-/* x509_trs.c */
-/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (shenson@bigfoot.com) for the OpenSSL
- * project 1999.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+/*
+ * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
-
-static int tr_cmp(X509_TRUST **a, X509_TRUST **b);
+static int tr_cmp(const X509_TRUST *const *a, const X509_TRUST *const *b);
static void trtable_free(X509_TRUST *p);
-static int trust_1bit(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags);
-static int trust_any(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags);
+static int trust_1oidany(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags);
+static int trust_1oid(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags);
+static int trust_compat(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags);
+
+static int obj_trust(int id, X509 *x, int flags);
+static int (*default_trust) (int id, X509 *x, int flags) = obj_trust;
-/* WARNING: the following table should be kept in order of trust
- * and without any gaps so we can just subtract the minimum trust
- * value to get an index into the table
+/*
+ * WARNING: the following table should be kept in order of trust and without
+ * any gaps so we can just subtract the minimum trust value to get an index
+ * into the table
*/
static X509_TRUST trstandard[] = {
-{X509_TRUST_ANY, 0, trust_any, "Any", 0, NULL},
-{X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, trust_1bit, "SSL Client", X509_TRUST_BIT_SSL_CLIENT, NULL},
-{X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, trust_1bit, "SSL Client", X509_TRUST_BIT_SSL_SERVER, NULL},
-{X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, trust_1bit, "S/MIME email", X509_TRUST_BIT_EMAIL, NULL},
-{X509_TRUST_OBJECT_SIGN, 0, trust_1bit, "Object Signing", X509_TRUST_BIT_OBJECT_SIGN, NULL},
+ {X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, trust_compat, "compatible", 0, NULL},
+ {X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, trust_1oidany, "SSL Client", NID_client_auth,
+ NULL},
+ {X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, trust_1oidany, "SSL Server", NID_server_auth,
+ NULL},
+ {X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, trust_1oidany, "S/MIME email", NID_email_protect,
+ NULL},
+ {X509_TRUST_OBJECT_SIGN, 0, trust_1oidany, "Object Signer", NID_code_sign,
+ NULL},
+ {X509_TRUST_OCSP_SIGN, 0, trust_1oid, "OCSP responder", NID_OCSP_sign,
+ NULL},
+ {X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST, 0, trust_1oid, "OCSP request", NID_ad_OCSP,
+ NULL},
+ {X509_TRUST_TSA, 0, trust_1oidany, "TSA server", NID_time_stamp, NULL}
};
-#define X509_TRUST_COUNT (sizeof(trstandard)/sizeof(X509_TRUST))
-
-IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_TRUST)
+#define X509_TRUST_COUNT OSSL_NELEM(trstandard)
static STACK_OF(X509_TRUST) *trtable = NULL;
-static int tr_cmp(X509_TRUST **a, X509_TRUST **b)
+static int tr_cmp(const X509_TRUST *const *a, const X509_TRUST *const *b)
{
- return (*a)->trust - (*b)->trust;
+ return (*a)->trust - (*b)->trust;
+}
+
+int (*X509_TRUST_set_default(int (*trust) (int, X509 *, int))) (int, X509 *,
+ int) {
+ int (*oldtrust) (int, X509 *, int);
+ oldtrust = default_trust;
+ default_trust = trust;
+ return oldtrust;
}
int X509_check_trust(X509 *x, int id, int flags)
{
- X509_TRUST *pt;
- int idx;
- if(id == -1) return 1;
- if(!(idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(id))) return 0;
- pt = X509_TRUST_iget(idx);
- return pt->check_trust(pt, x, flags);
+ X509_TRUST *pt;
+ int idx;
+
+ /* We get this as a default value */
+ if (id == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
+ return obj_trust(NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage, x,
+ flags | X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT);
+ idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(id);
+ if (idx == -1)
+ return default_trust(id, x, flags);
+ pt = X509_TRUST_get0(idx);
+ return pt->check_trust(pt, x, flags);
}
int X509_TRUST_get_count(void)
{
- if(!trtable) return X509_TRUST_COUNT;
- return sk_X509_TRUST_num(trtable) + X509_TRUST_COUNT;
+ if (!trtable)
+ return X509_TRUST_COUNT;
+ return sk_X509_TRUST_num(trtable) + X509_TRUST_COUNT;
}
-X509_TRUST * X509_TRUST_iget(int idx)
+X509_TRUST *X509_TRUST_get0(int idx)
{
- if(idx < 0) return NULL;
- if(idx < X509_TRUST_COUNT) return trstandard + idx;
- return sk_X509_TRUST_value(trtable, idx - X509_TRUST_COUNT);
+ if (idx < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ if (idx < (int)X509_TRUST_COUNT)
+ return trstandard + idx;
+ return sk_X509_TRUST_value(trtable, idx - X509_TRUST_COUNT);
}
int X509_TRUST_get_by_id(int id)
{
- X509_TRUST tmp;
- int idx;
- if((id >= X509_TRUST_MIN) && (id <= X509_TRUST_MAX))
- return id - X509_TRUST_MIN;
- tmp.trust = id;
- if(!trtable) return -1;
- idx = sk_X509_TRUST_find(trtable, &tmp);
- if(idx == -1) return -1;
- return idx + X509_TRUST_COUNT;
-}
-
-int X509_TRUST_add(int id, int flags, int (*ck)(X509_TRUST *, X509 *, int),
- char *name, int arg1, void *arg2)
-{
- int idx;
- X509_TRUST *trtmp;
- /* This is set according to what we change: application can't set it */
- flags &= ~X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC;
- /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */
- flags |= X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME;
- /* Get existing entry if any */
- idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(id);
- /* Need a new entry */
- if(idx == -1) {
- if(!(trtmp = Malloc(sizeof(X509_TRUST)))) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- trtmp->flags = X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC;
- } else trtmp = X509_TRUST_iget(idx);
-
- /* Free existing name if dynamic */
- if(trtmp->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME) Free(trtmp->name);
- /* dup supplied name */
- if(!(trtmp->name = BUF_strdup(name))) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */
- trtmp->flags &= X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC;
- /* Set all other flags */
- trtmp->flags |= flags;
-
- trtmp->trust = id;
- trtmp->check_trust = ck;
- trtmp->arg1 = arg1;
- trtmp->arg2 = arg2;
-
- /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */
- if(idx == -1) {
- if(!trtable && !(trtable = sk_X509_TRUST_new(tr_cmp))) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!sk_X509_TRUST_push(trtable, trtmp)) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- return 1;
+ X509_TRUST tmp;
+ int idx;
+ if ((id >= X509_TRUST_MIN) && (id <= X509_TRUST_MAX))
+ return id - X509_TRUST_MIN;
+ tmp.trust = id;
+ if (!trtable)
+ return -1;
+ idx = sk_X509_TRUST_find(trtable, &tmp);
+ if (idx == -1)
+ return -1;
+ return idx + X509_TRUST_COUNT;
+}
+
+int X509_TRUST_set(int *t, int trust)
+{
+ if (X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust) == -1) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_SET, X509_R_INVALID_TRUST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *t = trust;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_TRUST_add(int id, int flags, int (*ck) (X509_TRUST *, X509 *, int),
+ const char *name, int arg1, void *arg2)
+{
+ int idx;
+ X509_TRUST *trtmp;
+ /*
+ * This is set according to what we change: application can't set it
+ */
+ flags &= ~X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC;
+ /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */
+ flags |= X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME;
+ /* Get existing entry if any */
+ idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(id);
+ /* Need a new entry */
+ if (idx == -1) {
+ if ((trtmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*trtmp))) == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ trtmp->flags = X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC;
+ } else
+ trtmp = X509_TRUST_get0(idx);
+
+ /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */
+ if (trtmp->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME)
+ OPENSSL_free(trtmp->name);
+ /* dup supplied name */
+ if ((trtmp->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name)) == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */
+ trtmp->flags &= X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC;
+ /* Set all other flags */
+ trtmp->flags |= flags;
+
+ trtmp->trust = id;
+ trtmp->check_trust = ck;
+ trtmp->arg1 = arg1;
+ trtmp->arg2 = arg2;
+
+ /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */
+ if (idx == -1) {
+ if (trtable == NULL
+ && (trtable = sk_X509_TRUST_new(tr_cmp)) == NULL) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;;
+ }
+ if (!sk_X509_TRUST_push(trtable, trtmp)) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ if (idx == -1) {
+ OPENSSL_free(trtmp->name);
+ OPENSSL_free(trtmp);
+ }
+ return 0;
}
static void trtable_free(X509_TRUST *p)
- {
- if(!p) return;
- if (p->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC)
- {
- if (p->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME)
- Free(p->name);
- Free(p);
- }
- }
+{
+ if (!p)
+ return;
+ if (p->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC) {
+ if (p->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME)
+ OPENSSL_free(p->name);
+ OPENSSL_free(p);
+ }
+}
void X509_TRUST_cleanup(void)
{
- int i;
- for(i = 0; i < X509_TRUST_COUNT; i++) trtable_free(trstandard + i);
- sk_X509_TRUST_pop_free(trtable, trtable_free);
- trtable = NULL;
+ sk_X509_TRUST_pop_free(trtable, trtable_free);
+ trtable = NULL;
+}
+
+int X509_TRUST_get_flags(const X509_TRUST *xp)
+{
+ return xp->flags;
}
-int X509_TRUST_get_flags(X509_TRUST *xp)
+char *X509_TRUST_get0_name(const X509_TRUST *xp)
{
- return xp->flags;
+ return xp->name;
}
-char *X509_TRUST_iget_name(X509_TRUST *xp)
+int X509_TRUST_get_trust(const X509_TRUST *xp)
{
- return xp->name;
+ return xp->trust;
}
-int X509_TRUST_get_trust(X509_TRUST *xp)
+static int trust_1oidany(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
{
- return xp->trust;
+ /*
+ * Declare the chain verified if the desired trust OID is not rejected in
+ * any auxiliary trust info for this certificate, and the OID is either
+ * expressly trusted, or else either "anyEKU" is trusted, or the
+ * certificate is self-signed.
+ */
+ flags |= X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT | X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU;
+ return obj_trust(trust->arg1, x, flags);
}
-static int trust_1bit(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
+static int trust_1oid(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
{
- X509_CERT_AUX *ax;
- ax = x->aux;
- if(ax) {
- if(ax->reject
- && ( ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(ax->reject, X509_TRUST_BIT_ALL)
- || ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(ax->reject, trust->arg1)))
- return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
- if(ax->trust && (ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(ax->trust, X509_TRUST_BIT_ALL)
- || ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(ax->trust, trust->arg1)))
- return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
- return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
- }
- /* we don't have any trust settings: for compatability
- * we return trusted if it is self signed
- */
- X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
- if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
- else return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+ /*
+ * Declare the chain verified only if the desired trust OID is not
+ * rejected and is expressly trusted. Neither "anyEKU" nor "compat"
+ * trust in self-signed certificates apply.
+ */
+ flags &= ~(X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT | X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU);
+ return obj_trust(trust->arg1, x, flags);
}
-static int trust_any(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
+static int trust_compat(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
{
- return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+ /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
+ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+ if ((flags & X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT) == 0 && x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
+ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+ else
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+}
+
+static int obj_trust(int id, X509 *x, int flags)
+{
+ X509_CERT_AUX *ax = x->aux;
+ int i;
+
+ if (ax && ax->reject) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(ax->reject); i++) {
+ ASN1_OBJECT *obj = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(ax->reject, i);
+ int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj);
+
+ if (nid == id || (nid == NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage &&
+ (flags & X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU)))
+ return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ax && ax->trust) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(ax->trust); i++) {
+ ASN1_OBJECT *obj = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(ax->trust, i);
+ int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj);
+
+ if (nid == id || (nid == NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage &&
+ (flags & X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU)))
+ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Reject when explicit trust EKU are set and none match.
+ *
+ * Returning untrusted is enough for for full chains that end in
+ * self-signed roots, because when explicit trust is specified it
+ * suppresses the default blanket trust of self-signed objects.
+ *
+ * But for partial chains, this is not enough, because absent a similar
+ * trust-self-signed policy, non matching EKUs are indistinguishable
+ * from lack of EKU constraints.
+ *
+ * Therefore, failure to match any trusted purpose must trigger an
+ * explicit reject.
+ */
+ return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+ }
+
+ if ((flags & X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT) == 0)
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+
+ /*
+ * Not rejected, and there is no list of accepted uses, try compat.
+ */
+ return trust_compat(NULL, x, flags);
}
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