#include "rand_lcl.h"
#include "internal/thread_once.h"
#include "internal/rand_int.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib_int.h"
/*
- * Support framework for NIST SP 800-90A DRBG, AES-CTR mode.
- * The RAND_DRBG is OpenSSL's pointer to an instance of the DRBG.
+ * Support framework for NIST SP 800-90A DRBG
+ *
+ * See manual page RAND_DRBG(7) for a general overview.
*
* The OpenSSL model is to have new and free functions, and that new
* does all initialization. That is not the NIST model, which has
*/
/*
- * THE THREE SHARED DRBGs
- *
- * There are three shared DRBGs (master, public and private), which are
- * accessed concurrently by all threads.
+ * The three shared DRBG instances
*
- * THE MASTER DRBG
+ * There are three shared DRBG instances: <master>, <public>, and <private>.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * The <master> DRBG
*
* Not used directly by the application, only for reseeding the two other
* DRBGs. It reseeds itself by pulling either randomness from os entropy
- * sources or by consuming randomnes which was added by RAND_add()
+ * sources or by consuming randomness which was added by RAND_add().
+ *
+ * The <master> DRBG is a global instance which is accessed concurrently by
+ * all threads. The necessary locking is managed automatically by its child
+ * DRBG instances during reseeding.
*/
-static RAND_DRBG *drbg_master;
+static RAND_DRBG *master_drbg;
/*
- * THE PUBLIC DRBG
+ * The <public> DRBG
*
* Used by default for generating random bytes using RAND_bytes().
+ *
+ * The <public> DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per thread.
*/
-static RAND_DRBG *drbg_public;
+static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL public_drbg;
/*
- * THE PRIVATE DRBG
+ * The <private> DRBG
*
* Used by default for generating private keys using RAND_priv_bytes()
- */
-static RAND_DRBG *drbg_private;
-/*+
- * DRBG HIERARCHY
- *
- * In addition there are DRBGs, which are not shared, but used only by a
- * single thread at every time, for example the DRBGs which are owned by
- * an SSL context. All DRBGs are organized in a hierarchical fashion
- * with the <master> DRBG as root.
- *
- * This gives the following overall picture:
- *
- * <os entropy sources>
- * |
- * RAND_add() ==> <master> \
- * / \ | shared DRBGs (with locking)
- * <public> <private> /
- * |
- * <ssl> owned by an SSL context
- *
- * AUTOMATIC RESEEDING
- *
- * Before satisfying a generate request, a DRBG reseeds itself automatically,
- * if one of the following two conditions holds:
*
- * - the number of generate requests since the last reseeding exceeds a
- * certain threshold, the so called |reseed_interval|. This behaviour
- * can be disabled by setting the |reseed_interval| to 0.
- *
- * - the time elapsed since the last reseeding exceeds a certain time
- * interval, the so called |reseed_time_interval|. This behaviour
- * can be disabled by setting the |reseed_time_interval| to 0.
- *
- * MANUAL RESEEDING
- *
- * For the three shared DRBGs (and only for these) there is another way to
- * reseed them manually by calling RAND_seed() (or RAND_add() with a positive
- * |randomness| argument). This will immediately reseed the <master> DRBG.
- * The <public> and <private> DRBG will detect this on their next generate
- * call and reseed, pulling randomness from <master>.
- *
- * LOCKING
- *
- * The three shared DRBGs are intended to be used concurrently, so they
- * support locking. The RAND methods take the locks automatically, so using
- * the RAND api (in particular RAND_bytes() and RAND_priv_bytes()) is
- * thread-safe. Note however that accessing the shared DRBGs directly via
- * the RAND_DRBG interface is *not* thread-safe.
- *
- * All other DRBG instances don't support locking, because they are
- * intendended to be used by a single thread. Instead of accessing a single
- * DRBG instance concurrently from different threads, it is recommended to
- * instantiate a separate DRBG instance per thread. Using the same shared
- * DRBG (preferrably the public DRBG) as parent of DRBG instances on
- * different threads is safe.
+ * The <private> DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per thread.
*/
+static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL private_drbg;
+
/* NIST SP 800-90A DRBG recommends the use of a personalization string. */
static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_drbg_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+
+
+static int rand_drbg_type = RAND_DRBG_TYPE;
+static unsigned int rand_drbg_flags = RAND_DRBG_FLAGS;
+
static unsigned int master_reseed_interval = MASTER_RESEED_INTERVAL;
static unsigned int slave_reseed_interval = SLAVE_RESEED_INTERVAL;
RAND_DRBG *parent);
/*
- * Set/initialize |drbg| to be of type |nid|, with optional |flags|.
+ * Set/initialize |drbg| to be of type |type|, with optional |flags|.
+ *
+ * If |type| and |flags| are zero, use the defaults
*
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
*/
-int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int nid, unsigned int flags)
+int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type, unsigned int flags)
{
int ret = 1;
+ if (type == 0 && flags == 0) {
+ type = rand_drbg_type;
+ flags = rand_drbg_flags;
+ }
+
drbg->state = DRBG_UNINITIALISED;
drbg->flags = flags;
- drbg->nid = nid;
+ drbg->type = type;
- switch (nid) {
+ switch (type) {
default:
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE);
return 0;
return ret;
}
+/*
+ * Set/initialize default |type| and |flag| for new drbg instances.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
+ */
+int RAND_DRBG_set_defaults(int type, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ default:
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET_DEFAULTS, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ case NID_aes_128_ctr:
+ case NID_aes_192_ctr:
+ case NID_aes_256_ctr:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if ((flags & ~RAND_DRBG_USED_FLAGS) != 0) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET_DEFAULTS, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_FLAGS);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ rand_drbg_type = type;
+ rand_drbg_flags = flags;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
/*
* Allocate memory and initialize a new DRBG. The DRBG is allocated on
* the secure heap if |secure| is nonzero and the secure heap is enabled.
if (drbg == NULL) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
+ return NULL;
}
drbg->secure = secure && CRYPTO_secure_allocated(drbg);
if (RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, type, flags) == 0)
goto err;
- if (parent != NULL && drbg->strength > parent->strength) {
- /*
- * We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C
- * 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source
- */
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, RAND_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK);
- goto err;
+ if (parent != NULL) {
+ rand_drbg_lock(parent);
+ if (drbg->strength > parent->strength) {
+ /*
+ * We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C
+ * 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source
+ */
+ rand_drbg_unlock(parent);
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, RAND_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ rand_drbg_unlock(parent);
}
if (!RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, rand_drbg_get_entropy,
{
unsigned char *nonce = NULL, *entropy = NULL;
size_t noncelen = 0, entropylen = 0;
+ size_t min_entropy = drbg->strength;
+ size_t min_entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen;
+ size_t max_entropylen = drbg->max_entropylen;
if (perslen > drbg->max_perslen) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
}
drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
+
+ /*
+ * NIST SP800-90Ar1 section 9.1 says you can combine getting the entropy
+ * and nonce in 1 call by increasing the entropy with 50% and increasing
+ * the minimum length to accomadate the length of the nonce.
+ * We do this in case a nonce is require and get_nonce is NULL.
+ */
+ if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce == NULL) {
+ min_entropy += drbg->strength / 2;
+ min_entropylen += drbg->min_noncelen;
+ max_entropylen += drbg->max_noncelen;
+ }
+
if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL)
- entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
- drbg->min_entropylen, drbg->max_entropylen);
- if (entropylen < drbg->min_entropylen
- || entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) {
+ entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, min_entropy,
+ min_entropylen, max_entropylen, 0);
+ if (entropylen < min_entropylen
+ || entropylen > max_entropylen) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
goto end;
}
- if (drbg->max_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce != NULL) {
+ if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce != NULL) {
noncelen = drbg->get_nonce(drbg, &nonce, drbg->strength / 2,
drbg->min_noncelen, drbg->max_noncelen);
if (noncelen < drbg->min_noncelen || noncelen > drbg->max_noncelen) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
- RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE);
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE);
goto end;
}
}
* initial values.
*/
drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg);
- return RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, drbg->nid, drbg->flags);
+ return RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, drbg->type, drbg->flags);
}
/*
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
*/
int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
- const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
+ const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen,
+ int prediction_resistance)
{
unsigned char *entropy = NULL;
size_t entropylen = 0;
drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL)
entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
- drbg->min_entropylen, drbg->max_entropylen);
+ drbg->min_entropylen,
+ drbg->max_entropylen,
+ prediction_resistance);
if (entropylen < drbg->min_entropylen
|| entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
drbg->meth->reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0);
} else if (reseeded == 0) {
/* do a full reseeding if it has not been done yet above */
- RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, NULL, 0);
+ RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, NULL, 0, 0);
}
}
}
if (reseed_required || prediction_resistance) {
- if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen)) {
+ if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen, prediction_resistance)) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/*
* Set the RAND_DRBG callbacks for obtaining entropy and nonce.
*
- * In the following, the signature and the semantics of the
- * get_entropy() and cleanup_entropy() callbacks are explained.
- *
- * GET_ENTROPY
- *
- * size_t get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *ctx,
- * unsigned char **pout,
- * int entropy,
- * size_t min_len, size_t max_len);
- *
- * This is a request to allocate and fill a buffer of size
- * |min_len| <= size <= |max_len| (in bytes) which contains
- * at least |entropy| bits of randomness. The buffer's address is
- * to be returned in |*pout| and the number of collected
- * randomness bytes (which may be less than the allocated size
- * of the buffer) as return value.
- *
- * If the callback fails to acquire at least |entropy| bits of
- * randomness, it shall return a buffer length of 0.
- *
- * CLEANUP_ENTROPY
- *
- * void cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *ctx,
- * unsigned char *out, size_t outlen);
- *
- * A request to clear and free the buffer allocated by get_entropy().
- * The values |out| and |outlen| are expected to be the random buffer's
- * address and length, as returned by the get_entropy() callback.
- *
- * GET_NONCE, CLEANUP_NONCE
+ * Setting the callbacks is allowed only if the drbg has not been
+ * initialized yet. Otherwise, the operation will fail.
*
- * Signature and semantics of the get_nonce() and cleanup_nonce()
- * callbacks are analogous to get_entropy() and cleanup_entropy().
- * Currently, the nonce is used only for the known answer tests.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
*/
int RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
RAND_DRBG_get_entropy_fn get_entropy,
{
RAND_DRBG *drbg;
- drbg = RAND_DRBG_secure_new(RAND_DRBG_NID, 0, parent);
+ drbg = RAND_DRBG_secure_new(rand_drbg_type, rand_drbg_flags, parent);
if (drbg == NULL)
return NULL;
- if (rand_drbg_enable_locking(drbg) == 0)
+ /* Only the master DRBG needs to have a lock */
+ if (parent == NULL && rand_drbg_enable_locking(drbg) == 0)
goto err;
/* enable seed propagation */
*/
DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_drbg_init)
{
+ int ret = 1;
+
/*
* ensure that libcrypto is initialized, otherwise the
* DRBG locks are not cleaned up properly
if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL))
return 0;
- drbg_master = drbg_setup(NULL);
- drbg_public = drbg_setup(drbg_master);
- drbg_private = drbg_setup(drbg_master);
+ ossl_init_thread_start(OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_RAND);
+
+ master_drbg = drbg_setup(NULL);
- if (drbg_master == NULL || drbg_public == NULL || drbg_private == NULL)
+ ret &= CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&private_drbg, NULL);
+ ret &= CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&public_drbg, NULL);
+
+ if (master_drbg == NULL || ret == 0)
return 0;
return 1;
/* Clean up the global DRBGs before exit */
void rand_drbg_cleanup_int(void)
{
- RAND_DRBG_free(drbg_private);
- RAND_DRBG_free(drbg_public);
- RAND_DRBG_free(drbg_master);
+ RAND_DRBG_free(master_drbg);
+ master_drbg = NULL;
+
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&private_drbg);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&public_drbg);
+}
- drbg_private = drbg_public = drbg_master = NULL;
+void drbg_delete_thread_state()
+{
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg;
+
+ drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&public_drbg);
+ RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
+
+ drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&private_drbg);
+ RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
}
/* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_bytes() method */
if (drbg == NULL)
return 0;
- rand_drbg_lock(drbg);
ret = RAND_DRBG_bytes(drbg, out, count);
- rand_drbg_unlock(drbg);
return ret;
}
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init))
return NULL;
- return drbg_master;
+ return master_drbg;
}
/*
*/
RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_public(void)
{
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg;
+
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init))
return NULL;
- return drbg_public;
+ drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&public_drbg);
+ if (drbg == NULL) {
+ ossl_init_thread_start(OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_RAND);
+ drbg = drbg_setup(master_drbg);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&public_drbg, drbg);
+ }
+ return drbg;
}
/*
*/
RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_private(void)
{
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg;
+
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init))
return NULL;
- return drbg_private;
+ drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&private_drbg);
+ if (drbg == NULL) {
+ ossl_init_thread_start(OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_RAND);
+ drbg = drbg_setup(master_drbg);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&private_drbg, drbg);
+ }
+ return drbg;
}
RAND_METHOD rand_meth = {
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