/* p12_kiss.c */
-/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (shenson@bigfoot.com) for the OpenSSL
- * project 1999.
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 1999.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
*/
#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include "pkcs12.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
/* Simplified PKCS#12 routines */
-#ifndef NOPROTO
-static int parse_pk12( PKCS12 *p12, unsigned char *pass, int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK **ca);
-static int parse_bags( STACK *bags, unsigned char *pass, int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK **ca, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, char *keymatch);
-static int parse_bag( PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, unsigned char *pass, int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK **ca, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, char *keymatch);
-#else
-static int parse_pk12();
-static int parse_bags();
-static int parse_bag();
-#endif
-
-/* Parse and decrypt a PKCS#12 structure returning user key, user cert
- * and other (CA) certs. Note either ca should be NULL, *ca should be NULL,
- * or it should point to a valid STACK structure. pkey and cert can be
- * passed unitialised.
+static int parse_pk12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
+ EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts);
+
+static int parse_bags(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass,
+ int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts);
+
+static int parse_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen,
+ EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts);
+
+/*
+ * Parse and decrypt a PKCS#12 structure returning user key, user cert and
+ * other (CA) certs. Note either ca should be NULL, *ca should be NULL, or it
+ * should point to a valid STACK structure. pkey and cert can be passed
+ * unitialised.
*/
-int PKCS12_parse (PKCS12 *p12, char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
- STACK **ca)
+int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
+ STACK_OF(X509) **ca)
{
+ STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts = NULL;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ /* Check for NULL PKCS12 structure */
-/* Check for NULL PKCS12 structure */
+ if (!p12) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,
+ PKCS12_R_INVALID_NULL_PKCS12_POINTER);
+ return 0;
+ }
-if(!p12) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_INVALID_NULL_PKCS12_POINTER);
- return 0;
-}
+ if (pkey)
+ *pkey = NULL;
+ if (cert)
+ *cert = NULL;
-/* Allocate stack for ca certificates if needed */
-if ((ca != NULL) && (*ca == NULL)) {
- if (!(*ca = sk_new(NULL))) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
-}
+ /* Check the mac */
-if(pkey) *pkey = NULL;
-if(cert) *cert = NULL;
+ /*
+ * If password is zero length or NULL then try verifying both cases to
+ * determine which password is correct. The reason for this is that under
+ * PKCS#12 password based encryption no password and a zero length
+ * password are two different things...
+ */
-/* Check the mac */
+ if (!pass || !*pass) {
+ if (PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0))
+ pass = NULL;
+ else if (PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, "", 0))
+ pass = "";
+ else {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE, PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, pass, -1)) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE, PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
-if (!PKCS12_verify_mac (p12, pass, -1)) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE);
- goto err;
-}
+ /* Allocate stack for other certificates */
+ ocerts = sk_X509_new_null();
-if (!parse_pk12 (p12, pass, -1, pkey, cert, ca)) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_PARSE_ERROR);
- goto err;
-}
+ if (!ocerts) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!parse_pk12(p12, pass, -1, pkey, ocerts)) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE, PKCS12_R_PARSE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ while ((x = sk_X509_pop(ocerts))) {
+ if (pkey && *pkey && cert && !*cert) {
+ ERR_set_mark();
+ if (X509_check_private_key(x, *pkey)) {
+ *cert = x;
+ x = NULL;
+ }
+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
+ }
-return 1;
+ if (ca && x) {
+ if (!*ca)
+ *ca = sk_X509_new_null();
+ if (!*ca)
+ goto err;
+ if (!sk_X509_push(*ca, x))
+ goto err;
+ x = NULL;
+ }
+ X509_free(x);
+ }
-err:
+ sk_X509_pop_free(ocerts, X509_free);
-if (pkey && *pkey) EVP_PKEY_free (*pkey);
-if (cert && *cert) X509_free (*cert);
-if (ca) sk_pop_free (*ca, X509_free);
-return 0;
+ return 1;
+
+ err:
+
+ if (pkey)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(*pkey);
+ if (cert)
+ X509_free(*cert);
+ X509_free(x);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(ocerts, X509_free);
+ return 0;
}
/* Parse the outer PKCS#12 structure */
-static int parse_pk12 (PKCS12 *p12, unsigned char *pass, int passlen,
- EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK **ca)
+static int parse_pk12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
+ EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts)
{
- STACK *asafes, *bags;
- int i, bagnid;
- PKCS7 *p7;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *keyid = NULL;
- char keymatch = 0;
- if (!( asafes = M_PKCS12_unpack_authsafes (p12))) return 0;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_num (asafes); i++) {
- p7 = (PKCS7 *) sk_value (asafes, i);
- bagnid = OBJ_obj2nid (p7->type);
- if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_data) {
- bags = M_PKCS12_unpack_p7data (p7);
- } else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
- bags = M_PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata (p7, pass, passlen);
- } else continue;
- if (!bags) {
- sk_pop_free (asafes, PKCS7_free);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!parse_bags (bags, pass, passlen, pkey, cert, ca,
- &keyid, &keymatch)) {
- sk_pop_free (bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
- sk_pop_free (asafes, PKCS7_free);
- return 0;
- }
- sk_pop_free (bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
- }
- sk_pop_free (asafes, PKCS7_free);
- if (keyid) ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free (keyid);
- return 1;
-}
+ STACK_OF(PKCS7) *asafes;
+ STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags;
+ int i, bagnid;
+ PKCS7 *p7;
+ if ((asafes = PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(p12)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_num(asafes); i++) {
+ p7 = sk_PKCS7_value(asafes, i);
+ bagnid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
+ if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_data) {
+ bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7);
+ } else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
+ bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, pass, passlen);
+ } else
+ continue;
+ if (!bags) {
+ sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!parse_bags(bags, pass, passlen, pkey, ocerts)) {
+ sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
+ sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
+ }
+ sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
+ return 1;
+}
-static int parse_bags (STACK *bags, unsigned char *pass, int passlen,
- EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK **ca, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
- char *keymatch)
+static int parse_bags(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass,
+ int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts)
{
- int i;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_num (bags); i++) {
- if (!parse_bag ((PKCS12_SAFEBAG *)sk_value (bags, i),
- pass, passlen, pkey, cert, ca, keyid,
- keymatch)) return 0;
- }
- return 1;
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_num(bags); i++) {
+ if (!parse_bag(sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_value(bags, i),
+ pass, passlen, pkey, ocerts))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
}
-#define MATCH_KEY 0x1
-#define MATCH_CERT 0x2
-#define MATCH_ALL 0x3
-
-static int parse_bag (PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, unsigned char *pass, int passlen,
- EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK **ca, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
- char *keymatch)
+static int parse_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen,
+ EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts)
{
- PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8;
- X509 *x509;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *lkey = NULL;
- ASN1_TYPE *attrib;
-
-
- if ((attrib = PKCS12_get_attr (bag, NID_localKeyID)))
- lkey = attrib->value.octet_string;
-
- /* Check for any local key id matching (if needed) */
- if (lkey && ((*keymatch & MATCH_ALL) != MATCH_ALL)) {
- if (*keyid) {
- if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp (*keyid, lkey)) lkey = NULL;
- } else {
- if (!(*keyid = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup (lkey))) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PARSE_BAGS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
-
- switch (M_PKCS12_bag_type(bag))
- {
- case NID_keyBag:
- if (!lkey || !pkey) return 1;
- if (!(*pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY (bag->value.keybag))) return 0;
- *keymatch |= MATCH_KEY;
- break;
-
- case NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag:
- if (!lkey || !pkey) return 1;
- if (!(p8 = M_PKCS12_decrypt_skey (bag, pass, passlen)))
- return 0;
- *pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY (p8);
- PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free (p8);
- if (!(*pkey)) return 0;
- *keymatch |= MATCH_KEY;
- break;
-
- case NID_certBag:
- if (M_PKCS12_cert_bag_type(bag) != NID_x509Certificate )
- return 1;
- if (!(x509 = M_PKCS12_certbag2x509(bag))) return 0;
- if (lkey) {
- *keymatch |= MATCH_CERT;
- if (cert) *cert = x509;
- } else if (ca) sk_push (*ca, (char *)x509);
- break;
-
- case NID_safeContentsBag:
- return parse_bags(bag->value.safes, pass, passlen,
- pkey, cert, ca, keyid, keymatch);
- break;
-
- default:
- return 1;
- break;
- }
- return 1;
-}
+ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8;
+ X509 *x509;
+ ASN1_TYPE *attrib;
+ ASN1_BMPSTRING *fname = NULL;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *lkid = NULL;
+
+ if ((attrib = PKCS12_get_attr(bag, NID_friendlyName)))
+ fname = attrib->value.bmpstring;
+
+ if ((attrib = PKCS12_get_attr(bag, NID_localKeyID)))
+ lkid = attrib->value.octet_string;
+
+ switch (M_PKCS12_bag_type(bag)) {
+ case NID_keyBag:
+ if (!pkey || *pkey)
+ return 1;
+ if ((*pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(bag->value.keybag)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag:
+ if (!pkey || *pkey)
+ return 1;
+ if ((p8 = PKCS12_decrypt_skey(bag, pass, passlen)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ *pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);
+ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
+ if (!(*pkey))
+ return 0;
+ break;
+
+ case NID_certBag:
+ if (M_PKCS12_cert_bag_type(bag) != NID_x509Certificate)
+ return 1;
+ if ((x509 = PKCS12_certbag2x509(bag)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (lkid && !X509_keyid_set1(x509, lkid->data, lkid->length)) {
+ X509_free(x509);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (fname) {
+ int len, r;
+ unsigned char *data;
+ len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&data, fname);
+ if (len >= 0) {
+ r = X509_alias_set1(x509, data, len);
+ OPENSSL_free(data);
+ if (!r) {
+ X509_free(x509);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!sk_X509_push(ocerts, x509)) {
+ X509_free(x509);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ break;
+
+ case NID_safeContentsBag:
+ return parse_bags(bag->value.safes, pass, passlen, pkey, ocerts);
+
+ default:
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
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