/*
- * Copyright 2011-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2011-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
+/*
+ * RAND_DRBG_set is deprecated for public use, but still ok for
+ * internal use.
+ */
+#include "internal/deprecated.h"
+
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include "rand_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include "rand_local.h"
#include "internal/thread_once.h"
-#include "internal/rand_int.h"
+#include "crypto/rand.h"
+#include "crypto/cryptlib.h"
/*
- * Support framework for NIST SP 800-90A DRBG, AES-CTR mode.
- * The RAND_DRBG is OpenSSL's pointer to an instance of the DRBG.
+ * Support framework for NIST SP 800-90A DRBG
+ *
+ * See manual page RAND_DRBG(7) for a general overview.
*
* The OpenSSL model is to have new and free functions, and that new
* does all initialization. That is not the NIST model, which has
* a much bigger deal than just re-setting an allocated resource.)
*/
+
+typedef struct drbg_global_st {
+ /*
+ * The three shared DRBG instances
+ *
+ * There are three shared DRBG instances: <master>, <public>, and <private>.
+ */
+ CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+
+ /*
+ * The <master> DRBG
+ *
+ * Not used directly by the application, only for reseeding the two other
+ * DRBGs. It reseeds itself by pulling either randomness from os entropy
+ * sources or by consuming randomness which was added by RAND_add().
+ *
+ * The <master> DRBG is a global instance which is accessed concurrently by
+ * all threads. The necessary locking is managed automatically by its child
+ * DRBG instances during reseeding.
+ */
+ RAND_DRBG *master_drbg;
+ /*
+ * The <public> DRBG
+ *
+ * Used by default for generating random bytes using RAND_bytes().
+ *
+ * The <public> DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per
+ * thread.
+ */
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL public_drbg;
+ /*
+ * The <private> DRBG
+ *
+ * Used by default for generating private keys using RAND_priv_bytes()
+ *
+ * The <private> DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per
+ * thread.
+ */
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL private_drbg;
+} DRBG_GLOBAL;
+
+#define RAND_DRBG_TYPE_FLAGS ( \
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE )
+
+#define RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER 0
+#define RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC 1
+#define RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE 2
+
+/* Defaults */
+static int rand_drbg_type[3] = {
+ RAND_DRBG_TYPE, /* Master */
+ RAND_DRBG_TYPE, /* Public */
+ RAND_DRBG_TYPE /* Private */
+};
+static unsigned int rand_drbg_flags[3] = {
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAGS | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER, /* Master */
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAGS | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC, /* Public */
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAGS | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE /* Private */
+};
+
+static unsigned int master_reseed_interval = MASTER_RESEED_INTERVAL;
+static unsigned int slave_reseed_interval = SLAVE_RESEED_INTERVAL;
+
+static time_t master_reseed_time_interval = MASTER_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL;
+static time_t slave_reseed_time_interval = SLAVE_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL;
+
+/* A logical OR of all used DRBG flag bits (currently there is only one) */
+static const unsigned int rand_drbg_used_flags =
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC | RAND_DRBG_TYPE_FLAGS;
+
+
+static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_DRBG *parent, int drbg_type);
+
+static int get_drbg_params(int type, unsigned int flags, const char **name,
+ OSSL_PARAM params[3])
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM *p = params;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case 0:
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+
+#define CTR(v) \
+ *name = "CTR-DRBG"; \
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_CIPHER, v, 0)
+
+ case NID_aes_128_ctr:
+ CTR(SN_aes_128_ctr);
+ break;
+ case NID_aes_192_ctr:
+ CTR(SN_aes_192_ctr);
+ break;
+ case NID_aes_256_ctr:
+ CTR(SN_aes_256_ctr);
+ break;
+
+#define DGST(v) \
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_DIGEST, v, 0); \
+ if ((flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC) == 0) { \
+ *name = "HASH-DRBG"; \
+ } else { \
+ *name = "HMAC-DRBG"; \
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAC, \
+ SN_hmac, 0); \
+ }
+
+ case NID_sha1:
+ DGST(SN_sha1);
+ break;
+ case NID_sha224:
+ DGST(SN_sha224);
+ break;
+ case NID_sha256:
+ DGST(SN_sha256);
+ break;
+ case NID_sha384:
+ DGST(SN_sha384);
+ break;
+ case NID_sha512:
+ DGST(SN_sha512);
+ break;
+ case NID_sha512_224:
+ DGST(SN_sha512_224);
+ break;
+ case NID_sha512_256:
+ DGST(SN_sha512_256);
+ break;
+ case NID_sha3_224:
+ DGST(SN_sha3_224);
+ break;
+ case NID_sha3_256:
+ DGST(SN_sha3_256);
+ break;
+ case NID_sha3_384:
+ DGST(SN_sha3_384);
+ break;
+ case NID_sha3_512:
+ DGST(SN_sha3_512);
+ }
+ *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+ return 1;
+}
+
/*
- * THE THREE SHARED DRBGs
- *
- * There are three shared DRBGs (master, public and private), which are
- * accessed concurrently by all threads.
- *
- * THE MASTER DRBG
- *
- * Not used directly by the application, only for reseeding the two other
- * DRBGs. It reseeds itself by pulling either randomness from os entropy
- * sources or by consuming randomnes which was added by RAND_add()
- */
-static RAND_DRBG *drbg_master;
-/*
- * THE PUBLIC DRBG
- *
- * Used by default for generating random bytes using RAND_bytes().
+ * Initialize the OPENSSL_CTX global DRBGs on first use.
+ * Returns the allocated global data on success or NULL on failure.
*/
-static RAND_DRBG *drbg_public;
+static void *drbg_ossl_ctx_new(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx)
+{
+ DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dgbl));
+
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ /*
+ * We need to ensure that base libcrypto thread handling has been
+ * initialised.
+ */
+ OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL);
+#endif
+
+ dgbl->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+ if (dgbl->lock == NULL)
+ goto err0;
+
+ if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&dgbl->private_drbg, NULL))
+ goto err1;
+
+ if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&dgbl->public_drbg, NULL))
+ goto err2;
+
+ return dgbl;
+
+ err2:
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
+ err1:
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(dgbl->lock);
+ err0:
+ OPENSSL_free(dgbl);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void drbg_ossl_ctx_free(void *vdgbl)
+{
+ DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = vdgbl;
+
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(dgbl->lock);
+ RAND_DRBG_free(dgbl->master_drbg);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->public_drbg);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(dgbl);
+}
+
+static const OPENSSL_CTX_METHOD drbg_ossl_ctx_method = {
+ drbg_ossl_ctx_new,
+ drbg_ossl_ctx_free,
+};
+
+static DRBG_GLOBAL *drbg_get_global(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx)
+{
+ return openssl_ctx_get_data(libctx, OPENSSL_CTX_DRBG_INDEX,
+ &drbg_ossl_ctx_method);
+}
+
/*
- * THE PRIVATE DRBG
- *
- * Used by default for generating private keys using RAND_priv_bytes()
- */
-static RAND_DRBG *drbg_private;
-/*+
- * DRBG HIERARCHY
- *
- * In addition there are DRBGs, which are not shared, but used only by a
- * single thread at every time, for example the DRBGs which are owned by
- * an SSL context. All DRBGs are organized in a hierarchical fashion
- * with the <master> DRBG as root.
+ * Set the |drbg|'s callback data pointer for the entropy and nonce callbacks
*
- * This gives the following overall picture:
+ * The ownership of the context data remains with the caller,
+ * i.e., it is the caller's responsibility to keep it available as long
+ * as it is need by the callbacks and free it after use.
*
- * <os entropy sources>
- * |
- * RAND_add() ==> <master> \
- * / \ | shared DRBGs (with locking)
- * <public> <private> /
- * |
- * <ssl> owned by an SSL context
+ * Setting the callback data is allowed only if the drbg has not been
+ * initialized yet. Otherwise, the operation will fail.
*
- * AUTOMATIC RESEEDING
- *
- * Before satisfying a generate request, a DRBG reseeds itself automatically,
- * if one of the following two conditions holds:
- *
- * - the number of generate requests since the last reseeding exceeds a
- * certain threshold, the so called |reseed_interval|. This behaviour
- * can be disabled by setting the |reseed_interval| to 0.
- *
- * - the time elapsed since the last reseeding exceeds a certain time
- * interval, the so called |reseed_time_interval|. This behaviour
- * can be disabled by setting the |reseed_time_interval| to 0.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
+ */
+int RAND_DRBG_set_callback_data(RAND_DRBG *drbg, void *data)
+{
+ if (EVP_RAND_state(drbg->rand) != EVP_RAND_STATE_UNINITIALISED
+ || drbg->parent != NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ drbg->callback_data = data;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Retrieve the callback data pointer */
+void *RAND_DRBG_get_callback_data(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
+{
+ return drbg->callback_data;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set/initialize |drbg| to be of type |type|, with optional |flags|.
*
- * MANUAL RESEEDING
+ * If |type| and |flags| are zero, use the defaults
*
- * For the three shared DRBGs (and only for these) there is another way to
- * reseed them manually by calling RAND_seed() (or RAND_add() with a positive
- * |randomness| argument). This will immediately reseed the <master> DRBG.
- * The <public> and <private> DRBG will detect this on their next generate
- * call and reseed, pulling randomness from <master>.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
*/
+int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM params[6], *p = params;
+ unsigned int reseed_interval;
+ time_t reseed_time_interval;
+ const char *name = NULL;
+ EVP_RAND *rand;
+ EVP_RAND_CTX *pctx;
+ int use_df;
+
+ if (type == 0 && flags == 0) {
+ type = rand_drbg_type[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER];
+ flags = rand_drbg_flags[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER];
+ }
+
+ if (drbg->parent == NULL) {
+ reseed_interval = master_reseed_interval;
+ reseed_time_interval = master_reseed_time_interval;
+ } else {
+ reseed_interval = slave_reseed_interval;
+ reseed_time_interval = slave_reseed_time_interval;
+ }
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_REQUESTS,
+ &reseed_interval);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_time_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL,
+ &reseed_time_interval);
+ use_df = (flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF) == 0;
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_USE_DF, &use_df);
+
+ if (!get_drbg_params(type, flags, &name, p)) {
+ RANDerr(0, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ rand = EVP_RAND_fetch(drbg->libctx, name, NULL);
+ if (rand == NULL) {
+ RANDerr(0, RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED);
+ return 0;
+ }
-/* NIST SP 800-90A DRBG recommends the use of a personalization string. */
-static const char ossl_pers_string[] = "OpenSSL NIST SP 800-90A DRBG";
+ EVP_RAND_CTX_free(drbg->rand);
+ drbg->rand = NULL;
-static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_drbg_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+ drbg->flags = flags;
+ drbg->type = type;
-static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(RAND_DRBG *parent);
-static void drbg_cleanup(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
+ pctx = drbg->parent != NULL ? drbg->parent->rand : NULL;
+ drbg->rand = EVP_RAND_CTX_new(rand, pctx);
+ EVP_RAND_free(rand);
+ if (drbg->rand == NULL) {
+ RANDerr(0, RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!EVP_RAND_set_ctx_params(drbg->rand, params)) {
+ RANDerr(0, RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ return 1;
+err:
+ EVP_RAND_CTX_free(drbg->rand);
+ drbg->rand = NULL;
+ drbg->type = 0;
+ drbg->flags = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
/*
- * Set/initialize |drbg| to be of type |nid|, with optional |flags|.
+ * Set/initialize default |type| and |flag| for new drbg instances.
*
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
*/
-int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int nid, unsigned int flags)
+int RAND_DRBG_set_defaults(int type, unsigned int flags)
{
- int ret = 1;
+ int all;
+ const char *name;
+ OSSL_PARAM params[3];
- drbg->state = DRBG_UNINITIALISED;
- drbg->flags = flags;
- drbg->nid = nid;
+ if (!get_drbg_params(type, flags, &name, params)) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET_DEFAULTS, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
- switch (nid) {
- default:
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE);
+ if ((flags & ~rand_drbg_used_flags) != 0) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET_DEFAULTS, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_FLAGS);
return 0;
- case 0:
- /* Uninitialized; that's okay. */
- return 1;
- case NID_aes_128_ctr:
- case NID_aes_192_ctr:
- case NID_aes_256_ctr:
- ret = drbg_ctr_init(drbg);
- break;
}
- if (ret == 0)
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG);
- return ret;
+ all = ((flags & RAND_DRBG_TYPE_FLAGS) == 0);
+ if (all || (flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER) != 0) {
+ rand_drbg_type[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER] = type;
+ rand_drbg_flags[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER] = flags | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER;
+ }
+ if (all || (flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC) != 0) {
+ rand_drbg_type[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC] = type;
+ rand_drbg_flags[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC] = flags | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC;
+ }
+ if (all || (flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE) != 0) {
+ rand_drbg_type[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE] = type;
+ rand_drbg_flags[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE] = flags | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE;
+ }
+ return 1;
}
+
/*
- * Allocate memory and initialize a new DRBG. The |parent|, if not
- * NULL, will be used to auto-seed this RAND_DRBG as needed.
+ * Allocate memory and initialize a new DRBG.
+ * The |parent|, if not NULL, will be used as random source for reseeding.
*
* Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure.
*/
-RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
+static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int type,
+ unsigned int flags,
+ RAND_DRBG *parent)
{
RAND_DRBG *drbg = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg));
if (drbg == NULL) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
+ return NULL;
}
- drbg->fork_count = rand_fork_count;
+
+ drbg->libctx = ctx;
drbg->parent = parent;
- if (RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, type, flags) == 0)
- goto err;
- if (!RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, rand_drbg_get_entropy,
- rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy,
- NULL, NULL))
+ if (RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, type, flags) == 0)
goto err;
return drbg;
-err:
- OPENSSL_free(drbg);
+ err:
+ RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
+
return NULL;
}
+RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, int type, unsigned int flags,
+ RAND_DRBG *parent)
+{
+ return rand_drbg_new(ctx, type, flags, parent);
+}
+
+RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
+{
+ return RAND_DRBG_new_ex(NULL, type, flags, parent);
+}
+
/*
* Uninstantiate |drbg| and free all memory.
*/
if (drbg == NULL)
return;
- if (drbg->meth != NULL)
- drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg);
- CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DRBG, drbg, &drbg->ex_data);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(*drbg));
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RAND_DRBG, drbg, &drbg->ex_data);
+ EVP_RAND_CTX_free(drbg->rand);
+ OPENSSL_free(drbg);
}
/*
int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen)
{
- unsigned char *nonce = NULL, *entropy = NULL;
- size_t noncelen = 0, entropylen = 0;
-
- if (perslen > drbg->max_perslen) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
- RAND_R_PERSONALISATION_STRING_TOO_LONG);
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (drbg->meth == NULL)
- {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
- RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED);
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
- drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR ? RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE
- : RAND_R_ALREADY_INSTANTIATED);
- goto end;
- }
-
- drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
- if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL)
- entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
- drbg->min_entropylen, drbg->max_entropylen);
- if (entropylen < drbg->min_entropylen
- || entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (drbg->max_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce != NULL) {
- noncelen = drbg->get_nonce(drbg, &nonce, drbg->strength / 2,
- drbg->min_noncelen, drbg->max_noncelen);
- if (noncelen < drbg->min_noncelen || noncelen > drbg->max_noncelen) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
- RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE);
- goto end;
- }
- }
-
- if (!drbg->meth->instantiate(drbg, entropy, entropylen,
- nonce, noncelen, pers, perslen)) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG);
- goto end;
- }
-
- drbg->state = DRBG_READY;
- drbg->generate_counter = 0;
- drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL);
- if (drbg->reseed_counter > 0) {
- if (drbg->parent == NULL)
- drbg->reseed_counter++;
- else
- drbg->reseed_counter = drbg->parent->reseed_counter;
- }
-
-end:
- if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
- drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
- if (nonce != NULL && drbg->cleanup_nonce!= NULL )
- drbg->cleanup_nonce(drbg, nonce, noncelen);
- if (drbg->pool != NULL) {
- if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
- RAND_R_ERROR_ENTROPY_POOL_WAS_IGNORED);
- drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
- }
- RAND_POOL_free(drbg->pool);
- drbg->pool = NULL;
- }
- if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY)
- return 1;
- return 0;
+ return EVP_RAND_instantiate(drbg->rand, EVP_RAND_strength(drbg->rand), 0,
+ pers, perslen);
}
/*
*/
int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
{
- if (drbg->meth == NULL)
- {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_UNINSTANTIATE,
- RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED);
+ int index = -1, type, flags;
+
+ if (!EVP_RAND_uninstantiate(drbg->rand))
return 0;
- }
- /* Clear the entire drbg->ctr struct, then reset some important
- * members of the drbg->ctr struct (e.g. keysize, df_ks) to their
- * initial values.
- */
- drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg);
- return RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, drbg->nid, drbg->flags);
+ /* The reset uses the default values for type and flags */
+ if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER)
+ index = RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER;
+ else if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE)
+ index = RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE;
+ else if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC)
+ index = RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC;
+
+ if (index != -1) {
+ flags = rand_drbg_flags[index];
+ type = rand_drbg_type[index];
+ } else {
+ flags = drbg->flags;
+ type = drbg->type;
+ }
+ return RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, type, flags);
}
/*
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
*/
int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
- const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
+ const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen,
+ int prediction_resistance)
{
- unsigned char *entropy = NULL;
- size_t entropylen = 0;
-
- if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
- return 0;
- }
- if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (adin == NULL)
- adinlen = 0;
- else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
- return 0;
- }
-
- drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
- if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL)
- entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
- drbg->min_entropylen, drbg->max_entropylen);
- if (entropylen < drbg->min_entropylen
- || entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (!drbg->meth->reseed(drbg, entropy, entropylen, adin, adinlen))
- goto end;
-
- drbg->state = DRBG_READY;
- drbg->generate_counter = 0;
- drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL);
- if (drbg->reseed_counter > 0) {
- if (drbg->parent == NULL)
- drbg->reseed_counter++;
- else
- drbg->reseed_counter = drbg->parent->reseed_counter;
- }
-
-end:
- if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
- drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
- if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY)
- return 1;
- return 0;
+ return EVP_RAND_reseed(drbg->rand, prediction_resistance, NULL, 0,
+ adin, adinlen);
}
/*
- * Restart |drbg|, using the specified entropy or additional input
- *
- * Tries its best to get the drbg instantiated by all means,
- * regardless of its current state.
+ * Generate |outlen| bytes into the buffer at |out|. Reseed if we need
+ * to or if |prediction_resistance| is set. Additional input can be
+ * sent in |adin| and |adinlen|.
*
- * Optionally, a |buffer| of |len| random bytes can be passed,
- * which is assumed to contain at least |entropy| bits of entropy.
+ * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
*
- * If |entropy| > 0, the buffer content is used as entropy input.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
*
- * If |entropy| == 0, the buffer content is used as additional input
+ */
+int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
+ int prediction_resistance,
+ const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
+{
+ return EVP_RAND_generate(drbg->rand, out, outlen, 0,
+ prediction_resistance, adin, adinlen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generates |outlen| random bytes and stores them in |out|. It will
+ * using the given |drbg| to generate the bytes.
*
- * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
+ * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
*
- * This function is used internally only.
+ * Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
*/
-int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
- const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy)
+int RAND_DRBG_bytes(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
{
- int reseeded = 0;
- const unsigned char *adin = NULL;
- size_t adinlen = 0;
+ return EVP_RAND_generate(drbg->rand, out, outlen, 0, 0, NULL, 0);
+}
- if (drbg->pool != NULL) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- RAND_POOL_free(drbg->pool);
- drbg->pool = NULL;
- }
+/* DRBG call back shims */
+static int rand_drbg_get_entroy_cb(const OSSL_PARAM *params, OSSL_PARAM *out,
+ void *vdrbg)
+{
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg = (RAND_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+ int entropy = 0, prediction_resistance = 0;
+ size_t min_len = 0, max_len = 2048;
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ OSSL_PARAM *q;
- if (buffer != NULL) {
- if (entropy > 0) {
- if (drbg->max_entropylen < len) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART,
- RAND_R_ENTROPY_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (entropy > 8 * len) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, RAND_R_ENTROPY_OUT_OF_RANGE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* will be picked up by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback */
- drbg->pool = RAND_POOL_new(entropy, len, len);
- if (drbg->pool == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- RAND_POOL_add(drbg->pool, buffer, len, entropy);
- } else {
- if (drbg->max_adinlen < len) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART,
- RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
- return 0;
- }
- adin = buffer;
- adinlen = len;
- }
- }
+ if (drbg->get_entropy == NULL)
+ return 0;
- /* repair error state */
- if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR)
- RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg);
-
- /* repair uninitialized state */
- if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
- /* reinstantiate drbg */
- RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg,
- (const unsigned char *) ossl_pers_string,
- sizeof(ossl_pers_string) - 1);
- /* already reseeded. prevent second reseeding below */
- reseeded = (drbg->state == DRBG_READY);
- }
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_ENTROPY_REQUIRED);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &entropy))
+ return 0;
- /* refresh current state if entropy or additional input has been provided */
- if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY) {
- if (adin != NULL) {
- /*
- * mix in additional input without reseeding
- *
- * Similar to RAND_DRBG_reseed(), but the provided additional
- * data |adin| is mixed into the current state without pulling
- * entropy from the trusted entropy source using get_entropy().
- * This is not a reseeding in the strict sense of NIST SP 800-90A.
- */
- drbg->meth->reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0);
- } else if (reseeded == 0) {
- /* do a full reseeding if it has not been done yet above */
- RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, NULL, 0);
- }
- }
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_PREDICTION_RESISTANCE);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &prediction_resistance))
+ return 0;
- /* check whether a given entropy pool was cleared properly during reseed */
- if (drbg->pool != NULL) {
- drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- RAND_POOL_free(drbg->pool);
- drbg->pool = NULL;
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_LENGTH);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &max_len))
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MIN_LENGTH);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &min_len))
+ return 0;
+
+ q = OSSL_PARAM_locate(out, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RANDOM_DATA);
+ if (q == NULL || q->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_PTR || q->data == NULL)
return 0;
- }
- return drbg->state == DRBG_READY;
+ q->return_size = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, (unsigned char **)q->data, entropy,
+ min_len, max_len, prediction_resistance);
+ return 1;
}
-/*
- * Generate |outlen| bytes into the buffer at |out|. Reseed if we need
- * to or if |prediction_resistance| is set. Additional input can be
- * sent in |adin| and |adinlen|.
- *
- * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
- *
- * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
- *
- */
-int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
- int prediction_resistance,
- const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
+static int rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy_cb(const OSSL_PARAM *params, void *vdrbg)
{
- int reseed_required = 0;
-
- if (drbg->state != DRBG_READY) {
- /* try to recover from previous errors */
- rand_drbg_restart(drbg, NULL, 0, 0);
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg = (RAND_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ size_t sz;
- if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
- return 0;
- }
- if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED);
- return 0;
- }
- }
+ if (drbg->cleanup_entropy == NULL)
+ return 0;
- if (outlen > drbg->max_request) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE_FOR_DRBG);
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_SIZE);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &sz))
return 0;
- }
- if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RANDOM_DATA);
+ if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_PTR)
return 0;
- }
- if (drbg->fork_count != rand_fork_count) {
- drbg->fork_count = rand_fork_count;
- reseed_required = 1;
- }
+ drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, p->data, sz);
+ return 1;
+}
- if (drbg->reseed_interval > 0) {
- if (drbg->generate_counter >= drbg->reseed_interval)
- reseed_required = 1;
- }
- if (drbg->reseed_time_interval > 0) {
- time_t now = time(NULL);
- if (now < drbg->reseed_time
- || now - drbg->reseed_time >= drbg->reseed_time_interval)
- reseed_required = 1;
- }
- if (drbg->reseed_counter > 0 && drbg->parent != NULL) {
- if (drbg->reseed_counter != drbg->parent->reseed_counter)
- reseed_required = 1;
- }
+static int rand_drbg_get_nonce_cb(const OSSL_PARAM *params, OSSL_PARAM *out,
+ void *vdrbg)
+{
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg = (RAND_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+ int entropy = 0;
+ size_t min_len = 0, max_len = 10240;
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ OSSL_PARAM *q;
- if (reseed_required || prediction_resistance) {
- if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen)) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- adin = NULL;
- adinlen = 0;
- }
+ if (drbg->get_nonce == NULL)
+ return 0;
- if (!drbg->meth->generate(drbg, out, outlen, adin, adinlen)) {
- drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_GENERATE_ERROR);
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_ENTROPY_REQUIRED);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &entropy))
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_LENGTH);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &max_len))
return 0;
- }
- drbg->generate_counter++;
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MIN_LENGTH);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &min_len))
+ return 0;
+ q = OSSL_PARAM_locate(out, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RANDOM_DATA);
+ if (q == NULL || q->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_PTR || q->data == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ q->return_size = drbg->get_nonce(drbg, (unsigned char **)q->data, entropy,
+ min_len, max_len);
return 1;
}
-/*
- * Generates |outlen| random bytes and stores them in |out|. It will
- * using the given |drbg| to generate the bytes.
- *
- * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
- *
- * Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
- */
-int RAND_DRBG_bytes(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
+static int rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce_cb(const OSSL_PARAM *params, void *vdrbg)
{
- unsigned char *additional = NULL;
- size_t additional_len;
- size_t chunk;
- size_t ret;
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg = (RAND_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ size_t sz;
- additional_len = rand_drbg_get_additional_data(&additional, drbg->max_adinlen);
+ if (drbg->cleanup_nonce == NULL)
+ return 0;
- for ( ; outlen > 0; outlen -= chunk, out += chunk) {
- chunk = outlen;
- if (chunk > drbg->max_request)
- chunk = drbg->max_request;
- ret = RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, out, chunk, 0, additional, additional_len);
- if (!ret)
- goto err;
- }
- ret = 1;
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_SIZE);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &sz))
+ return 0;
-err:
- if (additional_len != 0)
- OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(additional, additional_len);
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RANDOM_DATA);
+ if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_PTR)
+ return 0;
- return ret;
+ drbg->cleanup_nonce(drbg, p->data, sz);
+ return 1;
}
/*
* Set the RAND_DRBG callbacks for obtaining entropy and nonce.
*
- * In the following, the signature and the semantics of the
- * get_entropy() and cleanup_entropy() callbacks are explained.
- *
- * GET_ENTROPY
- *
- * size_t get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *ctx,
- * unsigned char **pout,
- * int entropy,
- * size_t min_len, size_t max_len);
- *
- * This is a request to allocate and fill a buffer of size
- * |min_len| <= size <= |max_len| (in bytes) which contains
- * at least |entropy| bits of randomness. The buffer's address is
- * to be returned in |*pout| and the number of collected
- * randomness bytes (which may be less than the allocated size
- * of the buffer) as return value.
- *
- * If the callback fails to acquire at least |entropy| bits of
- * randomness, it shall return a buffer length of 0.
- *
- * CLEANUP_ENTROPY
- *
- * void cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *ctx,
- * unsigned char *out, size_t outlen);
- *
- * A request to clear and free the buffer allocated by get_entropy().
- * The values |out| and |outlen| are expected to be the random buffer's
- * address and length, as returned by the get_entropy() callback.
+ * Setting the callbacks is allowed only if the drbg has not been
+ * initialized yet. Otherwise, the operation will fail.
*
- * GET_NONCE, CLEANUP_NONCE
- *
- * Signature and semantics of the get_nonce() and cleanup_nonce()
- * callbacks are analogous to get_entropy() and cleanup_entropy().
- * Currently, the nonce is used only for the known answer tests.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
*/
int RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
RAND_DRBG_get_entropy_fn get_entropy,
RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn get_nonce,
RAND_DRBG_cleanup_nonce_fn cleanup_nonce)
{
- if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED)
+ EVP_RAND_CTX *rand = drbg->rand;
+ OSSL_INOUT_CALLBACK *g_ent = NULL, *g_nonce = NULL;
+ OSSL_CALLBACK *c_ent = NULL, *c_nonce = NULL;
+
+ if (get_entropy != NULL) {
+ g_ent = &rand_drbg_get_entroy_cb;
+ c_ent = &rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy_cb;
+ }
+ if (get_nonce != NULL) {
+ g_nonce = rand_drbg_get_nonce_cb;
+ c_nonce = rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce_cb;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_RAND_set_callbacks(rand, g_ent, c_ent, g_nonce, c_nonce, drbg))
return 0;
- drbg->get_entropy = get_entropy;
- drbg->cleanup_entropy = cleanup_entropy;
- drbg->get_nonce = get_nonce;
- drbg->cleanup_nonce = cleanup_nonce;
+
+ drbg->get_entropy = g_ent != NULL ? get_entropy : NULL;
+ drbg->cleanup_entropy = c_ent != NULL ? cleanup_entropy : NULL;
+ drbg->get_nonce = g_nonce != NULL ? get_nonce : NULL;
+ drbg->cleanup_nonce = c_nonce != NULL ? cleanup_nonce : NULL;
return 1;
}
*/
int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_interval(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned int interval)
{
+ OSSL_PARAM params[2] = { OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END };
+
if (interval > MAX_RESEED_INTERVAL)
return 0;
- drbg->reseed_interval = interval;
- return 1;
+ params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_REQUESTS,
+ &interval);
+ return EVP_RAND_set_ctx_params(drbg->rand, params);
}
/*
*/
int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_time_interval(RAND_DRBG *drbg, time_t interval)
{
+ OSSL_PARAM params[2] = { OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END };
+
if (interval > MAX_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL)
return 0;
- drbg->reseed_time_interval = interval;
+ params[0] =
+ OSSL_PARAM_construct_time_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL,
+ &interval);
+ return EVP_RAND_set_ctx_params(drbg->rand, params);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the default values for reseed (time) intervals of new DRBG instances
+ *
+ * The default values can be set independently for master DRBG instances
+ * (without a parent) and slave DRBG instances (with parent).
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
+ */
+
+int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_defaults(
+ unsigned int _master_reseed_interval,
+ unsigned int _slave_reseed_interval,
+ time_t _master_reseed_time_interval,
+ time_t _slave_reseed_time_interval
+ )
+{
+ if (_master_reseed_interval > MAX_RESEED_INTERVAL
+ || _slave_reseed_interval > MAX_RESEED_INTERVAL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (_master_reseed_time_interval > MAX_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL
+ || _slave_reseed_time_interval > MAX_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL)
+ return 0;
+
+ master_reseed_interval = _master_reseed_interval;
+ slave_reseed_interval = _slave_reseed_interval;
+
+ master_reseed_time_interval = _master_reseed_time_interval;
+ slave_reseed_time_interval = _slave_reseed_time_interval;
+
return 1;
}
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&drbg->ex_data, idx);
}
-
/*
* The following functions provide a RAND_METHOD that works on the
* global DRBG. They lock.
*
* Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure.
*/
-static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(RAND_DRBG *parent)
+static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_DRBG *parent, int drbg_type)
{
RAND_DRBG *drbg;
- drbg = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(RAND_DRBG));
+ drbg = RAND_DRBG_new_ex(ctx, rand_drbg_type[drbg_type],
+ rand_drbg_flags[drbg_type], parent);
if (drbg == NULL)
return NULL;
- drbg->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
- if (drbg->lock == NULL) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_DRBG_SETUP, RAND_R_FAILED_TO_CREATE_LOCK);
+ /* Only the master DRBG needs to have a lock */
+ if (parent == NULL && EVP_RAND_enable_locking(drbg->rand) == 0)
goto err;
- }
-
- if (RAND_DRBG_set(drbg,
- RAND_DRBG_NID, RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF) != 1)
- goto err;
- if (RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, rand_drbg_get_entropy,
- rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy, NULL, NULL) != 1)
- goto err;
-
- if (parent == NULL) {
- drbg->reseed_interval = MASTER_RESEED_INTERVAL;
- drbg->reseed_time_interval = MASTER_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL;
- } else {
- drbg->parent = parent;
- drbg->reseed_interval = SLAVE_RESEED_INTERVAL;
- drbg->reseed_time_interval = SLAVE_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL;
- }
-
- /* enable seed propagation */
- drbg->reseed_counter = 1;
/*
- * Ignore instantiation error so support just-in-time instantiation.
+ * Ignore instantiation error to support just-in-time instantiation.
*
* The state of the drbg will be checked in RAND_DRBG_generate() and
* an automatic recovery is attempted.
*/
- RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg,
- (const unsigned char *) ossl_pers_string,
- sizeof(ossl_pers_string) - 1);
+ (void)RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, NULL, 0);
return drbg;
err:
- drbg_cleanup(drbg);
+ RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
return NULL;
}
-/*
- * Initialize the global DRBGs on first use.
- * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
- */
-DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_drbg_init)
-{
- /*
- * ensure that libcrypto is initialized, otherwise the
- * DRBG locks are not cleaned up properly
- */
- if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL))
- return 0;
-
- drbg_master = drbg_setup(NULL);
- drbg_public = drbg_setup(drbg_master);
- drbg_private = drbg_setup(drbg_master);
-
- if (drbg_master == NULL || drbg_public == NULL || drbg_private == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* Cleans up the given global DRBG */
-static void drbg_cleanup(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
+static void drbg_delete_thread_state(void *arg)
{
- if (drbg != NULL) {
- RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg);
- CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(drbg->lock);
- OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(RAND_DRBG));
- }
-}
+ OPENSSL_CTX *ctx = arg;
+ DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg;
-/* Clean up the global DRBGs before exit */
-void rand_drbg_cleanup_int(void)
-{
- drbg_cleanup(drbg_private);
- drbg_cleanup(drbg_public);
- drbg_cleanup(drbg_master);
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
+ return;
+ drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->public_drbg);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->public_drbg, NULL);
+ RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
- drbg_private = drbg_public = drbg_master = NULL;
+ drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->private_drbg, NULL);
+ RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
}
/* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_bytes() method */
if (drbg == NULL)
return 0;
- CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->lock);
ret = RAND_DRBG_bytes(drbg, out, count);
- CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->lock);
return ret;
}
/* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_add() method */
static int drbg_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness)
{
- int ret = 0;
RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master();
- if (drbg == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- if (num < 0 || randomness < 0.0)
+ if (drbg == NULL || num <= 0)
return 0;
- if (randomness > (double)drbg->max_entropylen) {
- /*
- * The purpose of this check is to bound |randomness| by a
- * relatively small value in order to prevent an integer
- * overflow when multiplying by 8 in the rand_drbg_restart()
- * call below.
- */
- return 0;
- }
-
- CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->lock);
- ret = rand_drbg_restart(drbg, buf,
- (size_t)(unsigned int)num,
- (size_t)(8*randomness));
- CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->lock);
-
- return ret;
+ return EVP_RAND_reseed(drbg->rand, 0, NULL, 0, buf, num);
}
/* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_seed() method */
if (drbg == NULL)
return 0;
- CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->lock);
- ret = drbg->state == DRBG_READY ? 1 : 0;
- CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->lock);
+ ret = EVP_RAND_state(drbg->rand) == EVP_RAND_STATE_READY ? 1 : 0;
return ret;
}
+int RAND_DRBG_verify_zeroization(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
+{
+ return EVP_RAND_verify_zeroization(drbg->rand);
+}
+
/*
* Get the master DRBG.
* Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure.
*
*/
-RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_master(void)
+RAND_DRBG *OPENSSL_CTX_get0_master_drbg(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
{
- if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init))
+ DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
+
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
return NULL;
- return drbg_master;
+ if (dgbl->master_drbg == NULL) {
+ if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(dgbl->lock))
+ return NULL;
+ if (dgbl->master_drbg == NULL)
+ dgbl->master_drbg = drbg_setup(ctx, NULL, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(dgbl->lock);
+ }
+ return dgbl->master_drbg;
+}
+
+RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_master(void)
+{
+ return OPENSSL_CTX_get0_master_drbg(NULL);
}
/*
* Get the public DRBG.
* Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure.
*/
-RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_public(void)
+RAND_DRBG *OPENSSL_CTX_get0_public_drbg(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
{
- if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init))
+ DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg, *master;
+
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
return NULL;
- return drbg_public;
+ drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->public_drbg);
+ if (drbg == NULL) {
+ master = OPENSSL_CTX_get0_master_drbg(ctx);
+ if (master == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ctx = openssl_ctx_get_concrete(ctx);
+ /*
+ * If the private_drbg is also NULL then this is the first time we've
+ * used this thread.
+ */
+ if (CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->private_drbg) == NULL
+ && !ossl_init_thread_start(NULL, ctx, drbg_delete_thread_state))
+ return NULL;
+ drbg = drbg_setup(ctx, master, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->public_drbg, drbg);
+ }
+ return drbg;
+}
+
+RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_public(void)
+{
+ return OPENSSL_CTX_get0_public_drbg(NULL);
}
/*
* Get the private DRBG.
* Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure.
*/
-RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_private(void)
+RAND_DRBG *OPENSSL_CTX_get0_private_drbg(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
{
- if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init))
+ DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg, *master;
+
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
return NULL;
- return drbg_private;
+ drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
+ if (drbg == NULL) {
+ master = OPENSSL_CTX_get0_master_drbg(ctx);
+ if (master == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ctx = openssl_ctx_get_concrete(ctx);
+ /*
+ * If the public_drbg is also NULL then this is the first time we've
+ * used this thread.
+ */
+ if (CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->public_drbg) == NULL
+ && !ossl_init_thread_start(NULL, ctx, drbg_delete_thread_state))
+ return NULL;
+ drbg = drbg_setup(ctx, master, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->private_drbg, drbg);
+ }
+ return drbg;
+}
+
+RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_private(void)
+{
+ return OPENSSL_CTX_get0_private_drbg(NULL);
}
RAND_METHOD rand_meth = {
RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void)
{
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
return &rand_meth;
+#else
+ return NULL;
+#endif
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff