*/
#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <assert.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h> /* For d2i_DSAPrivateKey */
#include <openssl/ui.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h> /* For the PKCS8 stuff o.O */
#include "internal/asn1_int.h"
+#include "internal/o_dir.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/store_int.h"
#include "store_locl.h"
#include "e_os.h"
-/*
+#ifdef _WIN32
+# define stat _stat
+#endif
+
+/*-
* Password prompting
+ * ------------------
*/
static char *file_get_pass(const UI_METHOD *ui_method, char *pass,
void *data;
const char *prompt_info;
};
+
static int file_fill_pem_pass_data(struct pem_pass_data *pass_data,
const char *prompt_info,
const UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *ui_data)
pass_data->prompt_info = prompt_info;
return 1;
}
+
+/* This is used anywhere a pem_password_cb is needed */
static int file_get_pem_pass(char *buf, int num, int w, void *data)
{
struct pem_pass_data *pass_data = data;
return pass == NULL ? 0 : strlen(pass);
}
-/*
- * The file scheme handlers
+/*-
+ * The file scheme decoders
+ * ------------------------
+ *
+ * Each possible data type has its own decoder, which either operates
+ * through a given PEM name, or attempts to decode to see if the blob
+ * it's given is decodable for its data type. The assumption is that
+ * only the correct data type will match the content.
*/
/*-
* THE HANDLER'S RESPONSIBILITY TO CREATE AND DESTROY
* THIS CONTEXT APPROPRIATELY, i.e. create on first call
* and destroy when about to return NULL.
+ * matchcount: A pointer to an int to count matches for this data.
+ * Usually becomes 0 (no match) or 1 (match!), but may
+ * be higher in the (unlikely) event that the data matches
+ * more than one possibility. The int will always be
+ * zero when the function is called.
* ui_method: Application UI method for getting a password, pin
* or any other interactive data.
* ui_data: Application data to be passed to ui_method when
const char *pem_header,
const unsigned char *blob,
size_t len, void **handler_ctx,
+ int *matchcount,
const UI_METHOD *ui_method,
void *ui_data);
/*
int repeatable;
} FILE_HANDLER;
+/*
+ * PKCS#12 decoder. It operates by decoding all of the blob content,
+ * extracting all the interesting data from it and storing them internally,
+ * then serving them one piece at a time.
+ */
static OSSL_STORE_INFO *try_decode_PKCS12(const char *pem_name,
const char *pem_header,
const unsigned char *blob,
size_t len, void **pctx,
+ int *matchcount,
const UI_METHOD *ui_method,
void *ui_data)
{
X509 *cert = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
+ *matchcount = 1;
+
if (PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, "", 0)
|| PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0)) {
pass = "";
return NULL;
}
- if (ctx != NULL)
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ *matchcount = 1;
store_info = sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_shift(ctx);
+ }
return store_info;
}
+
static int eof_PKCS12(void *ctx_)
{
STACK_OF(OSSL_STORE_INFO) *ctx = ctx_;
return ctx == NULL || sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_num(ctx) == 0;
}
+
static void destroy_ctx_PKCS12(void **pctx)
{
STACK_OF(OSSL_STORE_INFO) *ctx = *pctx;
sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_pop_free(ctx, OSSL_STORE_INFO_free);
*pctx = NULL;
}
+
static FILE_HANDLER PKCS12_handler = {
"PKCS12",
try_decode_PKCS12,
1 /* repeatable */
};
+/*
+ * Encrypted PKCS#8 decoder. It operates by just decrypting the given blob
+ * into a new blob, which is returned as an EMBEDDED STORE_INFO. The whole
+ * decoding process will then start over with the new blob.
