
+ && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
+ && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ /* Increment path length if not self issued */
+ if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+ plen++;
+ /*
+ * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
+ * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
+ * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
+ */
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
+ if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ proxy_path_length++;
+ must_be_ca = 0;
+ } else
+ must_be_ca = 1;
+ }
+ ok = 1;
end:
- return ok;
-#endif
+ return ok;
}
static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
- {
- X509 *x;
- int i, j, rv;
- /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
- for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
- {
- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
- /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
- if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
- continue;
- /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
- * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
- * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
- * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
- */
- for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
- {
- NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
- if (nc)
- {
- rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
- if (rv != X509_V_OK)
- {
- ctx->error = rv;
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- return 1;
- }
-
-static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
-{
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
- return 1;
-#else
- int i, ok;
- X509 *x;
- int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
- cb=ctx->verify_cb;
-/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
- i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
- ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
- if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
- return 1;
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
- else
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
- ok = cb(0, ctx);
- return ok;
-#endif
+{
+ X509 *x;
+ int i, j, rv;
+ /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
+ for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
+ if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+ continue;
+ /*
+ * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
+ * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
+ * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
+ * to be obeyed.
+ */
+ for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
+ NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
+ if (nc) {
+ rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
+ if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
+ ctx->error = rv;
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
+{
+ ctx->error = errcode;
+ ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
+ ctx->error_depth = 0;
+ return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+}
+
+static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
+{
+ int i;
+ int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm->hosts);
+ char *name;
+
+ if (vpm->peername != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(vpm->peername);
+ vpm->peername = NULL;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
+ name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm->hosts, i);
+ if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, vpm->hostflags, &vpm->peername) > 0)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return n == 0;
+}
+
+static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
+ X509 *x = ctx->cert;
+ if (vpm->hosts && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) {
+ if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (vpm->email && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
+ if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (vpm->ip && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
+ if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted)
+{
+ int i, ok = 0;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ X509 *mx;
+ int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx) = ctx->verify_cb;
+ struct dane_st *dane = (struct dane_st *)ctx->dane;
+ int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+ int trust;
+
+ /*
+ * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2)
+ * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth.
+ */
+ if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && num_untrusted > 0 && num_untrusted < num) {
+ switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, num_untrusted)) {
+ case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
+ case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
+ return trust;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up.
+ * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted
+ * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those,
+ * and wants to incrementally check just any added since.
+ */
+ for (i = num_untrusted; i < num; i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ trust = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
+ /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
+ if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
+ goto trusted;
+ if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
+ goto rejected;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains,
+ * the chain is PKIX trusted.
+ */
+ if (num_untrusted < num) {
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
+ goto trusted;
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+ }
+
+ if (num_untrusted == num && ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
+ /*
+ * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf
+ * for a direct trust store match.
+ */
+ i = 0;
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
+ if (!mx)
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+
+ /*
+ * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings. If none are set,
+ * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed.
+ */
+ trust = X509_check_trust(mx, ctx->param->trust, 0);
+ if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
+ X509_free(mx);
+ goto rejected;
+ }
+
+ /* Replace leaf with trusted match */
+ (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
+ X509_free(x);
+ ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
+ goto trusted;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
+ * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
+ */
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+
+ rejected:
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
+ ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+
+ trusted:
+ if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
+ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+ if (dane->pdpth < 0)
+ dane->pdpth = num_untrusted;
+ /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */
+ if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
+ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
}
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
- {
- int i, last, ok;
- if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
- return 1;
- if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
- last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
- else
- last = 0;
- for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
- {
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ok = check_cert(ctx);
- if (!ok) return ok;
- }
- return 1;
- }
+{
+ int i = 0, last = 0, ok = 0;
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
+ return 1;
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
+ last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+ else {
+ /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
+ if (ctx->parent)
+ return 1;
+ last = 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ok = check_cert(ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ return ok;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
- {
- X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
- X509 *x;
- int ok, cnum;
- cnum = ctx->error_depth;
- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
- ctx->current_reasons = 0;
- while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
- {
- /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
- if (ctx->get_crl)
- ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
- else
- ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
- /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
- * notify callback
- */
- if(!ok)
- {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- goto err;
- }
- ctx->current_crl = crl;
- ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
- if (!ok)
- goto err;
-
- if (dcrl)
- {
- ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
- if (!ok)
- goto err;
- ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
- if (!ok)
- goto err;
- }
- else
- ok = 1;
-
- /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
- if (ok != 2)
- {
- ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
- if (!ok)
- goto err;
- }
-
- X509_CRL_free(crl);
- X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
- crl = NULL;
- dcrl = NULL;
- }
- err:
- X509_CRL_free(crl);
- X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
-
- ctx->current_crl = NULL;
- return ok;
-
- }
+{
+ X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ int ok = 0, cnum = 0;
+ unsigned int last_reasons = 0;
+ cnum = ctx->error_depth;
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
+ ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
+ ctx->current_reasons = 0;
+ while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
+ last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
+ /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
+ if (ctx->get_crl)
+ ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
+ else
+ ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
+ /*
+ * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
+ */
+ if (!ok) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ctx->current_crl = crl;
+ ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (dcrl) {
+ ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+ ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+ } else
+ ok = 1;
+
+ /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
+ if (ok != 2) {
+ ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ X509_CRL_free(crl);
+ X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
+ crl = NULL;
+ dcrl = NULL;
+ /*
+ * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
+ * so exit loop.
