rand_unix.c: Ensure requests to KERN_ARND don't exceed 256 bytes.

[openssl.git] / crypto / rand / rand_unix.c

diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
index 0925446580b4d2fba27b4ba15359005818851ead..081ffca908bd486145cabffa64f3caa5f794c97a 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
  *
  * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include "crypto/rand.h"
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "internal/dso.h"
+
 #ifdef __linux
 # include <sys/syscall.h>
 # ifdef DEVRANDOM_WAIT
@@ -26,12 +27,12 @@
 #  include <sys/utsname.h>
 # endif
 #endif
-#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
+#if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
 # include <sys/types.h>
 # include <sys/sysctl.h>
 # include <sys/param.h>
 #endif
-#if defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)
+#if defined(__OpenBSD__)
 # include <sys/param.h>
 #endif
 
@@ -226,10 +227,12 @@ static ssize_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen)
      * when the sysctl returns long and we want to request something not a
      * multiple of longs, which should never be the case.
      */
+#if   defined(__FreeBSD__)
     if (!ossl_assert(buflen % sizeof(long) == 0)) {
         errno = EINVAL;
         return -1;
     }
+#endif
 
     /*
      * On NetBSD before 4.0 KERN_ARND was an alias for KERN_URND, and only
@@ -247,7 +250,7 @@ static ssize_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen)
     mib[1] = KERN_ARND;
 
     do {
-        len = buflen;
+        len = buflen > 256 ? 256 : buflen;
         if (sysctl(mib, 2, buf, &len, NULL, 0) == -1)
             return done > 0 ? done : -1;
         done += len;
@@ -348,7 +351,7 @@ static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
 
     if (getentropy != NULL)
         return getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
-#  elif !defined(FIPS_MODE)
+#  elif !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
     union {
         void *p;
         int (*f)(void *buffer, size_t length);
@@ -391,7 +394,7 @@ static int keep_random_devices_open = 1;
 #   if defined(__linux) && defined(DEVRANDOM_WAIT)
 static void *shm_addr;
 
-#    if !defined(FIPS_MODE)
+#    if !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
 static void cleanup_shm(void)
 {
     shmdt(shm_addr);
@@ -462,7 +465,7 @@ static int wait_random_seeded(void)
              * If this call fails, it isn't a big problem.
              */
             shm_addr = shmat(shm_id, NULL, SHM_RDONLY);
-#    ifndef FIPS_MODE
+#    ifndef FIPS_MODULE
             /* TODO 3.0: The FIPS provider doesn't have OPENSSL_atexit */
             if (shm_addr != (void *)-1)
                 OPENSSL_atexit(&cleanup_shm);