/*
* Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
int taglen;
int iv_gen; /* It is OK to generate IVs */
int tls_aad_len; /* TLS AAD length */
+ uint64_t tls_enc_records; /* Number of TLS records encrypted */
ctr128_f ctr;
} EVP_AES_GCM_CTX;
const unsigned char iv[16]);
#endif
+/* increment counter (64-bit int) by 1 */
+static void ctr64_inc(unsigned char *counter)
+{
+ int n = 8;
+ unsigned char c;
+
+ do {
+ --n;
+ c = counter[n];
+ ++c;
+ counter[n] = c;
+ if (c)
+ return;
+ } while (n);
+}
+
#if defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) && (defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__ppc__) || defined(_ARCH_PPC))
# include "ppc_arch.h"
# ifdef VPAES_ASM
union {
double align;
/*-
- * KMA-GCM-AES parameter block
- * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation SA22-7832-11)
+ * KM-AES parameter block - begin
+ * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-06)
+ */
+ struct {
+ unsigned char k[32];
+ } param;
+ /* KM-AES parameter block - end */
+ } km;
+ unsigned int fc;
+} S390X_AES_ECB_CTX;
+
+typedef struct {
+ union {
+ double align;
+ /*-
+ * KMO-AES parameter block - begin
+ * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-08)
+ */
+ struct {
+ unsigned char cv[16];
+ unsigned char k[32];
+ } param;
+ /* KMO-AES parameter block - end */
+ } kmo;
+ unsigned int fc;
+
+ int res;
+} S390X_AES_OFB_CTX;
+
+typedef struct {
+ union {
+ double align;
+ /*-
+ * KMF-AES parameter block - begin
+ * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-08)
+ */
+ struct {
+ unsigned char cv[16];
+ unsigned char k[32];
+ } param;
+ /* KMF-AES parameter block - end */
+ } kmf;
+ unsigned int fc;
+
+ int res;
+} S390X_AES_CFB_CTX;
+
+typedef struct {
+ union {
+ double align;
+ /*-
+ * KMA-GCM-AES parameter block - begin
+ * (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-11)
*/
struct {
unsigned char reserved[12];
} j0;
unsigned char k[32];
} param;
+ /* KMA-GCM-AES parameter block - end */
} kma;
unsigned int fc;
int key_set;
int kreslen;
int tls_aad_len;
+ uint64_t tls_enc_records; /* Number of TLS records encrypted */
} S390X_AES_GCM_CTX;
typedef struct {
} aes;
} S390X_AES_CCM_CTX;
-# define S390X_aes_128_CAPABLE ((OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.km[0] & \
- S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)) &&\
- (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmc[0] & \
- S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)))
-# define S390X_aes_192_CAPABLE ((OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.km[0] & \
- S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)) &&\
- (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmc[0] & \
- S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)))
-# define S390X_aes_256_CAPABLE ((OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.km[0] & \
- S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256)) &&\
- (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmc[0] & \
- S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256)))
+/* Convert key size to function code: [16,24,32] -> [18,19,20]. */
+# define S390X_AES_FC(keylen) (S390X_AES_128 + ((((keylen) << 3) - 128) >> 6))
+
+/* Most modes of operation need km for partial block processing. */
+# define S390X_aes_128_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.km[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128))
+# define S390X_aes_192_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.km[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192))
+# define S390X_aes_256_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.km[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256))
# define s390x_aes_init_key aes_init_key
static int s390x_aes_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
# define S390X_aes_128_cbc_CAPABLE 1 /* checked by callee */
# define S390X_aes_192_cbc_CAPABLE 1
# define S390X_aes_256_cbc_CAPABLE 1
+# define S390X_AES_CBC_CTX EVP_AES_KEY
+
+# define s390x_aes_cbc_init_key aes_init_key
# define s390x_aes_cbc_cipher aes_cbc_cipher
static int s390x_aes_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
-# define S390X_aes_128_ecb_CAPABLE 0
-# define S390X_aes_192_ecb_CAPABLE 0
-# define S390X_aes_256_ecb_CAPABLE 0
+# define S390X_aes_128_ecb_CAPABLE S390X_aes_128_CAPABLE
+# define S390X_aes_192_ecb_CAPABLE S390X_aes_192_CAPABLE
+# define S390X_aes_256_ecb_CAPABLE S390X_aes_256_CAPABLE
+
+static int s390x_aes_ecb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+ S390X_AES_ECB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_ECB_CTX, ctx);
+ const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+
+ cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
+ if (!enc)
+ cctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT;
+
+ memcpy(cctx->km.param.k, key, keylen);
+ return 1;
+}
-# define s390x_aes_ecb_cipher aes_ecb_cipher
static int s390x_aes_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ S390X_AES_ECB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_ECB_CTX, ctx);
-# define S390X_aes_128_ofb_CAPABLE 0
-# define S390X_aes_192_ofb_CAPABLE 0
-# define S390X_aes_256_ofb_CAPABLE 0
+ s390x_km(in, len, out, cctx->fc, &cctx->km.param);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+# define S390X_aes_128_ofb_CAPABLE (S390X_aes_128_CAPABLE && \
+ (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmo[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)))
+# define S390X_aes_192_ofb_CAPABLE (S390X_aes_192_CAPABLE && \
+ (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmo[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)))
+# define S390X_aes_256_ofb_CAPABLE (S390X_aes_256_CAPABLE && \
+ (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmo[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256)))
+
+static int s390x_aes_ofb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *ivec, int enc)
+{
+ S390X_AES_OFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_OFB_CTX, ctx);
+ const unsigned char *iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_original_iv(ctx);
+ const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+ const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+
+ memcpy(cctx->kmo.param.cv, iv, ivlen);
+ memcpy(cctx->kmo.param.k, key, keylen);
+ cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
+ cctx->res = 0;
+ return 1;
+}
-# define s390x_aes_ofb_cipher aes_ofb_cipher
static int s390x_aes_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ S390X_AES_OFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_OFB_CTX, ctx);
+ int n = cctx->res;
+ int rem;
+
+ while (n && len) {
+ *out = *in ^ cctx->kmo.param.cv[n];
+ n = (n + 1) & 0xf;
+ --len;
+ ++in;
+ ++out;
+ }
+
+ rem = len & 0xf;
-# define S390X_aes_128_cfb_CAPABLE 0
-# define S390X_aes_192_cfb_CAPABLE 0
-# define S390X_aes_256_cfb_CAPABLE 0
+ len &= ~(size_t)0xf;
+ if (len) {
+ s390x_kmo(in, len, out, cctx->fc, &cctx->kmo.param);
+
+ out += len;
+ in += len;
+ }
+
+ if (rem) {
+ s390x_km(cctx->kmo.param.cv, 16, cctx->kmo.param.cv, cctx->fc,
+ cctx->kmo.param.k);
+
+ while (rem--) {
+ out[n] = in[n] ^ cctx->kmo.param.cv[n];
+ ++n;
+ }
+ }
+
+ cctx->res = n;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+# define S390X_aes_128_cfb_CAPABLE (S390X_aes_128_CAPABLE && \
+ (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmf[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)))
+# define S390X_aes_192_cfb_CAPABLE (S390X_aes_192_CAPABLE && \
+ (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmf[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)))
+# define S390X_aes_256_cfb_CAPABLE (S390X_aes_256_CAPABLE && \
+ (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmf[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256)))
+
+static int s390x_aes_cfb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *ivec, int enc)
+{
+ S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx);
+ const unsigned char *iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_original_iv(ctx);
+ const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+ const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+
+ cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
+ cctx->fc |= 16 << 24; /* 16 bytes cipher feedback */
+ if (!enc)
+ cctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT;
+
+ cctx->res = 0;
+ memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.cv, iv, ivlen);
+ memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.k, key, keylen);
+ return 1;
+}
-# define s390x_aes_cfb_cipher aes_cfb_cipher
static int s390x_aes_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx);
+ const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+ const int enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx);
+ int n = cctx->res;
+ int rem;
+ unsigned char tmp;
+
+ while (n && len) {
+ tmp = *in;
+ *out = cctx->kmf.param.cv[n] ^ tmp;
+ cctx->kmf.param.cv[n] = enc ? *out : tmp;
+ n = (n + 1) & 0xf;
+ --len;
+ ++in;
+ ++out;
+ }
+
+ rem = len & 0xf;
-# define S390X_aes_128_cfb8_CAPABLE 0
-# define S390X_aes_192_cfb8_CAPABLE 0
-# define S390X_aes_256_cfb8_CAPABLE 0
+ len &= ~(size_t)0xf;
+ if (len) {
+ s390x_kmf(in, len, out, cctx->fc, &cctx->kmf.param);
+
+ out += len;
+ in += len;
+ }
+
+ if (rem) {
+ s390x_km(cctx->kmf.param.cv, 16, cctx->kmf.param.cv,
+ S390X_AES_FC(keylen), cctx->kmf.param.k);
+
+ while (rem--) {
+ tmp = in[n];
+ out[n] = cctx->kmf.param.cv[n] ^ tmp;
+ cctx->kmf.param.cv[n] = enc ? out[n] : tmp;
+ ++n;
+ }
+ }
+
+ cctx->res = n;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+# define S390X_aes_128_cfb8_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmf[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128))
+# define S390X_aes_192_cfb8_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmf[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192))
+# define S390X_aes_256_cfb8_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kmf[0] & \
+ S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256))
+
+static int s390x_aes_cfb8_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *ivec, int enc)
+{
+ S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx);
+ const unsigned char *iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_original_iv(ctx);
+ const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+ const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+
+ cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
+ cctx->fc |= 1 << 24; /* 1 byte cipher feedback */
+ if (!enc)
+ cctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT;
+
+ memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.cv, iv, ivlen);
+ memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.k, key, keylen);
+ return 1;
+}
-# define s390x_aes_cfb8_cipher aes_cfb8_cipher
static int s390x_aes_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx);
+
+ s390x_kmf(in, len, out, cctx->fc, &cctx->kmf.param);
+ return 1;
+}
# define S390X_aes_128_cfb1_CAPABLE 0
# define S390X_aes_192_cfb1_CAPABLE 0
# define S390X_aes_256_cfb1_CAPABLE 0
+# define s390x_aes_cfb1_init_key aes_init_key
+
# define s390x_aes_cfb1_cipher aes_cfb1_cipher
static int s390x_aes_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
# define S390X_aes_128_ctr_CAPABLE 1 /* checked by callee */
# define S390X_aes_192_ctr_CAPABLE 1
# define S390X_aes_256_ctr_CAPABLE 1
+# define S390X_AES_CTR_CTX EVP_AES_KEY
+
+# define s390x_aes_ctr_init_key aes_init_key
# define s390x_aes_ctr_cipher aes_ctr_cipher
static int s390x_aes_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
/* iv + padding length for iv lenghts != 12 */
# define S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(i) ((((i) + 15) >> 4 << 4) + 16)
+/*-
+ * Process additional authenticated data. Returns 0 on success. Code is
+ * big-endian.
+ */
static int s390x_aes_gcm_aad(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *aad,
size_t len)
{
rem = len & 0xf;
- len &= ~0xf;
+ len &= ~(size_t)0xf;
if (len) {
s390x_kma(aad, len, NULL, 0, NULL, ctx->fc, &ctx->kma.param);
aad += len;
return 0;
}
+/*-
+ * En/de-crypt plain/cipher-text and authenticate ciphertext. Returns 0 for
+ * success. Code is big-endian.
+ */
static int s390x_aes_gcm(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *in,
unsigned char *out, size_t len)
{
rem = len & 0xf;
- len &= ~0xf;
+ len &= ~(size_t)0xf;
if (len) {
s390x_kma(ctx->ares, ctx->areslen, in, len, out,
ctx->fc | S390X_KMA_LAAD, &ctx->kma.param);
return 0;
}
+/*-
+ * Initialize context structure. Code is big-endian.
+ */
static void s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *ctx,
const unsigned char *iv)
{
}
}
+/*-
+ * Performs various operations on the context structure depending on control
+ * type. Returns 1 for success, 0 for failure and -1 for unknown control type.
+ * Code is big-endian.
+ */
static int s390x_aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
{
S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, c);
if (gctx->iv != iv)
OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
- gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
- if (gctx->iv == NULL)
+ if ((gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_S390X_AES_GCM_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
+ }
}
/* Add padding. */
memset(gctx->iv + arg, 0, len - arg - 8);
* Invocation field will be at least 8 bytes in size and so no need
* to check wrap around or increment more than last 8 bytes.
*/
- (*(unsigned long long *)(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - 8))++;
+ ctr64_inc(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - 8);
gctx->iv_set = 1;
return 1;
buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c);
memcpy(buf, ptr, arg);
gctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
+ gctx->tls_enc_records = 0;
len = buf[arg - 2] << 8 | buf[arg - 1];
/* Correct length for explicit iv. */
} else {
len = S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(gctx->ivlen);
- gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
- if (gctx_out->iv == NULL)
+ if ((gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_S390X_AES_GCM_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
+ }
memcpy(gctx_out->iv, gctx->iv, len);
}
}
}
+/*-
+ * Set key and/or iv. Returns 1 on success. Otherwise 0 is returned.
+ */
static int s390x_aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
memcpy(&gctx->kma.param.k, key, keylen);
- /* Convert key size to function code. */
- gctx->fc = S390X_AES_128 + (((keylen << 3) - 128) >> 6);
+ gctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
if (!enc)
gctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT;
return 1;
}
+/*-
+ * En/de-crypt and authenticate TLS packet. Returns the number of bytes written
+ * if successful. Otherwise -1 is returned. Code is big-endian.
+ */
static int s390x_aes_gcm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
if (out != in || len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN))
return -1;
+ /*
+ * Check for too many keys as per FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness
+ * Requirements from SP 800-38D". The requirements is for one party to the
+ * communication to fail after 2^64 - 1 keys. We do this on the encrypting
+ * side only.
+ */
+ if (ctx->encrypt && ++gctx->tls_enc_records == 0) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_S390X_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, enc ? EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN
: EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV,
EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN, out) <= 0)
return rv;
}
+/*-
+ * Called from EVP layer to initialize context, process additional
+ * authenticated data, en/de-crypt plain/cipher-text and authenticate
+ * ciphertext or process a TLS packet, depending on context. Returns bytes
+ * written on success. Otherwise -1 is returned. Code is big-endian.
+ */
static int s390x_aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
ctx->aes.ccm.blocks += 2;
rem = alen & 0xf;
- alen &= ~0xf;
+ alen &= ~(size_t)0xf;
if (alen) {
s390x_kmac(aad, alen, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param);
ctx->aes.ccm.blocks += alen >> 4;
num = 0;
rem = len & 0xf;
- len &= ~0xf;
+ len &= ~(size_t)0xf;
if (enc) {
/* mac-then-encrypt */
if (key != NULL) {
keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
- /* Convert key size to function code. */
- cctx->aes.ccm.fc = S390X_AES_128 + (((keylen << 3) - 128) >> 6);
+ cctx->aes.ccm.fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
memcpy(cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k, key, keylen);
/* Store encoded m and l. */
if (!cctx->aes.ccm.len_set) {
/*-
- * In case message length was not previously set explicitely via
+ * In case message length was not previously set explicitly via
* Update(), set it now.
*/
ivec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
memcpy(buf, ptr, arg);
cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len = arg;
- len = *(uint16_t *)(buf + arg - 2);
+ len = buf[arg - 2] << 8 | buf[arg - 1];
if (len < EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN)
return 0;
len -= cctx->aes.ccm.m;
}
- *(uint16_t *)(buf + arg - 2) = len;
+ buf[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
+ buf[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
+
/* Extra padding: tag appended to record. */
return cctx->aes.ccm.m;
keylen / 8, \
ivlen, \
flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
- s390x_aes_init_key, \
+ s390x_aes_##mode##_init_key, \
s390x_aes_##mode##_cipher, \
NULL, \
- sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \
+ sizeof(S390X_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \
NULL, \
NULL, \
NULL, \
aes_##mode##_cipher, \
NULL, \
sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \
- NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL \
+ NULL, \
+ NULL, \
+ NULL, \
+ NULL \
}; \
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
{ \
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx), dat->block);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
len -= MAXBITCHUNK;
+ out += MAXBITCHUNK;
+ in += MAXBITCHUNK;
}
if (len) {
int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
return 1;
}
-/* increment counter (64-bit int) by 1 */
-static void ctr64_inc(unsigned char *counter)
-{
- int n = 8;
- unsigned char c;
-
- do {
- --n;
- c = counter[n];
- ++c;
- counter[n] = c;
- if (c)
- return;
- } while (n);
-}
-
static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
{
EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,c);
case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
gctx->key_set = 0;
gctx->iv_set = 0;
- gctx->ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
- gctx->iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c);
+ gctx->ivlen = c->cipher->iv_len;
+ gctx->iv = c->iv;
gctx->taglen = -1;
gctx->iv_gen = 0;
gctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
return 0;
/* Allocate memory for IV if needed */
if ((arg > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) && (arg > gctx->ivlen)) {
- if (gctx->iv != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c))
+ if (gctx->iv != c->iv)
OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
- gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(arg);
- if (gctx->iv == NULL)
+ if ((gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(arg)) == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_GCM_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
+ }
}
gctx->ivlen = arg;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
- if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
+ if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || c->encrypt)
return 0;
- memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg);
+ memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg);
gctx->taglen = arg;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
- if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)
+ if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || !c->encrypt
|| gctx->taglen < 0)
return 0;
- memcpy(ptr, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), arg);
+ memcpy(ptr, c->buf, arg);
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_GET_IV:
+ if (gctx->iv_gen != 1)
+ return 0;
+ if (gctx->ivlen != arg)
+ return 0;
+ memcpy(ptr, gctx->iv, arg);
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED:
return 0;
if (arg)
memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, arg);
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)
- && RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + arg, gctx->ivlen - arg) <= 0)
+ if (c->encrypt && RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + arg, gctx->ivlen - arg) <= 0)
return 0;
gctx->iv_gen = 1;
return 1;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV:
- if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0
- || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
+ if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0 || c->encrypt)
return 0;
memcpy(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, ptr, arg);
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
/* Save the AAD for later use */
if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
return 0;
- memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg);
+ memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg);
gctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
+ gctx->tls_enc_records = 0;
{
- unsigned int len =
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] << 8
- | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1];
+ unsigned int len = c->buf[arg - 2] << 8 | c->buf[arg - 1];
/* Correct length for explicit IV */
if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN)
return 0;
len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
/* If decrypting correct for tag too */
- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)) {
+ if (!c->encrypt) {
if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)
return 0;
len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
}
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
+ c->buf[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
+ c->buf[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
}
/* Extra padding: tag appended to record */
return EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
return 0;
gctx_out->gcm.key = &gctx_out->ks;
}
- if (gctx->iv == EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c))
- gctx_out->iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(out);
+ if (gctx->iv == c->iv)
+ gctx_out->iv = out->iv;
else {
- gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(gctx->ivlen);
- if (gctx_out->iv == NULL)
+ if ((gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(gctx->ivlen)) == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_GCM_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
+ }
memcpy(gctx_out->iv, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
}
return 1;
do {
#ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
if (HWAES_CAPABLE) {
- HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
- &gctx->ks.ks);
+ HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks.ks);
CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
(block128_f) HWAES_encrypt);
# ifdef HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
#endif
#ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
if (BSAES_CAPABLE) {
- AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
- &gctx->ks.ks);
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks.ks);
CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
(block128_f) AES_encrypt);
gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
#endif
#ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
- vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
- &gctx->ks.ks);
+ vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks.ks);
CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
(block128_f) vpaes_encrypt);
gctx->ctr = NULL;
#endif
(void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */
- AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
- &gctx->ks.ks);
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks.ks);
CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
(block128_f) AES_encrypt);
#ifdef AES_CTR_ASM
if (out != in
|| len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN))
return -1;
+
+ /*
+ * Check for too many keys as per FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness
+ * Requirements from SP 800-38D". The requirements is for one party to the
+ * communication to fail after 2^64 - 1 keys. We do this on the encrypting
+ * side only.
+ */
+ if (ctx->encrypt && ++gctx->tls_enc_records == 0) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
/*
* Set IV from start of buffer or generate IV and write to start of
* buffer.
*/
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx) ?
- EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN : EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV,
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, ctx->encrypt ? EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN
+ : EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV,
EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN, out) <= 0)
goto err;
/* Use saved AAD */
- if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
- gctx->tls_aad_len))
+ if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, gctx->tls_aad_len))
goto err;
/* Fix buffer and length to point to payload */
in += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
out += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+ if (ctx->encrypt) {
/* Encrypt payload */
if (gctx->ctr) {
size_t bulk = 0;
goto err;
}
/* Retrieve tag */
- CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
- EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN);
+ CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN);
/* If tag mismatch wipe buffer */
- if (CRYPTO_memcmp(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), in + len,
- EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) {
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(ctx->buf, in + len, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len);
goto err;
}
if (out == NULL) {
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, in, len))
return -1;
- } else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+ } else if (ctx->encrypt) {
if (gctx->ctr) {
size_t bulk = 0;
#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM)
}
return len;
} else {
- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+ if (!ctx->encrypt) {
if (gctx->taglen < 0)
return -1;
- if (CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(&gctx->gcm,
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
- gctx->taglen) != 0)
+ if (CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, gctx->taglen) != 0)
return -1;
gctx->iv_set = 0;
return 0;
}
- CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), 16);
+ CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, 16);
gctx->taglen = 16;
/* Don't reuse the IV */
gctx->iv_set = 0;
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx);
- if (!xctx->xts.key1 || !xctx->xts.key2)
+
+ if (xctx->xts.key1 == NULL
+ || xctx->xts.key2 == NULL
+ || out == NULL
+ || in == NULL
+ || len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
return 0;
- if (!out || !in || len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+
+ /*
+ * Verify that the two keys are different.
+ *
+ * This addresses the vulnerability described in Rogaway's September 2004
+ * paper (http://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/offsets.pdf):
+ * "Efficient Instantiations of Tweakable Blockciphers and Refinements
+ * to Modes OCB and PMAC".
+ *
+ * FIPS 140-2 IG A.9 XTS-AES Key Generation Requirements states that:
+ * "The check for Key_1 != Key_2 shall be done at any place BEFORE
+ * using the keys in the XTS-AES algorithm to process data with them."
+ */
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(xctx->xts.key1, xctx->xts.key2,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2) == 0)
return 0;
+
if (xctx->stream)
(*xctx->stream) (in, out, len,
xctx->xts.key1, xctx->xts.key2,