+ */
+ if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ err:
+ X509_CRL_free(crl);
+ X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
+
+ ctx->current_crl = NULL;
+ return ok;
+
+}
/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
- {
- time_t *ptime;
- int i;
- if (notify)
- ctx->current_crl = crl;
- if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
- ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
- else
- ptime = NULL;
-
- i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
- if (i == 0)
- {
- if (!notify)
- return 0;
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (i > 0)
- {
- if (!notify)
- return 0;
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
- return 0;
- }
-
- if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
- {
- i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
-
- if (i == 0)
- {
- if (!notify)
- return 0;
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
- return 0;
- }
- /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
- if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
- {
- if (!notify)
- return 0;
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- if (notify)
- ctx->current_crl = NULL;
-
- return 1;
- }
+{
+ time_t *ptime;
+ int i;
+ if (notify)
+ ctx->current_crl = crl;
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
+ ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
+ else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
+ return 1;
+ else
+ ptime = NULL;
+
+ i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
+ if (i == 0) {
+ if (!notify)
+ return 0;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (i > 0) {
+ if (!notify)
+ return 0;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) {
+ i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
+
+ if (i == 0) {
+ if (!notify)
+ return 0;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
+ if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
+ if (!notify)
+ return 0;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (notify)
+ ctx->current_crl = NULL;
+
+ return 1;
+}
static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
- X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
- STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
- {
- int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
- unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
- X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
- X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
- X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
- {
- crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
- reasons = *preasons;
- crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
-
- if (crl_score > best_score)
- {
- best_crl = crl;
- best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
- best_score = crl_score;
- best_reasons = reasons;
- }
- }
-
- if (best_crl)
- {
- if (*pcrl)
- X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
- *pcrl = best_crl;
- *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
- *pscore = best_score;
- *preasons = best_reasons;
- CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
- if (*pdcrl)
- {
- X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
- *pdcrl = NULL;
- }
- get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
- }
-
- if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
- return 1;
-
- return 0;
- }
-
-/* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
+ X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
+ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
+{
+ int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
+ unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
+ X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
+ X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
+ X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
+ crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
+ reasons = *preasons;
+ crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
+
+ if (crl_score > best_score) {
+ best_crl = crl;
+ best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
+ best_score = crl_score;
+ best_reasons = reasons;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (best_crl) {
+ X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
+ *pcrl = best_crl;
+ *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
+ *pscore = best_score;
+ *preasons = best_reasons;
+ X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl);
+ X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
+ *pdcrl = NULL;
+ get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
+ }
+
+ if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
* both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
*/
static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
- {
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
- int i;
- i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, 0);
- if (i >= 0)
- {
- /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
- if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
- return 0;
- exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
- }
- else
- exta = NULL;
-
- i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, 0);
+{
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
+ int i;
+ i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
+ if (i >= 0) {
+ /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
+ if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
+ return 0;
+ exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
+ } else
+ exta = NULL;
- if (i >= 0)
- {
+ i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
- if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
- return 0;
- extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
- }
- else
- extb = NULL;
+ if (i >= 0) {
- if (!exta && !extb)
- return 1;
+ if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
+ return 0;
+ extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
+ } else
+ extb = NULL;
- if (!exta || !extb)
- return 0;
+ if (!exta && !extb)
+ return 1;
+ if (!exta || !extb)
+ return 0;
- if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
- return 0;
+ if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
+ return 0;
- return 1;
- }
+ return 1;
+}
/* See if a base and delta are compatible */
static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
- {
- /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
- if (!delta->base_crl_number)
- return 0;
- /* Base must have a CRL number */
- if (!base->crl_number)
- return 0;
- /* Issuer names must match */
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
- X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
- return 0;
- /* AKID and IDP must match */
- if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
- return 0;
- if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
- return 0;
- /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
- if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
- return 0;
- /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
- if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
- return 1;
- return 0;
- }
-
-/* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
- * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
+{
+ /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
+ if (!delta->base_crl_number)
+ return 0;
+ /* Base must have a CRL number */
+ if (!base->crl_number)
+ return 0;
+ /* Issuer names must match */
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
+ return 0;
+ /* AKID and IDP must match */
+ if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
+ return 0;
+ if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
+ return 0;
+ /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
+ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
+ return 0;
+ /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
+ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
+ * retrieve a chain of deltas...
*/
static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
- X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
- {
- X509_CRL *delta;
- int i;
- if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
- return;
- if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
- return;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
- {
- delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
- if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
- {
- if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
- *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
- CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
- *dcrl = delta;
- return;
- }
- }
- *dcrl = NULL;
- }
-
-/* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
- * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
- * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
- * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
- * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
+ X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
+{
+ X509_CRL *delta;
+ int i;
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
+ return;
+ if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
+ delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
+ if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
+ if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
+ *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
+ X509_CRL_up_ref(delta);
+ *dcrl = delta;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ *dcrl = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
+ * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
+ * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
+ * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
+ * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
*/
static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
- unsigned int *preasons,
- X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
- {
-
- int crl_score = 0;
- unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
-
- /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
-
- /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
- if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
- return 0;
- /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
- if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
- {
- if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
- return 0;
- }
- else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
- {
- /* If no new reasons reject */
- if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
- return 0;
- }
- /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
- else if (crl->base_crl_number)
- return 0;
- /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
- {
- if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
- return 0;
- }
- else
- crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
-
- if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
- crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
-
- /* Check expiry */
- if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
- crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
-
- /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
- crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
-
- /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
-
- if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
- return 0;
-
- /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
-
- if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
- {
- /* If no new reasons reject */
- if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
- return 0;
- tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
- crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
- }
-
- *preasons = tmp_reasons;
-
- return crl_score;
-
- }
+ unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
+{
+
+ int crl_score = 0;
+ unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
+
+ /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
+
+ /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
+ return 0;
+ /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
+ if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
+ return 0;
+ } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
+ /* If no new reasons reject */
+ if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
+ else if (crl->base_crl_number)
+ return 0;
+ /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
+ if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
+ return 0;
+ } else
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
+
+ if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
+
+ /* Check expiry */
+ if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
+
+ /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
+ crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
+
+ /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
+
+ if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
+
+ if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
+ /* If no new reasons reject */
+ if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
+ return 0;
+ tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
+ }
+
+ *preasons = tmp_reasons;
+
+ return crl_score;
+
+}
static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
- X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
- {
- X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
- X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
- int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
- int i;
-
- if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
- cidx++;
-
- crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
-
- if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
- {
- if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
- {
- *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
- *pissuer = crl_issuer;
- return;
- }
- }
-
- for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
- {
- crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
- continue;
- if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
- {
- *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
- *pissuer = crl_issuer;
- return;
- }
- }
-
- /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
-
- if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
- return;
-
- /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
- * set of untrusted certificates.
- */
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
- {
- crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
- continue;
- if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
- {
- *pissuer = crl_issuer;
- *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
- return;
- }
- }
- }
-
-/* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
+ X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
+{
+ X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
+ int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
+ int i;
+
+ if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
+ cidx++;
+
+ crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
+
+ if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
+ if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
+ *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
+ *pissuer = crl_issuer;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
+ crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
+ continue;
+ if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
+ *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
+ *pissuer = crl_issuer;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
+
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
+ * untrusted certificates.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
+ crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
+ continue;
+ if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
+ *pissuer = crl_issuer;
+ *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
* X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
- * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
- * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in
- * practice.
+ * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
+ * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
*/
static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
- {
- X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
- int ret;
- /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
- if (ctx->parent)
- return 0;
- if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
- return -1;
-
- crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
- /* Copy verify params across */
- X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
-
- crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
- crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
-
- /* Verify CRL issuer */
- ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
-
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- /* Check chain is acceptable */
-
- ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
- err:
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
- return ret;
- }
-
-/* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
- * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
- * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
- * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
- * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
- * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
+{
+ X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
+ int ret;
+ /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
+ if (ctx->parent)
+ return 0;
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
+ return -1;
+
+ crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
+ /* Copy verify params across */
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
+
+ crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
+ crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
+
+ /* Verify CRL issuer */
+ ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
+
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Check chain is acceptable */
+
+ ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
+ err:
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
+ * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
+ * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
+ * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
+ * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
+ * RFC5280 version
*/
static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
- STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
- STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
- {
- X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
- cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
- crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
- if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
- return 1;
- return 0;
- }
-
-/* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
+ STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
+{
+ X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
+ cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
+ crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
+ if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
* 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
* 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
* 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
* 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
*/
-
static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
- {
- X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
- GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
- GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
- int i, j;
- if (!a || !b)
- return 1;
- if (a->type == 1)
- {
- if (!a->dpname)
- return 0;
- /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
- if (b->type == 1)
- {
- if (!b->dpname)
- return 0;
- if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
- return 1;
- else
- return 0;
- }
- /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
- nm = a->dpname;
- gens = b->name.fullname;
- }
- else if (b->type == 1)
- {
- if (!b->dpname)
- return 0;
- /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
- gens = a->name.fullname;
- nm = b->dpname;
- }
-
- /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
- if (nm)
- {
- for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
- {
- gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
- if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
- continue;
- if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
- return 1;
- }
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
- {
- gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
- for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
- {
- genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
- if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
- return 0;
-
- }
+{
+ X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
+ GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
+ GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
+ int i, j;
+ if (!a || !b)
+ return 1;
+ if (a->type == 1) {
+ if (!a->dpname)
+ return 0;
+ /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
+ if (b->type == 1) {
+ if (!b->dpname)
+ return 0;
+ if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
+ return 1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
+ nm = a->dpname;
+ gens = b->name.fullname;
+ } else if (b->type == 1) {
+ if (!b->dpname)
+ return 0;
+ /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
+ gens = a->name.fullname;
+ nm = b->dpname;
+ }
+
+ /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
+ if (nm) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
+ gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
+ if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
+ continue;
+ if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
+ gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
+ for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
+ genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
+ if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+}
static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
- {
- int i;
- X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
- /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
- if (!dp->CRLissuer)
- return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
- for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
- {
- GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
- if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
- continue;
- if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
- return 1;
- }
- return 0;
- }
+{
+ int i;
+ X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
+ /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
+ if (!dp->CRLissuer)
+ return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
+ GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
+ if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
+ continue;
+ if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
/* Check CRLDP and IDP */
static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
- unsigned int *preasons)
- {
- int i;
- if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
- return 0;
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
- {
- if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
- return 0;
- }
- else
- {
- if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
- return 0;
- }
- *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
- {
- DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
- if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
- {
- if (!crl->idp ||
- idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
- {
- *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
- return 1;
- }
- }
- }
- if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
- return 1;
- return 0;
- }
-
-/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
- * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
+ unsigned int *preasons)
+{
+ int i;
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
+ return 0;
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
+ DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
+ if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
+ if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
+ *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
+ && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
+ * to find a delta CRL too
*/
-
+
static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
- X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
- {
- int ok;
- X509 *issuer = NULL;
- int crl_score = 0;
- unsigned int reasons;
- X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
- STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
- X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
- reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
- ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
- &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
-
- if (ok)
- goto done;
-
- /* Lookup CRLs from store */
-
- skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
-
- /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
- if (!skcrl && crl)
- goto done;
-
- get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
-
- sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
-
- done:
-
- /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
- if (crl)
- {
- ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
- ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
- ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
- *pcrl = crl;
- *pdcrl = dcrl;
- return 1;
- }
-
- return 0;
- }
+ X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
+{
+ int ok;
+ X509 *issuer = NULL;
+ int crl_score = 0;
+ unsigned int reasons;
+ X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
+ X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+ reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
+ ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
+ &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
+
+ if (ok)
+ goto done;
+
+ /* Lookup CRLs from store */
+
+ skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
+
+ /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
+ if (!skcrl && crl)
+ goto done;
+
+ get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
+
+ sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
+
+ done:
+
+ /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
+ if (crl) {
+ ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
+ ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
+ ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
+ *pcrl = crl;
+ *pdcrl = dcrl;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
/* Check CRL validity */
static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
- {
- X509 *issuer = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
- int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
- cnum = ctx->error_depth;
- chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
- /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
- if (ctx->current_issuer)
- issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
-
- /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
- * is next certificate in chain.
- */
- else if (cnum < chnum)
- issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
- else
- {
- issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
- /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
- if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
- {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if(!ok) goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if(issuer)
- {
- /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
- * been done
- */
- if (!crl->base_crl_number)
- {
- /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
- if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
- !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
- {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if(!ok) goto err;
- }
-
- if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
- {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if(!ok) goto err;
- }
-
- if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
- {
- if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
- {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if(!ok) goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
- {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if(!ok) goto err;
- }
-
-
- }
-
- if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
- {
- ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
- if (!ok)
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
- ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
-
- if(!ikey)
- {
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok) goto err;
- }
- else
- {
- /* Verify CRL signature */
- if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
- {
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok) goto err;
- }
- }
- }
-
- ok = 1;
-
- err:
- EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
- return ok;
- }
+{
+ X509 *issuer = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
+ int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
+ cnum = ctx->error_depth;
+ chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+ /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
+ if (ctx->current_issuer)
+ issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
+
+ /*
+ * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
+ * certificate in chain.
+ */
+ else if (cnum < chnum)
+ issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
+ else {
+ issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
+ /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
+ if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (issuer) {
+ /*
+ * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
+ */
+ if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
+ /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
+ if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
+ !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
+ if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
+ ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
+ ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer);
+
+ if (!ikey) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ int rv;
+ rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
+ if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
+ ctx->error = rv;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Verify CRL signature */
+ if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ ok = 1;
+
+ err:
+ return ok;
+}
/* Check certificate against CRL */
static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
- {
- int ok;
- X509_REVOKED *rev;
- /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
- * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
- * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
- * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
- */
- if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
- {
- if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
- return 1;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if(!ok)
- return 0;
- }
- /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
- * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
- */
- if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
- {
- if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
- return 2;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
+{
+ int ok;
+ X509_REVOKED *rev;
+ /*
+ * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
+ * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
+ * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
+ * change the meaning of CRL entries.
+ */
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+ && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
+ * is not removeFromCRL.
+ */
+ if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
+ if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
+ return 2;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
- {
- int ret;
- if (ctx->parent)
- return 1;
- ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
- ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
- if (ret == 0)
- {
- X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
- if (ret == -1)
- {
- /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
- * callback.
- */
- X509 *x;
- int i;
- for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
- {
- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
- if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
- continue;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
- if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
- }
- if (ret == -2)
- {
- ctx->current_cert = NULL;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
- return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- }
-
- if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
- {
- ctx->current_cert = NULL;
- ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
-static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
- {
- time_t *ptime;
- int i;
-
- if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
- ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
- else
- ptime = NULL;
-
- i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
- if (i == 0)
- {
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
- ctx->current_cert=x;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (i > 0)
- {
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
- ctx->current_cert=x;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
- return 0;
- }
-
- i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
- if (i == 0)
- {
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
- ctx->current_cert=x;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (i < 0)
- {
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
- ctx->current_cert=x;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
+{
+ int ret;
+ if (ctx->parent)
+ return 1;
+ ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
+ ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ /*
+ * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
+ */
+ X509 *x;
+ int i;
+ for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
+ continue;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (ret == -2) {
+ ctx->current_cert = NULL;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
+ return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
+ ctx->current_cert = NULL;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int quiet)
+{
+ time_t *ptime;
+ int i;
+
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
+ ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
+ else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
+ return 1;
+ else
+ ptime = NULL;
+
+ i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
+ if (i == 0) {
+ if (quiet)
+ return 0;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (i > 0) {
+ if (quiet)
+ return 0;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
+ if (i == 0) {
+ if (quiet)
+ return 0;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (i < 0) {
+ if (quiet)
+ return 0;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
- {
- int ok=0,n;
- X509 *xs,*xi;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
- int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
-
- cb=ctx->verify_cb;
-
- n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
- ctx->error_depth=n-1;
- n--;
- xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
-
- if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
- xs=xi;
- else
- {
- if (n <= 0)
- {
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
- ctx->current_cert=xi;
- ok=cb(0,ctx);
- goto end;
- }
- else
- {
- n--;
- ctx->error_depth=n;
- xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
- }
- }
-
-/* ctx->error=0; not needed */
- while (n >= 0)
- {
- ctx->error_depth=n;
-
- /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
- * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
- * just wastes time.
- */
- if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
- {
- if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
- {
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
- ctx->current_cert=xi;
- ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
- if (!ok) goto end;
- }
- else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
- {
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
- ctx->current_cert=xs;
- ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
- if (!ok)
- {
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- goto end;
- }
- }
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- pkey=NULL;
- }
-
- xs->valid = 1;
-
- ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
- if (!ok)
- goto end;
-
- /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
- ctx->current_issuer=xi;
- ctx->current_cert=xs;
- ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
- if (!ok) goto end;
-
- n--;
- if (n >= 0)
- {
- xi=xs;
- xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
- }
- }
- ok=1;
-end:
- return ok;
- }
+{
+ int ok = 0, n;
+ X509 *xs, *xi;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
+
+ cb = ctx->verify_cb;
+
+ n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+ ctx->error_depth = n;
+ xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+
+ /*
+ * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to
+ * check the timestamps of the top certificate. We report the issuer as
+ * NULL, since all we have is a bare key.
+ */
+ if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) {
+ xs = xi;
+ xi = NULL;
+ goto check_cert;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
+ xs = xi;
+ else {
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
+ xs = xi;
+ goto check_cert;
+ }
+ if (n <= 0) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
+ ctx->current_cert = xi;
+ ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ goto end;
+ } else {
+ n--;
+ ctx->error_depth = n;
+ xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the user's callback
+ * is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril).
+ */
+ while (n >= 0) {
+ ctx->error_depth = n;
+
+ /*
+ * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
+ * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
+ * time.
+ */
+ if (!xs->valid
+ && (xs != xi
+ || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) {
+ if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
+ ctx->current_cert = xi;
+ ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+ } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
+ ctx->current_cert = xs;
+ ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ xs->valid = 1;
+
+ check_cert:
+ ok = x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, 0);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+
+ /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
+ ctx->current_issuer = xi;
+ ctx->current_cert = xs;
+ ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
+
+ n--;
+ if (n >= 0) {
+ xi = xs;
+ xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+ }
+ }
+ ok = 1;
+ end:
+ return ok;
+}
int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
{
- return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
+ return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
}
int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
- {
- char *str;
- ASN1_TIME atm;
- long offset;
- char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
- int i,j;
-
- p=buff1;
- i=ctm->length;
- str=(char *)ctm->data;
- if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
- {
- if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
- memcpy(p,str,10);
- p+=10;
- str+=10;
- }
- else
- {
- if (i < 13) return 0;
- memcpy(p,str,12);
- p+=12;
- str+=12;
- }
-
- if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
- { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
- else
- {
- *(p++)= *(str++);
- *(p++)= *(str++);
- /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
- if (*str == '.')
- {
- str++;
- while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
- }
-
- }
- *(p++)='Z';
- *(p++)='\0';
-
- if (*str == 'Z')
- offset=0;
- else
- {
- if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
- return 0;
- offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
- offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
- if (*str == '-')
- offset= -offset;
- }
- atm.type=ctm->type;
- atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
- atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
-
- if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
- {
- i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
- if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
- j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
- if (j < 50) j+=100;
-
- if (i < j) return -1;
- if (i > j) return 1;
- }
- i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
- if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
- return -1;
- else
- return i;
- }
+{
+ char *str;
+ ASN1_TIME atm;
+ long offset;
+ char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
+ int i, j, remaining;
+
+ p = buff1;
+ remaining = ctm->length;
+ str = (char *)ctm->data;
+ /*
+ * Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
+ * time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
+ * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
+ * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
+ */
+ if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
+ /* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
+ int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
+ int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
+ if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
+ return 0;
+ memcpy(p, str, 10);
+ p += 10;
+ str += 10;
+ remaining -= 10;
+ } else {
+ /* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
+ int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
+ int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
+ if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
+ return 0;
+ memcpy(p, str, 12);
+ p += 12;
+ str += 12;
+ remaining -= 12;
+ }
+
+ if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
+ *(p++) = '0';
+ *(p++) = '0';
+ } else {
+ /* SS (seconds) */
+ if (remaining < 2)
+ return 0;
+ *(p++) = *(str++);
+ *(p++) = *(str++);
+ remaining -= 2;
+ /*
+ * Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
+ * TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
+ * Can we just kill them altogether?
+ */
+ if (remaining && *str == '.') {
+ str++;
+ remaining--;
+ for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) {
+ if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ }
+ *(p++) = 'Z';
+ *(p++) = '\0';
+
+ /* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
+ if (!remaining)
+ return 0;
+ if (*str == 'Z') {
+ if (remaining != 1)
+ return 0;
+ offset = 0;
+ } else {
+ /* (+-)HHMM */
+ if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
+ return 0;
+ /* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
+ if (remaining != 5)
+ return 0;
+ if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
+ str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
+ return 0;
+ offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
+ offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
+ if (*str == '-')
+ offset = -offset;
+ }
+ atm.type = ctm->type;
+ atm.flags = 0;
+ atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
+ atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;
+
+ if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
+ i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
+ if (i < 50)
+ i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
+ j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
+ if (j < 50)
+ j += 100;
+
+ if (i < j)
+ return -1;
+ if (i > j)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
+ if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
+ return -1;
+ else
+ return i;
+}
ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
{
- return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
+ return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
}
ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
- {
- return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
- }
+{
+ return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
+}
ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
- int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
- {
- time_t t;
-
- if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
- else time(&t);
-
- if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
- {
- if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
- return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
- if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
- return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
- offset_sec);
- }
- return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
- }
+ int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
+{
+ time_t t;
+
+ if (in_tm)
+ t = *in_tm;
+ else
+ time(&t);
+
+ if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
+ if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
+ return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
+ if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
+ return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
+ }
+ return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
+}
int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
- {
- EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
- int i,j;
-
- if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
-
- for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
- {
- ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
- if (ktmp == NULL)
- {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
- break;
- else
- {
- EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
- ktmp=NULL;
- }
- }
- if (ktmp == NULL)
- {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* first, populate the other certs */
- for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
- {
- ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
- EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
- EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
- }
-
- if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
- EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
- return 1;
- }
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
- CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
- {
- /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
- * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
- return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
- new_func, dup_func, free_func);
- }
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
+ int i, j;
+
+ if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
+ return 1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+ ktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
+ if (ktmp == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
+ X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
+ break;
+ }
+ if (ktmp == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
+ X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* first, populate the other certs */
+ for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
+ ktmp2 = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
+ EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
+ }
+
+ if (pkey != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
+
+X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
+ EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
+ int i;
+ STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
+ /* CRLs can't be delta already */
+ if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
+ if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* Issuer names must match */
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* AKID and IDP must match */
+ if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
+ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* CRLs must verify */
+ if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
+ X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* Create new CRL */
+ crl = X509_CRL_new();
+ if (crl == NULL || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
+ goto memerr;
+ /* Set issuer name */
+ if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
+ goto memerr;
+
+ if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
+ goto memerr;
+ if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
+ goto memerr;
+
+ /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
+
+ if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
+ goto memerr;
+
+ /*
+ * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
+ * number to correct value too.
+ */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
+ X509_EXTENSION *ext;
+ ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
+ if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
+ goto memerr;
+ }
+
+ /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
+
+ revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) {
+ X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
+ rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
+ /*
+ * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
+ * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
+ */
+ if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, &rvn->serialNumber)) {
+ rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
+ if (!rvtmp)
+ goto memerr;
+ if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
+ X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
+ goto memerr;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
+
+ if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
+ goto memerr;
+
+ return crl;
+
+ memerr:
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ X509_CRL_free(crl);
+ return NULL;
+}
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
- {
- return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
- }
+{
+ return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
+}
void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
- {
- return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
- }
+{
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
+}
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
- {
- return ctx->error;
- }
+{
+ return ctx->error;
+}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
- {
- ctx->error=err;
- }
+{
+ ctx->error = err;
+}
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
- {
- return ctx->error_depth;
- }
+{
+ return ctx->error_depth;
+}
X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
- {
- return ctx->current_cert;
- }
+{
+ return ctx->current_cert;
+}
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
- {
- return ctx->chain;
- }
+{
+ return ctx->chain;
+}
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
- {
- int i;
- X509 *x;
- STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
- if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
- {
- x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- }
- return chain;
- }
+{
+ if (!ctx->chain)
+ return NULL;
+ return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
+}
+
+X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->current_issuer;
+}
+
+X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->current_crl;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->parent;
+}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
- {
- ctx->cert=x;
- }
+{
+ ctx->cert = x;
+}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
- {
- ctx->untrusted=sk;
- }
+{
+ ctx->untrusted = sk;
+}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
- {
- ctx->crls=sk;
- }
+{
+ ctx->crls = sk;
+}
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
- {
- return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
- }
+{
+ return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
+}
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
- {
- return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
- }
-
-/* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
- * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
- * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
- * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
- * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
- * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
- * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
- * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
+{
+ return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
+ * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
+ * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
+ * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
+ * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
+ * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
+ * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
+ * client/server.
*/
int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
- int purpose, int trust)
-{
- int idx;
- /* If purpose not set use default */
- if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
- /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
- if (purpose)
- {
- X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
- idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
- if (idx == -1)
- {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
- X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
- return 0;
- }
- ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
- if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
- {
- idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
- if (idx == -1)
- {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
- X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
- return 0;
- }
- ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
- }
- /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
- if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
- }
- if (trust)
- {
- idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
- if (idx == -1)
- {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
- X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
- if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
- return 1;
+ int purpose, int trust)
+{
+ int idx;
+ /* If purpose not set use default */
+ if (!purpose)
+ purpose = def_purpose;
+ /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
+ if (purpose) {
+ X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
+ idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
+ if (idx == -1) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
+ X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+ if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
+ idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
+ if (idx == -1) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
+ X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+ }
+ /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
+ if (!trust)
+ trust = ptmp->trust;
+ }
+ if (trust) {
+ idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
+ if (idx == -1) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
+ X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
+ ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
+ if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
+ ctx->param->trust = trust;
+ return 1;
}
X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
{
- X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
- ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
- if (!ctx)
- {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
- memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
- return ctx;
+ X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ctx;
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
- OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+ if (!ctx)
+ return;
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
- STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
- {
- int ret = 1;
- ctx->ctx=store;
- ctx->current_method=0;
- ctx->cert=x509;
- ctx->untrusted=chain;
- ctx->crls = NULL;
- ctx->last_untrusted=0;
- ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
- ctx->valid=0;
- ctx->chain=NULL;
- ctx->error=0;
- ctx->explicit_policy=0;
- ctx->error_depth=0;
- ctx->current_cert=NULL;
- ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
- ctx->tree = NULL;
- ctx->parent = NULL;
-
- ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
-
- if (!ctx->param)
- {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
- * use defaults.
- */
-
-
- if (store)
- ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
- else
- ctx->param->flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
-
- if (store)
- {
- ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
- ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
- }
- else
- ctx->cleanup = 0;
-
- if (ret)
- ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
-
- if (ret == 0)
- {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (store && store->check_issued)
- ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
- else
- ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
-
- if (store && store->get_issuer)
- ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
- else
- ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
-
- if (store && store->verify_cb)
- ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
- else
- ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
-
- if (store && store->verify)
- ctx->verify = store->verify;
- else
- ctx->verify = internal_verify;
-
- if (store && store->check_revocation)
- ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
- else
- ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
-
- if (store && store->get_crl)
- ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
- else
- ctx->get_crl = NULL;
-
- if (store && store->check_crl)
- ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
- else
- ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
-
- if (store && store->cert_crl)
- ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
- else
- ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
-
- if (store && store->lookup_certs)
- ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
- else
- ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
-
- if (store && store->lookup_crls)
- ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
- else
- ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
-
- ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
-
-
- /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
- * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
- * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
- /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
- if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
- &(ctx->ex_data)))
- {
- OPENSSL_free(ctx);
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
- }
-
-/* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
- * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ ctx->ctx = store;
+ ctx->current_method = 0;
+ ctx->cert = x509;
+ ctx->untrusted = chain;
+ ctx->crls = NULL;
+ ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
+ ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
+ ctx->valid = 0;
+ ctx->chain = NULL;
+ ctx->error = 0;
+ ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
+ ctx->error_depth = 0;
+ ctx->current_cert = NULL;
+ ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
+ ctx->current_crl = NULL;
+ ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
+ ctx->current_reasons = 0;
+ ctx->tree = NULL;
+ ctx->parent = NULL;
+ ctx->dane = NULL;
+ ctx->bare_ta_signed = 0;
+ /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
+ memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
+
+ if (store) {
+ ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
+ /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, else must be idempotent */
+ ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
+ } else
+ ctx->cleanup = 0;
+
+ if (store && store->check_issued)
+ ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
+ else
+ ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
+
+ if (store && store->get_issuer)
+ ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
+ else
+ ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
+
+ if (store && store->verify_cb)
+ ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
+ else
+ ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
+
+ if (store && store->verify)
+ ctx->verify = store->verify;
+ else
+ ctx->verify = internal_verify;
+
+ if (store && store->check_revocation)
+ ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
+ else
+ ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
+
+ if (store && store->get_crl)
+ ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
+ else
+ ctx->get_crl = NULL;
+
+ if (store && store->check_crl)
+ ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
+ else
+ ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
+
+ if (store && store->cert_crl)
+ ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
+ else
+ ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
+
+ if (store && store->lookup_certs)
+ ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
+ else
+ ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
+
+ if (store && store->lookup_crls)
+ ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
+ else
+ ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
+
+ ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
+
+ ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+ if (ctx->param == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
+ */
+ if (store)
+ ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
+ else
+ ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
+
+ if (ret)
+ ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
+
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
+ &ctx->ex_data))
+ return 1;
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+
+ err:
+ /*
+ * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
+ * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
+ */
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
+ * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
*/
void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
{
- ctx->other_ctx = sk;
- ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
+ ctx->other_ctx = sk;
+ ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
+ ctx->lookup_certs = lookup_certs_sk;
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
- {
- if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
- if (ctx->param != NULL)
- {
- if (ctx->parent == NULL)
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
- ctx->param=NULL;
- }
- if (ctx->tree != NULL)
- {
- X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
- ctx->tree=NULL;
- }
- if (ctx->chain != NULL)
- {
- sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
- ctx->chain=NULL;
- }
- CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
- memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
- }
+{
+ /*
+ * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
+ * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
+ * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
+ * pointers below after they're freed!
+ */
+ /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
+ if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
+ ctx->cleanup(ctx);
+ ctx->cleanup = NULL;
+ }
+ if (ctx->param != NULL) {
+ if (ctx->parent == NULL)
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
+ ctx->param = NULL;
+ }
+ X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
+ ctx->tree = NULL;
+ sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
+ ctx->chain = NULL;
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
+ memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
+}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
- {
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
- }
+{
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
+}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
- {
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
- }
+{
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
+}
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
- {
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
- }
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
+ time_t t)
+{
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
+}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
- int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
- {
- ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
- }
+ int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
+{
+ ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
+}
X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
- {
- return ctx->tree;
- }
+{
+ return ctx->tree;
+}
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
- {
- return ctx->explicit_policy;
- }
+{
+ return ctx->explicit_policy;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->num_untrusted;
+}
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
- {
- const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
- param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
- if (!param)
- return 0;
- return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
- }
+{
+ const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+ param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
+ if (!param)
+ return 0;
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
+}
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
- {
- return ctx->param;
- }
+{
+ return ctx->param;
+}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
- {
- if (ctx->param)
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
- ctx->param = param;
- }
+{
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
+ ctx->param = param;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, struct dane_st *dane)
+{
+ ctx->dane = dane;
+}
+
+static unsigned char *dane_i2d(
+ X509 *cert,
+ uint8_t selector,
+ unsigned int *i2dlen)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+ int len;
+
+ /*
+ * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key.
+ */
+ switch (selector) {
+ case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT:
+ len = i2d_X509(cert, &buf);
+ break;
+ case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI:
+ len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf);
+ break;
+ default:
+ X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (len < 0 || buf == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ *i2dlen = (unsigned int)len;
+ return buf;
+}
+
+#define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */
+
+static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth)
+{
+ struct dane_st *dane = (struct dane_st *)ctx->dane;
+ unsigned usage = DANETLS_NONE;
+ unsigned selector = DANETLS_NONE;
+ unsigned ordinal = DANETLS_NONE;
+ unsigned mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
+ unsigned char *i2dbuf = NULL;
+ unsigned int i2dlen = 0;
+ unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char *cmpbuf = NULL;
+ unsigned int cmplen = 0;
+ int i;
+ int recnum;
+ int matched = 0;
+ danetls_record *t = NULL;
+ uint32_t mask;
+
+ mask = (depth == 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK : DANETLS_TA_MASK;
+
+ /*
+ * The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2)
+ */
+ if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
+ mask &= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
+
+ /*
+ * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
+ * furher PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
+ * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
+ */
+ if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
+ mask &= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
+
+ /*-
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4
+ *
+ * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building
+ * and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with
+ * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which
+ * is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1).
+ *
+ * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX
+ * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest
+ * priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c.
+ *
+ * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we
+ * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers
+ * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch
+ * usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1",
+ * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public
+ * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1"
+ * or multiple "3 0 1" records.
+ *
+ * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either
+ * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after
+ * exhausing all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is
+ * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation.
+ */
+ recnum = (dane->umask & mask) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs) : 0;
+ for (i = 0; matched == 0 && i < recnum; ++i) {
+ t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
+ if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t->usage) & mask) == 0)
+ continue;
+ if (t->usage != usage) {
+ usage = t->usage;
+
+ /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
+ mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
+ ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
+ }
+ if (t->selector != selector) {
+ selector = t->selector;
+
+ /* Update per-selector state */
+ OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
+ i2dbuf = dane_i2d(cert, selector, &i2dlen);
+ if (i2dbuf == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
+ mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
+ ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
+ } else if (t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) {
+ /*-
+ * Digest agility:
+ *
+ * <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9>
+ *
+ * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the
+ * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals
+ * other than "Full".
+ */
+ if (dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype] < ordinal)
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant
+ * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space.
+ */
+ if (t->mtype != mtype) {
+ const EVP_MD *md = dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype = t->mtype];
+ cmpbuf = i2dbuf;
+ cmplen = i2dlen;
+
+ if (md != NULL) {
+ cmpbuf = mdbuf;
+ if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf, i2dlen, cmpbuf, &cmplen, md, 0)) {
+ matched = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any
+ * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a
+ * full chain.
+ */
+ if (cmplen == t->dlen &&
+ memcmp(cmpbuf, t->data, cmplen) == 0) {
+ if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK)
+ matched = 1;
+ if (matched || dane->mdpth < 0) {
+ dane->mdpth = depth;
+ dane->mtlsa = t;
+ OPENSSL_free(dane->mcert);
+ dane->mcert = cert;
+ X509_up_ref(cert);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Clear the one-element DER cache */
+ OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
+ return matched;
+}
-IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
-IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
+static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
+{
+ struct dane_st *dane = (struct dane_st *)ctx->dane;
+ int matched = 0;
+ X509 *cert;
+
+ if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) || depth == 0)
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+
+ /*
+ * Record any DANE trust anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if
+ * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking
+ * for an exact match for the leaf certificate).
+ */
+ cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
+ if (cert != NULL && (matched = dane_match(ctx, cert, depth)) < 0)
+ return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+ if (matched > 0) {
+ ctx->num_untrusted = depth - 1;
+ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+ }
+
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+}
-IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
+static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ struct dane_st *dane = (struct dane_st *)ctx->dane;
+ danetls_record *t;
+ int num = ctx->num_untrusted;
+ X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
+ int recnum = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs);
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < recnum; ++i) {
+ t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
+ if (t->usage != DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA ||
+ t->selector != DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI ||
+ t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL ||
+ X509_verify(cert, t->spki) <= 0)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Clear PKIX-?? matches that failed to panned out to a full chain */
+ X509_free(dane->mcert);
+ dane->mcert = NULL;
+
+ /* Record match via a bare TA public key */
+ ctx->bare_ta_signed = 1;
+ dane->mdpth = num - 1;
+ dane->mtlsa = t;
+
+ /* Prune any excess chain certificates */
+ num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+ for (; num > ctx->num_untrusted; --num)
+ X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
+
+ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+ }
+
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+}
-IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
-IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
+static void dane_reset(struct dane_st *dane)
+{
+ /*
+ * Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure.
+ */
+ X509_free(dane->mcert);
+ dane->mcert = NULL;
+ dane->mtlsa = NULL;
+ dane->mdpth = -1;
+ dane->pdpth = -1;
+}
+
+static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ X509 *cert = ctx->cert;
+ int (*cb)(int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx) = ctx->verify_cb;
+ struct dane_st *dane = (struct dane_st *)ctx->dane;
+ int matched;
+ int done;
+
+ dane_reset(dane);
+
+ matched = dane_match(ctx, ctx->cert, 0);
+ done = matched != 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && dane->mdpth < 0);
+
+ if (done)
+ X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
+
+ if (matched > 0) {
+ ctx->error_depth = 0;
+ ctx->current_cert = cert;
+ return cb(1, ctx);
+ }
+
+ if (matched < 0) {
+ ctx->error_depth = 0;
+ ctx->current_cert = cert;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (done) {
+ /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */
+ ctx->current_cert = cert;
+ ctx->error_depth = 0;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
+ return cb(0, ctx);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0
+ * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain.
+ */
+ return verify_chain(ctx);
+}
+
+static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ struct dane_st *dane = (struct dane_st *)ctx->dane;
+ int (*cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) = ctx->verify_cb;
+ int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+ X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
+ int ss = cert_self_signed(cert);
+ STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
+ unsigned int search;
+ int may_trusted = 0;
+ int may_alternate = 0;
+ int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+ int alt_untrusted = 0;
+ int depth;
+ int ok = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */
+ OPENSSL_assert(num == 1 && ctx->num_untrusted == num);
+
+#define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */
+#define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */
+#define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */
+ /*
+ * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled.
+ * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the
+ * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first,
+ * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain
+ * if no luck with untrusted first.
+ */
+ search = (ctx->untrusted != NULL) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED : 0;
+ if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane)) {
+ if (search == 0 || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
+ search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
+ else if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS))
+ may_alternate = 1;
+ may_trusted = 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is
+ * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make
+ * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go.
+ */
+ if (ctx->untrusted && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Include any untrusted full certificates from DNS */
+ if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->certs != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(dane->certs); ++i) {
+ if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp, sk_X509_value(dane->certs, i))) {
+ sk_X509_free(sktmp);
+ X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound
+ * might be reasonable.
+ */
+ if (ctx->param->depth > INT_MAX/2)
+ ctx->param->depth = INT_MAX/2;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to Extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer.
+ * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit,
+ * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code.
+ */
+ depth = ctx->param->depth + 1;
+
+ while (search != 0) {
+ X509 *x;
+ X509 *xtmp = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run
+ * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When
+ * we exceed the depth limit, we simulate absence of a match.
+ */
+ if ((search & S_DOTRUSTED) != 0) {
+ STACK_OF(X509) *hide = ctx->chain;
+
+ i = num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+ if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative
+ * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently
+ * has an untrusted issuer. We use the alt_untrusted variable
+ * to track how far up the chain we find the first match. It
+ * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain
+ * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of
+ * untrusted certificates. While we're searching for such a
+ * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor
+ * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or
+ * ctx->num_untrusted.
+ *
+ * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of
+ * untrusted certificates, not a "depth".
+ */
+ i = alt_untrusted;
+ }
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i-1);
+
+ /* Suppress duplicate suppression */
+ ctx->chain = NULL;
+ ok = (depth < num) ? 0 : ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
+ ctx->chain = hide;
+
+ if (ok < 0) {
+ trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+ search = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (ok > 0) {
+ /*
+ * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert?
+ * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now
+ * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store. Note
+ * that despite the current trust-store match we might still
+ * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust-anchor, in which
+ * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try
+ * again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on
+ * again with an even shorter untrusted chain!
+ *
+ * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust
+ * anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted
+ * certificate among the ones from the trust store.
+ */
+ if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_assert(num > i && i > 0 && ss == 0);
+ search &= ~S_DOALTERNATE;
+ for (; num > i; --num)
+ X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
+ ctx->num_untrusted = num;
+
+ if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
+ dane->mdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) {
+ dane->mdpth = -1;
+ X509_free(dane->mcert);
+ dane->mcert = NULL;
+ }
+ if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
+ dane->pdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
+ dane->pdpth = -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Self-signed untrusted certificates get replaced by their
+ * trusted matching issuer. Otherwise, grow the chain.
+ */
+ if (ss == 0) {
+ if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x = xtmp)) {
+ X509_free(xtmp);
+ X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+ search = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ ss = cert_self_signed(x);
+ } else if (num == ctx->num_untrusted) {
+ /*
+ * We have a self-signed certificate that has the same
+ * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as
+ * a trust-anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid
+ * possible impersonation via key substitution etc.
+ */
+ if (X509_cmp(x, xtmp) != 0) {
+ /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */
+ X509_free(xtmp);
+ ok = 0;
+ } else {
+ X509_free(x);
+ ctx->num_untrusted = --num;
+ (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, num, x = xtmp);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, recheck
+ * trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper.
+ * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer
+ * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain.
+ *
+ * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the
+ * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE
+ * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from
+ * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the
+ * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted
+ * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num.
+ */
+ if (ok) {
+ OPENSSL_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num);
+ search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
+ switch (trust = check_trust(ctx, num)) {
+ case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
+ case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
+ search = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (ss == 0)
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if
+ * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled,
+ * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time,
+ * and trying to extend the shorted chain.
+ */
+ if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) == 0) {
+ /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */
+ if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 && --alt_untrusted > 0)
+ continue;
+ /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */
+ if (!may_alternate || (search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 ||
+ ctx->num_untrusted < 2)
+ break;
+ /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */
+ search |= S_DOALTERNATE;
+ alt_untrusted = ctx->num_untrusted - 1;
+ ss = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Extend chain with peer-provided certificates
+ */
+ if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) != 0) {
+ num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+ OPENSSL_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted);
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num-1);
+ xtmp = (depth < num) ? NULL : find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
+
+ /*
+ * Once we run out of untrusted issuers, we stop looking for more
+ * and start looking only in the trust store if enabled.
+ */
+ if (xtmp == NULL) {
+ search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
+ if (may_trusted)
+ search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x = xtmp)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+ search = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ X509_up_ref(x);
+ ++ctx->num_untrusted;
+ ss = cert_self_signed(xtmp);
+
+ /*
+ * Not strictly necessary, but saves cycles looking at the same
+ * certificates over and over.
+ */
+ (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, x);
+
+ /*
+ * Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate.
+ */
+ switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1)) {
+ case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
+ case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
+ search = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ sk_X509_free(sktmp);
+
+ /*
+ * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key
+ * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust.
+ */
+ num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+ if (num <= depth) {
+ if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane))
+ trust = check_dane_pkeys(ctx);
+ if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && num == ctx->num_untrusted)
+ trust = check_trust(ctx, num);
+ }
+
+ switch (trust) {
+ case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
+ return 1;
+ case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
+ return 0;
+ case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED:
+ default:
+ num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+ ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
+ ctx->error_depth = num-1;
+ if (num > depth)
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
+ else if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
+ (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0))
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
+ else if (ss && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
+ else if (ss)
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
+ else if (ctx->num_untrusted == num)
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
+ else
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
+ if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
+ dane_reset(dane);
+ return cb(0, ctx);
+ }
+}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff