*
*/
+#define OPENSSL_FIPSAPI
+
#ifdef MD_RAND_DEBUG
# ifndef NDEBUG
# define NDEBUG
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#endif
+
#ifdef BN_DEBUG
# define PREDICT
#endif
const char RAND_version[]="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void);
-static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, size_t num);
-static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, size_t num, double add_entropy);
-static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t num);
-static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t num);
+static int ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
+static int ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
+static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo);
+static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
static int ssleay_rand_status(void);
RAND_METHOD rand_ssleay_meth={
ssleay_rand_seed,
- ssleay_rand_bytes,
+ ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes,
ssleay_rand_cleanup,
ssleay_rand_add,
ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes,
initialized=0;
}
-static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, size_t num, double add)
+static int ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
{
- int i,st_idx;
- ssize_t j,k;
+ int i,j,k,st_idx;
long md_c[2];
unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_MD_CTX m;
int do_not_lock;
+ int rv = 0;
/*
* (Based on the rand(3) manpage)
* hash function.
*/
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m);
/* check if we already have the lock */
if (crypto_lock_rand)
{
if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m);
for (i=0; i<num; i+=MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)
{
j=(num-i);
j=(j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH:j;
- MD_Init(&m);
- MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ if (!MD_Init(&m))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ goto err;
k=(st_idx+j)-STATE_SIZE;
if (k > 0)
{
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k);
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k);
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k))
+ goto err;
}
else
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j);
-
- MD_Update(&m,buf,j);
- MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
- MD_Final(&m,local_md);
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,buf,j))
+ goto err;
+ /* We know that line may cause programs such as
+ purify and valgrind to complain about use of
+ uninitialized data. The problem is not, it's
+ with the caller. Removing that line will make
+ sure you get really bad randomness and thereby
+ other problems such as very insecure keys. */
+
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Final(&m,local_md))
+ goto err;
md_c[1]++;
buf=(const char *)buf + j;
st_idx=0;
}
}
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
/* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that
#if !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]);
#endif
+ rv = 1;
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
+ return rv;
}
-static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, size_t num)
+static int ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
{
- ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, (double)num);
+ return ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, (double)num);
}
-static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t num)
+static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
{
static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
- int i,st_num,st_idx;
- ssize_t j,k;
+ int i,j,k,st_num,st_idx;
int num_ceil;
int ok;
long md_c[2];
/* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
j=(num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2:num;
num-=j;
- MD_Init(&m);
+ if (!MD_Init(&m))
+ goto err;
#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
if (curr_pid) /* just in the first iteration to save time */
{
- MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&curr_pid,sizeof curr_pid);
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&curr_pid,sizeof curr_pid))
+ goto err;
curr_pid = 0;
}
#endif
- MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
-#ifndef PURIFY
- MD_Update(&m,buf,j); /* purify complains */
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)))
+ goto err;
+
+#ifndef PURIFY /* purify complains */
+ /* The following line uses the supplied buffer as a small
+ * source of entropy: since this buffer is often uninitialised
+ * it may cause programs such as purify or valgrind to
+ * complain. So for those builds it is not used: the removal
+ * of such a small source of entropy has negligible impact on
+ * security.
+ */
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,buf,j))
+ goto err;
#endif
+
k=(st_idx+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)-st_num;
if (k > 0)
{
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2-k);
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k);
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2-k))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k))
+ goto err;
}
else
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2);
- MD_Final(&m,local_md);
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Final(&m,local_md))
+ goto err;
for (i=0; i<MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2; i++)
{
}
}
- MD_Init(&m);
- MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
- MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ if (!MD_Init(&m)
+ || !MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c))
+ || !MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ goto err;
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
- MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- MD_Final(&m,md);
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) || !MD_Final(&m,md))
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ goto err;
+ }
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
if (ok)
return(1);
- else
+ else if (pseudo)
+ return 0;
+ else
{
RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES,RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED);
ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, "
"http://www.openssl.org/support/faq.html");
return(0);
}
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ return 0;
+
+ }
+
+static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+ {
+ return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 0);
}
/* pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not
unpredictable */
-static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t num)
+static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
- int ret;
- unsigned long err;
-
- ret = RAND_bytes(buf, num);
- if (ret == 0)
- {
- err = ERR_peek_error();
- if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_RAND &&
- ERR_GET_REASON(err) == RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED)
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
- return (ret);
+ return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 1);
}
static int ssleay_rand_status(void)