* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
*
*/
+#define OPENSSL_FIPSAPI
+
#ifdef MD_RAND_DEBUG
# ifndef NDEBUG
# define NDEBUG
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#endif
#ifdef BN_DEBUG
# define PREDICT
* holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND
* (to prevent double locking) */
/* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */
-static unsigned long locking_thread = 0; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
+static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
#ifdef PREDICT
int rand_predictable=0;
#endif
-const char *RAND_version="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
+const char RAND_version[]="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void);
-static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
-static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
-static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+static int ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
+static int ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
+static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo);
+static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
static int ssleay_rand_status(void);
RAND_METHOD rand_ssleay_meth={
ssleay_rand_seed,
- ssleay_rand_bytes,
+ ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes,
ssleay_rand_cleanup,
ssleay_rand_add,
ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes,
static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void)
{
- memset(state,0,sizeof(state));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(state,sizeof(state));
state_num=0;
state_index=0;
- memset(md,0,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
md_count[0]=0;
md_count[1]=0;
entropy=0;
initialized=0;
}
-static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
+static int ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
{
int i,j,k,st_idx;
long md_c[2];
unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_MD_CTX m;
int do_not_lock;
+ int rv = 0;
/*
* (Based on the rand(3) manpage)
* hash function.
*/
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m);
/* check if we already have the lock */
if (crypto_lock_rand)
{
+ CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- do_not_lock = (locking_thread == CRYPTO_thread_id());
+ do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
}
else
if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m);
for (i=0; i<num; i+=MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)
{
j=(num-i);
j=(j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH:j;
- MD_Init(&m);
- MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ if (!MD_Init(&m))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ goto err;
k=(st_idx+j)-STATE_SIZE;
if (k > 0)
{
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k);
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k);
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k))
+ goto err;
}
else
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j);
-
- MD_Update(&m,buf,j);
- MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
- MD_Final(&m,local_md);
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,buf,j))
+ goto err;
+ /* We know that line may cause programs such as
+ purify and valgrind to complain about use of
+ uninitialized data. The problem is not, it's
+ with the caller. Removing that line will make
+ sure you get really bad randomness and thereby
+ other problems such as very insecure keys. */
+
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Final(&m,local_md))
+ goto err;
md_c[1]++;
buf=(const char *)buf + j;
st_idx=0;
}
}
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
/* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that
* other thread's seeding remains without effect (except for
* the incremented counter). By XORing it we keep at least as
* much entropy as fits into md. */
- for (k = 0; k < sizeof md; k++)
+ for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++)
{
md[k] ^= local_md[k];
}
#if !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]);
#endif
+ rv = 1;
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
+ return rv;
}
-static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
+static int ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
{
- ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, num);
+ return ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, (double)num);
}
-static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
{
static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
int i,j,k,st_num,st_idx;
/* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- locking_thread = CRYPTO_thread_id();
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid);
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
crypto_lock_rand = 1;
/* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
j=(num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2:num;
num-=j;
- MD_Init(&m);
+ if (!MD_Init(&m))
+ goto err;
#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
if (curr_pid) /* just in the first iteration to save time */
{
- MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&curr_pid,sizeof curr_pid);
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&curr_pid,sizeof curr_pid))
+ goto err;
curr_pid = 0;
}
#endif
- MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
-#ifndef PURIFY
- MD_Update(&m,buf,j); /* purify complains */
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)))
+ goto err;
+
+#ifndef PURIFY /* purify complains */
+ /* The following line uses the supplied buffer as a small
+ * source of entropy: since this buffer is often uninitialised
+ * it may cause programs such as purify or valgrind to
+ * complain. So for those builds it is not used: the removal
+ * of such a small source of entropy has negligible impact on
+ * security.
+ */
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,buf,j))
+ goto err;
#endif
+
k=(st_idx+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)-st_num;
if (k > 0)
{
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2-k);
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k);
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2-k))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k))
+ goto err;
}
else
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2);
- MD_Final(&m,local_md);
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Final(&m,local_md))
+ goto err;
for (i=0; i<MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2; i++)
{
}
}
- MD_Init(&m);
- MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
- MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ if (!MD_Init(&m)
+ || !MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c))
+ || !MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ goto err;
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
- MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- MD_Final(&m,md);
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) || !MD_Final(&m,md))
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ goto err;
+ }
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
if (ok)
return(1);
- else
+ else if (pseudo)
+ return 0;
+ else
{
RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES,RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED);
ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, "
"http://www.openssl.org/support/faq.html");
return(0);
}
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ return 0;
+
+ }
+
+static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+ {
+ return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 0);
}
/* pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not
unpredictable */
static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
- int ret;
- unsigned long err;
-
- ret = RAND_bytes(buf, num);
- if (ret == 0)
- {
- err = ERR_peek_error();
- if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_RAND &&
- ERR_GET_REASON(err) == RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED)
- (void)ERR_get_error();
- }
- return (ret);
+ return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 1);
}
static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
{
+ CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
int ret;
int do_not_lock;
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
/* check if we already have the lock
* (could happen if a RAND_poll() implementation calls RAND_status()) */
if (crypto_lock_rand)
{
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- do_not_lock = (locking_thread == CRYPTO_thread_id());
+ do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
}
else
/* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- locking_thread = CRYPTO_thread_id();
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur);
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
crypto_lock_rand = 1;
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff