#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
-static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
+#ifndef RSA_NULL
+
+static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
+static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
+static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
+static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa);
+static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa);
static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
"Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
- RSA_eay_public_decrypt,
- RSA_eay_private_encrypt,
+ RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
+ RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
RSA_eay_mod_exp,
- BN_mod_exp_mont,
+ BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */
RSA_eay_init,
RSA_eay_finish,
- 0,
+ 0, /* flags */
NULL,
+ 0, /* rsa_sign */
+ 0, /* rsa_verify */
+ NULL /* rsa_keygen */
};
-RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
+const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
{
return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
}
-static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
+/* Static helper to reduce oodles of code duplication. As a slight
+ * optimisation, the "MONT_HELPER() macro must be used as front-end to this
+ * function, to prevent unnecessary function calls - there is an initial test
+ * that is performed by the macro-generated code. */
+static int rsa_eay_mont_helper(BN_MONT_CTX **ptr, const BIGNUM *modulus, BN_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ BN_MONT_CTX *bn_mont_ctx;
+ if((bn_mont_ctx = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if(!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx, modulus, ctx))
+ {
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (*ptr == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ if (*ptr == NULL) /* check again in the lock to stop races */
+ {
+ *ptr = bn_mont_ctx;
+ bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ }
+ if (bn_mont_ctx)
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
+ return 1;
+ }
+/* Usage example;
+ * MONT_HELPER(rsa, bn_ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
+ */
+#define MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, m, pre_cond, err_instr) \
+ if((pre_cond) && ((rsa)->_method_mod_##m == NULL) && \
+ !rsa_eay_mont_helper(&((rsa)->_method_mod_##m), \
+ (rsa)->m, (ctx))) \
+ err_instr
+
+static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
BIGNUM f,ret;
BN_init(&ret);
if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- if ((buf=(unsigned char *)Malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
break;
+#endif
case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen);
break;
if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
- if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
- {
- if ((rsa->_method_mod_n=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_n,rsa->n,ctx))
- goto err;
+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+ {
+ /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
}
+ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
+
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
BN_clear_free(&ret);
if (buf != NULL)
{
- memset(buf,0,num);
- Free(buf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
return(r);
}
-static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
+static int rsa_eay_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ int ret = 1;
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ /* Check again inside the lock - the macro's check is racey */
+ if(rsa->blinding == NULL)
+ ret = RSA_blinding_on(rsa, ctx);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+#define BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, err_instr) \
+ do { \
+ if((!((rsa)->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) && \
+ ((rsa)->blinding == NULL) && \
+ !rsa_eay_blinding(rsa, ctx)) \
+ err_instr \
+ } while(0)
+
+/* signing */
+static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
BIGNUM f,ret;
if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- if ((buf=(unsigned char *)Malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
if (i <= 0) goto err;
if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+ {
+ /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
+ }
- if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
- RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
+ BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
+
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
- if ( (rsa->p != NULL) &&
+ if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
+ ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
(rsa->q != NULL) &&
(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
(rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
- (rsa->iqmp != NULL))
+ (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
{ if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
else
{
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
+ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
}
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
/* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
BN_clear_free(&f);
if (buf != NULL)
{
- memset(buf,0,num);
- Free(buf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
return(r);
}
-static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
+static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
BIGNUM f,ret;
num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- if ((buf=(unsigned char *)Malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- /* This check was for equallity but PGP does evil things
+ /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
* and chops off the top '0' bytes */
if (flen > num)
{
/* make data into a big number */
if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
- if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
- RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
+
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
/* do the decrypt */
- if ( (rsa->p != NULL) &&
+ if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
+ ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
(rsa->q != NULL) &&
(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
(rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
- (rsa->iqmp != NULL))
+ (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
{ if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
else
{
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL))
+ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n))
goto err;
}
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
p=buf;
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
break;
+#endif
case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
break;
BN_clear_free(&ret);
if (buf != NULL)
{
- memset(buf,0,num);
- Free(buf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
return(r);
}
-static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
+/* signature verification */
+static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
BIGNUM f,ret;
if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- buf=(unsigned char *)Malloc(num);
+ buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
if (buf == NULL)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- /* This check was for equallity but PGP does evil things
+ /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
* and chops off the top '0' bytes */
if (flen > num)
{
}
if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
- /* do the decrypt */
- if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
{
- if ((rsa->_method_mod_n=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_n,rsa->n,ctx))
- goto err;
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
}
+ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
+
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
BN_clear_free(&ret);
if (buf != NULL)
{
- memset(buf,0,num);
- Free(buf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
return(r);
}
-static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
+static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
{
- BIGNUM r1,m1;
+ BIGNUM r1,m1,vrfy;
int ret=0;
BN_CTX *ctx;
- if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
BN_init(&m1);
BN_init(&r1);
+ BN_init(&vrfy);
+ if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
- {
- if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL)
- {
- if ((rsa->_method_mod_p=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_p,rsa->p,
- ctx))
- goto err;
- }
- if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
- {
- if ((rsa->_method_mod_q=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_q,rsa->q,
- ctx))
- goto err;
- }
- }
+ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
+ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, q, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
+ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err;
/* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
* affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
- if (r0->neg)
+ if (BN_get_sign(r0))
if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
* This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
* they ensure p > q [steve]
*/
- if (r0->neg)
+ if (BN_get_sign(r0))
if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err;
+ if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
+ {
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
+ /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
+ * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
+ * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
+ * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
+ if (!BN_sub(&vrfy, &vrfy, I)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
+ if (BN_get_sign(&vrfy))
+ if (!BN_add(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_is_zero(&vrfy))
+ /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
+ * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
+ * mod_exp and return that instead. */
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
+ }
ret=1;
err:
BN_clear_free(&m1);
BN_clear_free(&r1);
+ BN_clear_free(&vrfy);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return(ret);
}
return(1);
}
-
+#endif
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff