/*
- * Copyright 2011-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2011-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include "rand_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include "rand_local.h"
#include "internal/thread_once.h"
-#include "internal/rand_int.h"
-#include "internal/cryptlib_int.h"
+#include "crypto/rand.h"
+#include "crypto/cryptlib.h"
/*
* Support framework for NIST SP 800-90A DRBG
* a much bigger deal than just re-setting an allocated resource.)
*/
-/*
- * The three shared DRBG instances
- *
- * There are three shared DRBG instances: <master>, <public>, and <private>.
- */
-/*
- * The <master> DRBG
- *
- * Not used directly by the application, only for reseeding the two other
- * DRBGs. It reseeds itself by pulling either randomness from os entropy
- * sources or by consuming randomness which was added by RAND_add().
- *
- * The <master> DRBG is a global instance which is accessed concurrently by
- * all threads. The necessary locking is managed automatically by its child
- * DRBG instances during reseeding.
- */
-static RAND_DRBG *master_drbg;
-/*
- * The <public> DRBG
- *
- * Used by default for generating random bytes using RAND_bytes().
- *
- * The <public> DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per thread.
- */
-static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL public_drbg;
-/*
- * The <private> DRBG
- *
- * Used by default for generating private keys using RAND_priv_bytes()
- *
- * The <private> DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per thread.
- */
-static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL private_drbg;
-
-
-
-/* NIST SP 800-90A DRBG recommends the use of a personalization string. */
-static const char ossl_pers_string[] = "OpenSSL NIST SP 800-90A DRBG";
-
-static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_drbg_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+typedef struct drbg_global_st {
+ /*
+ * The three shared DRBG instances
+ *
+ * There are three shared DRBG instances: <master>, <public>, and <private>.
+ */
+ CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+ /*
+ * The <master> DRBG
+ *
+ * Not used directly by the application, only for reseeding the two other
+ * DRBGs. It reseeds itself by pulling either randomness from os entropy
+ * sources or by consuming randomness which was added by RAND_add().
+ *
+ * The <master> DRBG is a global instance which is accessed concurrently by
+ * all threads. The necessary locking is managed automatically by its child
+ * DRBG instances during reseeding.
+ */
+ RAND_DRBG *master_drbg;
+ /*
+ * The <public> DRBG
+ *
+ * Used by default for generating random bytes using RAND_bytes().
+ *
+ * The <public> DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per
+ * thread.
+ */
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL public_drbg;
+ /*
+ * The <private> DRBG
+ *
+ * Used by default for generating private keys using RAND_priv_bytes()
+ *
+ * The <private> DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per
+ * thread.
+ */
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL private_drbg;
+} DRBG_GLOBAL;
#define RAND_DRBG_TYPE_FLAGS ( \
RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE )
RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC | RAND_DRBG_TYPE_FLAGS;
-static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(RAND_DRBG *parent, int drbg_type);
-
-static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure,
- int type,
- unsigned int flags,
- RAND_DRBG *parent);
+static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_DRBG *parent, int drbg_type);
-static int is_ctr(int type)
+static int get_drbg_params(int type, unsigned int flags, const char **name,
+ OSSL_PARAM params[3])
{
+ OSSL_PARAM *p = params;
+
switch (type) {
- case NID_aes_128_ctr:
- case NID_aes_192_ctr:
- case NID_aes_256_ctr:
+ case 0:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
+
+#define CTR(v) \
+ *name = "CTR-DRBG"; \
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_CIPHER, v, 0)
+
+ case NID_aes_128_ctr:
+ CTR(SN_aes_128_ctr);
+ break;
+ case NID_aes_192_ctr:
+ CTR(SN_aes_192_ctr);
+ break;
+ case NID_aes_256_ctr:
+ CTR(SN_aes_256_ctr);
+ break;
+
+#define DGST(v) \
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_DIGEST, v, 0); \
+ if ((flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC) == 0) { \
+ *name = "HASH-DRBG"; \
+ } else { \
+ *name = "HMAC-DRBG"; \
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAC, \
+ SN_hmac, 0); \
}
-}
-static int is_digest(int type)
-{
- switch (type) {
case NID_sha1:
+ DGST(SN_sha1);
+ break;
case NID_sha224:
+ DGST(SN_sha224);
+ break;
case NID_sha256:
+ DGST(SN_sha256);
+ break;
case NID_sha384:
+ DGST(SN_sha384);
+ break;
case NID_sha512:
+ DGST(SN_sha512);
+ break;
case NID_sha512_224:
+ DGST(SN_sha512_224);
+ break;
case NID_sha512_256:
+ DGST(SN_sha512_256);
+ break;
case NID_sha3_224:
+ DGST(SN_sha3_224);
+ break;
case NID_sha3_256:
+ DGST(SN_sha3_256);
+ break;
case NID_sha3_384:
+ DGST(SN_sha3_384);
+ break;
case NID_sha3_512:
- return 1;
- default:
- return 0;
+ DGST(SN_sha3_512);
}
+ *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize the OPENSSL_CTX global DRBGs on first use.
+ * Returns the allocated global data on success or NULL on failure.
+ */
+static void *drbg_ossl_ctx_new(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx)
+{
+ DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dgbl));
+
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ /*
+ * We need to ensure that base libcrypto thread handling has been
+ * initialised.
+ */
+ OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL);
+#endif
+
+ dgbl->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+ if (dgbl->lock == NULL)
+ goto err0;
+
+ if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&dgbl->private_drbg, NULL))
+ goto err1;
+
+ if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&dgbl->public_drbg, NULL))
+ goto err2;
+
+ return dgbl;
+
+ err2:
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
+ err1:
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(dgbl->lock);
+ err0:
+ OPENSSL_free(dgbl);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void drbg_ossl_ctx_free(void *vdgbl)
+{
+ DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = vdgbl;
+
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(dgbl->lock);
+ RAND_DRBG_free(dgbl->master_drbg);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->public_drbg);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(dgbl);
+}
+
+static const OPENSSL_CTX_METHOD drbg_ossl_ctx_method = {
+ drbg_ossl_ctx_new,
+ drbg_ossl_ctx_free,
+};
+
+static DRBG_GLOBAL *drbg_get_global(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx)
+{
+ return openssl_ctx_get_data(libctx, OPENSSL_CTX_DRBG_INDEX,
+ &drbg_ossl_ctx_method);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the |drbg|'s callback data pointer for the entropy and nonce callbacks
+ *
+ * The ownership of the context data remains with the caller,
+ * i.e., it is the caller's responsibility to keep it available as long
+ * as it is need by the callbacks and free it after use.
+ *
+ * Setting the callback data is allowed only if the drbg has not been
+ * initialized yet. Otherwise, the operation will fail.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
+ */
+int RAND_DRBG_set_callback_data(RAND_DRBG *drbg, void *data)
+{
+ if (EVP_RAND_state(drbg->rand) != EVP_RAND_STATE_UNINITIALISED
+ || drbg->parent != NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ drbg->callback_data = data;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Retrieve the callback data pointer */
+void *RAND_DRBG_get_callback_data(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
+{
+ return drbg->callback_data;
}
/*
*/
int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type, unsigned int flags)
{
- int ret = 1;
+ OSSL_PARAM params[6], *p = params;
+ unsigned int reseed_interval;
+ time_t reseed_time_interval;
+ const char *name = NULL;
+ EVP_RAND *rand;
+ EVP_RAND_CTX *pctx;
+ int use_df;
if (type == 0 && flags == 0) {
type = rand_drbg_type[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER];
flags = rand_drbg_flags[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER];
}
- /* If set is called multiple times - clear the old one */
- if (drbg->type != 0 && (type != drbg->type || flags != drbg->flags)) {
- drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg);
- rand_pool_free(drbg->adin_pool);
- drbg->adin_pool = NULL;
+ if (drbg->parent == NULL) {
+ reseed_interval = master_reseed_interval;
+ reseed_time_interval = master_reseed_time_interval;
+ } else {
+ reseed_interval = slave_reseed_interval;
+ reseed_time_interval = slave_reseed_time_interval;
+ }
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_REQUESTS,
+ &reseed_interval);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_time_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL,
+ &reseed_time_interval);
+ use_df = (flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF) == 0;
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_USE_DF, &use_df);
+
+ if (!get_drbg_params(type, flags, &name, p)) {
+ RANDerr(0, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ rand = EVP_RAND_fetch(drbg->libctx, name, NULL);
+ if (rand == NULL) {
+ RANDerr(0, RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED);
+ return 0;
}
- drbg->state = DRBG_UNINITIALISED;
+ EVP_RAND_CTX_free(drbg->rand);
+ drbg->rand = NULL;
+
drbg->flags = flags;
drbg->type = type;
- if (type == 0) {
- /* Uninitialized; that's okay. */
- drbg->meth = NULL;
- return 1;
- } else if (is_ctr(type)) {
- ret = drbg_ctr_init(drbg);
- } else if (is_digest(type)) {
- if (flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC)
- ret = drbg_hmac_init(drbg);
- else
- ret = drbg_hash_init(drbg);
- } else {
- drbg->type = 0;
- drbg->flags = 0;
- drbg->meth = NULL;
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE);
- return 0;
+ pctx = drbg->parent != NULL ? drbg->parent->rand : NULL;
+ drbg->rand = EVP_RAND_CTX_new(rand, pctx);
+ EVP_RAND_free(rand);
+ if (drbg->rand == NULL) {
+ RANDerr(0, RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED);
+ goto err;
}
- if (ret == 0) {
- drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG);
+ if (!EVP_RAND_set_ctx_params(drbg->rand, params)) {
+ RANDerr(0, RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG);
+ goto err;
}
- return ret;
+ return 1;
+err:
+ EVP_RAND_CTX_free(drbg->rand);
+ drbg->rand = NULL;
+ drbg->type = 0;
+ drbg->flags = 0;
+ return 0;
}
/*
int RAND_DRBG_set_defaults(int type, unsigned int flags)
{
int all;
- if (!(is_digest(type) || is_ctr(type))) {
+ const char *name;
+ OSSL_PARAM params[3];
+
+ if (!get_drbg_params(type, flags, &name, params)) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET_DEFAULTS, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE);
return 0;
}
/*
- * Allocate memory and initialize a new DRBG. The DRBG is allocated on
- * the secure heap if |secure| is nonzero and the secure heap is enabled.
+ * Allocate memory and initialize a new DRBG.
* The |parent|, if not NULL, will be used as random source for reseeding.
*
* Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure.
*/
-static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure,
+static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx,
int type,
unsigned int flags,
RAND_DRBG *parent)
{
- RAND_DRBG *drbg = secure ?
- OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg)) : OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg));
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg));
if (drbg == NULL) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
- drbg->secure = secure && CRYPTO_secure_allocated(drbg);
- drbg->fork_count = rand_fork_count;
+ drbg->libctx = ctx;
drbg->parent = parent;
- if (parent == NULL) {
- drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy;
- drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy;
-#ifndef RAND_DRBG_GET_RANDOM_NONCE
- drbg->get_nonce = rand_drbg_get_nonce;
- drbg->cleanup_nonce = rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce;
-#endif
-
- drbg->reseed_interval = master_reseed_interval;
- drbg->reseed_time_interval = master_reseed_time_interval;
- } else {
- drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy;
- drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy;
- /*
- * Do not provide nonce callbacks, the child DRBGs will
- * obtain their nonce using random bits from the parent.
- */
-
- drbg->reseed_interval = slave_reseed_interval;
- drbg->reseed_time_interval = slave_reseed_time_interval;
- }
-
if (RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, type, flags) == 0)
goto err;
- if (parent != NULL) {
- rand_drbg_lock(parent);
- if (drbg->strength > parent->strength) {
- /*
- * We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C
- * 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source
- */
- rand_drbg_unlock(parent);
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, RAND_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK);
- goto err;
- }
- rand_drbg_unlock(parent);
- }
-
return drbg;
err:
return NULL;
}
-RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
+RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, int type, unsigned int flags,
+ RAND_DRBG *parent)
{
- return rand_drbg_new(0, type, flags, parent);
+ return rand_drbg_new(ctx, type, flags, parent);
}
-RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_secure_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
+RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
{
- return rand_drbg_new(1, type, flags, parent);
+ return RAND_DRBG_new_ex(NULL, type, flags, parent);
}
/*
if (drbg == NULL)
return;
- if (drbg->meth != NULL)
- drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg);
- rand_pool_free(drbg->adin_pool);
- CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(drbg->lock);
- CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DRBG, drbg, &drbg->ex_data);
-
- if (drbg->secure)
- OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(*drbg));
- else
- OPENSSL_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(*drbg));
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RAND_DRBG, drbg, &drbg->ex_data);
+ OPENSSL_free(drbg);
}
/*
int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen)
{
- unsigned char *nonce = NULL, *entropy = NULL;
- size_t noncelen = 0, entropylen = 0;
- size_t min_entropy = drbg->strength;
- size_t min_entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen;
- size_t max_entropylen = drbg->max_entropylen;
-
- if (perslen > drbg->max_perslen) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
- RAND_R_PERSONALISATION_STRING_TOO_LONG);
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (drbg->meth == NULL) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
- RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED);
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
- drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR ? RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE
- : RAND_R_ALREADY_INSTANTIATED);
- goto end;
- }
-
- drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
-
- /*
- * NIST SP800-90Ar1 section 9.1 says you can combine getting the entropy
- * and nonce in 1 call by increasing the entropy with 50% and increasing
- * the minimum length to accomadate the length of the nonce.
- * We do this in case a nonce is require and get_nonce is NULL.
- */
- if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce == NULL) {
- min_entropy += drbg->strength / 2;
- min_entropylen += drbg->min_noncelen;
- max_entropylen += drbg->max_noncelen;
- }
-
- drbg->reseed_next_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter);
- if (drbg->reseed_next_counter) {
- drbg->reseed_next_counter++;
- if(!drbg->reseed_next_counter)
- drbg->reseed_next_counter = 1;
- }
-
- if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL)
- entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, min_entropy,
- min_entropylen, max_entropylen, 0);
- if (entropylen < min_entropylen
- || entropylen > max_entropylen) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce != NULL) {
- noncelen = drbg->get_nonce(drbg, &nonce, drbg->strength / 2,
- drbg->min_noncelen, drbg->max_noncelen);
- if (noncelen < drbg->min_noncelen || noncelen > drbg->max_noncelen) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE);
- goto end;
- }
- }
-
- if (!drbg->meth->instantiate(drbg, entropy, entropylen,
- nonce, noncelen, pers, perslen)) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG);
- goto end;
- }
-
- drbg->state = DRBG_READY;
- drbg->reseed_gen_counter = 1;
- drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL);
- tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, drbg->reseed_next_counter);
-
- end:
- if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
- drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
- if (nonce != NULL && drbg->cleanup_nonce != NULL)
- drbg->cleanup_nonce(drbg, nonce, noncelen);
- if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY)
- return 1;
- return 0;
+ return EVP_RAND_instantiate(drbg->rand, EVP_RAND_strength(drbg->rand), 0,
+ pers, perslen);
}
/*
int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
{
int index = -1, type, flags;
- if (drbg->meth == NULL) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_UNINSTANTIATE,
- RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED);
- return 0;
- }
- /* Clear the entire drbg->ctr struct, then reset some important
- * members of the drbg->ctr struct (e.g. keysize, df_ks) to their
- * initial values.
- */
- drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg);
+ if (!EVP_RAND_uninstantiate(drbg->rand))
+ return 0;
/* The reset uses the default values for type and flags */
if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER)
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen,
int prediction_resistance)
{
- unsigned char *entropy = NULL;
- size_t entropylen = 0;
-
- if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
- return 0;
- }
- if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (adin == NULL) {
- adinlen = 0;
- } else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
- return 0;
- }
-
- drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
-
- drbg->reseed_next_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter);
- if (drbg->reseed_next_counter) {
- drbg->reseed_next_counter++;
- if(!drbg->reseed_next_counter)
- drbg->reseed_next_counter = 1;
- }
-
- if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL)
- entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
- drbg->min_entropylen,
- drbg->max_entropylen,
- prediction_resistance);
- if (entropylen < drbg->min_entropylen
- || entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (!drbg->meth->reseed(drbg, entropy, entropylen, adin, adinlen))
- goto end;
-
- drbg->state = DRBG_READY;
- drbg->reseed_gen_counter = 1;
- drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL);
- tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, drbg->reseed_next_counter);
-
- end:
- if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
- drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
- if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY)
- return 1;
- return 0;
+ return EVP_RAND_reseed(drbg->rand, prediction_resistance, NULL, 0,
+ adin, adinlen);
}
/*
- * Restart |drbg|, using the specified entropy or additional input
- *
- * Tries its best to get the drbg instantiated by all means,
- * regardless of its current state.
+ * Generate |outlen| bytes into the buffer at |out|. Reseed if we need
+ * to or if |prediction_resistance| is set. Additional input can be
+ * sent in |adin| and |adinlen|.
*
- * Optionally, a |buffer| of |len| random bytes can be passed,
- * which is assumed to contain at least |entropy| bits of entropy.
+ * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
*
- * If |entropy| > 0, the buffer content is used as entropy input.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
*
- * If |entropy| == 0, the buffer content is used as additional input
+ */
+int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
+ int prediction_resistance,
+ const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
+{
+ return EVP_RAND_generate(drbg->rand, out, outlen, 0,
+ prediction_resistance, adin, adinlen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generates |outlen| random bytes and stores them in |out|. It will
+ * using the given |drbg| to generate the bytes.
*
- * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
+ * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
*
- * This function is used internally only.
+ * Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
*/
-int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
- const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy)
+int RAND_DRBG_bytes(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
{
- int reseeded = 0;
- const unsigned char *adin = NULL;
- size_t adinlen = 0;
-
- if (drbg->pool != NULL) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
- rand_pool_free(drbg->pool);
- drbg->pool = NULL;
+ return EVP_RAND_generate(drbg->rand, out, outlen, 0, 0, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+/* DRBG call back shims */
+static int rand_drbg_get_entroy_cb(const OSSL_PARAM *params, OSSL_PARAM *out,
+ void *vdrbg)
+{
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg = (RAND_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+ int entropy = 0, prediction_resistance = 0;
+ size_t min_len = 0, max_len = 2048;
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ OSSL_PARAM *q;
+
+ if (drbg->get_entropy == NULL)
return 0;
- }
- if (buffer != NULL) {
- if (entropy > 0) {
- if (drbg->max_entropylen < len) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART,
- RAND_R_ENTROPY_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
- drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (entropy > 8 * len) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, RAND_R_ENTROPY_OUT_OF_RANGE);
- drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* will be picked up by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback */
- drbg->pool = rand_pool_attach(buffer, len, entropy);
- if (drbg->pool == NULL)
- return 0;
- } else {
- if (drbg->max_adinlen < len) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART,
- RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
- drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- adin = buffer;
- adinlen = len;
- }
- }
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_ENTROPY_REQUIRED);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &entropy))
+ return 0;
- /* repair error state */
- if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR)
- RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg);
-
- /* repair uninitialized state */
- if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
- /* reinstantiate drbg */
- RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg,
- (const unsigned char *) ossl_pers_string,
- sizeof(ossl_pers_string) - 1);
- /* already reseeded. prevent second reseeding below */
- reseeded = (drbg->state == DRBG_READY);
- }
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_PREDICTION_RESISTANCE);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &prediction_resistance))
+ return 0;
- /* refresh current state if entropy or additional input has been provided */
- if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY) {
- if (adin != NULL) {
- /*
- * mix in additional input without reseeding
- *
- * Similar to RAND_DRBG_reseed(), but the provided additional
- * data |adin| is mixed into the current state without pulling
- * entropy from the trusted entropy source using get_entropy().
- * This is not a reseeding in the strict sense of NIST SP 800-90A.
- */
- drbg->meth->reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0);
- } else if (reseeded == 0) {
- /* do a full reseeding if it has not been done yet above */
- RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, NULL, 0, 0);
- }
- }
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_LENGTH);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &max_len))
+ return 0;
- rand_pool_free(drbg->pool);
- drbg->pool = NULL;
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MIN_LENGTH);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &min_len))
+ return 0;
- return drbg->state == DRBG_READY;
+ q = OSSL_PARAM_locate(out, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RANDOM_DATA);
+ if (q == NULL || q->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_PTR || q->data == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ q->return_size = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, (unsigned char **)q->data, entropy,
+ min_len, max_len, prediction_resistance);
+ return 1;
}
-/*
- * Generate |outlen| bytes into the buffer at |out|. Reseed if we need
- * to or if |prediction_resistance| is set. Additional input can be
- * sent in |adin| and |adinlen|.
- *
- * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
- *
- * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
- *
- */
-int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
- int prediction_resistance,
- const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
+static int rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy_cb(const OSSL_PARAM *params, void *vdrbg)
{
- int reseed_required = 0;
-
- if (drbg->state != DRBG_READY) {
- /* try to recover from previous errors */
- rand_drbg_restart(drbg, NULL, 0, 0);
-
- if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
- return 0;
- }
- if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED);
- return 0;
- }
- }
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg = (RAND_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ size_t sz;
- if (outlen > drbg->max_request) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE_FOR_DRBG);
+ if (drbg->cleanup_entropy == NULL)
return 0;
- }
- if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_SIZE);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &sz))
return 0;
- }
- if (drbg->fork_count != rand_fork_count) {
- drbg->fork_count = rand_fork_count;
- reseed_required = 1;
- }
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RANDOM_DATA);
+ if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_PTR)
+ return 0;
- if (drbg->reseed_interval > 0) {
- if (drbg->reseed_gen_counter > drbg->reseed_interval)
- reseed_required = 1;
- }
- if (drbg->reseed_time_interval > 0) {
- time_t now = time(NULL);
- if (now < drbg->reseed_time
- || now - drbg->reseed_time >= drbg->reseed_time_interval)
- reseed_required = 1;
- }
- if (drbg->parent != NULL) {
- unsigned int reseed_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter);
- if (reseed_counter > 0
- && tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_prop_counter)
- != reseed_counter)
- reseed_required = 1;
- }
+ drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, p->data, sz);
+ return 1;
+}
- if (reseed_required || prediction_resistance) {
- if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen, prediction_resistance)) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- adin = NULL;
- adinlen = 0;
- }
+static int rand_drbg_get_nonce_cb(const OSSL_PARAM *params, OSSL_PARAM *out,
+ void *vdrbg)
+{
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg = (RAND_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+ int entropy = 0;
+ size_t min_len = 0, max_len = 10240;
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ OSSL_PARAM *q;
- if (!drbg->meth->generate(drbg, out, outlen, adin, adinlen)) {
- drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_GENERATE_ERROR);
+ if (drbg->get_nonce == NULL)
return 0;
- }
- drbg->reseed_gen_counter++;
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_ENTROPY_REQUIRED);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &entropy))
+ return 0;
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_LENGTH);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &max_len))
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MIN_LENGTH);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &min_len))
+ return 0;
+
+ q = OSSL_PARAM_locate(out, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RANDOM_DATA);
+ if (q == NULL || q->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_PTR || q->data == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ q->return_size = drbg->get_nonce(drbg, (unsigned char **)q->data, entropy,
+ min_len, max_len);
return 1;
}
-/*
- * Generates |outlen| random bytes and stores them in |out|. It will
- * using the given |drbg| to generate the bytes.
- *
- * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
- *
- * Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
- */
-int RAND_DRBG_bytes(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
+static int rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce_cb(const OSSL_PARAM *params, void *vdrbg)
{
- unsigned char *additional = NULL;
- size_t additional_len;
- size_t chunk;
- size_t ret = 0;
-
- if (drbg->adin_pool == NULL) {
- if (drbg->type == 0)
- goto err;
- drbg->adin_pool = rand_pool_new(0, 0, drbg->max_adinlen);
- if (drbg->adin_pool == NULL)
- goto err;
- }
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg = (RAND_DRBG *)vdrbg;
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ size_t sz;
- additional_len = rand_drbg_get_additional_data(drbg->adin_pool,
- &additional);
+ if (drbg->cleanup_nonce == NULL)
+ return 0;
- for ( ; outlen > 0; outlen -= chunk, out += chunk) {
- chunk = outlen;
- if (chunk > drbg->max_request)
- chunk = drbg->max_request;
- ret = RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, out, chunk, 0, additional, additional_len);
- if (!ret)
- goto err;
- }
- ret = 1;
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_SIZE);
+ if (p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &sz))
+ return 0;
- err:
- if (additional != NULL)
- rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(drbg->adin_pool, additional);
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RANDOM_DATA);
+ if (p == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_PTR)
+ return 0;
- return ret;
+ drbg->cleanup_nonce(drbg, p->data, sz);
+ return 1;
}
/*
RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn get_nonce,
RAND_DRBG_cleanup_nonce_fn cleanup_nonce)
{
- if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED
- || drbg->parent != NULL)
+ EVP_RAND_CTX *rand = drbg->rand;
+ OSSL_INOUT_CALLBACK *g_ent = NULL, *g_nonce = NULL;
+ OSSL_CALLBACK *c_ent = NULL, *c_nonce = NULL;
+
+ if (get_entropy != NULL) {
+ g_ent = &rand_drbg_get_entroy_cb;
+ c_ent = &rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy_cb;
+ }
+ if (get_nonce != NULL) {
+ g_nonce = rand_drbg_get_nonce_cb;
+ c_nonce = rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce_cb;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_RAND_set_callbacks(rand, g_ent, c_ent, g_nonce, c_nonce, drbg))
return 0;
- drbg->get_entropy = get_entropy;
- drbg->cleanup_entropy = cleanup_entropy;
- drbg->get_nonce = get_nonce;
- drbg->cleanup_nonce = cleanup_nonce;
+
+ drbg->get_entropy = g_ent != NULL ? get_entropy : NULL;
+ drbg->cleanup_entropy = c_ent != NULL ? cleanup_entropy : NULL;
+ drbg->get_nonce = g_nonce != NULL ? get_nonce : NULL;
+ drbg->cleanup_nonce = c_nonce != NULL ? cleanup_nonce : NULL;
return 1;
}
*/
int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_interval(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned int interval)
{
+ OSSL_PARAM params[2] = { OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END };
+
if (interval > MAX_RESEED_INTERVAL)
return 0;
- drbg->reseed_interval = interval;
- return 1;
+ params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_REQUESTS,
+ &interval);
+ return EVP_RAND_set_ctx_params(drbg->rand, params);
}
/*
*/
int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_time_interval(RAND_DRBG *drbg, time_t interval)
{
+ OSSL_PARAM params[2] = { OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END };
+
if (interval > MAX_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL)
return 0;
- drbg->reseed_time_interval = interval;
- return 1;
+ params[0] =
+ OSSL_PARAM_construct_time_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL,
+ &interval);
+ return EVP_RAND_set_ctx_params(drbg->rand, params);
}
/*
return 1;
}
-/*
- * Locks the given drbg. Locking a drbg which does not have locking
- * enabled is considered a successful no-op.
- *
- * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
- */
-int rand_drbg_lock(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
-{
- if (drbg->lock != NULL)
- return CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->lock);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Unlocks the given drbg. Unlocking a drbg which does not have locking
- * enabled is considered a successful no-op.
- *
- * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
- */
-int rand_drbg_unlock(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
-{
- if (drbg->lock != NULL)
- return CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->lock);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Enables locking for the given drbg
- *
- * Locking can only be enabled if the random generator
- * is in the uninitialized state.
- *
- * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
- */
-int rand_drbg_enable_locking(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
-{
- if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_ENABLE_LOCKING,
- RAND_R_DRBG_ALREADY_INITIALIZED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (drbg->lock == NULL) {
- if (drbg->parent != NULL && drbg->parent->lock == NULL) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_ENABLE_LOCKING,
- RAND_R_PARENT_LOCKING_NOT_ENABLED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- drbg->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
- if (drbg->lock == NULL) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_ENABLE_LOCKING,
- RAND_R_FAILED_TO_CREATE_LOCK);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
/*
* Get and set the EXDATA
*/
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&drbg->ex_data, idx);
}
-
/*
* The following functions provide a RAND_METHOD that works on the
* global DRBG. They lock.
*
* Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure.
*/
-static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(RAND_DRBG *parent, int drbg_type)
+static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_DRBG *parent, int drbg_type)
{
RAND_DRBG *drbg;
- drbg = RAND_DRBG_secure_new(rand_drbg_type[drbg_type],
- rand_drbg_flags[drbg_type], parent);
+ drbg = RAND_DRBG_new_ex(ctx, rand_drbg_type[drbg_type],
+ rand_drbg_flags[drbg_type], parent);
if (drbg == NULL)
return NULL;
/* Only the master DRBG needs to have a lock */
- if (parent == NULL && rand_drbg_enable_locking(drbg) == 0)
+ if (parent == NULL && EVP_RAND_enable_locking(drbg->rand) == 0)
goto err;
- /* enable seed propagation */
- tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, 1);
-
/*
* Ignore instantiation error to support just-in-time instantiation.
*
* The state of the drbg will be checked in RAND_DRBG_generate() and
* an automatic recovery is attempted.
*/
- (void)RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg,
- (const unsigned char *) ossl_pers_string,
- sizeof(ossl_pers_string) - 1);
+ (void)RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, NULL, 0);
return drbg;
err:
return NULL;
}
-/*
- * Initialize the global DRBGs on first use.
- * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
- */
-DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_drbg_init)
-{
- /*
- * ensure that libcrypto is initialized, otherwise the
- * DRBG locks are not cleaned up properly
- */
- if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL))
- return 0;
-
- if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&private_drbg, NULL))
- return 0;
-
- if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&public_drbg, NULL))
- goto err1;
-
- master_drbg = drbg_setup(NULL, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER);
- if (master_drbg == NULL)
- goto err2;
-
- return 1;
-
-err2:
- CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&public_drbg);
-err1:
- CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&private_drbg);
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Clean up the global DRBGs before exit */
-void rand_drbg_cleanup_int(void)
-{
- if (master_drbg != NULL) {
- RAND_DRBG_free(master_drbg);
- master_drbg = NULL;
-
- CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&private_drbg);
- CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&public_drbg);
- }
-}
-
-void drbg_delete_thread_state(void)
+static void drbg_delete_thread_state(void *arg)
{
+ OPENSSL_CTX *ctx = arg;
+ DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
RAND_DRBG *drbg;
- drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&public_drbg);
- CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&public_drbg, NULL);
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
+ return;
+ drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->public_drbg);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->public_drbg, NULL);
RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
- drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&private_drbg);
- CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&private_drbg, NULL);
+ drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->private_drbg, NULL);
RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
}
return ret;
}
-/*
- * Calculates the minimum length of a full entropy buffer
- * which is necessary to seed (i.e. instantiate) the DRBG
- * successfully.
- *
- * NOTE: There is a copy of this function in drbgtest.c.
- * If you change anything here, you need to update
- * the copy accordingly.
- */
-static size_t rand_drbg_seedlen(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
-{
- /*
- * If no os entropy source is available then RAND_seed(buffer, bufsize)
- * is expected to succeed if and only if the buffer length satisfies
- * the following requirements, which follow from the calculations
- * in RAND_DRBG_instantiate().
- */
- size_t min_entropy = drbg->strength;
- size_t min_entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen;
-
- /*
- * Extra entropy for the random nonce in the absence of a
- * get_nonce callback, see comment in RAND_DRBG_instantiate().
- */
- if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce == NULL) {
- min_entropy += drbg->strength / 2;
- min_entropylen += drbg->min_noncelen;
- }
-
- /*
- * Convert entropy requirement from bits to bytes
- * (dividing by 8 without rounding upwards, because
- * all entropy requirements are divisible by 8).
- */
- min_entropy >>= 3;
-
- /* Return a value that satisfies both requirements */
- return min_entropy > min_entropylen ? min_entropy : min_entropylen;
-}
-
/* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_add() method */
static int drbg_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness)
{
- int ret = 0;
RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master();
- size_t buflen;
- size_t seedlen;
- if (drbg == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- if (num < 0 || randomness < 0.0)
+ if (drbg == NULL || num <= 0)
return 0;
- rand_drbg_lock(drbg);
- seedlen = rand_drbg_seedlen(drbg);
-
- buflen = (size_t)num;
-
- if (buflen < seedlen || randomness < (double) seedlen) {
-#if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
- /*
- * If no os entropy source is available, a reseeding will fail
- * inevitably. So we use a trick to mix the buffer contents into
- * the DRBG state without forcing a reseeding: we generate a
- * dummy random byte, using the buffer content as additional data.
- * Note: This won't work with RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF.
- */
- unsigned char dummy[1];
-
- ret = RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, dummy, sizeof(dummy), 0, buf, buflen);
- rand_drbg_unlock(drbg);
- return ret;
-#else
- /*
- * If an os entropy source is avaible then we declare the buffer content
- * as additional data by setting randomness to zero and trigger a regular
- * reseeding.
- */
- randomness = 0.0;
-#endif
- }
-
-
- if (randomness > (double)seedlen) {
- /*
- * The purpose of this check is to bound |randomness| by a
- * relatively small value in order to prevent an integer
- * overflow when multiplying by 8 in the rand_drbg_restart()
- * call below. Note that randomness is measured in bytes,
- * not bits, so this value corresponds to eight times the
- * security strength.
- */
- randomness = (double)seedlen;
- }
-
- ret = rand_drbg_restart(drbg, buf, buflen, (size_t)(8 * randomness));
- rand_drbg_unlock(drbg);
-
- return ret;
+ return EVP_RAND_reseed(drbg->rand, 0, NULL, 0, buf, num);
}
/* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_seed() method */
if (drbg == NULL)
return 0;
- rand_drbg_lock(drbg);
- ret = drbg->state == DRBG_READY ? 1 : 0;
- rand_drbg_unlock(drbg);
+ ret = EVP_RAND_state(drbg->rand) == EVP_RAND_STATE_READY ? 1 : 0;
return ret;
}
+int RAND_DRBG_verify_zeroization(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
+{
+ return EVP_RAND_verify_zeroization(drbg->rand);
+}
+
/*
* Get the master DRBG.
* Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure.
*
*/
-RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_master(void)
+RAND_DRBG *OPENSSL_CTX_get0_master_drbg(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
{
- if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init))
+ DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
+
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
return NULL;
- return master_drbg;
+ if (dgbl->master_drbg == NULL) {
+ if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(dgbl->lock))
+ return NULL;
+ if (dgbl->master_drbg == NULL)
+ dgbl->master_drbg = drbg_setup(ctx, NULL, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(dgbl->lock);
+ }
+ return dgbl->master_drbg;
+}
+
+RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_master(void)
+{
+ return OPENSSL_CTX_get0_master_drbg(NULL);
}
/*
* Get the public DRBG.
* Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure.
*/
-RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_public(void)
+RAND_DRBG *OPENSSL_CTX_get0_public_drbg(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
{
- RAND_DRBG *drbg;
+ DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg, *master;
- if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init))
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
return NULL;
- drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&public_drbg);
+ drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->public_drbg);
if (drbg == NULL) {
- if (!ossl_init_thread_start(OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_RAND))
+ master = OPENSSL_CTX_get0_master_drbg(ctx);
+ if (master == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ctx = openssl_ctx_get_concrete(ctx);
+ /*
+ * If the private_drbg is also NULL then this is the first time we've
+ * used this thread.
+ */
+ if (CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->private_drbg) == NULL
+ && !ossl_init_thread_start(NULL, ctx, drbg_delete_thread_state))
return NULL;
- drbg = drbg_setup(master_drbg, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC);
- CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&public_drbg, drbg);
+ drbg = drbg_setup(ctx, master, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->public_drbg, drbg);
}
return drbg;
}
+RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_public(void)
+{
+ return OPENSSL_CTX_get0_public_drbg(NULL);
+}
+
/*
* Get the private DRBG.
* Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure.
*/
-RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_private(void)
+RAND_DRBG *OPENSSL_CTX_get0_private_drbg(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
{
- RAND_DRBG *drbg;
+ DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg, *master;
- if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init))
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
return NULL;
- drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&private_drbg);
+ drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
if (drbg == NULL) {
- if (!ossl_init_thread_start(OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_RAND))
+ master = OPENSSL_CTX_get0_master_drbg(ctx);
+ if (master == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ctx = openssl_ctx_get_concrete(ctx);
+ /*
+ * If the public_drbg is also NULL then this is the first time we've
+ * used this thread.
+ */
+ if (CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->public_drbg) == NULL
+ && !ossl_init_thread_start(NULL, ctx, drbg_delete_thread_state))
return NULL;
- drbg = drbg_setup(master_drbg, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE);
- CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&private_drbg, drbg);
+ drbg = drbg_setup(ctx, master, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->private_drbg, drbg);
}
return drbg;
}
+RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_private(void)
+{
+ return OPENSSL_CTX_get0_private_drbg(NULL);
+}
+
RAND_METHOD rand_meth = {
drbg_seed,
drbg_bytes,
RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void)
{
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
return &rand_meth;
+#else
+ return NULL;
+#endif
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff