/*
* Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
#include "internal/evp_int.h"
#include "modes_lcl.h"
#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/cmac.h>
#include "evp_locl.h"
typedef struct {
int taglen;
int iv_gen; /* It is OK to generate IVs */
int tls_aad_len; /* TLS AAD length */
+ uint64_t tls_enc_records; /* Number of TLS records encrypted */
ctr128_f ctr;
} EVP_AES_GCM_CTX;
const unsigned char iv[16]);
#endif
+/* increment counter (64-bit int) by 1 */
+static void ctr64_inc(unsigned char *counter)
+{
+ int n = 8;
+ unsigned char c;
+
+ do {
+ --n;
+ c = counter[n];
+ ++c;
+ counter[n] = c;
+ if (c)
+ return;
+ } while (n);
+}
+
#if defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) && (defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__ppc__) || defined(_ARCH_PPC))
# include "ppc_arch.h"
# ifdef VPAES_ASM
# define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags) \
static const EVP_CIPHER aesni_##keylen##_##mode = { \
nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
- (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \
+ (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, \
+ ivlen, \
flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
aesni_##mode##_init_key, \
aesni_##mode##_cipher, \
NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
- (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \
+ (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, \
+ ivlen, \
flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
aes_##mode##_init_key, \
aes_##mode##_cipher, \
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SIV
+# define aes_t4_siv_init_key aes_siv_init_key
+# define aes_t4_siv_cipher aes_siv_cipher
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SIV */
+
# define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode,MODE,flags) \
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode = { \
nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize,keylen/8,ivlen, \
# define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags) \
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode = { \
nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
- (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \
+ (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, \
+ ivlen, \
flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
aes_t4_##mode##_init_key, \
aes_t4_##mode##_cipher, \
NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
- (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \
+ (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, \
+ ivlen, \
flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
aes_##mode##_init_key, \
aes_##mode##_cipher, \
int res;
} S390X_AES_OFB_CTX;
+typedef struct {
+ union {
+ double align;
+ /*-
+ * KMF-AES parameter block - begin
+ * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-08)
+ */
+ struct {
+ unsigned char cv[16];
+ unsigned char k[32];
+ } param;
+ /* KMF-AES parameter block - end */
+ } kmf;
+ unsigned int fc;
+
+ int res;
+} S390X_AES_CFB_CTX;
+
typedef struct {
union {
double align;
int kreslen;
int tls_aad_len;
+ uint64_t tls_enc_records; /* Number of TLS records encrypted */
} S390X_AES_GCM_CTX;
typedef struct {
return 1;
}
-# define S390X_aes_128_cfb_CAPABLE 0
-# define S390X_aes_192_cfb_CAPABLE 0
-# define S390X_aes_256_cfb_CAPABLE 0
-# define S390X_AES_CFB_CTX EVP_AES_KEY
+# define S390X_aes_128_cfb_CAPABLE (S390X_aes_128_CAPABLE && \
+ (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmf[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)))
+# define S390X_aes_192_cfb_CAPABLE (S390X_aes_192_CAPABLE && \
+ (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmf[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)))
+# define S390X_aes_256_cfb_CAPABLE (S390X_aes_256_CAPABLE && \
+ (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmf[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256)))
+
+static int s390x_aes_cfb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *ivec, int enc)
+{
+ S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx);
+ const unsigned char *iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_original_iv(ctx);
+ const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+ const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+
+ cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
+ cctx->fc |= 16 << 24; /* 16 bytes cipher feedback */
+ if (!enc)
+ cctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT;
-# define s390x_aes_cfb_init_key aes_init_key
+ cctx->res = 0;
+ memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.cv, iv, ivlen);
+ memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.k, key, keylen);
+ return 1;
+}
-# define s390x_aes_cfb_cipher aes_cfb_cipher
static int s390x_aes_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx);
+ const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+ const int enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx);
+ int n = cctx->res;
+ int rem;
+ unsigned char tmp;
+
+ while (n && len) {
+ tmp = *in;
+ *out = cctx->kmf.param.cv[n] ^ tmp;
+ cctx->kmf.param.cv[n] = enc ? *out : tmp;
+ n = (n + 1) & 0xf;
+ --len;
+ ++in;
+ ++out;
+ }
+
+ rem = len & 0xf;
+
+ len &= ~(size_t)0xf;
+ if (len) {
+ s390x_kmf(in, len, out, cctx->fc, &cctx->kmf.param);
+
+ out += len;
+ in += len;
+ }
+
+ if (rem) {
+ s390x_km(cctx->kmf.param.cv, 16, cctx->kmf.param.cv,
+ S390X_AES_FC(keylen), cctx->kmf.param.k);
+
+ while (rem--) {
+ tmp = in[n];
+ out[n] = cctx->kmf.param.cv[n] ^ tmp;
+ cctx->kmf.param.cv[n] = enc ? out[n] : tmp;
+ ++n;
+ }
+ }
+
+ cctx->res = n;
+ return 1;
+}
-# define S390X_aes_128_cfb8_CAPABLE 0
-# define S390X_aes_192_cfb8_CAPABLE 0
-# define S390X_aes_256_cfb8_CAPABLE 0
+# define S390X_aes_128_cfb8_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmf[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128))
+# define S390X_aes_192_cfb8_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmf[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192))
+# define S390X_aes_256_cfb8_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmf[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256))
-# define s390x_aes_cfb8_init_key aes_init_key
+static int s390x_aes_cfb8_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *ivec, int enc)
+{
+ S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx);
+ const unsigned char *iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_original_iv(ctx);
+ const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+ const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+
+ cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
+ cctx->fc |= 1 << 24; /* 1 byte cipher feedback */
+ if (!enc)
+ cctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT;
+
+ memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.cv, iv, ivlen);
+ memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.k, key, keylen);
+ return 1;
+}
-# define s390x_aes_cfb8_cipher aes_cfb8_cipher
static int s390x_aes_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx);
+
+ s390x_kmf(in, len, out, cctx->fc, &cctx->kmf.param);
+ return 1;
+}
# define S390X_aes_128_cfb1_CAPABLE 0
# define S390X_aes_192_cfb1_CAPABLE 0
rem = len & 0xf;
- len &= ~0xf;
+ len &= ~(size_t)0xf;
if (len) {
s390x_kma(aad, len, NULL, 0, NULL, ctx->fc, &ctx->kma.param);
aad += len;
rem = len & 0xf;
- len &= ~0xf;
+ len &= ~(size_t)0xf;
if (len) {
s390x_kma(ctx->ares, ctx->areslen, in, len, out,
ctx->fc | S390X_KMA_LAAD, &ctx->kma.param);
if (gctx->iv != iv)
OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
- gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
- if (gctx->iv == NULL)
+ if ((gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_S390X_AES_GCM_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
+ }
}
/* Add padding. */
memset(gctx->iv + arg, 0, len - arg - 8);
* Invocation field will be at least 8 bytes in size and so no need
* to check wrap around or increment more than last 8 bytes.
*/
- (*(unsigned long long *)(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - 8))++;
+ ctr64_inc(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - 8);
gctx->iv_set = 1;
return 1;
buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c);
memcpy(buf, ptr, arg);
gctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
+ gctx->tls_enc_records = 0;
len = buf[arg - 2] << 8 | buf[arg - 1];
/* Correct length for explicit iv. */
} else {
len = S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(gctx->ivlen);
- gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
- if (gctx_out->iv == NULL)
+ if ((gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_S390X_AES_GCM_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
+ }
memcpy(gctx_out->iv, gctx->iv, len);
}
keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
memcpy(&gctx->kma.param.k, key, keylen);
- /* Convert key size to function code. */
- gctx->fc = S390X_AES_128 + (((keylen << 3) - 128) >> 6);
+ gctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
if (!enc)
gctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT;
if (out != in || len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN))
return -1;
+ /*
+ * Check for too many keys as per FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness
+ * Requirements from SP 800-38D". The requirements is for one party to the
+ * communication to fail after 2^64 - 1 keys. We do this on the encrypting
+ * side only.
+ */
+ if (ctx->encrypt && ++gctx->tls_enc_records == 0) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_S390X_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, enc ? EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN
: EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV,
EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN, out) <= 0)
ctx->aes.ccm.blocks += 2;
rem = alen & 0xf;
- alen &= ~0xf;
+ alen &= ~(size_t)0xf;
if (alen) {
s390x_kmac(aad, alen, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param);
ctx->aes.ccm.blocks += alen >> 4;
num = 0;
rem = len & 0xf;
- len &= ~0xf;
+ len &= ~(size_t)0xf;
if (enc) {
/* mac-then-encrypt */
if (key != NULL) {
keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
- /* Convert key size to function code. */
- cctx->aes.ccm.fc = S390X_AES_128 + (((keylen << 3) - 128) >> 6);
+ cctx->aes.ccm.fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
memcpy(cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k, key, keylen);
/* Store encoded m and l. */
if (!cctx->aes.ccm.len_set) {
/*-
- * In case message length was not previously set explicitely via
+ * In case message length was not previously set explicitly via
* Update(), set it now.
*/
ivec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
memcpy(buf, ptr, arg);
cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len = arg;
- len = *(uint16_t *)(buf + arg - 2);
+ len = buf[arg - 2] << 8 | buf[arg - 1];
if (len < EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN)
return 0;
len -= cctx->aes.ccm.m;
}
- *(uint16_t *)(buf + arg - 2) = len;
+ buf[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
+ buf[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
+
/* Extra padding: tag appended to record. */
return cctx->aes.ccm.m;
static int s390x_aes_ocb_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type, int arg, void *ptr);
# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SIV
+# define S390X_AES_SIV_CTX EVP_AES_SIV_CTX
+# define S390X_aes_128_siv_CAPABLE 0
+# define S390X_aes_192_siv_CAPABLE 0
+# define S390X_aes_256_siv_CAPABLE 0
+
+# define s390x_aes_siv_init_key aes_siv_init_key
+# define s390x_aes_siv_cipher aes_siv_cipher
+# define s390x_aes_siv_cleanup aes_siv_cleanup
+# define s390x_aes_siv_ctrl aes_siv_ctrl
+# endif
+
# define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode, \
MODE,flags) \
static const EVP_CIPHER s390x_aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
static const EVP_CIPHER s390x_aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
nid##_##keylen##_##mode, \
blocksize, \
- (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE ? 2 : 1) * keylen / 8, \
+ (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE ? 2 : 1) * keylen / 8, \
ivlen, \
flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
s390x_aes_##mode##_init_key, \
}; \
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
- (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE ? 2 : 1) * keylen / 8, \
+ (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE ? 2 : 1) * keylen / 8, \
ivlen, \
flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
aes_##mode##_init_key, \
# define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags) \
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
- (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \
+ (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, \
+ ivlen, \
flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
aes_##mode##_init_key, \
aes_##mode##_cipher, \
return 1;
}
-/* increment counter (64-bit int) by 1 */
-static void ctr64_inc(unsigned char *counter)
-{
- int n = 8;
- unsigned char c;
-
- do {
- --n;
- c = counter[n];
- ++c;
- counter[n] = c;
- if (c)
- return;
- } while (n);
-}
-
static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
{
EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,c);
case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
gctx->key_set = 0;
gctx->iv_set = 0;
- gctx->ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
- gctx->iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c);
+ gctx->ivlen = c->cipher->iv_len;
+ gctx->iv = c->iv;
gctx->taglen = -1;
gctx->iv_gen = 0;
gctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
return 0;
/* Allocate memory for IV if needed */
if ((arg > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) && (arg > gctx->ivlen)) {
- if (gctx->iv != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c))
+ if (gctx->iv != c->iv)
OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
- gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(arg);
- if (gctx->iv == NULL)
+ if ((gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(arg)) == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_GCM_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
+ }
}
gctx->ivlen = arg;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
- if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
+ if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || c->encrypt)
return 0;
- memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg);
+ memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg);
gctx->taglen = arg;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
- if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)
+ if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || !c->encrypt
|| gctx->taglen < 0)
return 0;
- memcpy(ptr, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), arg);
+ memcpy(ptr, c->buf, arg);
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_GET_IV:
+ if (gctx->iv_gen != 1)
+ return 0;
+ if (gctx->ivlen != arg)
+ return 0;
+ memcpy(ptr, gctx->iv, arg);
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED:
return 0;
if (arg)
memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, arg);
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)
- && RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + arg, gctx->ivlen - arg) <= 0)
+ if (c->encrypt && RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + arg, gctx->ivlen - arg) <= 0)
return 0;
gctx->iv_gen = 1;
return 1;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV:
- if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0
- || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
+ if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0 || c->encrypt)
return 0;
memcpy(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, ptr, arg);
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
/* Save the AAD for later use */
if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
return 0;
- memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg);
+ memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg);
gctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
+ gctx->tls_enc_records = 0;
{
- unsigned int len =
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] << 8
- | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1];
+ unsigned int len = c->buf[arg - 2] << 8 | c->buf[arg - 1];
/* Correct length for explicit IV */
if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN)
return 0;
len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
/* If decrypting correct for tag too */
- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)) {
+ if (!c->encrypt) {
if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)
return 0;
len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
}
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
+ c->buf[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
+ c->buf[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
}
/* Extra padding: tag appended to record */
return EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
return 0;
gctx_out->gcm.key = &gctx_out->ks;
}
- if (gctx->iv == EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c))
- gctx_out->iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(out);
+ if (gctx->iv == c->iv)
+ gctx_out->iv = out->iv;
else {
- gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(gctx->ivlen);
- if (gctx_out->iv == NULL)
+ if ((gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(gctx->ivlen)) == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_GCM_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
+ }
memcpy(gctx_out->iv, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
}
return 1;
do {
#ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
if (HWAES_CAPABLE) {
- HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
- &gctx->ks.ks);
+ HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks.ks);
CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
(block128_f) HWAES_encrypt);
# ifdef HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
#endif
#ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
if (BSAES_CAPABLE) {
- AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
- &gctx->ks.ks);
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks.ks);
CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
(block128_f) AES_encrypt);
gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
#endif
#ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
- vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
- &gctx->ks.ks);
+ vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks.ks);
CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
(block128_f) vpaes_encrypt);
gctx->ctr = NULL;
#endif
(void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */
- AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
- &gctx->ks.ks);
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks.ks);
CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
(block128_f) AES_encrypt);
#ifdef AES_CTR_ASM
if (out != in
|| len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN))
return -1;
+
+ /*
+ * Check for too many keys as per FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness
+ * Requirements from SP 800-38D". The requirements is for one party to the
+ * communication to fail after 2^64 - 1 keys. We do this on the encrypting
+ * side only.
+ */
+ if (ctx->encrypt && ++gctx->tls_enc_records == 0) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
/*
* Set IV from start of buffer or generate IV and write to start of
* buffer.
*/
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx) ?
- EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN : EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV,
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, ctx->encrypt ? EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN
+ : EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV,
EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN, out) <= 0)
goto err;
/* Use saved AAD */
- if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
- gctx->tls_aad_len))
+ if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, gctx->tls_aad_len))
goto err;
/* Fix buffer and length to point to payload */
in += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
out += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+ if (ctx->encrypt) {
/* Encrypt payload */
if (gctx->ctr) {
size_t bulk = 0;
goto err;
}
/* Retrieve tag */
- CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
- EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN);
+ CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN);
/* If tag mismatch wipe buffer */
- if (CRYPTO_memcmp(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), in + len,
- EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) {
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(ctx->buf, in + len, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len);
goto err;
}
if (out == NULL) {
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, in, len))
return -1;
- } else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+ } else if (ctx->encrypt) {
if (gctx->ctr) {
size_t bulk = 0;
#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM)
}
return len;
} else {
- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+ if (!ctx->encrypt) {
if (gctx->taglen < 0)
return -1;
- if (CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(&gctx->gcm,
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
- gctx->taglen) != 0)
+ if (CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, gctx->taglen) != 0)
return -1;
gctx->iv_set = 0;
return 0;
}
- CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), 16);
+ CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, 16);
gctx->taglen = 16;
/* Don't reuse the IV */
gctx->iv_set = 0;
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx);
- if (!xctx->xts.key1 || !xctx->xts.key2)
+
+ if (xctx->xts.key1 == NULL
+ || xctx->xts.key2 == NULL
+ || out == NULL
+ || in == NULL
+ || len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
return 0;
- if (!out || !in || len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+
+ /*
+ * Verify that the two keys are different.
+ *
+ * This addresses the vulnerability described in Rogaway's September 2004
+ * paper (http://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/offsets.pdf):
+ * "Efficient Instantiations of Tweakable Blockciphers and Refinements
+ * to Modes OCB and PMAC".
+ *
+ * FIPS 140-2 IG A.9 XTS-AES Key Generation Requirements states that:
+ * "The check for Key_1 != Key_2 shall be done at any place BEFORE
+ * using the keys in the XTS-AES algorithm to process data with them."
+ */
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(xctx->xts.key1, xctx->xts.key2,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2) == 0)
return 0;
+
if (xctx->stream)
(*xctx->stream) (in, out, len,
xctx->xts.key1, xctx->xts.key2,
BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 16, 12, ocb, OCB,
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */
+
+/* AES-SIV mode */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SIV
+
+typedef SIV128_CONTEXT EVP_AES_SIV_CTX;
+
+#define aesni_siv_init_key aes_siv_init_key
+static int aes_siv_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+ const EVP_CIPHER *ctr;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cbc;
+ SIV128_CONTEXT *sctx = EVP_C_DATA(SIV128_CONTEXT, ctx);
+ int klen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2;
+
+ if (key == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ switch (klen) {
+ case 16:
+ cbc = EVP_aes_128_cbc();
+ ctr = EVP_aes_128_ctr();
+ break;
+ case 24:
+ cbc = EVP_aes_192_cbc();
+ ctr = EVP_aes_192_ctr();
+ break;
+ case 32:
+ cbc = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
+ ctr = EVP_aes_256_ctr();
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* klen is the length of the underlying cipher, not the input key,
+ which should be twice as long */
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_init(sctx, key, klen, cbc, ctr);
+}
+
+#define aesni_siv_cipher aes_siv_cipher
+static int aes_siv_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ SIV128_CONTEXT *sctx = EVP_C_DATA(SIV128_CONTEXT, ctx);
+
+ /* EncryptFinal or DecryptFinal */
+ if (in == NULL)
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_finish(sctx);
+
+ /* Deal with associated data */
+ if (out == NULL)
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_aad(sctx, in, len);
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx))
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_encrypt(sctx, in, out, len);
+
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_decrypt(sctx, in, out, len);
+}
+
+#define aesni_siv_cleanup aes_siv_cleanup
+static int aes_siv_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c)
+{
+ SIV128_CONTEXT *sctx = EVP_C_DATA(SIV128_CONTEXT, c);
+
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_cleanup(sctx);
+}
+
+
+#define aesni_siv_ctrl aes_siv_ctrl
+static int aes_siv_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
+{
+ SIV128_CONTEXT *sctx = EVP_C_DATA(SIV128_CONTEXT, c);
+ SIV128_CONTEXT *sctx_out;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_cleanup(sctx);
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_SET_SPEED:
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_speed(sctx, arg);
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
+ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_set_tag(sctx, ptr, arg);
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
+ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
+ return 0;
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_get_tag(sctx, ptr, arg);
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
+ sctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(SIV128_CONTEXT, (EVP_CIPHER_CTX*)ptr);
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_copy_ctx(sctx_out, sctx);
+
+ default:
+ return -1;
+
+ }
+}
+
+#define SIV_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 \
+ | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER \
+ | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY \
+ | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT)
+
+BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 0, siv, SIV, SIV_FLAGS)
+BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 1, 0, siv, SIV, SIV_FLAGS)
+BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 0, siv, SIV, SIV_FLAGS)
+#endif