/*
- * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
* Geoff
*/
+/*
+ * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
+ * internal use.
+ */
+#include "internal/deprecated.h"
+
#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include "rsa_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/self_test.h>
+#include "rsa_local.h"
-static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e_value,
- BN_GENCB *cb);
+static int rsa_keygen_pairwise_test(RSA *rsa, OSSL_CALLBACK *cb, void *cbarg);
+static int rsa_keygen(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
+ BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb, int pairwise_test);
/*
* NB: this wrapper would normally be placed in rsa_lib.c and the static
int RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
{
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
/* multi-prime is only supported with the builtin key generation */
- if (rsa->meth->rsa_multi_prime_keygen != NULL)
+ if (rsa->meth->rsa_multi_prime_keygen != NULL) {
return rsa->meth->rsa_multi_prime_keygen(rsa, bits, primes,
e_value, cb);
- return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, primes, e_value, cb);
+ } else if (rsa->meth->rsa_keygen != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * However, if rsa->meth implements only rsa_keygen, then we
+ * have to honour it in 2-prime case and assume that it wouldn't
+ * know what to do with multi-prime key generated by builtin
+ * subroutine...
+ */
+ if (primes == 2)
+ return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
+ else
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif /* FIPS_MODUKE */
+ return rsa_keygen(rsa->libctx, rsa, bits, primes, e_value, cb, 0);
}
-static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e_value,
- BN_GENCB *cb)
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+static int rsa_multiprime_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
+ BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
{
BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *tmp, *prime;
- int ok = -1, n = 0, bitsr[RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM], bitse = 0;
+ int n = 0, bitsr[RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM], bitse = 0;
int i = 0, quo = 0, rmd = 0, adj = 0, retries = 0;
RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL;
STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos = NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BN_ULONG bitst = 0;
+ unsigned long error = 0;
+ int ok = -1;
- /*
- * From Github pull request #4241:
- *
- * We are in disagreement on how to handle security trade-off, in other
- * words:
- *
- * mechanical-check-for-maximum-of-16-prime-factors vs.
- * limiting-number-depending-on-length-less-factors-for-shorter-keys.
- */
-
- /*
- * When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
- * continually regenerating the same prime values.
- */
- if (bits < 16) {
+ if (bits < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
ok = 0; /* we set our own err */
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+ RSAerr(0, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
}
- if (primes < RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM
- || primes > RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM || bits <= primes) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID);
+ /* A bad value for e can cause infinite loops */
+ if (e_value != NULL && !rsa_check_public_exponent(e_value)) {
+ RSAerr(0, RSA_R_PUB_EXPONENT_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (primes < RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM || primes > rsa_multip_cap(bits)) {
+ ok = 0; /* we set our own err */
+ RSAerr(0, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID);
goto err;
}
quo = bits / primes;
rmd = bits % primes;
- if (primes > RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM && quo < RSA_MIN_PRIME_SIZE) {
- /*
- * this means primes are too many for the key bits.
- *
- * This only affects multi-prime keys. For normal RSA,
- * it's limited above (bits >= 16, hence each prime >= 8).
- *
- * This is done in this way because the original normal
- * RSA's behavior should not alter at least in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
- */
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID);
- goto err;
- }
-
for (i = 0; i < primes; i++)
bitsr[i] = (i < rmd) ? quo + 1 : quo;
+ rsa->dirty_cnt++;
+
/* We need the RSA components non-NULL */
if (!rsa->n && ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
if (!rsa->d && ((rsa->d = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
+ BN_set_flags(rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!rsa->e && ((rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
if (!rsa->p && ((rsa->p = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
+ BN_set_flags(rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!rsa->q && ((rsa->q = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
+ BN_set_flags(rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!rsa->dmp1 && ((rsa->dmp1 = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
+ BN_set_flags(rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!rsa->dmq1 && ((rsa->dmq1 = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
+ BN_set_flags(rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
goto err;
+ BN_set_flags(rsa->iqmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
/* initialize multi-prime components */
if (primes > RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM) {
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2);
prime = pinfo->r;
}
+ BN_set_flags(prime, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
for (;;) {
redo:
}
if (!BN_sub(r2, prime, BN_value_one()))
goto err;
- if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (BN_is_one(r1))
+ ERR_set_mark();
+ BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) {
+ /* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */
break;
+ }
+ error = ERR_peek_last_error();
+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN
+ && ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) {
+ /* GCD != 1 */
+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
+ } else {
+ goto err;
+ }
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
goto err;
}
*
* This strategy has the following goals:
*
- * 1. 1024-bit factors are effcient when using 3072 and 4096-bit key
+ * 1. 1024-bit factors are efficient when using 3072 and 4096-bit key
* 2. stay the same logic with normal 2-prime key
*/
bitse -= bitsr[i];
ok = 1;
err:
if (ok == -1) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, ERR_LIB_BN);
+ RSAerr(0, ERR_LIB_BN);
ok = 0;
}
- if (ctx != NULL)
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return ok;
}
+#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
+
+static int rsa_keygen(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
+ BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb, int pairwise_test)
+{
+ int ok = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Only multi-prime keys or insecure keys with a small key length will use
+ * the older rsa_multiprime_keygen().
+ */
+ if (primes == 2 && bits >= 2048)
+ ok = rsa_sp800_56b_generate_key(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ else
+ ok = rsa_multiprime_keygen(rsa, bits, primes, e_value, cb);
+#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
+
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ pairwise_test = 1; /* FIPS MODE needs to always run the pairwise test */
+#endif
+ if (pairwise_test && ok > 0) {
+ OSSL_CALLBACK *stcb = NULL;
+ void *stcbarg = NULL;
+
+ OSSL_SELF_TEST_get_callback(libctx, &stcb, &stcbarg);
+ ok = rsa_keygen_pairwise_test(rsa, stcb, stcbarg);
+ if (!ok) {
+ /* Clear intermediate results */
+ BN_clear_free(rsa->d);
+ BN_clear_free(rsa->p);
+ BN_clear_free(rsa->q);
+ BN_clear_free(rsa->dmp1);
+ BN_clear_free(rsa->dmq1);
+ BN_clear_free(rsa->iqmp);
+ rsa->d = NULL;
+ rsa->p = NULL;
+ rsa->q = NULL;
+ rsa->dmp1 = NULL;
+ rsa->dmq1 = NULL;
+ rsa->iqmp = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ return ok;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For RSA key generation it is not known whether the key pair will be used
+ * for key transport or signatures. FIPS 140-2 IG 9.9 states that in this case
+ * either a signature verification OR an encryption operation may be used to
+ * perform the pairwise consistency check. The simpler encrypt/decrypt operation
+ * has been chosen for this case.
+ */
+static int rsa_keygen_pairwise_test(RSA *rsa, OSSL_CALLBACK *cb, void *cbarg)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ unsigned int ciphertxt_len;
+ unsigned char *ciphertxt = NULL;
+ const unsigned char plaintxt[16] = {0};
+ unsigned char decoded[256];
+ unsigned int decoded_len;
+ unsigned int plaintxt_len = (unsigned int)sizeof(plaintxt_len);
+ int padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+ OSSL_SELF_TEST *st = NULL;
+
+ st = OSSL_SELF_TEST_new(cb, cbarg);
+ if (st == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ OSSL_SELF_TEST_onbegin(st, OSSL_SELF_TEST_TYPE_PCT,
+ OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_PCT_RSA_PKCS1);
+
+ ciphertxt_len = RSA_size(rsa);
+ ciphertxt = OPENSSL_zalloc(ciphertxt_len);
+ if (ciphertxt == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ ciphertxt_len = RSA_public_encrypt(plaintxt_len, plaintxt, ciphertxt, rsa,
+ padding);
+ if (ciphertxt_len <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (ciphertxt_len == plaintxt_len
+ && memcmp(ciphertxt, plaintxt, plaintxt_len) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ OSSL_SELF_TEST_oncorrupt_byte(st, ciphertxt);
+
+ decoded_len = RSA_private_decrypt(ciphertxt_len, ciphertxt, decoded, rsa,
+ padding);
+ if (decoded_len != plaintxt_len
+ || memcmp(decoded, plaintxt, decoded_len) != 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ OSSL_SELF_TEST_onend(st, ret);
+ OSSL_SELF_TEST_free(st);
+ OPENSSL_free(ciphertxt);
+
+ return ret;
+}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff