#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(X509 *a, X509 *b)
+int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
{
int i;
X509_CINF *ai,*bi;
return(X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer,bi->issuer));
}
-#ifndef NO_MD5
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
{
unsigned long ret=0;
- MD5_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
unsigned char md[16];
char str[256];
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer,str,256);
ret=strlen(str);
- MD5_Init(&ctx);
- MD5_Update(&ctx,(unsigned char *)str,ret);
- MD5_Update(&ctx,(unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)str,ret);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
(unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length);
- MD5_Final(&(md[0]),&ctx);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,&(md[0]),NULL);
ret=( ((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
)&0xffffffffL;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return(ret);
}
#endif
-int X509_issuer_name_cmp(X509 *a, X509 *b)
+int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
{
return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer,b->cert_info->issuer));
}
-int X509_subject_name_cmp(X509 *a, X509 *b)
+int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
{
return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject,b->cert_info->subject));
}
-int X509_CRL_cmp(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b)
+int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
{
return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer,b->crl->issuer));
}
{
return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
/* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for
- * this to work.
+ * this to work. NB: Although "cmp" operations are generally
+ * prototyped to take "const" arguments (eg. for use in
+ * STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these operations may
+ * involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
+ * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point
+ * where the "depth-first" constification tree has to halt
+ * with an evil cast.
*/
-int X509_cmp(X509 *a, X509 *b)
+int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
{
/* ensure hash is valid */
- X509_check_purpose(a, -1, 0);
- X509_check_purpose(b, -1, 0);
+ X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
+ X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
+
return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
}
+#endif
-int X509_NAME_cmp(X509_NAME *a, X509_NAME *b)
+int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
{
int i,j;
X509_NAME_ENTRY *na,*nb;
return(0);
}
-#ifndef NO_MD5
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
/* I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
- * this is reasonably effiecent. */
+ * this is reasonably efficient. */
unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
{
unsigned long ret=0;
unsigned char md[16];
- unsigned char str[256],*p,*pp;
- int i;
-
- i=i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL);
- if (i > sizeof(str))
- p=Malloc(i);
- else
- p=str;
- pp=p;
- i2d_X509_NAME(x,&pp);
- MD5((unsigned char *)p,i,&(md[0]));
- if (p != str) Free(p);
+ /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
+ i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL);
+ EVP_Digest(x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length, md, NULL, EVP_md5(), NULL);
ret=( ((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
return(X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
}
+ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
+ {
+ if(!x) return NULL;
+ return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
+ }
+
int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
{
EVP_PKEY *xk=NULL;
}
switch (k->type)
{
-#ifndef NO_RSA
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
if (BN_cmp(xk->pkey.rsa->n,k->pkey.rsa->n) != 0
|| BN_cmp(xk->pkey.rsa->e,k->pkey.rsa->e) != 0)
}
break;
#endif
-#ifndef NO_DSA
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
if (BN_cmp(xk->pkey.dsa->pub_key,k->pkey.dsa->pub_key) != 0)
{
}
break;
#endif
-#ifndef NO_DH
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ case EVP_PKEY_ECDSA:
+ {
+ int r = EC_POINT_cmp(xk->pkey.ecdsa->group,xk->pkey.ecdsa->pub_key,k->pkey.ecdsa->pub_key,NULL);
+ if (r != 0)
+ {
+ if (r == 1)
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
+ else
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
case EVP_PKEY_DH:
/* No idea */
X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_CANT_CHECK_DH_KEY);
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff