/*
- * Copyright 2011-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2011-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include "rand_lcl.h"
+#include "rand_local.h"
#include "internal/thread_once.h"
-#include "internal/rand_int.h"
-#include "internal/cryptlib_int.h"
+#include "crypto/rand.h"
+#include "crypto/rand_pool.h"
+#include "crypto/cryptlib.h"
/*
* Support framework for NIST SP 800-90A DRBG
* a much bigger deal than just re-setting an allocated resource.)
*/
-/*
- * The three shared DRBG instances
- *
- * There are three shared DRBG instances: <master>, <public>, and <private>.
- */
-/*
- * The <master> DRBG
- *
- * Not used directly by the application, only for reseeding the two other
- * DRBGs. It reseeds itself by pulling either randomness from os entropy
- * sources or by consuming randomness which was added by RAND_add().
- *
- * The <master> DRBG is a global instance which is accessed concurrently by
- * all threads. The necessary locking is managed automatically by its child
- * DRBG instances during reseeding.
- */
-static RAND_DRBG *master_drbg;
-/*
- * The <public> DRBG
- *
- * Used by default for generating random bytes using RAND_bytes().
- *
- * The <public> DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per thread.
- */
-static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL public_drbg;
-/*
- * The <private> DRBG
- *
- * Used by default for generating private keys using RAND_priv_bytes()
- *
- * The <private> DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per thread.
- */
-static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL private_drbg;
+typedef struct drbg_global_st {
+ /*
+ * The three shared DRBG instances
+ *
+ * There are three shared DRBG instances: <master>, <public>, and <private>.
+ */
+ /*
+ * The <master> DRBG
+ *
+ * Not used directly by the application, only for reseeding the two other
+ * DRBGs. It reseeds itself by pulling either randomness from os entropy
+ * sources or by consuming randomness which was added by RAND_add().
+ *
+ * The <master> DRBG is a global instance which is accessed concurrently by
+ * all threads. The necessary locking is managed automatically by its child
+ * DRBG instances during reseeding.
+ */
+ RAND_DRBG *master_drbg;
+ /*
+ * The <public> DRBG
+ *
+ * Used by default for generating random bytes using RAND_bytes().
+ *
+ * The <public> DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per
+ * thread.
+ */
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL public_drbg;
+ /*
+ * The <private> DRBG
+ *
+ * Used by default for generating private keys using RAND_priv_bytes()
+ *
+ * The <private> DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per
+ * thread.
+ */
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL private_drbg;
+} DRBG_GLOBAL;
+typedef struct drbg_nonce_global_st {
+ CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_nonce_lock;
+ int rand_nonce_count;
+} DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL;
/* NIST SP 800-90A DRBG recommends the use of a personalization string. */
-static const char ossl_pers_string[] = "OpenSSL NIST SP 800-90A DRBG";
+static const char ossl_pers_string[] = DRBG_DEFAULT_PERS_STRING;
-static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_drbg_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+#define RAND_DRBG_TYPE_FLAGS ( \
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE )
+#define RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER 0
+#define RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC 1
+#define RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE 2
-
-static int rand_drbg_type = RAND_DRBG_TYPE;
-static unsigned int rand_drbg_flags = RAND_DRBG_FLAGS;
+/* Defaults */
+static int rand_drbg_type[3] = {
+ RAND_DRBG_TYPE, /* Master */
+ RAND_DRBG_TYPE, /* Public */
+ RAND_DRBG_TYPE /* Private */
+};
+static unsigned int rand_drbg_flags[3] = {
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAGS | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER, /* Master */
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAGS | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC, /* Public */
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAGS | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE /* Private */
+};
static unsigned int master_reseed_interval = MASTER_RESEED_INTERVAL;
static unsigned int slave_reseed_interval = SLAVE_RESEED_INTERVAL;
/* A logical OR of all used DRBG flag bits (currently there is only one) */
static const unsigned int rand_drbg_used_flags =
- RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF;
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC | RAND_DRBG_TYPE_FLAGS;
-static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(RAND_DRBG *parent);
-static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure,
+static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_DRBG *parent, int drbg_type);
+
+static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int secure,
int type,
unsigned int flags,
RAND_DRBG *parent);
+static int rand_drbg_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type, unsigned int flags);
+static int rand_drbg_init_method(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
+
+static int is_ctr(int type)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+ case NID_aes_128_ctr:
+ case NID_aes_192_ctr:
+ case NID_aes_256_ctr:
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+static int is_digest(int type)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+ case NID_sha1:
+ case NID_sha224:
+ case NID_sha256:
+ case NID_sha384:
+ case NID_sha512:
+ case NID_sha512_224:
+ case NID_sha512_256:
+ case NID_sha3_224:
+ case NID_sha3_256:
+ case NID_sha3_384:
+ case NID_sha3_512:
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize the OPENSSL_CTX global DRBGs on first use.
+ * Returns the allocated global data on success or NULL on failure.
+ */
+static void *drbg_ossl_ctx_new(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx)
+{
+ DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dgbl));
+
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ /*
+ * We need to ensure that base libcrypto thread handling has been
+ * initialised.
+ */
+ OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL);
+#endif
+
+ if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&dgbl->private_drbg, NULL))
+ goto err1;
+
+ if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&dgbl->public_drbg, NULL))
+ goto err2;
+
+ dgbl->master_drbg = drbg_setup(libctx, NULL, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER);
+ if (dgbl->master_drbg == NULL)
+ goto err3;
+
+ return dgbl;
+
+ err3:
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->public_drbg);
+ err2:
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
+ err1:
+ OPENSSL_free(dgbl);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void drbg_ossl_ctx_free(void *vdgbl)
+{
+ DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = vdgbl;
+
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ RAND_DRBG_free(dgbl->master_drbg);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->public_drbg);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(dgbl);
+}
+
+static const OPENSSL_CTX_METHOD drbg_ossl_ctx_method = {
+ drbg_ossl_ctx_new,
+ drbg_ossl_ctx_free,
+};
+
+/*
+ * drbg_ossl_ctx_new() calls drgb_setup() which calls rand_drbg_get_nonce()
+ * which needs to get the rand_nonce_lock out of the OPENSSL_CTX...but since
+ * drbg_ossl_ctx_new() hasn't finished running yet we need the rand_nonce_lock
+ * to be in a different global data object. Otherwise we will go into an
+ * infinite recursion loop.
+ */
+static void *drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_new(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx)
+{
+ DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL *dngbl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dngbl));
+
+ if (dngbl == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ dngbl->rand_nonce_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+ if (dngbl->rand_nonce_lock == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(dngbl);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return dngbl;
+}
+
+static void drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_free(void *vdngbl)
+{
+ DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL *dngbl = vdngbl;
+
+ if (dngbl == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(dngbl->rand_nonce_lock);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(dngbl);
+}
+
+static const OPENSSL_CTX_METHOD drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_method = {
+ drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_new,
+ drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_free,
+};
+
+static DRBG_GLOBAL *drbg_get_global(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx)
+{
+ return openssl_ctx_get_data(libctx, OPENSSL_CTX_DRBG_INDEX,
+ &drbg_ossl_ctx_method);
+}
+
+/* Implements the get_nonce() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks()) */
+size_t rand_drbg_get_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+ unsigned char **pout,
+ int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
+{
+ size_t ret = 0;
+ RAND_POOL *pool;
+ DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL *dngbl
+ = openssl_ctx_get_data(drbg->libctx, OPENSSL_CTX_DRBG_NONCE_INDEX,
+ &drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_method);
+ struct {
+ void *instance;
+ int count;
+ } data;
+
+ if (dngbl == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
+ pool = rand_pool_new(0, 0, min_len, max_len);
+ if (pool == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (rand_pool_add_nonce_data(pool) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ data.instance = drbg;
+ CRYPTO_atomic_add(&dngbl->rand_nonce_count, 1, &data.count,
+ dngbl->rand_nonce_lock);
+
+ if (rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = rand_pool_length(pool);
+ *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
+
+ err:
+ rand_pool_free(pool);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Implements the cleanup_nonce() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
+ *
+ */
+void rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
+{
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(out, outlen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the |drbg|'s callback data pointer for the entropy and nonce callbacks
+ *
+ * The ownership of the context data remains with the caller,
+ * i.e., it is the caller's responsibility to keep it available as long
+ * as it is need by the callbacks and free it after use.
+ *
+ * Setting the callback data is allowed only if the drbg has not been
+ * initialized yet. Otherwise, the operation will fail.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
+ */
+int RAND_DRBG_set_callback_data(RAND_DRBG *drbg, void *data)
+{
+ if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED
+ || drbg->parent != NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ drbg->callback_data = data;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Retrieve the callback data pointer */
+void *RAND_DRBG_get_callback_data(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
+{
+ return drbg->callback_data;
+}
+
/*
* Set/initialize |drbg| to be of type |type|, with optional |flags|.
*
*/
int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type, unsigned int flags)
{
- int ret = 1;
+ return rand_drbg_set(drbg, type, flags) && rand_drbg_init_method(drbg);
+}
+static int rand_drbg_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type, unsigned int flags)
+{
if (type == 0 && flags == 0) {
- type = rand_drbg_type;
- flags = rand_drbg_flags;
+ type = rand_drbg_type[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER];
+ flags = rand_drbg_flags[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER];
+ }
+
+ /* If set is called multiple times - clear the old one */
+ if (drbg->type != 0 && (type != drbg->type || flags != drbg->flags)) {
+ if (drbg->meth != NULL)
+ drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg);
+ rand_pool_free(drbg->adin_pool);
+ drbg->adin_pool = NULL;
}
drbg->state = DRBG_UNINITIALISED;
drbg->flags = flags;
drbg->type = type;
+ drbg->meth = NULL;
- switch (type) {
- default:
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE);
- return 0;
- case 0:
- /* Uninitialized; that's okay. */
+ if (type == 0 || is_ctr(type) || is_digest(type))
return 1;
- case NID_aes_128_ctr:
- case NID_aes_192_ctr:
- case NID_aes_256_ctr:
+
+ drbg->type = 0;
+ drbg->flags = 0;
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int rand_drbg_init_method(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (drbg->meth != NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (is_ctr(drbg->type)) {
ret = drbg_ctr_init(drbg);
- break;
+ } else if (is_digest(drbg->type)) {
+ if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC)
+ ret = drbg_hmac_init(drbg);
+ else
+ ret = drbg_hash_init(drbg);
+ } else {
+ /* other cases should already be excluded */
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INIT_METHOD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ drbg->type = 0;
+ drbg->flags = 0;
+ return 0;
}
- if (ret == 0)
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INIT_METHOD, RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG);
+ }
return ret;
}
*/
int RAND_DRBG_set_defaults(int type, unsigned int flags)
{
- int ret = 1;
-
- switch (type) {
- default:
+ int all;
+ if (!(is_digest(type) || is_ctr(type))) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET_DEFAULTS, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE);
return 0;
- case NID_aes_128_ctr:
- case NID_aes_192_ctr:
- case NID_aes_256_ctr:
- break;
}
if ((flags & ~rand_drbg_used_flags) != 0) {
return 0;
}
- rand_drbg_type = type;
- rand_drbg_flags = flags;
-
- return ret;
+ all = ((flags & RAND_DRBG_TYPE_FLAGS) == 0);
+ if (all || (flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER) != 0) {
+ rand_drbg_type[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER] = type;
+ rand_drbg_flags[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER] = flags | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER;
+ }
+ if (all || (flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC) != 0) {
+ rand_drbg_type[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC] = type;
+ rand_drbg_flags[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC] = flags | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC;
+ }
+ if (all || (flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE) != 0) {
+ rand_drbg_type[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE] = type;
+ rand_drbg_flags[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE] = flags | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE;
+ }
+ return 1;
}
*
* Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure.
*/
-static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure,
+static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int secure,
int type,
unsigned int flags,
RAND_DRBG *parent)
{
- RAND_DRBG *drbg = secure ?
- OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg)) : OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg));
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg = secure ? OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg))
+ : OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg));
if (drbg == NULL) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
+ drbg->libctx = ctx;
drbg->secure = secure && CRYPTO_secure_allocated(drbg);
- drbg->fork_count = rand_fork_count;
+ drbg->fork_id = openssl_get_fork_id();
drbg->parent = parent;
if (parent == NULL) {
return drbg;
-err:
- if (drbg->secure)
- OPENSSL_secure_free(drbg);
- else
- OPENSSL_free(drbg);
+ err:
+ RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
return NULL;
}
+RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, int type, unsigned int flags,
+ RAND_DRBG *parent)
+{
+ return rand_drbg_new(ctx, 0, type, flags, parent);
+}
+
RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
{
- return rand_drbg_new(0, type, flags, parent);
+ return RAND_DRBG_new_ex(NULL, type, flags, parent);
}
-RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_secure_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
+RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, int type,
+ unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
{
- return rand_drbg_new(1, type, flags, parent);
+ return rand_drbg_new(ctx, 1, type, flags, parent);
}
+RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_secure_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
+{
+ return RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex(NULL, type, flags, parent);
+}
/*
* Uninstantiate |drbg| and free all memory.
*/
if (drbg->meth != NULL)
drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg);
+ rand_pool_free(drbg->adin_pool);
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(drbg->lock);
- CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DRBG, drbg, &drbg->ex_data);
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RAND_DRBG, drbg, &drbg->ex_data);
+#endif
if (drbg->secure)
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(*drbg));
{
unsigned char *nonce = NULL, *entropy = NULL;
size_t noncelen = 0, entropylen = 0;
- size_t min_entropy = drbg->strength;
- size_t min_entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen;
- size_t max_entropylen = drbg->max_entropylen;
+ size_t min_entropy, min_entropylen, max_entropylen;
- if (perslen > drbg->max_perslen) {
+ if (drbg->meth == NULL && !rand_drbg_init_method(drbg)) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
- RAND_R_PERSONALISATION_STRING_TOO_LONG);
+ RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED);
goto end;
}
- if (drbg->meth == NULL) {
+ min_entropy = drbg->strength;
+ min_entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen;
+ max_entropylen = drbg->max_entropylen;
+
+ if (perslen > drbg->max_perslen) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
- RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED);
+ RAND_R_PERSONALISATION_STRING_TOO_LONG);
goto end;
}
if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
- drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR ? RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE
- : RAND_R_ALREADY_INSTANTIATED);
+ if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR)
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
+ else
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ALREADY_INSTANTIATED);
goto end;
}
/*
* NIST SP800-90Ar1 section 9.1 says you can combine getting the entropy
* and nonce in 1 call by increasing the entropy with 50% and increasing
- * the minimum length to accomadate the length of the nonce.
+ * the minimum length to accommodate the length of the nonce.
* We do this in case a nonce is require and get_nonce is NULL.
*/
if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce == NULL) {
max_entropylen += drbg->max_noncelen;
}
+ drbg->reseed_next_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter);
+ if (drbg->reseed_next_counter) {
+ drbg->reseed_next_counter++;
+ if(!drbg->reseed_next_counter)
+ drbg->reseed_next_counter = 1;
+ }
+
if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL)
entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, min_entropy,
min_entropylen, max_entropylen, 0);
if (entropylen < min_entropylen
- || entropylen > max_entropylen) {
+ || entropylen > max_entropylen) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
goto end;
}
}
drbg->state = DRBG_READY;
- drbg->generate_counter = 0;
+ drbg->reseed_gen_counter = 1;
drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL);
- if (drbg->reseed_counter > 0) {
- if (drbg->parent == NULL)
- drbg->reseed_counter++;
- else
- drbg->reseed_counter = drbg->parent->reseed_counter;
- }
+ tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, drbg->reseed_next_counter);
-end:
+ end:
if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
- if (nonce != NULL && drbg->cleanup_nonce!= NULL )
+ if (nonce != NULL && drbg->cleanup_nonce != NULL)
drbg->cleanup_nonce(drbg, nonce, noncelen);
- if (drbg->pool != NULL) {
- if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
- RAND_R_ERROR_ENTROPY_POOL_WAS_IGNORED);
- drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
- }
- rand_pool_free(drbg->pool);
- drbg->pool = NULL;
- }
if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY)
return 1;
return 0;
*/
int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
{
- if (drbg->meth == NULL) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_UNINSTANTIATE,
- RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED);
- return 0;
+ int index = -1, type, flags;
+ if (drbg->meth != NULL) {
+ drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg);
+ drbg->meth = NULL;
}
- /* Clear the entire drbg->ctr struct, then reset some important
- * members of the drbg->ctr struct (e.g. keysize, df_ks) to their
- * initial values.
- */
- drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg);
- return RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, drbg->type, drbg->flags);
+ /* The reset uses the default values for type and flags */
+ if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER)
+ index = RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER;
+ else if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE)
+ index = RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE;
+ else if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC)
+ index = RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC;
+
+ if (index != -1) {
+ flags = rand_drbg_flags[index];
+ type = rand_drbg_type[index];
+ } else {
+ flags = drbg->flags;
+ type = drbg->type;
+ }
+ return rand_drbg_set(drbg, type, flags);
}
/*
}
drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
+
+ drbg->reseed_next_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter);
+ if (drbg->reseed_next_counter) {
+ drbg->reseed_next_counter++;
+ if(!drbg->reseed_next_counter)
+ drbg->reseed_next_counter = 1;
+ }
+
if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL)
entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
drbg->min_entropylen,
drbg->max_entropylen,
prediction_resistance);
if (entropylen < drbg->min_entropylen
- || entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) {
+ || entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
goto end;
}
goto end;
drbg->state = DRBG_READY;
- drbg->generate_counter = 0;
+ drbg->reseed_gen_counter = 1;
drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL);
- if (drbg->reseed_counter > 0) {
- if (drbg->parent == NULL)
- drbg->reseed_counter++;
- else
- drbg->reseed_counter = drbg->parent->reseed_counter;
- }
+ tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, drbg->reseed_next_counter);
-end:
+ end:
if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY)
const unsigned char *adin = NULL;
size_t adinlen = 0;
- if (drbg->pool != NULL) {
+ if (drbg->seed_pool != NULL) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- rand_pool_free(drbg->pool);
- drbg->pool = NULL;
+ drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
+ rand_pool_free(drbg->seed_pool);
+ drbg->seed_pool = NULL;
+ return 0;
}
if (buffer != NULL) {
if (drbg->max_entropylen < len) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART,
RAND_R_ENTROPY_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
+ drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (entropy > 8 * len) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, RAND_R_ENTROPY_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+ drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
return 0;
}
/* will be picked up by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback */
- drbg->pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, len, len);
- if (drbg->pool == NULL)
+ drbg->seed_pool = rand_pool_attach(buffer, len, entropy);
+ if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL)
return 0;
-
- rand_pool_add(drbg->pool, buffer, len, entropy);
} else {
if (drbg->max_adinlen < len) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART,
RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
+ drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
return 0;
}
adin = buffer;
}
}
- /* check whether a given entropy pool was cleared properly during reseed */
- if (drbg->pool != NULL) {
- drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- rand_pool_free(drbg->pool);
- drbg->pool = NULL;
- return 0;
- }
+ rand_pool_free(drbg->seed_pool);
+ drbg->seed_pool = NULL;
return drbg->state == DRBG_READY;
}
int prediction_resistance,
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
{
+ int fork_id;
int reseed_required = 0;
if (drbg->state != DRBG_READY) {
return 0;
}
- if (drbg->fork_count != rand_fork_count) {
- drbg->fork_count = rand_fork_count;
+ fork_id = openssl_get_fork_id();
+
+ if (drbg->fork_id != fork_id) {
+ drbg->fork_id = fork_id;
reseed_required = 1;
}
if (drbg->reseed_interval > 0) {
- if (drbg->generate_counter >= drbg->reseed_interval)
+ if (drbg->reseed_gen_counter > drbg->reseed_interval)
reseed_required = 1;
}
if (drbg->reseed_time_interval > 0) {
|| now - drbg->reseed_time >= drbg->reseed_time_interval)
reseed_required = 1;
}
- if (drbg->reseed_counter > 0 && drbg->parent != NULL) {
- if (drbg->reseed_counter != drbg->parent->reseed_counter)
+ if (drbg->parent != NULL) {
+ unsigned int reseed_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter);
+ if (reseed_counter > 0
+ && tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_prop_counter)
+ != reseed_counter)
reseed_required = 1;
}
return 0;
}
- drbg->generate_counter++;
+ drbg->reseed_gen_counter++;
return 1;
}
unsigned char *additional = NULL;
size_t additional_len;
size_t chunk;
- size_t ret;
+ size_t ret = 0;
+
+ if (drbg->adin_pool == NULL) {
+ if (drbg->type == 0)
+ goto err;
+ drbg->adin_pool = rand_pool_new(0, 0, 0, drbg->max_adinlen);
+ if (drbg->adin_pool == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
- additional_len = rand_drbg_get_additional_data(&additional, drbg->max_adinlen);
+ additional_len = rand_drbg_get_additional_data(drbg->adin_pool,
+ &additional);
for ( ; outlen > 0; outlen -= chunk, out += chunk) {
chunk = outlen;
}
ret = 1;
-err:
- if (additional_len != 0)
- OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(additional, additional_len);
+ err:
+ if (additional != NULL)
+ rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(drbg->adin_pool, additional);
return ret;
}
RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn get_nonce,
RAND_DRBG_cleanup_nonce_fn cleanup_nonce)
{
- if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED)
+ if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED
+ || drbg->parent != NULL)
return 0;
drbg->get_entropy = get_entropy;
drbg->cleanup_entropy = cleanup_entropy;
return 1;
}
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
/*
* Get and set the EXDATA
*/
{
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&drbg->ex_data, idx);
}
-
+#endif
/*
* The following functions provide a RAND_METHOD that works on the
*
* Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure.
*/
-static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(RAND_DRBG *parent)
+static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_DRBG *parent, int drbg_type)
{
RAND_DRBG *drbg;
- drbg = RAND_DRBG_secure_new(rand_drbg_type, rand_drbg_flags, parent);
+ drbg = RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex(ctx, rand_drbg_type[drbg_type],
+ rand_drbg_flags[drbg_type], parent);
if (drbg == NULL)
return NULL;
goto err;
/* enable seed propagation */
- drbg->reseed_counter = 1;
+ tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, 1);
/*
* Ignore instantiation error to support just-in-time instantiation.
return NULL;
}
-/*
- * Initialize the global DRBGs on first use.
- * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
- */
-DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_drbg_init)
-{
- /*
- * ensure that libcrypto is initialized, otherwise the
- * DRBG locks are not cleaned up properly
- */
- if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL))
- return 0;
-
- if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&private_drbg, NULL))
- return 0;
-
- if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&public_drbg, NULL))
- goto err1;
-
- master_drbg = drbg_setup(NULL);
- if (master_drbg == NULL)
- goto err2;
-
- return 1;
-
-err2:
- CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&public_drbg);
-err1:
- CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&private_drbg);
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Clean up the global DRBGs before exit */
-void rand_drbg_cleanup_int(void)
-{
- if (master_drbg != NULL) {
- RAND_DRBG_free(master_drbg);
- master_drbg = NULL;
-
- CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&private_drbg);
- CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&public_drbg);
- }
-}
-
-void drbg_delete_thread_state(void)
+static void drbg_delete_thread_state(void *arg)
{
+ OPENSSL_CTX *ctx = arg;
+ DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
RAND_DRBG *drbg;
- drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&public_drbg);
- CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&public_drbg, NULL);
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
+ return;
+ drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->public_drbg);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->public_drbg, NULL);
RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
- drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&private_drbg);
- CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&private_drbg, NULL);
+ drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->private_drbg, NULL);
RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
}
return ret;
}
+/*
+ * Calculates the minimum length of a full entropy buffer
+ * which is necessary to seed (i.e. instantiate) the DRBG
+ * successfully.
+ */
+size_t rand_drbg_seedlen(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
+{
+ /*
+ * If no os entropy source is available then RAND_seed(buffer, bufsize)
+ * is expected to succeed if and only if the buffer length satisfies
+ * the following requirements, which follow from the calculations
+ * in RAND_DRBG_instantiate().
+ */
+ size_t min_entropy = drbg->strength;
+ size_t min_entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen;
+
+ /*
+ * Extra entropy for the random nonce in the absence of a
+ * get_nonce callback, see comment in RAND_DRBG_instantiate().
+ */
+ if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce == NULL) {
+ min_entropy += drbg->strength / 2;
+ min_entropylen += drbg->min_noncelen;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Convert entropy requirement from bits to bytes
+ * (dividing by 8 without rounding upwards, because
+ * all entropy requirements are divisible by 8).
+ */
+ min_entropy >>= 3;
+
+ /* Return a value that satisfies both requirements */
+ return min_entropy > min_entropylen ? min_entropy : min_entropylen;
+}
+
/* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_add() method */
static int drbg_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness)
{
int ret = 0;
RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master();
+ size_t buflen;
+ size_t seedlen;
if (drbg == NULL)
return 0;
if (num < 0 || randomness < 0.0)
return 0;
- if (randomness > (double)drbg->max_entropylen) {
+ rand_drbg_lock(drbg);
+ seedlen = rand_drbg_seedlen(drbg);
+
+ buflen = (size_t)num;
+
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ /*
+ * NIST SP-800-90A mandates that entropy *shall not* be provided
+ * by the consuming application. By setting the randomness to zero,
+ * we ensure that the buffer contents will be added to the internal
+ * state of the DRBG only as additional data.
+ *
+ * (NIST SP-800-90Ar1, Sections 9.1 and 9.2)
+ */
+ randomness = 0.0;
+#endif
+ if (buflen < seedlen || randomness < (double) seedlen) {
+#if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
+ /*
+ * If no os entropy source is available, a reseeding will fail
+ * inevitably. So we use a trick to mix the buffer contents into
+ * the DRBG state without forcing a reseeding: we generate a
+ * dummy random byte, using the buffer content as additional data.
+ * Note: This won't work with RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF.
+ */
+ unsigned char dummy[1];
+
+ ret = RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, dummy, sizeof(dummy), 0, buf, buflen);
+ rand_drbg_unlock(drbg);
+ return ret;
+#else
+ /*
+ * If an os entropy source is available then we declare the buffer content
+ * as additional data by setting randomness to zero and trigger a regular
+ * reseeding.
+ */
+ randomness = 0.0;
+#endif
+ }
+
+ if (randomness > (double)seedlen) {
/*
* The purpose of this check is to bound |randomness| by a
* relatively small value in order to prevent an integer
* overflow when multiplying by 8 in the rand_drbg_restart()
- * call below.
+ * call below. Note that randomness is measured in bytes,
+ * not bits, so this value corresponds to eight times the
+ * security strength.
*/
- return 0;
+ randomness = (double)seedlen;
}
- rand_drbg_lock(drbg);
- ret = rand_drbg_restart(drbg, buf,
- (size_t)(unsigned int)num,
- (size_t)(8*randomness));
+ ret = rand_drbg_restart(drbg, buf, buflen, (size_t)(8 * randomness));
rand_drbg_unlock(drbg);
return ret;
* Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure.
*
*/
-RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_master(void)
+RAND_DRBG *OPENSSL_CTX_get0_master_drbg(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
{
- if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init))
+ DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
+
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
return NULL;
- return master_drbg;
+ return dgbl->master_drbg;
+}
+
+RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_master(void)
+{
+ return OPENSSL_CTX_get0_master_drbg(NULL);
}
/*
* Get the public DRBG.
* Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure.
*/
-RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_public(void)
+RAND_DRBG *OPENSSL_CTX_get0_public_drbg(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
{
+ DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
RAND_DRBG *drbg;
- if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init))
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
return NULL;
- drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&public_drbg);
+ drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->public_drbg);
if (drbg == NULL) {
- if (!ossl_init_thread_start(OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_RAND))
+ ctx = openssl_ctx_get_concrete(ctx);
+ /*
+ * If the private_drbg is also NULL then this is the first time we've
+ * used this thread.
+ */
+ if (CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->private_drbg) == NULL
+ && !ossl_init_thread_start(NULL, ctx, drbg_delete_thread_state))
return NULL;
- drbg = drbg_setup(master_drbg);
- CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&public_drbg, drbg);
+ drbg = drbg_setup(ctx, dgbl->master_drbg, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->public_drbg, drbg);
}
return drbg;
}
+RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_public(void)
+{
+ return OPENSSL_CTX_get0_public_drbg(NULL);
+}
+
/*
* Get the private DRBG.
* Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure.
*/
-RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_private(void)
+RAND_DRBG *OPENSSL_CTX_get0_private_drbg(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
{
+ DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
RAND_DRBG *drbg;
- if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init))
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
return NULL;
- drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&private_drbg);
+ drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
if (drbg == NULL) {
- if (!ossl_init_thread_start(OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_RAND))
+ ctx = openssl_ctx_get_concrete(ctx);
+ /*
+ * If the public_drbg is also NULL then this is the first time we've
+ * used this thread.
+ */
+ if (CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->public_drbg) == NULL
+ && !ossl_init_thread_start(NULL, ctx, drbg_delete_thread_state))
return NULL;
- drbg = drbg_setup(master_drbg);
- CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&private_drbg, drbg);
+ drbg = drbg_setup(ctx, dgbl->master_drbg, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->private_drbg, drbg);
}
return drbg;
}
+RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_private(void)
+{
+ return OPENSSL_CTX_get0_private_drbg(NULL);
+}
+
RAND_METHOD rand_meth = {
drbg_seed,
drbg_bytes,
RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void)
{
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
return &rand_meth;
+#else
+ return NULL;
+#endif
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff