Correct serious bug in AES-CBC decryption when the message length isn't

[openssl.git] / crypto / opensslconf.h.in

diff --git a/crypto/opensslconf.h.in b/crypto/opensslconf.h.in
index 5da5911228a4a613fb9c9e9072a716e67d6ca457..685e83b7a33ff912a508ceb5b2bc25b9a941be07 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/opensslconf.h.in
+++ b/crypto/opensslconf.h.in
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
 #undef OPENSSL_UNISTD
 #define OPENSSL_UNISTD <unistd.h>
 
+#undef OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION
+
 #if defined(HEADER_IDEA_H) && !defined(IDEA_INT)
 #define IDEA_INT unsigned int
 #endif
@@ -45,7 +47,7 @@
 #endif
 #endif
 
-#if defined(HEADER_DES_H) && !defined(DES_LONG)
+#if (defined(HEADER_NEW_DES_H) || defined(HEADER_DES_H)) && !defined(DES_LONG)
 /* If this is set to 'unsigned int' on a DEC Alpha, this gives about a
  * %20 speed up (longs are 8 bytes, int's are 4). */
 #ifndef DES_LONG
@@ -145,7 +147,7 @@ YOU SHOULD NOT HAVE BOTH DES_RISC1 AND DES_RISC2 DEFINED!!!!!
 #  define DES_PTR
 #  define DES_RISC2
 #  define DES_UNROLL
-#elif defined( i386 )          /* x86 boxes, should be gcc */
+#elif defined(i386) || defined(__i386__)       /* x86 boxes, should be gcc */
 #  define DES_PTR
 #  define DES_RISC1
 #  define DES_UNROLL