/*
- * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
union {
double align;
/*-
- * KMA-GCM-AES parameter block
- * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation SA22-7832-11)
+ * KMA-GCM-AES parameter block - begin
+ * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-11)
*/
struct {
unsigned char reserved[12];
} j0;
unsigned char k[32];
} param;
+ /* KMA-GCM-AES parameter block - end */
} kma;
unsigned int fc;
int key_set;
int tls_aad_len;
} S390X_AES_GCM_CTX;
+typedef struct {
+ union {
+ double align;
+ /*-
+ * Padding is chosen so that ccm.kmac_param.k overlaps with key.k and
+ * ccm.fc with key.k.rounds. Remember that on s390x, an AES_KEY's
+ * rounds field is used to store the function code and that the key
+ * schedule is not stored (if aes hardware support is detected).
+ */
+ struct {
+ unsigned char pad[16];
+ AES_KEY k;
+ } key;
+
+ struct {
+ /*-
+ * KMAC-AES parameter block - begin
+ * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-08)
+ */
+ struct {
+ union {
+ unsigned long long g[2];
+ unsigned char b[16];
+ } icv;
+ unsigned char k[32];
+ } kmac_param;
+ /* KMAC-AES paramater block - end */
+
+ union {
+ unsigned long long g[2];
+ unsigned char b[16];
+ } nonce;
+ union {
+ unsigned long long g[2];
+ unsigned char b[16];
+ } buf;
+
+ unsigned long long blocks;
+ int l;
+ int m;
+ int tls_aad_len;
+ int iv_set;
+ int tag_set;
+ int len_set;
+ int key_set;
+
+ unsigned char pad[140];
+ unsigned int fc;
+ } ccm;
+ } aes;
+} S390X_AES_CCM_CTX;
+
# define S390X_aes_128_CAPABLE ((OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.km[0] & \
S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)) &&\
(OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmc[0] & \
/* iv + padding length for iv lenghts != 12 */
# define S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(i) ((((i) + 15) >> 4 << 4) + 16)
+/*-
+ * Process additional authenticated data. Returns 0 on success. Code is
+ * big-endian.
+ */
static int s390x_aes_gcm_aad(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *aad,
size_t len)
{
return 0;
}
+/*-
+ * En/de-crypt plain/cipher-text and authenticate ciphertext. Returns 0 for
+ * success. Code is big-endian.
+ */
static int s390x_aes_gcm(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *in,
unsigned char *out, size_t len)
{
return 0;
}
+/*-
+ * Initialize context structure. Code is big-endian.
+ */
static void s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *ctx,
const unsigned char *iv)
{
}
}
+/*-
+ * Performs various operations on the context structure depending on control
+ * type. Returns 1 for success, 0 for failure and -1 for unknown control type.
+ * Code is big-endian.
+ */
static int s390x_aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
{
S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, c);
}
}
+/*-
+ * Set key and/or iv. Returns 1 on success. Otherwise 0 is returned.
+ */
static int s390x_aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
return 1;
}
+/*-
+ * En/de-crypt and authenticate TLS packet. Returns the number of bytes written
+ * if successful. Otherwise -1 is returned. Code is big-endian.
+ */
static int s390x_aes_gcm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
return rv;
}
+/*-
+ * Called from EVP layer to initialize context, process additional
+ * authenticated data, en/de-crypt plain/cipher-text and authenticate
+ * ciphertext or process a TLS packet, depending on context. Returns bytes
+ * written on success. Otherwise -1 is returned. Code is big-endian.
+ */
static int s390x_aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
static int s390x_aes_xts_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type, int arg, void *ptr);
# define s390x_aes_xts_cleanup aes_xts_cleanup
-# define S390X_AES_CCM_CTX EVP_AES_CCM_CTX
-# define S390X_aes_128_ccm_CAPABLE 0
-# define S390X_aes_192_ccm_CAPABLE 0
-# define S390X_aes_256_ccm_CAPABLE 0
+# define S390X_aes_128_ccm_CAPABLE (S390X_aes_128_CAPABLE && \
+ (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmac[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)))
+# define S390X_aes_192_ccm_CAPABLE (S390X_aes_192_CAPABLE && \
+ (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmac[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)))
+# define S390X_aes_256_ccm_CAPABLE (S390X_aes_256_CAPABLE && \
+ (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmac[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256)))
+
+# define S390X_CCM_AAD_FLAG 0x40
+
+/*-
+ * Set nonce and length fields. Code is big-endian.
+ */
+static inline void s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *nonce,
+ size_t mlen)
+{
+ ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] &= ~S390X_CCM_AAD_FLAG;
+ ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.g[1] = mlen;
+ memcpy(ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b + 1, nonce, 15 - ctx->aes.ccm.l);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Process additional authenticated data. Code is big-endian.
+ */
+static void s390x_aes_ccm_aad(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *aad,
+ size_t alen)
+{
+ unsigned char *ptr;
+ int i, rem;
+
+ if (!alen)
+ return;
+
+ ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] |= S390X_CCM_AAD_FLAG;
+
+ /* Suppress 'type-punned pointer dereference' warning. */
+ ptr = ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b;
+
+ if (alen < ((1 << 16) - (1 << 8))) {
+ *(uint16_t *)ptr = alen;
+ i = 2;
+ } else if (sizeof(alen) == 8
+ && alen >= (size_t)1 << (32 % (sizeof(alen) * 8))) {
+ *(uint16_t *)ptr = 0xffff;
+ *(uint64_t *)(ptr + 2) = alen;
+ i = 10;
+ } else {
+ *(uint16_t *)ptr = 0xfffe;
+ *(uint32_t *)(ptr + 2) = alen;
+ i = 6;
+ }
+
+ while (i < 16 && alen) {
+ ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b[i] = *aad;
+ ++aad;
+ --alen;
+ ++i;
+ }
+ while (i < 16) {
+ ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b[i] = 0;
+ ++i;
+ }
+
+ ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.g[0] = 0;
+ ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.g[1] = 0;
+ s390x_kmac(ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, 32, ctx->aes.ccm.fc,
+ &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param);
+ ctx->aes.ccm.blocks += 2;
+
+ rem = alen & 0xf;
+ alen &= ~0xf;
+ if (alen) {
+ s390x_kmac(aad, alen, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param);
+ ctx->aes.ccm.blocks += alen >> 4;
+ aad += alen;
+ }
+ if (rem) {
+ for (i = 0; i < rem; i++)
+ ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b[i] ^= aad[i];
+
+ s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, 16,
+ ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, ctx->aes.ccm.fc,
+ ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k);
+ ctx->aes.ccm.blocks++;
+ }
+}
+
+/*-
+ * En/de-crypt plain/cipher-text. Compute tag from plaintext. Returns 0 for
+ * success.
+ */
+static int s390x_aes_ccm(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t len, int enc)
+{
+ size_t n, rem;
+ unsigned int i, l, num;
+ unsigned char flags;
+
+ flags = ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0];
+ if (!(flags & S390X_CCM_AAD_FLAG)) {
+ s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, 16, ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b,
+ ctx->aes.ccm.fc, ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k);
+ ctx->aes.ccm.blocks++;
+ }
+ l = flags & 0x7;
+ ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] = l;
+
+ /*-
+ * Reconstruct length from encoded length field
+ * and initialize it with counter value.
+ */
+ n = 0;
+ for (i = 15 - l; i < 15; i++) {
+ n |= ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[i];
+ ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[i] = 0;
+ n <<= 8;
+ }
+ n |= ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[15];
+ ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[15] = 1;
+
+ if (n != len)
+ return -1; /* length mismatch */
+
+ if (enc) {
+ /* Two operations per block plus one for tag encryption */
+ ctx->aes.ccm.blocks += (((len + 15) >> 4) << 1) + 1;
+ if (ctx->aes.ccm.blocks > (1ULL << 61))
+ return -2; /* too much data */
+ }
+
+ num = 0;
+ rem = len & 0xf;
+ len &= ~0xf;
+
+ if (enc) {
+ /* mac-then-encrypt */
+ if (len)
+ s390x_kmac(in, len, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param);
+ if (rem) {
+ for (i = 0; i < rem; i++)
+ ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b[i] ^= in[len + i];
+
+ s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, 16,
+ ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, ctx->aes.ccm.fc,
+ ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k);
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len + rem, &ctx->aes.key.k,
+ ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b,
+ &num, (ctr128_f)AES_ctr32_encrypt);
+ } else {
+ /* decrypt-then-mac */
+ CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len + rem, &ctx->aes.key.k,
+ ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b,
+ &num, (ctr128_f)AES_ctr32_encrypt);
+
+ if (len)
+ s390x_kmac(out, len, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param);
+ if (rem) {
+ for (i = 0; i < rem; i++)
+ ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b[i] ^= out[len + i];
+
+ s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, 16,
+ ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, ctx->aes.ccm.fc,
+ ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k);
+ }
+ }
+ /* encrypt tag */
+ for (i = 15 - l; i < 16; i++)
+ ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[i] = 0;
+
+ s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, 16, ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b, ctx->aes.ccm.fc,
+ ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k);
+ ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.g[0] ^= ctx->aes.ccm.buf.g[0];
+ ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.g[1] ^= ctx->aes.ccm.buf.g[1];
+
+ ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] = flags; /* restore flags field */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * En/de-crypt and authenticate TLS packet. Returns the number of bytes written
+ * if successful. Otherwise -1 is returned.
+ */
+static int s390x_aes_ccm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx);
+ unsigned char *ivec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
+ unsigned char *buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx);
+ const int enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx);
+
+ if (out != in
+ || len < (EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + (size_t)cctx->aes.ccm.m))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (enc) {
+ /* Set explicit iv (sequence number). */
+ memcpy(out, buf, EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN);
+ }
+
+ len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + cctx->aes.ccm.m;
+ /*-
+ * Get explicit iv (sequence number). We already have fixed iv
+ * (server/client_write_iv) here.
+ */
+ memcpy(ivec + EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN, in, EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN);
+ s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(cctx, ivec, len);
+
+ /* Process aad (sequence number|type|version|length) */
+ s390x_aes_ccm_aad(cctx, buf, cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len);
+
+ in += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ out += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+
+ if (enc) {
+ if (s390x_aes_ccm(cctx, in, out, len, enc))
+ return -1;
+
+ memcpy(out + len, cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, cctx->aes.ccm.m);
+ return len + EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + cctx->aes.ccm.m;
+ } else {
+ if (!s390x_aes_ccm(cctx, in, out, len, enc)) {
+ if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, in + len,
+ cctx->aes.ccm.m))
+ return len;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len);
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
-# define s390x_aes_ccm_init_key aes_ccm_init_key
+/*-
+ * Set key and flag field and/or iv. Returns 1 if successful. Otherwise 0 is
+ * returned.
+ */
static int s390x_aes_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
const unsigned char *key,
- const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
-# define s390x_aes_ccm_cipher aes_ccm_cipher
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+ S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx);
+ unsigned char *ivec;
+ int keylen;
+
+ if (iv == NULL && key == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (key != NULL) {
+ keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+ /* Convert key size to function code. */
+ cctx->aes.ccm.fc = S390X_AES_128 + (((keylen << 3) - 128) >> 6);
+ memcpy(cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k, key, keylen);
+
+ /* Store encoded m and l. */
+ cctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] = ((cctx->aes.ccm.l - 1) & 0x7)
+ | (((cctx->aes.ccm.m - 2) >> 1) & 0x7) << 3;
+ memset(cctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b + 1, 0,
+ sizeof(cctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b));
+ cctx->aes.ccm.blocks = 0;
+
+ cctx->aes.ccm.key_set = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (iv != NULL) {
+ ivec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
+ memcpy(ivec, iv, 15 - cctx->aes.ccm.l);
+
+ cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 1;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Called from EVP layer to initialize context, process additional
+ * authenticated data, en/de-crypt plain/cipher-text and authenticate
+ * plaintext or process a TLS packet, depending on context. Returns bytes
+ * written on success. Otherwise -1 is returned.
+ */
static int s390x_aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
-# define s390x_aes_ccm_ctrl aes_ccm_ctrl
-static int s390x_aes_ccm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type, int arg, void *ptr);
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx);
+ const int enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx);
+ int rv;
+ unsigned char *buf, *ivec;
+
+ if (!cctx->aes.ccm.key_set)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len >= 0)
+ return s390x_aes_ccm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len);
+
+ /*-
+ * Final(): Does not return any data. Recall that ccm is mac-then-encrypt
+ * so integrity must be checked already at Update() i.e., before
+ * potentially corrupted data is output.
+ */
+ if (in == NULL && out != NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (!enc && !cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (out == NULL) {
+ /* Update(): Pass message length. */
+ if (in == NULL) {
+ ivec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
+ s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(cctx, ivec, len);
+
+ cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 1;
+ return len;
+ }
+
+ /* Update(): Process aad. */
+ if (!cctx->aes.ccm.len_set && len)
+ return -1;
+
+ s390x_aes_ccm_aad(cctx, in, len);
+ return len;
+ }
+
+ /* Update(): Process message. */
+
+ if (!cctx->aes.ccm.len_set) {
+ /*-
+ * In case message length was not previously set explicitely via
+ * Update(), set it now.
+ */
+ ivec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
+ s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(cctx, ivec, len);
+
+ cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (enc) {
+ if (s390x_aes_ccm(cctx, in, out, len, enc))
+ return -1;
+
+ cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 1;
+ return len;
+ } else {
+ rv = -1;
+
+ if (!s390x_aes_ccm(cctx, in, out, len, enc)) {
+ buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx);
+ if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, buf,
+ cctx->aes.ccm.m))
+ rv = len;
+ }
+
+ if (rv == -1)
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len);
+
+ cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 0;
+ cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 0;
+ cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 0;
+ return rv;
+ }
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Performs various operations on the context structure depending on control
+ * type. Returns 1 for success, 0 for failure and -1 for unknown control type.
+ * Code is big-endian.
+ */
+static int s390x_aes_ccm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
+{
+ S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, c);
+ unsigned char *buf, *iv;
+ int enc, len;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
+ cctx->aes.ccm.key_set = 0;
+ cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 0;
+ cctx->aes.ccm.l = 8;
+ cctx->aes.ccm.m = 12;
+ cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 0;
+ cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 0;
+ cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len = -1;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
+ if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Save the aad for later use. */
+ buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c);
+ memcpy(buf, ptr, arg);
+ cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len = arg;
+
+ len = *(uint16_t *)(buf + arg - 2);
+ if (len < EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Correct length for explicit iv. */
+ len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+
+ enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c);
+ if (!enc) {
+ if (len < cctx->aes.ccm.m)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Correct length for tag. */
+ len -= cctx->aes.ccm.m;
+ }
+
+ *(uint16_t *)(buf + arg - 2) = len;
+ /* Extra padding: tag appended to record. */
+ return cctx->aes.ccm.m;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED:
+ if (arg != EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Copy to first part of the iv. */
+ iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c);
+ memcpy(iv, ptr, arg);
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
+ arg = 15 - arg;
+ /* fall-through */
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_L:
+ if (arg < 2 || arg > 8)
+ return 0;
+
+ cctx->aes.ccm.l = arg;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
+ if ((arg & 1) || arg < 4 || arg > 16)
+ return 0;
+
+ enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c);
+ if (enc && ptr)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (ptr) {
+ cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 1;
+ buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c);
+ memcpy(buf, ptr, arg);
+ }
+
+ cctx->aes.ccm.m = arg;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
+ enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c);
+ if (!enc || !cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set)
+ return 0;
+
+ if(arg < cctx->aes.ccm.m)
+ return 0;
+
+ memcpy(ptr, cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, cctx->aes.ccm.m);
+ cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 0;
+ cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 0;
+ cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 0;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
+ return 1;
+
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
# define s390x_aes_ccm_cleanup aes_ccm_cleanup
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx), dat->block);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
len -= MAXBITCHUNK;
+ out += MAXBITCHUNK;
+ in += MAXBITCHUNK;
}
if (len) {
int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
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