+ */
static OSSL_STORE_INFO *try_decode_PKCS8Encrypted(const char *pem_name,
const char *pem_header,
const unsigned char *blob,
size_t len, void **pctx,
+ int *matchcount,
const UI_METHOD *ui_method,
void *ui_data)
{
unsigned char *new_data = NULL;
int new_data_len;
- if (pem_name != NULL && strcmp(pem_name, PEM_STRING_PKCS8) != 0)
- return NULL;
+ if (pem_name != NULL) {
+ if (strcmp(pem_name, PEM_STRING_PKCS8) != 0)
+ return NULL;
+ *matchcount = 1;
+ }
if ((p8 = d2i_X509_SIG(NULL, &blob, len)) == NULL)
return NULL;
+ *matchcount = 1;
+
if ((mem = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_TRY_DECODE_PKCS8ENCRYPTED,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
BUF_MEM_free(mem);
return NULL;
}
+
static FILE_HANDLER PKCS8Encrypted_handler = {
"PKCS8Encrypted",
try_decode_PKCS8Encrypted
};
+/*
+ * Private key decoder. Decodes all sorts of private keys, both PKCS#8
+ * encoded ones and old style PEM ones (with the key type is encoded into
+ * the PEM name).
+ */
int pem_check_suffix(const char *pem_str, const char *suffix);
static OSSL_STORE_INFO *try_decode_PrivateKey(const char *pem_name,
const char *pem_header,
const unsigned char *blob,
size_t len, void **pctx,
+ int *matchcount,
const UI_METHOD *ui_method,
void *ui_data)
{
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf =
d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &blob, len);
+ *matchcount = 1;
if (p8inf != NULL)
pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8inf);
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf);
if ((slen = pem_check_suffix(pem_name, "PRIVATE KEY")) > 0
&& (ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL, pem_name,
- slen)) != NULL)
+ slen)) != NULL) {
+ *matchcount = 1;
pkey = d2i_PrivateKey(ameth->pkey_id, NULL, &blob, len);
+ }
}
} else {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count(); i++) {
+ EVP_PKEY *tmp_pkey = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *tmp_blob = blob;
+
ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0(i);
if (ameth->pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS)
continue;
- pkey = d2i_PrivateKey(ameth->pkey_id, NULL, &blob, len);
- if (pkey != NULL)
- break;
+
+ tmp_pkey = d2i_PrivateKey(ameth->pkey_id, NULL, &tmp_blob, len);
+ if (tmp_pkey != NULL) {
+ if (pkey != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(tmp_pkey);
+ else
+ pkey = tmp_pkey;
+ (*matchcount)++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (*matchcount > 1) {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ pkey = NULL;
}
}
if (pkey == NULL)
return store_info;
}
+
static FILE_HANDLER PrivateKey_handler = {
"PrivateKey",
try_decode_PrivateKey
};
+/*
+ * Public key decoder. Only supports SubjectPublicKeyInfo formated keys.
+ */
static OSSL_STORE_INFO *try_decode_PUBKEY(const char *pem_name,
const char *pem_header,
const unsigned char *blob,
size_t len, void **pctx,
+ int *matchcount,
const UI_METHOD *ui_method,
void *ui_data)
{
OSSL_STORE_INFO *store_info = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- if (pem_name != NULL && strcmp(pem_name, PEM_STRING_PUBLIC) != 0)
- /* No match */
- return NULL;
+ if (pem_name != NULL) {
+ if (strcmp(pem_name, PEM_STRING_PUBLIC) != 0)
+ /* No match */
+ return NULL;
+ *matchcount = 1;
+ }
- if ((pkey = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, &blob, len)) != NULL)
+ if ((pkey = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, &blob, len)) != NULL) {
+ *matchcount = 1;
store_info = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_PKEY(pkey);
+ }
return store_info;
}
+
static FILE_HANDLER PUBKEY_handler = {
"PUBKEY",
try_decode_PUBKEY
};
+/*
+ * Key parameter decoder.
+ */
static OSSL_STORE_INFO *try_decode_params(const char *pem_name,
const char *pem_header,
const unsigned char *blob,
size_t len, void **pctx,
+ int *matchcount,
const UI_METHOD *ui_method,
void *ui_data)
{
OSSL_STORE_INFO *store_info = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ int slen = 0;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth = NULL;
int ok = 0;
- if (pkey == NULL) {
- OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_TRY_DECODE_PARAMS, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- return NULL;
+ if (pem_name != NULL) {
+ if ((slen = pem_check_suffix(pem_name, "PARAMETERS")) == 0)
+ return NULL;
+ *matchcount = 1;
}
- if (pem_name != NULL) {
- int slen;
+ if (slen > 0) {
+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
+ OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_TRY_DECODE_PARAMS, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
- if ((slen = pem_check_suffix(pem_name, "PARAMETERS")) > 0
- && EVP_PKEY_set_type_str(pkey, pem_name, slen)
+ if (EVP_PKEY_set_type_str(pkey, pem_name, slen)
&& (ameth = EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1(pkey)) != NULL
&& ameth->param_decode != NULL
&& ameth->param_decode(pkey, &blob, len))
ok = 1;
} else {
int i;
+ EVP_PKEY *tmp_pkey = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count(); i++) {
+ const unsigned char *tmp_blob = blob;
+
+ if (tmp_pkey == NULL && (tmp_pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
+ OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_TRY_DECODE_PARAMS, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ break;
+ }
+
ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0(i);
if (ameth->pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS)
continue;
- if (EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, ameth->pkey_id)
- && (ameth = EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1(pkey)) != NULL
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmp_pkey, ameth->pkey_id)
+ && (ameth = EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1(tmp_pkey)) != NULL
&& ameth->param_decode != NULL
- && ameth->param_decode(pkey, &blob, len)) {
- ok = 1;
- break;
+ && ameth->param_decode(tmp_pkey, &tmp_blob, len)) {
+ if (pkey != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(tmp_pkey);
+ else
+ pkey = tmp_pkey;
+ tmp_pkey = NULL;
+ (*matchcount)++;
}
}
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(tmp_pkey);
+ if (*matchcount == 1) {
+ ok = 1;
+ }
}
if (ok)
return store_info;
}
+
static FILE_HANDLER params_handler = {
"params",
try_decode_params
};
+/*
+ * X.509 certificate decoder.
+ */
static OSSL_STORE_INFO *try_decode_X509Certificate(const char *pem_name,
const char *pem_header,
const unsigned char *blob,
size_t len, void **pctx,
+ int *matchcount,
const UI_METHOD *ui_method,
void *ui_data)
{
&& strcmp(pem_name, PEM_STRING_X509) != 0)
/* No match */
return NULL;
+ *matchcount = 1;
}
if ((cert = d2i_X509_AUX(NULL, &blob, len)) != NULL
- || (ignore_trusted && (cert = d2i_X509(NULL, &blob, len)) != NULL))
+ || (ignore_trusted && (cert = d2i_X509(NULL, &blob, len)) != NULL)) {
+ *matchcount = 1;
store_info = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_CERT(cert);
+ }
if (store_info == NULL)
X509_free(cert);
return store_info;
}
+
static FILE_HANDLER X509Certificate_handler = {
"X509Certificate",
try_decode_X509Certificate
};
+/*
+ * X.509 CRL decoder.
+ */
static OSSL_STORE_INFO *try_decode_X509CRL(const char *pem_name,
const char *pem_header,
const unsigned char *blob,
size_t len, void **pctx,
+ int *matchcount,
const UI_METHOD *ui_method,
void *ui_data)
{
OSSL_STORE_INFO *store_info = NULL;
X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
- if (pem_name != NULL
- && strcmp(pem_name, PEM_STRING_X509_CRL) != 0)
- /* No match */
- return NULL;
+ if (pem_name != NULL) {
+ if (strcmp(pem_name, PEM_STRING_X509_CRL) != 0)
+ /* No match */
+ return NULL;
+ *matchcount = 1;
+ }
- if ((crl = d2i_X509_CRL(NULL, &blob, len)) != NULL)
+ if ((crl = d2i_X509_CRL(NULL, &blob, len)) != NULL) {
+ *matchcount = 1;
store_info = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_CRL(crl);
+ }
if (store_info == NULL)
X509_CRL_free(crl);
return store_info;
}
+
static FILE_HANDLER X509CRL_handler = {
"X509CRL",
try_decode_X509CRL
};
+/*
+ * To finish it all off, we collect all the handlers.
+ */
static const FILE_HANDLER *file_handlers[] = {
&PKCS12_handler,
&PKCS8Encrypted_handler,
};
-/*
+/*-
* The loader itself
+ * -----------------
*/
struct ossl_store_loader_ctx_st {
- BIO *file;
- int is_pem;
+ enum {
+ is_raw = 0,
+ is_pem,
+ is_dir
+ } type;
int errcnt;
-
- /* The following are used when the handler is marked as repeatable */
- const FILE_HANDLER *last_handler;
- void *last_handler_ctx;
+#define FILE_FLAG_SECMEM (1<<0)
+ unsigned int flags;
+ union {
+ struct { /* Used with is_raw and is_pem */
+ BIO *file;
+
+ /*
+ * The following are used when the handler is marked as
+ * repeatable
+ */
+ const FILE_HANDLER *last_handler;
+ void *last_handler_ctx;
+ } file;
+ struct { /* Used with is_dir */
+ OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *ctx;
+ int end_reached;
+ char *uri;
+
+ /*
+ * The directory reading utility we have combines opening with
+ * reading the first name. To make sure we can detect the end
+ * at the right time, we read early and cache the name.
+ */
+ const char *last_entry;
+ int last_errno;
+ } dir;
+ } _;
};
+static void OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX_free(OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->type == is_dir) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->_.dir.uri);
+ } else {
+ if (ctx->_.file.last_handler != NULL) {
+ ctx->_.file.last_handler->destroy_ctx(&ctx->_.file.last_handler_ctx);
+ ctx->_.file.last_handler_ctx = NULL;
+ ctx->_.file.last_handler = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
static OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *file_open(const OSSL_STORE_LOADER *loader,
const char *uri,
const UI_METHOD *ui_method,
void *ui_data)
{
- BIO *buff = NULL;
- char peekbuf[4096];
OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ struct stat st;
const char *path = NULL;
if (strncasecmp(uri, "file:", 5) == 0) {
- if (strncmp(&uri[5], "//localhost/", 12) == 0) {
+ if (strncasecmp(&uri[5], "//localhost/", 12) == 0) {
path = &uri[16];
} else if (strncmp(&uri[5], "///", 3) == 0) {
path = &uri[7];
}
+ if (stat(path, &st) < 0) {
+ SYSerr(SYS_F_STAT, errno);
+ ERR_add_error_data(1, path);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
if (ctx == NULL) {
OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_OPEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
- if ((buff = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer())) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if ((ctx->file = BIO_new_file(path, "rb")) == NULL) {
- goto err;
- }
- ctx->file = BIO_push(buff, ctx->file);
- if (BIO_buffer_peek(ctx->file, peekbuf, sizeof(peekbuf)-1) > 0) {
- peekbuf[sizeof(peekbuf)-1] = '\0';
- if (strstr(peekbuf, "-----BEGIN ") != NULL)
- ctx->is_pem = 1;
+ if ((st.st_mode & S_IFDIR) == S_IFDIR) {
+ /*
+ * Try to copy everything, even if we know that some of them must be
+ * NULL for the moment. This prevents errors in the future, when more
+ * components may be used.
+ */
+ ctx->_.dir.uri = OPENSSL_strdup(uri);
+ ctx->type = is_dir;
+
+ if (ctx->_.dir.uri == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ ctx->_.dir.last_entry = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx->_.dir.ctx, path);
+ ctx->_.dir.last_errno = errno;
+ if (ctx->_.dir.last_entry == NULL) {
+ if (ctx->_.dir.last_errno != 0) {
+ char errbuf[256];
+ errno = ctx->_.dir.last_errno;
+ openssl_strerror_r(errno, errbuf, sizeof(errbuf));
+ OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_OPEN, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ ERR_add_error_data(1, errbuf);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ctx->_.dir.end_reached = 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ BIO *buff = NULL;
+ char peekbuf[4096];
+
+ if ((buff = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer())) == NULL
+ || (ctx->_.file.file = BIO_new_file(path, "rb")) == NULL) {
+ BIO_free_all(buff);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ctx->_.file.file = BIO_push(buff, ctx->_.file.file);
+ if (BIO_buffer_peek(ctx->_.file.file, peekbuf, sizeof(peekbuf)-1) > 0) {
+ peekbuf[sizeof(peekbuf)-1] = '\0';
+ if (strstr(peekbuf, "-----BEGIN ") != NULL)
+ ctx->type = is_pem;
+ }
}
return ctx;
err:
- if (buff != NULL)
- BIO_free(buff);
- OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+ OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX_free(ctx);
return NULL;
}
+static int file_ctrl(OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx, int cmd, va_list args)
+{
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case OSSL_STORE_C_USE_SECMEM:
+ {
+ int on = *(va_arg(args, int *));
+
+ switch (on) {
+ case 0:
+ ctx->flags &= ~FILE_FLAG_SECMEM;
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ ctx->flags |= FILE_FLAG_SECMEM;
+ break;
+ default:
+ OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_CTRL,
+ ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Internal function to decode an already opened PEM file */
+OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ossl_store_file_attach_pem_bio_int(BIO *bp)
+{
+ OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_OSSL_STORE_FILE_ATTACH_PEM_BIO_INT,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ctx->_.file.file = bp;
+ ctx->type = is_pem;
+
+ return ctx;
+}
+
static OSSL_STORE_INFO *file_load_try_decode(OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx,
const char *pem_name,
const char *pem_header,
*matchcount = 0;
for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(file_handlers); i++) {
const FILE_HANDLER *handler = file_handlers[i];
+ int try_matchcount = 0;
void *tmp_handler_ctx = NULL;
OSSL_STORE_INFO *tmp_result =
handler->try_decode(pem_name, pem_header, data, len,
- &tmp_handler_ctx, ui_method, ui_data);
+ &tmp_handler_ctx, &try_matchcount,
+ ui_method, ui_data);
- if (tmp_result == NULL) {
- OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_LOAD_TRY_DECODE,
- OSSL_STORE_R_IS_NOT_A);
- ERR_add_error_data(1, handler->name);
- } else {
+ if (try_matchcount > 0) {
if (matching_handlers)
matching_handlers[*matchcount] = handler;
handler->destroy_ctx(&handler_ctx);
handler_ctx = tmp_handler_ctx;
- if (++*matchcount == 1) {
- result = tmp_result;
- tmp_result = NULL;
- } else {
+ if ((*matchcount += try_matchcount) > 1) {
/* more than one match => ambiguous, kill any result */
OSSL_STORE_INFO_free(result);
OSSL_STORE_INFO_free(tmp_result);
if (handler->destroy_ctx != NULL)
handler->destroy_ctx(&handler_ctx);
handler_ctx = NULL;
+ tmp_result = NULL;
result = NULL;
}
+ if (result == NULL)
+ result = tmp_result;
}
}
- if (*matchcount > 1)
- OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_LOAD_TRY_DECODE,
- OSSL_STORE_R_AMBIGUOUS_CONTENT_TYPE);
- if (*matchcount == 0)
- OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_LOAD_TRY_DECODE,
- OSSL_STORE_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE);
- else if (matching_handlers[0]->repeatable) {
- if (ctx == NULL) {
- OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_LOAD_TRY_DECODE,
- OSSL_STORE_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE);
- OSSL_STORE_INFO_free(result);
- result = NULL;
- } else {
- ctx->last_handler = matching_handlers[0];
- ctx->last_handler_ctx = handler_ctx;
- }
+ if (*matchcount == 1 && matching_handlers[0]->repeatable) {
+ ctx->_.file.last_handler = matching_handlers[0];
+ ctx->_.file.last_handler_ctx = handler_ctx;
}
OPENSSL_free(matching_handlers);
void *ui_data)
{
OSSL_STORE_INFO *result = NULL;
+ int try_matchcount = 0;
- if (ctx->last_handler != NULL) {
- result = ctx->last_handler->try_decode(NULL, NULL, NULL, 0,
- &ctx->last_handler_ctx,
- ui_method, ui_data);
+ if (ctx->_.file.last_handler != NULL) {
+ result =
+ ctx->_.file.last_handler->try_decode(NULL, NULL, NULL, 0,
+ &ctx->_.file.last_handler_ctx,
+ &try_matchcount,
+ ui_method, ui_data);
if (result == NULL) {
- ctx->last_handler->destroy_ctx(&ctx->last_handler_ctx);
- ctx->last_handler_ctx = NULL;
- ctx->last_handler = NULL;
+ ctx->_.file.last_handler->destroy_ctx(&ctx->_.file.last_handler_ctx);
+ ctx->_.file.last_handler_ctx = NULL;
+ ctx->_.file.last_handler = NULL;
}
}
return result;
}
+static void pem_free_flag(void *pem_data, int secure)
+{
+ if (secure)
+ OPENSSL_secure_free(pem_data);
+ else
+ OPENSSL_free(pem_data);
+}
static int file_read_pem(BIO *bp, char **pem_name, char **pem_header,
unsigned char **data, long *len,
const UI_METHOD *ui_method,
- void *ui_data)
+ void *ui_data, int secure)
{
- int i = PEM_read_bio(bp, pem_name, pem_header, data, len);
+ int i = secure
+ ? PEM_read_bio_ex(bp, pem_name, pem_header, data, len,
+ PEM_FLAG_SECURE | PEM_FLAG_EAY_COMPATIBLE)
+ : PEM_read_bio(bp, pem_name, pem_header, data, len);
if (i <= 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
+static int ends_with_dirsep(const char *uri)
+{
+ if (*uri != '\0')
+ uri += strlen(uri) - 1;
+#if defined __VMS
+ if (*uri == ']' || *uri == '>' || *uri == ':')
+ return 1;
+#elif defined _WIN32
+ if (*uri == '\\')
+ return 1;
+#endif
+ return *uri == '/';
+}
+
+static int file_name_to_uri(OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx, const char *name,
+ char **data)
+{
+ assert(name != NULL);
+ assert(data != NULL);
+ {
+ const char *pathsep = ends_with_dirsep(ctx->_.dir.uri) ? "" : "/";
+ long calculated_length = strlen(ctx->_.dir.uri) + strlen(pathsep)
+ + strlen(name) + 1 /* \0 */;
+
+ *data = OPENSSL_zalloc(calculated_length);
+ if (*data == NULL) {
+ OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_NAME_TO_URI, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_strlcat(*data, ctx->_.dir.uri, calculated_length);
+ OPENSSL_strlcat(*data, pathsep, calculated_length);
+ OPENSSL_strlcat(*data, name, calculated_length);
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
static int file_eof(OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx);
static int file_error(OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx);
static OSSL_STORE_INFO *file_load(OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx,
const UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *ui_data)
{
OSSL_STORE_INFO *result = NULL;
- int matchcount = -1;
- result = file_load_try_repeat(ctx, ui_method, ui_data);
- if (result != NULL)
- return result;
+ ctx->errcnt = 0;
+ ERR_clear_error();
- if (file_error(ctx))
- return NULL;
-
- do {
- char *pem_name = NULL; /* PEM record name */
- char *pem_header = NULL; /* PEM record header */
- unsigned char *data = NULL; /* DER encoded data */
- long len = 0; /* DER encoded data length */
+ if (ctx->type == is_dir) {
+ do {
+ char *newname = NULL;
- if (ctx->is_pem) {
- if (!file_read_pem(ctx->file, &pem_name, &pem_header, &data, &len,
- ui_method, ui_data)) {
- if (!file_eof(ctx))
+ if (ctx->_.dir.last_entry == NULL) {
+ if (!ctx->_.dir.end_reached) {
+ char errbuf[256];
+ assert(ctx->_.dir.last_errno != 0);
+ errno = ctx->_.dir.last_errno;
ctx->errcnt++;
- goto err;
+ openssl_strerror_r(errno, errbuf, sizeof(errbuf));
+ OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_LOAD, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ ERR_add_error_data(1, errbuf);
+ }
+ return NULL;
}
- } else {
- if (!file_read_asn1(ctx->file, &data, &len)) {
- if (!file_eof(ctx))
+
+ if (ctx->_.dir.last_entry[0] != '.'
+ && !file_name_to_uri(ctx, ctx->_.dir.last_entry, &newname))
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * On the first call (with a NULL context), OPENSSL_DIR_read()
+ * cares about the second argument. On the following calls, it
+ * only cares that it isn't NULL. Therefore, we can safely give
+ * it our URI here.
+ */
+ ctx->_.dir.last_entry = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx->_.dir.ctx,
+ ctx->_.dir.uri);
+ ctx->_.dir.last_errno = errno;
+ if (ctx->_.dir.last_entry == NULL && ctx->_.dir.last_errno == 0)
+ ctx->_.dir.end_reached = 1;
+
+ if (newname != NULL
+ && (result = OSSL_STORE_INFO_new_NAME(newname)) == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(newname);
+ OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_LOAD, ERR_R_OSSL_STORE_LIB);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ } while (result == NULL && !file_eof(ctx));
+ } else {
+ int matchcount = -1;
+
+ result = file_load_try_repeat(ctx, ui_method, ui_data);
+ if (result != NULL)
+ return result;
+
+ if (file_eof(ctx))
+ return NULL;
+
+ do {
+ char *pem_name = NULL; /* PEM record name */
+ char *pem_header = NULL; /* PEM record header */
+ unsigned char *data = NULL; /* DER encoded data */
+ long len = 0; /* DER encoded data length */
+
+ matchcount = -1;
+ if (ctx->type == is_pem) {
+ if (!file_read_pem(ctx->_.file.file, &pem_name, &pem_header,
+ &data, &len, ui_method, ui_data,
+ (ctx->flags & FILE_FLAG_SECMEM) != 0)) {
ctx->errcnt++;
- goto err;
+ goto endloop;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!file_read_asn1(ctx->_.file.file, &data, &len)) {
+ ctx->errcnt++;
+ goto endloop;
+ }
}
- }
- matchcount = -1;
- result = file_load_try_decode(ctx, pem_name, pem_header, data, len,
- ui_method, ui_data, &matchcount);
+ result = file_load_try_decode(ctx, pem_name, pem_header, data, len,
+ ui_method, ui_data, &matchcount);
- err:
- OPENSSL_free(pem_name);
- OPENSSL_free(pem_header);
- OPENSSL_free(data);
- } while (matchcount == 0 && !file_eof(ctx) && !file_error(ctx));
+ if (result != NULL)
+ goto endloop;
- /* We bail out on ambiguity */
- if (matchcount > 1)
- return NULL;
+ /*
+ * If a PEM name matches more than one handler, the handlers are
+ * badly coded.
+ */
+ if (!ossl_assert(pem_name == NULL || matchcount <= 1)) {
+ ctx->errcnt++;
+ goto endloop;
+ }
+
+ if (matchcount > 1) {
+ OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_LOAD,
+ OSSL_STORE_R_AMBIGUOUS_CONTENT_TYPE);
+ } else if (matchcount == 1) {
+ /*
+ * If there are other errors on the stack, they already show
+ * what the problem is.
+ */
+ if (ERR_peek_error() == 0) {
+ OSSL_STOREerr(OSSL_STORE_F_FILE_LOAD,
+ OSSL_STORE_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE);
+ if (pem_name != NULL)
+ ERR_add_error_data(3, "PEM type is '", pem_name, "'");
+ }
+ }
+ if (matchcount > 0)
+ ctx->errcnt++;
+
+ endloop:
+ pem_free_flag(pem_name, (ctx->flags & FILE_FLAG_SECMEM) != 0);
+ pem_free_flag(pem_header, (ctx->flags & FILE_FLAG_SECMEM) != 0);
+ pem_free_flag(data, (ctx->flags & FILE_FLAG_SECMEM) != 0);
+ } while (matchcount == 0 && !file_eof(ctx) && !file_error(ctx));
+
+ /* We bail out on ambiguity */
+ if (matchcount > 1)
+ return NULL;
+ }
return result;
}
static int file_eof(OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx)
{
- if (ctx->last_handler != NULL
- && !ctx->last_handler->eof(ctx->last_handler_ctx))
+ if (ctx->type == is_dir)
+ return ctx->_.dir.end_reached;
+
+ if (ctx->_.file.last_handler != NULL
+ && !ctx->_.file.last_handler->eof(ctx->_.file.last_handler_ctx))
return 0;
- return BIO_eof(ctx->file);
+ return BIO_eof(ctx->_.file.file);
}
static int file_close(OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx)
{
- if (ctx->last_handler != NULL) {
- ctx->last_handler->destroy_ctx(&ctx->last_handler_ctx);
- ctx->last_handler_ctx = NULL;
- ctx->last_handler = NULL;
+ if (ctx->type == is_dir) {
+ OPENSSL_DIR_end(&ctx->_.dir.ctx);
+ } else {
+ BIO_free_all(ctx->_.file.file);
}
- BIO_free_all(ctx->file);
- OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+ OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ossl_store_file_detach_pem_bio_int(OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ OSSL_STORE_LOADER_CTX_free(ctx);
return 1;
}
static OSSL_STORE_LOADER file_loader =
{
"file",
- file_open,
NULL,
+ file_open,
+ file_ctrl,
file_load,
file_eof,
file_error,
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff