#include <stdio.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include "bn.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
-#include "rand.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#ifndef NOPROTO
-static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
+#ifndef RSA_NULL
+
+static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
+static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
+static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
+static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa);
+static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
-#else
-static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt();
-static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt();
-static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt();
-static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt();
-static int RSA_eay_mod_exp();
-static int RSA_eay_init();
-static int RSA_eay_finish();
-#endif
-
static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
"Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
- RSA_eay_public_decrypt,
- RSA_eay_private_encrypt,
+ RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
+ RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
RSA_eay_mod_exp,
- BN_mod_exp_mont,
+ BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */
RSA_eay_init,
RSA_eay_finish,
- 0,
+ 0, /* flags */
NULL,
+ 0, /* rsa_sign */
+ 0, /* rsa_verify */
+ NULL /* rsa_keygen */
};
-RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay()
+const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
{
return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
}
-static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(flen, from, to, rsa, padding)
-int flen;
-unsigned char *from;
-unsigned char *to;
-RSA *rsa;
-int padding;
+/* Static helper to reduce oodles of code duplication. As a slight
+ * optimisation, the "MONT_HELPER() macro must be used as front-end to this
+ * function, to prevent unnecessary function calls - there is an initial test
+ * that is performed by the macro-generated code. */
+static int rsa_eay_mont_helper(BN_MONT_CTX **ptr, const BIGNUM *modulus, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
- BIGNUM *f=NULL,*ret=NULL;
+ BN_MONT_CTX *bn_mont_ctx;
+ if((bn_mont_ctx = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if(!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx, modulus, ctx))
+ {
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (*ptr == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ if (*ptr == NULL) /* check again in the lock to stop races */
+ {
+ *ptr = bn_mont_ctx;
+ bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ }
+ if (bn_mont_ctx)
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
+ return 1;
+ }
+/* Usage example;
+ * MONT_HELPER(rsa, bn_ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
+ */
+#define MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, m, pre_cond, err_instr) \
+ if((pre_cond) && ((rsa)->_method_mod_##m == NULL) && \
+ !rsa_eay_mont_helper(&((rsa)->_method_mod_##m), \
+ (rsa)->m, (ctx))) \
+ err_instr
+
+static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+ {
+ BIGNUM *f,*ret;
int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- if ((buf=(unsigned char *)Malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if (!f || !ret || !buf)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+ i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
+ break;
+#endif
case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen);
break;
}
if (i <= 0) goto err;
- if (((f=BN_new()) == NULL) || ((ret=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
-
if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
- if ((rsa->method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
- {
- if ((rsa->method_mod_n=(char *)BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set((BN_MONT_CTX *)rsa->method_mod_n,
- rsa->n,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+ {
+ /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
}
+ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
+
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
- rsa->method_mod_n)) goto err;
+ rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
/* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
* length of the modulus */
r=num;
err:
- if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- if (f != NULL) BN_free(f);
- if (ret != NULL) BN_free(ret);
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
if (buf != NULL)
{
- memset(buf,0,num);
- Free(buf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
return(r);
}
-static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(flen, from, to, rsa, padding)
-int flen;
-unsigned char *from;
-unsigned char *to;
-RSA *rsa;
-int padding;
+static int rsa_eay_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ int ret = 1;
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ /* Check again inside the lock - the macro's check is racey */
+ if(rsa->blinding == NULL)
+ ret = RSA_blinding_on(rsa, ctx);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+#define BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, err_instr) \
+ do { \
+ if((!((rsa)->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) && \
+ ((rsa)->blinding == NULL) && \
+ !rsa_eay_blinding(rsa, ctx)) \
+ err_instr \
+ } while(0)
+
+static BN_BLINDING *setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ BIGNUM *A, *Ai;
+ BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
+
+ /* added in OpenSSL 0.9.6j and 0.9.7b */
+
+ /* NB: similar code appears in RSA_blinding_on (rsa_lib.c);
+ * this should be placed in a new function of its own, but for reasons
+ * of binary compatibility can't */
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ A = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if ((RAND_status() == 0) && rsa->d != NULL && rsa->d->d != NULL)
+ {
+ /* if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret exponent as unpredictable seed */
+ RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof rsa->d->d[0], 0.0);
+ if (!BN_pseudo_rand_range(A,rsa->n)) goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (!BN_rand_range(A,rsa->n)) goto err;
+ }
+ if ((Ai=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,A,rsa->n,ctx)) == NULL) goto err;
+
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(A,A,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n))
+ goto err;
+ ret = BN_BLINDING_new(A,Ai,rsa->n);
+ BN_free(Ai);
+err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+/* signing */
+static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
- BIGNUM *f=NULL,*ret=NULL;
+ BIGNUM *f,*ret;
int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
+ int local_blinding = 0;
+ BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- if ((buf=(unsigned char *)Malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if(!f || !ret || !buf)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (i <= 0) goto err;
- if (((f=BN_new()) == NULL) || ((ret=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+ {
+ /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
+ }
- if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
- RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
- if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
+ BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
+ blinding = rsa->blinding;
+
+ /* Now unless blinding is disabled, 'blinding' is non-NULL.
+ * But the BN_BLINDING object may be owned by some other thread
+ * (we don't want to keep it constant and we don't want to use
+ * lots of locking to avoid race conditions, so only a single
+ * thread can use it; other threads have to use local blinding
+ * factors) */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
+ {
+ if (blinding == NULL)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (blinding != NULL)
+ {
+ if (blinding->thread_id != CRYPTO_thread_id())
+ {
+ /* we need a local one-time blinding factor */
- if ( (rsa->p != NULL) &&
+ blinding = setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
+ if (blinding == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ local_blinding = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (blinding)
+ if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(f, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
+
+ if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
+ ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
(rsa->q != NULL) &&
(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
(rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
- (rsa->iqmp != NULL))
- { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa)) goto err; }
+ (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
+ { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa,ctx)) goto err; }
else
{
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx)) goto err;
+ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
}
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
- if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (blinding)
+ if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(ret, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
/* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
* length of the modulus */
r=num;
err:
- if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- if (ret != NULL) BN_free(ret);
- if (f != NULL) BN_free(f);
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
+ if (local_blinding)
+ BN_BLINDING_free(blinding);
if (buf != NULL)
{
- memset(buf,0,num);
- Free(buf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
return(r);
}
-static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(flen, from, to, rsa,padding)
-int flen;
-unsigned char *from;
-unsigned char *to;
-RSA *rsa;
-int padding;
+static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
- BIGNUM *f=NULL,*ret=NULL;
+ BIGNUM *f,*ret;
int j,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
+ int local_blinding = 0;
+ BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
- ctx=BN_CTX_new();
- if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
-
+ if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-
- if ((buf=(unsigned char *)Malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if(!f || !ret || !buf)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- /* This check was for equallity but PGP does evil things
+ /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
* and chops off the top '0' bytes */
if (flen > num)
{
}
/* make data into a big number */
- if (((ret=BN_new()) == NULL) || ((f=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
- if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
- RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
- if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
+ blinding = rsa->blinding;
+
+ /* Now unless blinding is disabled, 'blinding' is non-NULL.
+ * But the BN_BLINDING object may be owned by some other thread
+ * (we don't want to keep it constant and we don't want to use
+ * lots of locking to avoid race conditions, so only a single
+ * thread can use it; other threads have to use local blinding
+ * factors) */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
+ {
+ if (blinding == NULL)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (blinding != NULL)
+ {
+ if (blinding->thread_id != CRYPTO_thread_id())
+ {
+ /* we need a local one-time blinding factor */
+
+ blinding = setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
+ if (blinding == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ local_blinding = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (blinding)
+ if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(f, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
/* do the decrypt */
- if ( (rsa->p != NULL) &&
+ if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
+ ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
(rsa->q != NULL) &&
(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
(rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
- (rsa->iqmp != NULL))
- { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa)) goto err; }
+ (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
+ { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa,ctx)) goto err; }
else
{
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx))
+ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n))
goto err;
}
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
- if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (blinding)
+ if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(ret, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
p=buf;
j=BN_bn2bin(ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
switch (padding)
{
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j);
+ r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
break;
- case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+ r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
+ break;
+#endif
+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+ r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
break;
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j);
+ r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num);
break;
default:
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
err:
- if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- if (f != NULL) BN_free(f);
- if (ret != NULL) BN_free(ret);
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
+ if (local_blinding)
+ BN_BLINDING_free(blinding);
if (buf != NULL)
{
- memset(buf,0,num);
- Free(buf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
return(r);
}
-static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(flen, from, to, rsa, padding)
-int flen;
-unsigned char *from;
-unsigned char *to;
-RSA *rsa;
-int padding;
+/* signature verification */
+static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
- BIGNUM *f=NULL,*ret=NULL;
+ BIGNUM *f,*ret;
int i,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
- ctx=BN_CTX_new();
- if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
-
+ if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- buf=(unsigned char *)Malloc(num);
- if (buf == NULL)
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if(!f || !ret || !buf)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- /* This check was for equallity but PGP does evil things
+ /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
* and chops off the top '0' bytes */
if (flen > num)
{
goto err;
}
- /* make data into a big number */
- if (((ret=BN_new()) == NULL) || ((f=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
-
if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
- /* do the decrypt */
- if ((rsa->method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
{
- if ((rsa->method_mod_n=(char *)BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set((BN_MONT_CTX *)rsa->method_mod_n,
- rsa->n,ctx)) goto err;
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
}
+ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
+
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
- rsa->method_mod_n)) goto err;
+ rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
p=buf;
i=BN_bn2bin(ret,p);
switch (padding)
{
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i);
+ r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
break;
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i);
+ r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
break;
default:
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
err:
- if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- if (f != NULL) BN_free(f);
- if (ret != NULL) BN_free(ret);
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
if (buf != NULL)
{
- memset(buf,0,num);
- Free(buf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
return(r);
}
-static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(r0, I, rsa)
-BIGNUM *r0;
-BIGNUM *I;
-RSA *rsa;
+static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
- BIGNUM *r1=NULL,*m1=NULL;
+ BIGNUM *r1,*m1,*vrfy;
int ret=0;
- BN_CTX *ctx;
- if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
- m1=BN_new();
- r1=BN_new();
- if ((m1 == NULL) || (r1 == NULL)) goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
- {
- if (rsa->method_mod_p == NULL)
- {
- if ((rsa->method_mod_p=(char *)
- BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set((BN_MONT_CTX *)
- rsa->method_mod_p,rsa->p,ctx))
- goto err;
- }
- if (rsa->method_mod_q == NULL)
- {
- if ((rsa->method_mod_q=(char *)
- BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set((BN_MONT_CTX *)
- rsa->method_mod_q,rsa->q,ctx))
- goto err;
- }
- }
+ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
+ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, q, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
+ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1,r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
- rsa->method_mod_q)) goto err;
+ rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
- rsa->method_mod_p)) goto err;
+ rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
- if (!BN_add(r1,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
- if (!BN_sub(r0,r1,m1)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,m1)) goto err;
+ /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
+ * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
+ if (BN_get_sign(r0))
+ if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
if (!BN_mod(r0,r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->q)) goto err;
+ /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
+ * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
+ * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
+ * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
+ * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
+ * they ensure p > q [steve]
+ */
+ if (BN_get_sign(r0))
+ if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
if (!BN_add(r0,r1,m1)) goto err;
+ if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
+ {
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
+ /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
+ * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
+ * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
+ * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
+ if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
+ if (BN_get_sign(vrfy))
+ if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy))
+ /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
+ * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
+ * mod_exp and return that instead. */
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
+ }
ret=1;
err:
- if (m1 != NULL) BN_free(m1);
- if (r1 != NULL) BN_free(r1);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return(ret);
}
-static int RSA_eay_init(rsa)
-RSA *rsa;
+static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa)
{
rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
return(1);
}
-static int RSA_eay_finish(rsa)
-RSA *rsa;
+static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa)
{
- if (rsa->method_mod_n != NULL)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free((BN_MONT_CTX *)rsa->method_mod_n);
- if (rsa->method_mod_p != NULL)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free((BN_MONT_CTX *)rsa->method_mod_p);
- if (rsa->method_mod_q != NULL)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free((BN_MONT_CTX *)rsa->method_mod_q);
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
return(1);
}
-
+#endif
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff