/*
* Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
int taglen;
int iv_gen; /* It is OK to generate IVs */
int tls_aad_len; /* TLS AAD length */
+ uint64_t tls_enc_records; /* Number of TLS records encrypted */
ctr128_f ctr;
} EVP_AES_GCM_CTX;
const unsigned char iv[16]);
#endif
+/* increment counter (64-bit int) by 1 */
+static void ctr64_inc(unsigned char *counter)
+{
+ int n = 8;
+ unsigned char c;
+
+ do {
+ --n;
+ c = counter[n];
+ ++c;
+ counter[n] = c;
+ if (c)
+ return;
+ } while (n);
+}
+
#if defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) && (defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__ppc__) || defined(_ARCH_PPC))
# include "ppc_arch.h"
# ifdef VPAES_ASM
int kreslen;
int tls_aad_len;
+ uint64_t tls_enc_records; /* Number of TLS records encrypted */
} S390X_AES_GCM_CTX;
typedef struct {
* Invocation field will be at least 8 bytes in size and so no need
* to check wrap around or increment more than last 8 bytes.
*/
- (*(unsigned long long *)(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - 8))++;
+ ctr64_inc(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - 8);
gctx->iv_set = 1;
return 1;
buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c);
memcpy(buf, ptr, arg);
gctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
+ gctx->tls_enc_records = 0;
len = buf[arg - 2] << 8 | buf[arg - 1];
/* Correct length for explicit iv. */
if (out != in || len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN))
return -1;
+ /*
+ * Check for too many keys as per FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness
+ * Requirements from SP 800-38D". The requirements is for one party to the
+ * communication to fail after 2^64 - 1 keys. We do this on the encrypting
+ * side only.
+ */
+ if (ctx->encrypt && ++gctx->tls_enc_records == 0) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_S390X_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, enc ? EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN
: EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV,
EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN, out) <= 0)
if (!cctx->aes.ccm.len_set) {
/*-
- * In case message length was not previously set explicitely via
+ * In case message length was not previously set explicitly via
* Update(), set it now.
*/
ivec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
memcpy(buf, ptr, arg);
cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len = arg;
- len = *(uint16_t *)(buf + arg - 2);
+ len = buf[arg - 2] << 8 | buf[arg - 1];
if (len < EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN)
return 0;
len -= cctx->aes.ccm.m;
}
- *(uint16_t *)(buf + arg - 2) = len;
+ buf[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
+ buf[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
+
/* Extra padding: tag appended to record. */
return cctx->aes.ccm.m;
return 1;
}
-/* increment counter (64-bit int) by 1 */
-static void ctr64_inc(unsigned char *counter)
-{
- int n = 8;
- unsigned char c;
-
- do {
- --n;
- c = counter[n];
- ++c;
- counter[n] = c;
- if (c)
- return;
- } while (n);
-}
-
static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
{
EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,c);
return 0;
memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg);
gctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
+ gctx->tls_enc_records = 0;
{
unsigned int len = c->buf[arg - 2] << 8 | c->buf[arg - 1];
/* Correct length for explicit IV */
if (out != in
|| len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN))
return -1;
+
+ /*
+ * Check for too many keys as per FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness
+ * Requirements from SP 800-38D". The requirements is for one party to the
+ * communication to fail after 2^64 - 1 keys. We do this on the encrypting
+ * side only.
+ */
+ if (ctx->encrypt && ++gctx->tls_enc_records == 0) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
/*
* Set IV from start of buffer or generate IV and write to start of
* buffer.
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx);
- if (!xctx->xts.key1 || !xctx->xts.key2)
+
+ if (xctx->xts.key1 == NULL
+ || xctx->xts.key2 == NULL
+ || out == NULL
+ || in == NULL
+ || len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
return 0;
- if (!out || !in || len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+
+ /*
+ * Verify that the two keys are different.
+ *
+ * This addresses the vulnerability described in Rogaway's September 2004
+ * paper (http://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/offsets.pdf):
+ * "Efficient Instantiations of Tweakable Blockciphers and Refinements
+ * to Modes OCB and PMAC".
+ *
+ * FIPS 140-2 IG A.9 XTS-AES Key Generation Requirements states that:
+ * "The check for Key_1 != Key_2 shall be done at any place BEFORE
+ * using the keys in the XTS-AES algorithm to process data with them."
+ */
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(xctx->xts.key1, xctx->xts.key2,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2) == 0)
return 0;
+
if (xctx->stream)
(*xctx->stream) (in, out, len,
xctx->xts.key1, xctx->xts.key2,
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