Change to mitigate branch prediction attacks
[openssl.git] / crypto / rsa / rsa_eay.c
index 385439cdc9494310f0d3bfcac8390d3983905098..15ebf5dfa3c844762a829974372944e38c301da2 100644 (file)
@@ -429,11 +429,11 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
                BIGNUM local_d;
                BIGNUM *d = NULL;
                
-               if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
+               if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
                        {
                        BN_init(&local_d);
                        d = &local_d;
-                       BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
+                       BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
                        }
                else
                        d = rsa->d;
@@ -551,10 +551,10 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
                BIGNUM local_d;
                BIGNUM *d = NULL;
                
-               if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
+               if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
                        {
                        d = &local_d;
-                       BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
+                       BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
                        }
                else
                        d = rsa->d;
@@ -715,8 +715,9 @@ err:
 static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
        {
        BIGNUM *r1,*m1,*vrfy;
-       BIGNUM local_dmp1, local_dmq1;
-       BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1;
+       BIGNUM local_dmp1,local_dmq1,local_c,local_r1;
+       BIGNUM *dmp1,*dmq1,*c,*pr1;
+       int bn_flags;
        int ret=0;
 
        BN_CTX_start(ctx);
@@ -724,26 +725,72 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
        m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
        vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
 
+       /* Make sure mod_inverse in montgomerey intialization use correct 
+        * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag.
+        */
+       bn_flags = rsa->p->flags;
+       if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+               {
+               rsa->p->flags |= BN_FLG_CONSTTIME;
+               }
        MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
+       /* We restore bn_flags back */
+       rsa->p->flags = bn_flags;
+
+        /* Make sure mod_inverse in montgomerey intialization use correct
+         * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag.
+         */
+       bn_flags = rsa->q->flags;
+       if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+               {
+               rsa->q->flags |= BN_FLG_CONSTTIME;
+               }
        MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, q, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
+       /* We restore bn_flags back */
+       rsa->q->flags = bn_flags;       
+
        MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
 
-       if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
-       if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
+       /* compute I mod q */
+       if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+               {
+               c = &local_c;
+               BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+               if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
+               }
+       else
+               {
+               if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
+               }
+
+       /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
+       if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
                {
                dmq1 = &local_dmq1;
-               BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
+               BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
                }
        else
                dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
        if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1,r1,dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
                rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
 
-       if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
-       if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
+       /* compute I mod p */
+       if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+               {
+               c = &local_c;
+               BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+               if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+               }
+       else
+               {
+               if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+               }
+
+       /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
+       if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
                {
                dmp1 = &local_dmp1;
-               BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
+               BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
                }
        else
                dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
@@ -757,7 +804,17 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
                if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
 
        if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
-       if (!BN_mod(r0,r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+
+       /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
+       if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+               {
+               pr1 = &local_r1;
+               BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+               }
+       else
+               pr1 = r1;
+       if (!BN_mod(r0,pr1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+
        /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
          * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
         * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
@@ -790,10 +847,10 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
                        BIGNUM local_d;
                        BIGNUM *d = NULL;
                
-                       if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
+                       if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
                                {
                                d = &local_d;
-                               BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
+                               BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
                                }
                        else
                                d = rsa->d;