/* Written by Ulf Moeller. This software is distributed on an "AS IS"
basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. */
-/* EME_OAEP as defined in RFC 2437 (PKCS #1 v2.0) */
-
+/* EME-OAEP as defined in RFC 2437 (PKCS #1 v2.0) */
+
+/* See Victor Shoup, "OAEP reconsidered," Nov. 2000,
+ * <URL: http://www.shoup.net/papers/oaep.ps.Z>
+ * for problems with the security proof for the
+ * original OAEP scheme, which EME-OAEP is based on.
+ *
+ * A new proof can be found in E. Fujisaki, T. Okamoto,
+ * D. Pointcheval, J. Stern, "RSA-OEAP is Still Alive!",
+ * Dec. 2000, <URL: http://eprint.iacr.org/2000/061/>.
+ * The new proof has stronger requirements for the
+ * underlying permutation: "partial-one-wayness" instead
+ * of one-wayness. For the RSA function, this is
+ * an equivalent notion.
+ */
+
+#define OPENSSL_FIPSEVP
+
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA1)
#include <stdio.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include "bn.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
-#include "sha.h"
-#include "rand.h"
-
-int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, unsigned char *seed, long seedlen);
-
-int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(to, tlen, from, flen, param, plen)
- unsigned char *to;
- int tlen;
- unsigned char *from;
- int flen;
- unsigned char *param;
- int plen;
- {
- int i, emlen = tlen - 1;
- unsigned char *db, *seed;
- unsigned char *dbmask, seedmask[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-
- if (flen > emlen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1)
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+static int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
+ const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen);
+
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+ const unsigned char *param, int plen)
{
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP,
- RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
- return (0);
- }
+ int i, emlen = tlen - 1;
+ unsigned char *db, *seed;
+ unsigned char *dbmask, seedmask[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- if (emlen < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
- return (0);
- }
-
- dbmask = Malloc(emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- if (dbmask == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (0);
- }
+ if (flen > emlen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP,
+ RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+ return 0;
+ }
- to[0] = 0;
- seed = to + 1;
- db = to + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1;
+ if (emlen < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
- SHA1(param, plen, db);
- memset(db + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0,
- emlen - flen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1);
- db[emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1] = 0x01;
- memcpy(db + emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, from, (unsigned int) flen);
- RAND_bytes(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ to[0] = 0;
+ seed = to + 1;
+ db = to + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1;
+
+ if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, db, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
+ return 0;
+ memset(db + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0,
+ emlen - flen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1);
+ db[emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1] = 0x01;
+ memcpy(db + emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, from, (unsigned int) flen);
+ if (RAND_bytes(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0)
+ return 0;
#ifdef PKCS_TESTVECT
- memcpy(seed,
+ memcpy(seed,
"\xaa\xfd\x12\xf6\x59\xca\xe6\x34\x89\xb4\x79\xe5\x07\x6d\xde\xc2\xf0\x6c\xb5\x8f",
20);
#endif
- MGF1(dbmask, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- for (i = 0; i < emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
- db[i] ^= dbmask[i];
-
- MGF1(seedmask, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, db, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
- seed[i] ^= seedmask[i];
-
- Free(dbmask);
- return (1);
- }
-
-int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, tlen, from, flen, num, param, plen)
- unsigned char *to;
- int tlen;
- unsigned char *from;
- int flen;
- int num;
- unsigned char *param;
- int plen;
- {
- int i, dblen, mlen = -1;
- unsigned char *maskeddb;
- unsigned char *db, seed[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], phash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-
- if (flen < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
- return (-1);
+ dbmask = OPENSSL_malloc(emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ if (dbmask == NULL)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (MGF1(dbmask, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+ db[i] ^= dbmask[i];
+
+ if (MGF1(seedmask, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, db, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+ seed[i] ^= seedmask[i];
+
+ OPENSSL_free(dbmask);
+ return 1;
}
- dblen = flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
- db = Malloc(dblen);
- if (db == NULL)
+int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num,
+ const unsigned char *param, int plen)
{
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (-1);
- }
+ int i, dblen, mlen = -1;
+ const unsigned char *maskeddb;
+ int lzero;
+ unsigned char *db = NULL, seed[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], phash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char *padded_from;
+ int bad = 0;
+
+ if (--num < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1)
+ /* 'num' is the length of the modulus, i.e. does not depend on the
+ * particular ciphertext. */
+ goto decoding_err;
+
+ lzero = num - flen;
+ if (lzero < 0)
+ {
+ /* signalling this error immediately after detection might allow
+ * for side-channel attacks (e.g. timing if 'plen' is huge
+ * -- cf. James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA Optimal
+ * Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001),
+ * so we use a 'bad' flag */
+ bad = 1;
+ lzero = 0;
+ flen = num; /* don't overflow the memcpy to padded_from */
+ }
+
+ dblen = num - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen + num);
+ if (db == NULL)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
- maskeddb = from + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
-
- MGF1(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, maskeddb, dblen);
- for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
- seed[i] ^= from[i];
+ /* Always do this zero-padding copy (even when lzero == 0)
+ * to avoid leaking timing info about the value of lzero. */
+ padded_from = db + dblen;
+ memset(padded_from, 0, lzero);
+ memcpy(padded_from + lzero, from, flen);
+
+ maskeddb = padded_from + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+
+ if (MGF1(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, maskeddb, dblen))
+ return -1;
+ for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+ seed[i] ^= padded_from[i];
- MGF1(db, dblen, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++)
- db[i] ^= maskeddb[i];
+ if (MGF1(db, dblen, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ return -1;
+ for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++)
+ db[i] ^= maskeddb[i];
- SHA1(param, plen, phash);
+ if (!EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
+ return -1;
- if (memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0)
+ if (memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0 || bad)
+ goto decoding_err;
+ else
+ {
+ for (i = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i < dblen; i++)
+ if (db[i] != 0x00)
+ break;
+ if (i == dblen || db[i] != 0x01)
+ goto decoding_err;
+ else
+ {
+ /* everything looks OK */
+
+ mlen = dblen - ++i;
+ if (tlen < mlen)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+ mlen = -1;
+ }
+ else
+ memcpy(to, db + i, mlen);
+ }
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(db);
+ return mlen;
+
+decoding_err:
+ /* to avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not reveal
+ * which kind of decoding error happened */
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
- else
+ if (db != NULL) OPENSSL_free(db);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
+ const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen, const EVP_MD *dgst)
{
- for (i = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i < dblen; i++)
- if (db[i] != 0x00)
- break;
- if (db[i] != 0x01 || i++ >= dblen)
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP,
- RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
- else
- {
- mlen = dblen - i;
- if (tlen < mlen)
+ long i, outlen = 0;
+ unsigned char cnt[4];
+ EVP_MD_CTX c;
+ unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ int mdlen;
+ int rv = -1;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c);
+ mdlen = M_EVP_MD_size(dgst);
+ if (mdlen < 0)
+ goto err;
+ for (i = 0; outlen < len; i++)
{
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
- mlen = -1;
+ cnt[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 255);
+ cnt[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 255);
+ cnt[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8)) & 255;
+ cnt[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 255);
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&c,dgst, NULL)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, seed, seedlen)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, cnt, 4))
+ goto err;
+ if (outlen + mdlen <= len)
+ {
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, mask + outlen, NULL))
+ goto err;
+ outlen += mdlen;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, md, NULL))
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(mask + outlen, md, len - outlen);
+ outlen = len;
+ }
}
- else
- memcpy(to, db + i, mlen);
- }
+ rv = 0;
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c);
+ return rv;
}
- Free(db);
- return (mlen);
- }
-
-int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, unsigned char *seed, long seedlen)
- {
- long i, outlen = 0;
- unsigned char cnt[4];
- SHA_CTX c;
- unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-
- for (i = 0; outlen < len; i++)
+
+static int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, const unsigned char *seed,
+ long seedlen)
{
- cnt[0] = (i >> 24) & 255, cnt[1] = (i >> 16) & 255,
- cnt[2] = (i >> 8) & 255, cnt[3] = i & 255;
- SHA1_Init(&c);
- SHA1_Update(&c, seed, seedlen);
- SHA1_Update(&c, cnt, 4);
- if (outlen + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH <= len)
- {
- SHA1_Final(mask + outlen, &c);
- outlen += SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
- }
- else
- {
- SHA1_Final(md, &c);
- memcpy(mask + outlen, md, len - outlen);
- outlen = len;
- }
+ return PKCS1_MGF1(mask, len, seed, seedlen, EVP_sha1());
}
- return (0);
- }
+#endif
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff