Fix modes.h so that indent doesn't complain

[openssl.git] / crypto / rsa / rsa_sign.c

diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
index 4d48164b773809c4f3fa018a6251364eea869684..225bcfe2dcabee2afb39cf224d9b4302b9eb180e 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "rsa_locl.h"
 
 /* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
 #define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36
@@ -76,6 +77,14 @@ int RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
        const unsigned char *s = NULL;
        X509_ALGOR algor;
        ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+       if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
+                       && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW))
+               {
+               RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD);
+               return 0;
+               }
+#endif
        if((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_sign)
                {
                return rsa->meth->rsa_sign(type, m, m_len,
@@ -142,18 +151,47 @@ int RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
        return(ret);
        }
 
-int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
-               unsigned char *rm, unsigned int *prm_len,
-               unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
-               RSA *rsa)
+/*
+ * Check DigestInfo structure does not contain extraneous data by reencoding
+ * using DER and checking encoding against original. 
+ */
+static int rsa_check_digestinfo(X509_SIG *sig, const unsigned char *dinfo, int dinfolen)
+       {
+       unsigned char *der = NULL;
+       int derlen;
+       int ret = 0;
+       derlen = i2d_X509_SIG(sig, &der);
+       if (derlen <= 0)
+               return 0;
+       if (derlen == dinfolen && !memcmp(dinfo, der, derlen))
+               ret = 1;
+       OPENSSL_cleanse(der, derlen);
+       OPENSSL_free(der);
+       return ret;
+       }
+
+int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
+                         unsigned int m_len,
+                         unsigned char *rm, size_t *prm_len,
+                         const unsigned char *sigbuf, size_t siglen,
+                         RSA *rsa)
        {
        int i,ret=0,sigtype;
        unsigned char *s;
        X509_SIG *sig=NULL;
 
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+       if (FIPS_mode() && !(rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
+                       && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW))
+               {
+               RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_NON_FIPS_RSA_METHOD);
+               return 0;
+               }
+#endif
+
        if (siglen != (unsigned int)RSA_size(rsa))
                {
-               RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+               RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
                return(0);
                }
 
@@ -170,27 +208,60 @@ int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
        s=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)siglen);
        if (s == NULL)
                {
-               RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+               RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                goto err;
                }
        if((dtype == NID_md5_sha1) && (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) ) {
-                       RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+                       RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
                        goto err;
        }
        i=RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen,sigbuf,s,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
 
        if (i <= 0) goto err;
+       /* Oddball MDC2 case: signature can be OCTET STRING.
+        * check for correct tag and length octets.
+        */
+       if (dtype == NID_mdc2 && i == 18 && s[0] == 0x04 && s[1] == 0x10)
+               {
+               if (rm)
+                       {
+                       memcpy(rm, s + 2, 16);
+                       *prm_len = 16;
+                       ret = 1;
+                       }
+               else if(memcmp(m, s + 2, 16))
+                       RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+               else
+                       ret = 1;
+               }
 
        /* Special case: SSL signature */
        if(dtype == NID_md5_sha1) {
                if((i != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) || memcmp(s, m, SSL_SIG_LENGTH))
-                               RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+                               RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
                else ret = 1;
        } else {
                const unsigned char *p=s;
                sig=d2i_X509_SIG(NULL,&p,(long)i);
 
                if (sig == NULL) goto err;
+
+               /* Excess data can be used to create forgeries */
+               if(p != s+i || !rsa_check_digestinfo(sig, s, i))
+                       {
+                       RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+                       goto err;
+                       }
+
+               /* Parameters to the signature algorithm can also be used to
+                  create forgeries */
+               if(sig->algor->parameter
+                  && ASN1_TYPE_get(sig->algor->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL)
+                       {
+                       RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+                       goto err;
+                       }
+
                sigtype=OBJ_obj2nid(sig->algor->algorithm);
 
 
@@ -213,7 +284,7 @@ int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
                                }
                        else
                                {
-                               RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,
+                               RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,
                                                RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
                                goto err;
                                }
@@ -223,7 +294,7 @@ int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
                        const EVP_MD *md;
                        md = EVP_get_digestbynid(dtype);
                        if (md && (EVP_MD_size(md) != sig->digest->length))
-                               RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,
+                               RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,
                                                RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
                        else
                                {
@@ -236,7 +307,7 @@ int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
                else if (((unsigned int)sig->digest->length != m_len) ||
                        (memcmp(m,sig->digest->data,m_len) != 0))
                        {
-                       RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+                       RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
                        }
                else
                        ret=1;
@@ -252,7 +323,7 @@ err:
        }
 
 int RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
-               unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
+               const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
                RSA *rsa)
        {