#include "e_os.h"
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+# include "prov/rand_pool.h"
+# include "prov/seeding.h"
+
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
/* non-NULL if default_RAND_meth is ENGINE-provided */
static ENGINE *funct_ref;
static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
static int rand_inited = 0;
-#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
-/*
- * IMPORTANT NOTE: It is not currently possible to use this code
- * because we are not sure about the amount of randomness it provides.
- * Some SP900 tests have been run, but there is internal skepticism.
- * So for now this code is not used.
- */
-# error "RDTSC enabled? Should not be possible!"
-
-/*
- * Acquire entropy from high-speed clock
- *
- * Since we get some randomness from the low-order bits of the
- * high-speed clock, it can help.
- *
- * Returns the total entropy count, if it exceeds the requested
- * entropy count. Otherwise, returns an entropy count of 0.
- */
-size_t rand_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- unsigned char c;
- int i;
-
- if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 4)) != 0) {
- for (i = 0; i < TSC_READ_COUNT; i++) {
- c = (unsigned char)(OPENSSL_rdtsc() & 0xFF);
- rand_pool_add(pool, &c, 1, 4);
- }
- }
- return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU
-size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
-size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
-
-/*
- * Acquire entropy using Intel-specific cpu instructions
- *
- * Uses the RDSEED instruction if available, otherwise uses
- * RDRAND if available.
- *
- * For the differences between RDSEED and RDRAND, and why RDSEED
- * is the preferred choice, see https://goo.gl/oK3KcN
- *
- * Returns the total entropy count, if it exceeds the requested
- * entropy count. Otherwise, returns an entropy count of 0.
- */
-size_t rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- size_t bytes_needed;
- unsigned char *buffer;
-
- bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
- if (bytes_needed > 0) {
- buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
-
- if (buffer != NULL) {
- /* Whichever comes first, use RDSEED, RDRAND or nothing */
- if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2] & (1 << 18)) != 0) {
- if (OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed_bytes(buffer, bytes_needed)
- == bytes_needed) {
- rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes_needed, 8 * bytes_needed);
- }
- } else if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))) != 0) {
- if (OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes(buffer, bytes_needed)
- == bytes_needed) {
- rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes_needed, 8 * bytes_needed);
- }
- } else {
- rand_pool_add_end(pool, 0, 0);
- }
- }
- }
-
- return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-}
-#endif
-
-
-/*
- * Implements the get_entropy() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
- *
- * If the DRBG has a parent, then the required amount of entropy input
- * is fetched using the parent's RAND_DRBG_generate().
- *
- * Otherwise, the entropy is polled from the system entropy sources
- * using rand_pool_acquire_entropy().
- *
- * If a random pool has been added to the DRBG using RAND_add(), then
- * its entropy will be used up first.
- */
-size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
- unsigned char **pout,
- int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
- int prediction_resistance)
-{
- size_t ret = 0;
- size_t entropy_available = 0;
- RAND_POOL *pool;
-
- if (drbg->parent != NULL && drbg->strength > drbg->parent->strength) {
- /*
- * We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C
- * 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source
- */
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GET_ENTROPY, RAND_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (drbg->seed_pool != NULL) {
- pool = drbg->seed_pool;
- pool->entropy_requested = entropy;
- } else {
- pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, drbg->secure, min_len, max_len);
- if (pool == NULL)
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (drbg->parent != NULL) {
- size_t bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
- unsigned char *buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
-
- if (buffer != NULL) {
- size_t bytes = 0;
-
- /*
- * Get random data from parent. Include our address as additional input,
- * in order to provide some additional distinction between different
- * DRBG child instances.
- * Our lock is already held, but we need to lock our parent before
- * generating bits from it. (Note: taking the lock will be a no-op
- * if locking if drbg->parent->lock == NULL.)
- */
- rand_drbg_lock(drbg->parent);
- if (RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg->parent,
- buffer, bytes_needed,
- prediction_resistance,
- (unsigned char *)&drbg, sizeof(drbg)) != 0)
- bytes = bytes_needed;
- drbg->reseed_next_counter
- = tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_prop_counter);
- rand_drbg_unlock(drbg->parent);
-
- rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
- entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
- }
-
- } else {
- /* Get entropy by polling system entropy sources. */
- entropy_available = rand_pool_acquire_entropy(pool);
- }
-
- if (entropy_available > 0) {
- ret = rand_pool_length(pool);
- *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
- }
-
- if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL)
- rand_pool_free(pool);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Implements the cleanup_entropy() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
- *
- */
-void rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
- unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
-{
- if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL) {
- if (drbg->secure)
- OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
- else
- OPENSSL_clear_free(out, outlen);
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Generate additional data that can be used for the drbg. The data does
- * not need to contain entropy, but it's useful if it contains at least
- * some bits that are unpredictable.
- *
- * Returns 0 on failure.
- *
- * On success it allocates a buffer at |*pout| and returns the length of
- * the data. The buffer should get freed using OPENSSL_secure_clear_free().
- */
-size_t rand_drbg_get_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char **pout)
-{
- size_t ret = 0;
-
- if (rand_pool_add_additional_data(pool) == 0)
- goto err;
-
- ret = rand_pool_length(pool);
- *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
-
- err:
- return ret;
-}
-
-void rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *out)
-{
- rand_pool_reattach(pool, out);
-}
-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init)
{
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
rand_inited = 0;
}
-/* TODO(3.0): Do we need to handle this somehow in the FIPS module? */
/*
* RAND_close_seed_files() ensures that any seed file descriptors are
- * closed after use.
+ * closed after use. This only applies to libcrypto/default provider,
+ * it does not apply to other providers.
*/
void RAND_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
{
*/
int RAND_poll(void)
{
- int ret = 0;
-
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+ int ret = meth == RAND_OpenSSL();
+ RAND_POOL *pool;
if (meth == NULL)
return 0;
- if (meth == RAND_OpenSSL()) {
- /* fill random pool and seed the master DRBG */
- RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master();
-
- if (drbg == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- rand_drbg_lock(drbg);
- ret = rand_drbg_restart(drbg, NULL, 0, 0);
- rand_drbg_unlock(drbg);
-
- return ret;
-
- } else {
- RAND_POOL *pool = NULL;
-
+ if (!ret) {
/* fill random pool and seed the current legacy RNG */
pool = rand_pool_new(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH, 1,
(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH + 7) / 8,
if (pool == NULL)
return 0;
- if (rand_pool_acquire_entropy(pool) == 0)
+ if (prov_pool_acquire_entropy(pool) == 0)
goto err;
if (meth->add == NULL
goto err;
ret = 1;
-
err:
rand_pool_free(pool);
}
-
- return ret;
-}
-#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
-
-/*
- * Allocate memory and initialize a new random pool
- */
-
-RAND_POOL *rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, int secure,
- size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
-{
- RAND_POOL *pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool));
- size_t min_alloc_size = RAND_POOL_MIN_ALLOCATION(secure);
-
- if (pool == NULL) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- pool->min_len = min_len;
- pool->max_len = (max_len > RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH) ?
- RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH : max_len;
- pool->alloc_len = min_len < min_alloc_size ? min_alloc_size : min_len;
- if (pool->alloc_len > pool->max_len)
- pool->alloc_len = pool->max_len;
-
- if (secure)
- pool->buffer = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(pool->alloc_len);
- else
- pool->buffer = OPENSSL_zalloc(pool->alloc_len);
-
- if (pool->buffer == NULL) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- pool->entropy_requested = entropy_requested;
- pool->secure = secure;
-
- return pool;
-
-err:
- OPENSSL_free(pool);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/*
- * Attach new random pool to the given buffer
- *
- * This function is intended to be used only for feeding random data
- * provided by RAND_add() and RAND_seed() into the <master> DRBG.
- */
-RAND_POOL *rand_pool_attach(const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len,
- size_t entropy)
-{
- RAND_POOL *pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool));
-
- if (pool == NULL) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ATTACH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- /*
- * The const needs to be cast away, but attached buffers will not be
- * modified (in contrary to allocated buffers which are zeroed and
- * freed in the end).
- */
- pool->buffer = (unsigned char *) buffer;
- pool->len = len;
-
- pool->attached = 1;
-
- pool->min_len = pool->max_len = pool->alloc_len = pool->len;
- pool->entropy = entropy;
-
- return pool;
-}
-
-/*
- * Free |pool|, securely erasing its buffer.
- */
-void rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- if (pool == NULL)
- return;
-
- /*
- * Although it would be advisable from a cryptographical viewpoint,
- * we are not allowed to clear attached buffers, since they are passed
- * to rand_pool_attach() as `const unsigned char*`.
- * (see corresponding comment in rand_pool_attach()).
- */
- if (!pool->attached) {
- if (pool->secure)
- OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->alloc_len);
- else
- OPENSSL_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->alloc_len);
- }
-
- OPENSSL_free(pool);
-}
-
-/*
- * Return the |pool|'s buffer to the caller (readonly).
- */
-const unsigned char *rand_pool_buffer(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- return pool->buffer;
-}
-
-/*
- * Return the |pool|'s entropy to the caller.
- */
-size_t rand_pool_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- return pool->entropy;
-}
-
-/*
- * Return the |pool|'s buffer length to the caller.
- */
-size_t rand_pool_length(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- return pool->len;
-}
-
-/*
- * Detach the |pool| buffer and return it to the caller.
- * It's the responsibility of the caller to free the buffer
- * using OPENSSL_secure_clear_free() or to re-attach it
- * again to the pool using rand_pool_reattach().
- */
-unsigned char *rand_pool_detach(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- unsigned char *ret = pool->buffer;
- pool->buffer = NULL;
- pool->entropy = 0;
return ret;
}
-/*
- * Re-attach the |pool| buffer. It is only allowed to pass
- * the |buffer| which was previously detached from the same pool.
- */
-void rand_pool_reattach(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *buffer)
-{
- pool->buffer = buffer;
- OPENSSL_cleanse(pool->buffer, pool->len);
- pool->len = 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * If |entropy_factor| bits contain 1 bit of entropy, how many bytes does one
- * need to obtain at least |bits| bits of entropy?
- */
-#define ENTROPY_TO_BYTES(bits, entropy_factor) \
- (((bits) * (entropy_factor) + 7) / 8)
-
-
-/*
- * Checks whether the |pool|'s entropy is available to the caller.
- * This is the case when entropy count and buffer length are high enough.
- * Returns
- *
- * |entropy| if the entropy count and buffer size is large enough
- * 0 otherwise
- */
-size_t rand_pool_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- if (pool->entropy < pool->entropy_requested)
- return 0;
-
- if (pool->len < pool->min_len)
- return 0;
-
- return pool->entropy;
-}
-
-/*
- * Returns the (remaining) amount of entropy needed to fill
- * the random pool.
- */
-
-size_t rand_pool_entropy_needed(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- if (pool->entropy < pool->entropy_requested)
- return pool->entropy_requested - pool->entropy;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Increase the allocation size -- not usable for an attached pool */
-static int rand_pool_grow(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len)
-{
- if (len > pool->alloc_len - pool->len) {
- unsigned char *p;
- const size_t limit = pool->max_len / 2;
- size_t newlen = pool->alloc_len;
-
- if (pool->attached || len > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_GROW, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- do
- newlen = newlen < limit ? newlen * 2 : pool->max_len;
- while (len > newlen - pool->len);
-
- if (pool->secure)
- p = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(newlen);
- else
- p = OPENSSL_zalloc(newlen);
- if (p == NULL) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_GROW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- memcpy(p, pool->buffer, pool->len);
- if (pool->secure)
- OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->alloc_len);
- else
- OPENSSL_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->alloc_len);
- pool->buffer = p;
- pool->alloc_len = newlen;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Returns the number of bytes needed to fill the pool, assuming
- * the input has 1 / |entropy_factor| entropy bits per data bit.
- * In case of an error, 0 is returned.
- */
-
-size_t rand_pool_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_factor)
-{
- size_t bytes_needed;
- size_t entropy_needed = rand_pool_entropy_needed(pool);
-
- if (entropy_factor < 1) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_BYTES_NEEDED, RAND_R_ARGUMENT_OUT_OF_RANGE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- bytes_needed = ENTROPY_TO_BYTES(entropy_needed, entropy_factor);
-
- if (bytes_needed > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
- /* not enough space left */
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_BYTES_NEEDED, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_OVERFLOW);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (pool->len < pool->min_len &&
- bytes_needed < pool->min_len - pool->len)
- /* to meet the min_len requirement */
- bytes_needed = pool->min_len - pool->len;
-
- /*
- * Make sure the buffer is large enough for the requested amount
- * of data. This guarantees that existing code patterns where
- * rand_pool_add_begin, rand_pool_add_end or rand_pool_add
- * are used to collect entropy data without any error handling
- * whatsoever, continue to be valid.
- * Furthermore if the allocation here fails once, make sure that
- * we don't fall back to a less secure or even blocking random source,
- * as that could happen by the existing code patterns.
- * This is not a concern for additional data, therefore that
- * is not needed if rand_pool_grow fails in other places.
- */
- if (!rand_pool_grow(pool, bytes_needed)) {
- /* persistent error for this pool */
- pool->max_len = pool->len = 0;
- return 0;
- }
-
- return bytes_needed;
-}
-
-/* Returns the remaining number of bytes available */
-size_t rand_pool_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- return pool->max_len - pool->len;
-}
-
-/*
- * Add random bytes to the random pool.
- *
- * It is expected that the |buffer| contains |len| bytes of
- * random input which contains at least |entropy| bits of
- * randomness.
- *
- * Returns 1 if the added amount is adequate, otherwise 0
- */
-int rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool,
- const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy)
-{
- if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD, RAND_R_ENTROPY_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (pool->buffer == NULL) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (len > 0) {
- /*
- * This is to protect us from accidentally passing the buffer
- * returned from rand_pool_add_begin.
- * The check for alloc_len makes sure we do not compare the
- * address of the end of the allocated memory to something
- * different, since that comparison would have an
- * indeterminate result.
- */
- if (pool->alloc_len > pool->len && pool->buffer + pool->len == buffer) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * We have that only for cases when a pool is used to collect
- * additional data.
- * For entropy data, as long as the allocation request stays within
- * the limits given by rand_pool_bytes_needed this rand_pool_grow
- * below is guaranteed to succeed, thus no allocation happens.
- */
- if (!rand_pool_grow(pool, len))
- return 0;
- memcpy(pool->buffer + pool->len, buffer, len);
- pool->len += len;
- pool->entropy += entropy;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Start to add random bytes to the random pool in-place.
- *
- * Reserves the next |len| bytes for adding random bytes in-place
- * and returns a pointer to the buffer.
- * The caller is allowed to copy up to |len| bytes into the buffer.
- * If |len| == 0 this is considered a no-op and a NULL pointer
- * is returned without producing an error message.
- *
- * After updating the buffer, rand_pool_add_end() needs to be called
- * to finish the update operation (see next comment).
- */
-unsigned char *rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len)
-{
- if (len == 0)
- return NULL;
-
- if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD_BEGIN, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_OVERFLOW);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if (pool->buffer == NULL) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD_BEGIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- /*
- * As long as the allocation request stays within the limits given
- * by rand_pool_bytes_needed this rand_pool_grow below is guaranteed
- * to succeed, thus no allocation happens.
- * We have that only for cases when a pool is used to collect
- * additional data. Then the buffer might need to grow here,
- * and of course the caller is responsible to check the return
- * value of this function.
- */
- if (!rand_pool_grow(pool, len))
- return NULL;
-
- return pool->buffer + pool->len;
-}
-
-/*
- * Finish to add random bytes to the random pool in-place.
- *
- * Finishes an in-place update of the random pool started by
- * rand_pool_add_begin() (see previous comment).
- * It is expected that |len| bytes of random input have been added
- * to the buffer which contain at least |entropy| bits of randomness.
- * It is allowed to add less bytes than originally reserved.
- */
-int rand_pool_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy)
-{
- if (len > pool->alloc_len - pool->len) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD_END, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_OVERFLOW);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (len > 0) {
- pool->len += len;
- pool->entropy += entropy;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth)
{
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock);
return 1;
}
-#endif
const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void)
{
-#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
- return NULL;
-#else
const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
tmp_meth = default_RAND_meth;
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock);
return tmp_meth;
-#endif
}
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE)
int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine)
{
const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_engine_lock);
return 1;
}
-#endif
+# endif
void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num)
{
meth->add(buf, num, randomness);
}
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_1_1_0)
+int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+{
+ const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+
+ if (meth != NULL && meth->pseudorand != NULL)
+ return meth->pseudorand(buf, num);
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES, RAND_R_FUNC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+ return -1;
+}
+# endif
+
+int RAND_status(void)
+{
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg;
+ const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+
+ if (meth != NULL && meth != RAND_OpenSSL())
+ return meth->status != NULL ? meth->status() : 0;
+
+ if ((drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master()) == NULL || drbg->rand == NULL)
+ return EVP_RAND_STATE_UNINITIALISED;
+ return EVP_RAND_state(drbg->rand) == EVP_RAND_STATE_READY;
+}
+#else /* !FIPS_MODULE */
+
+const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+#endif /* !FIPS_MODULE */
+
/*
* This function is not part of RAND_METHOD, so if we're not using
* the default method, then just call RAND_bytes(). Otherwise make
{
return RAND_bytes_ex(NULL, buf, num);
}
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_1_1_0) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
-int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
-{
- const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
-
- if (meth != NULL && meth->pseudorand != NULL)
- return meth->pseudorand(buf, num);
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES, RAND_R_FUNC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
- return -1;
-}
-#endif
-
-int RAND_status(void)
-{
- const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
-
- if (meth != NULL && meth->status != NULL)
- return meth->status();
- return 0;
-}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff