-/* crypto/ec/ec_mult.c */
/*
- * Originally written by Bodo Moeller and Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
*
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * Portions of this software developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC.,
- * and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+
+/*
+ * ECDSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
+ * internal use.
*/
+#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include "internal/bn_int.h"
-#include "ec_lcl.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "crypto/bn.h"
+#include "ec_local.h"
+#include "internal/refcount.h"
/*
- * This file implements the wNAF-based interleaving multi-exponentation method
- * (<URL:http://www.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/TI/Mitarbeiter/moeller.html#multiexp>);
- * for multiplication with precomputation, we use wNAF splitting
- * (<URL:http://www.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/TI/Mitarbeiter/moeller.html#fastexp>).
+ * This file implements the wNAF-based interleaving multi-exponentiation method
+ * Formerly at:
+ * http://www.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/TI/Mitarbeiter/moeller.html#multiexp
+ * You might now find it here:
+ * http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F3-540-45537-X_13
+ * http://www.bmoeller.de/pdf/TI-01-08.multiexp.pdf
+ * For multiplication with precomputation, we use wNAF splitting, formerly at:
+ * http://www.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/TI/Mitarbeiter/moeller.html#fastexp
*/
/* structure for precomputed multiples of the generator */
-typedef struct ec_pre_comp_st {
+struct ec_pre_comp_st {
const EC_GROUP *group; /* parent EC_GROUP object */
size_t blocksize; /* block size for wNAF splitting */
size_t numblocks; /* max. number of blocks for which we have
* generator: 'num' pointers to EC_POINT
* objects followed by a NULL */
size_t num; /* numblocks * 2^(w-1) */
- int references;
-} EC_PRE_COMP;
-
-/* functions to manage EC_PRE_COMP within the EC_GROUP extra_data framework */
-static void *ec_pre_comp_dup(void *);
-static void ec_pre_comp_free(void *);
-static void ec_pre_comp_clear_free(void *);
+ CRYPTO_REF_COUNT references;
+ CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+};
static EC_PRE_COMP *ec_pre_comp_new(const EC_GROUP *group)
{
if (!group)
return NULL;
- ret = (EC_PRE_COMP *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EC_PRE_COMP));
- if (!ret) {
+ ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+ if (ret == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_PRE_COMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return ret;
}
+
ret->group = group;
ret->blocksize = 8; /* default */
- ret->numblocks = 0;
ret->w = 4; /* default */
- ret->points = NULL;
- ret->num = 0;
ret->references = 1;
+
+ ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+ if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_PRE_COMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
return ret;
}
-static void *ec_pre_comp_dup(void *src_)
+EC_PRE_COMP *EC_ec_pre_comp_dup(EC_PRE_COMP *pre)
{
- EC_PRE_COMP *src = src_;
-
- /* no need to actually copy, these objects never change! */
-
- CRYPTO_add(&src->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EC_PRE_COMP);
-
- return src_;
+ int i;
+ if (pre != NULL)
+ CRYPTO_UP_REF(&pre->references, &i, pre->lock);
+ return pre;
}
-static void ec_pre_comp_free(void *pre_)
+void EC_ec_pre_comp_free(EC_PRE_COMP *pre)
{
int i;
- EC_PRE_COMP *pre = pre_;
- if (!pre)
+ if (pre == NULL)
return;
- i = CRYPTO_add(&pre->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EC_PRE_COMP);
+ CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&pre->references, &i, pre->lock);
+ REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_ec", pre);
if (i > 0)
return;
+ REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
- if (pre->points) {
- EC_POINT **p;
+ if (pre->points != NULL) {
+ EC_POINT **pts;
- for (p = pre->points; *p != NULL; p++)
- EC_POINT_free(*p);
+ for (pts = pre->points; *pts != NULL; pts++)
+ EC_POINT_free(*pts);
OPENSSL_free(pre->points);
}
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(pre->lock);
OPENSSL_free(pre);
}
-static void ec_pre_comp_clear_free(void *pre_)
+#define EC_POINT_BN_set_flags(P, flags) do { \
+ BN_set_flags((P)->X, (flags)); \
+ BN_set_flags((P)->Y, (flags)); \
+ BN_set_flags((P)->Z, (flags)); \
+} while(0)
+
+/*-
+ * This functions computes a single point multiplication over the EC group,
+ * using, at a high level, a Montgomery ladder with conditional swaps, with
+ * various timing attack defenses.
+ *
+ * It performs either a fixed point multiplication
+ * (scalar * generator)
+ * when point is NULL, or a variable point multiplication
+ * (scalar * point)
+ * when point is not NULL.
+ *
+ * `scalar` cannot be NULL and should be in the range [0,n) otherwise all
+ * constant time bets are off (where n is the cardinality of the EC group).
+ *
+ * This function expects `group->order` and `group->cardinality` to be well
+ * defined and non-zero: it fails with an error code otherwise.
+ *
+ * NB: This says nothing about the constant-timeness of the ladder step
+ * implementation (i.e., the default implementation is based on EC_POINT_add and
+ * EC_POINT_dbl, which of course are not constant time themselves) or the
+ * underlying multiprecision arithmetic.
+ *
+ * The product is stored in `r`.
+ *
+ * This is an internal function: callers are in charge of ensuring that the
+ * input parameters `group`, `r`, `scalar` and `ctx` are not NULL.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int ec_scalar_mul_ladder(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
+ const BIGNUM *scalar, const EC_POINT *point,
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
{
- int i;
- EC_PRE_COMP *pre = pre_;
+ int i, cardinality_bits, group_top, kbit, pbit, Z_is_one;
+ EC_POINT *p = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *s = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *k = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *lambda = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *cardinality = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
- if (!pre)
- return;
+ /* early exit if the input point is the point at infinity */
+ if (point != NULL && EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point))
+ return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r);
- i = CRYPTO_add(&pre->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EC_PRE_COMP);
- if (i > 0)
- return;
+ if (BN_is_zero(group->order)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, EC_R_UNKNOWN_ORDER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (BN_is_zero(group->cofactor)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, EC_R_UNKNOWN_COFACTOR);
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (pre->points) {
- EC_POINT **p;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+ if (((p = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
+ || ((s = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
- for (p = pre->points; *p != NULL; p++) {
- EC_POINT_clear_free(*p);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof *p);
+ if (point == NULL) {
+ if (!EC_POINT_copy(p, group->generator)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!EC_POINT_copy(p, point)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
}
- OPENSSL_free(pre->points);
}
- OPENSSL_cleanse(pre, sizeof *pre);
- OPENSSL_free(pre);
+
+ EC_POINT_BN_set_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ EC_POINT_BN_set_flags(r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ EC_POINT_BN_set_flags(s, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+ cardinality = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ lambda = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ k = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (k == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!BN_mul(cardinality, group->order, group->cofactor, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Group cardinalities are often on a word boundary.
+ * So when we pad the scalar, some timing diff might
+ * pop if it needs to be expanded due to carries.
+ * So expand ahead of time.
+ */
+ cardinality_bits = BN_num_bits(cardinality);
+ group_top = bn_get_top(cardinality);
+ if ((bn_wexpand(k, group_top + 2) == NULL)
+ || (bn_wexpand(lambda, group_top + 2) == NULL)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!BN_copy(k, scalar)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BN_set_flags(k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+ if ((BN_num_bits(k) > cardinality_bits) || (BN_is_negative(k))) {
+ /*-
+ * this is an unusual input, and we don't guarantee
+ * constant-timeness
+ */
+ if (!BN_nnmod(k, k, cardinality, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!BN_add(lambda, k, cardinality)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ BN_set_flags(lambda, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ if (!BN_add(k, lambda, cardinality)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * lambda := scalar + cardinality
+ * k := scalar + 2*cardinality
+ */
+ kbit = BN_is_bit_set(lambda, cardinality_bits);
+ BN_consttime_swap(kbit, k, lambda, group_top + 2);
+
+ group_top = bn_get_top(group->field);
+ if ((bn_wexpand(s->X, group_top) == NULL)
+ || (bn_wexpand(s->Y, group_top) == NULL)
+ || (bn_wexpand(s->Z, group_top) == NULL)
+ || (bn_wexpand(r->X, group_top) == NULL)
+ || (bn_wexpand(r->Y, group_top) == NULL)
+ || (bn_wexpand(r->Z, group_top) == NULL)
+ || (bn_wexpand(p->X, group_top) == NULL)
+ || (bn_wexpand(p->Y, group_top) == NULL)
+ || (bn_wexpand(p->Z, group_top) == NULL)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* ensure input point is in affine coords for ladder step efficiency */
+ if (!p->Z_is_one && (group->meth->make_affine == NULL
+ || !group->meth->make_affine(group, p, ctx))) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize the Montgomery ladder */
+ if (!ec_point_ladder_pre(group, r, s, p, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, EC_R_LADDER_PRE_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* top bit is a 1, in a fixed pos */
+ pbit = 1;
+
+#define EC_POINT_CSWAP(c, a, b, w, t) do { \
+ BN_consttime_swap(c, (a)->X, (b)->X, w); \
+ BN_consttime_swap(c, (a)->Y, (b)->Y, w); \
+ BN_consttime_swap(c, (a)->Z, (b)->Z, w); \
+ t = ((a)->Z_is_one ^ (b)->Z_is_one) & (c); \
+ (a)->Z_is_one ^= (t); \
+ (b)->Z_is_one ^= (t); \
+} while(0)
+
+ /*-
+ * The ladder step, with branches, is
+ *
+ * k[i] == 0: S = add(R, S), R = dbl(R)
+ * k[i] == 1: R = add(S, R), S = dbl(S)
+ *
+ * Swapping R, S conditionally on k[i] leaves you with state
+ *
+ * k[i] == 0: T, U = R, S
+ * k[i] == 1: T, U = S, R
+ *
+ * Then perform the ECC ops.
+ *
+ * U = add(T, U)
+ * T = dbl(T)
+ *
+ * Which leaves you with state
+ *
+ * k[i] == 0: U = add(R, S), T = dbl(R)
+ * k[i] == 1: U = add(S, R), T = dbl(S)
+ *
+ * Swapping T, U conditionally on k[i] leaves you with state
+ *
+ * k[i] == 0: R, S = T, U
+ * k[i] == 1: R, S = U, T
+ *
+ * Which leaves you with state
+ *
+ * k[i] == 0: S = add(R, S), R = dbl(R)
+ * k[i] == 1: R = add(S, R), S = dbl(S)
+ *
+ * So we get the same logic, but instead of a branch it's a
+ * conditional swap, followed by ECC ops, then another conditional swap.
+ *
+ * Optimization: The end of iteration i and start of i-1 looks like
+ *
+ * ...
+ * CSWAP(k[i], R, S)
+ * ECC
+ * CSWAP(k[i], R, S)
+ * (next iteration)
+ * CSWAP(k[i-1], R, S)
+ * ECC
+ * CSWAP(k[i-1], R, S)
+ * ...
+ *
+ * So instead of two contiguous swaps, you can merge the condition
+ * bits and do a single swap.
+ *
+ * k[i] k[i-1] Outcome
+ * 0 0 No Swap
+ * 0 1 Swap
+ * 1 0 Swap
+ * 1 1 No Swap
+ *
+ * This is XOR. pbit tracks the previous bit of k.
+ */
+
+ for (i = cardinality_bits - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ kbit = BN_is_bit_set(k, i) ^ pbit;
+ EC_POINT_CSWAP(kbit, r, s, group_top, Z_is_one);
+
+ /* Perform a single step of the Montgomery ladder */
+ if (!ec_point_ladder_step(group, r, s, p, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, EC_R_LADDER_STEP_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * pbit logic merges this cswap with that of the
+ * next iteration
+ */
+ pbit ^= kbit;
+ }
+ /* one final cswap to move the right value into r */
+ EC_POINT_CSWAP(pbit, r, s, group_top, Z_is_one);
+#undef EC_POINT_CSWAP
+
+ /* Finalize ladder (and recover full point coordinates) */
+ if (!ec_point_ladder_post(group, r, s, p, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, EC_R_LADDER_POST_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ EC_POINT_free(p);
+ EC_POINT_clear_free(s);
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+
+ return ret;
}
+#undef EC_POINT_BN_set_flags
+
/*
* TODO: table should be optimised for the wNAF-based implementation,
* sometimes smaller windows will give better performance (thus the
size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[],
BN_CTX *ctx)
{
- BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
const EC_POINT *generator = NULL;
EC_POINT *tmp = NULL;
size_t totalnum;
* precomputation is not available */
int ret = 0;
- if (group->meth != r->meth) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if ((scalar == NULL) && (num == 0)) {
- return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r);
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
- if (group->meth != points[i]->meth) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
- return 0;
+ if (!BN_is_zero(group->order) && !BN_is_zero(group->cofactor)) {
+ /*-
+ * Handle the common cases where the scalar is secret, enforcing a
+ * scalar multiplication implementation based on a Montgomery ladder,
+ * with various timing attack defenses.
+ */
+ if ((scalar != group->order) && (scalar != NULL) && (num == 0)) {
+ /*-
+ * In this case we want to compute scalar * GeneratorPoint: this
+ * codepath is reached most prominently by (ephemeral) key
+ * generation of EC cryptosystems (i.e. ECDSA keygen and sign setup,
+ * ECDH keygen/first half), where the scalar is always secret. This
+ * is why we ignore if BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is actually set and we
+ * always call the ladder version.
+ */
+ return ec_scalar_mul_ladder(group, r, scalar, NULL, ctx);
+ }
+ if ((scalar == NULL) && (num == 1) && (scalars[0] != group->order)) {
+ /*-
+ * In this case we want to compute scalar * VariablePoint: this
+ * codepath is reached most prominently by the second half of ECDH,
+ * where the secret scalar is multiplied by the peer's public point.
+ * To protect the secret scalar, we ignore if BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is
+ * actually set and we always call the ladder version.
+ */
+ return ec_scalar_mul_ladder(group, r, scalars[0], points[0], ctx);
}
- }
-
- if (ctx == NULL) {
- ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- if (ctx == NULL)
- goto err;
}
if (scalar != NULL) {
/* look if we can use precomputed multiples of generator */
- pre_comp =
- EC_EX_DATA_get_data(group->extra_data, ec_pre_comp_dup,
- ec_pre_comp_free, ec_pre_comp_clear_free);
-
+ pre_comp = group->pre_comp.ec;
if (pre_comp && pre_comp->numblocks
&& (EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, pre_comp->points[0], ctx) ==
0)) {
totalnum = num + numblocks;
- wsize = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof wsize[0]);
- wNAF_len = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof wNAF_len[0]);
- wNAF = OPENSSL_malloc((totalnum + 1) * sizeof wNAF[0]); /* includes space
- * for pivot */
- val_sub = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof val_sub[0]);
+ wsize = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof(wsize[0]));
+ wNAF_len = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof(wNAF_len[0]));
+ /* include space for pivot */
+ wNAF = OPENSSL_malloc((totalnum + 1) * sizeof(wNAF[0]));
+ val_sub = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof(val_sub[0]));
/* Ensure wNAF is initialised in case we end up going to err */
- if (wNAF)
+ if (wNAF != NULL)
wNAF[0] = NULL; /* preliminary pivot */
- if (!wsize || !wNAF_len || !wNAF || !val_sub) {
+ if (wsize == NULL || wNAF_len == NULL || wNAF == NULL || val_sub == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
wNAF[num] = tmp_wNAF;
wNAF[num + 1] = NULL;
wNAF_len[num] = tmp_len;
- if (tmp_len > max_len)
- max_len = tmp_len;
/*
* pre_comp->points starts with the points that we need here:
*/
numblocks = (tmp_len + blocksize - 1) / blocksize;
if (numblocks > pre_comp->numblocks) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF);
goto err;
}
totalnum = num + numblocks;
wNAF_len[i] = blocksize;
if (tmp_len < blocksize) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_wNAF);
goto err;
}
tmp_len -= blocksize;
* 'val_sub[i]' is a pointer to the subarray for the i-th point, or to a
* subarray of 'pre_comp->points' if we already have precomputation.
*/
- val = OPENSSL_malloc((num_val + 1) * sizeof val[0]);
+ val = OPENSSL_malloc((num_val + 1) * sizeof(val[0]));
if (val == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
goto err;
}
- if (!(tmp = EC_POINT_new(group)))
+ if ((tmp = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
goto err;
- /*-
- * prepare precomputed values:
- * val_sub[i][0] := points[i]
- * val_sub[i][1] := 3 * points[i]
- * val_sub[i][2] := 5 * points[i]
- * ...
- */
+ /*-
+ * prepare precomputed values:
+ * val_sub[i][0] := points[i]
+ * val_sub[i][1] := 3 * points[i]
+ * val_sub[i][2] := 5 * points[i]
+ * ...
+ */
for (i = 0; i < num + num_scalar; i++) {
if (i < num) {
if (!EC_POINT_copy(val_sub[i][0], points[i]))
}
}
-#if 1 /* optional; EC_window_bits_for_scalar_size
- * assumes we do this step */
- if (!EC_POINTs_make_affine(group, num_val, val, ctx))
+ if (group->meth->points_make_affine == NULL
+ || !group->meth->points_make_affine(group, num_val, val, ctx))
goto err;
-#endif
r_is_at_infinity = 1;
if (r_is_at_infinity) {
if (!EC_POINT_copy(r, val_sub[i][digit >> 1]))
goto err;
+
+ /*-
+ * Apply coordinate blinding for EC_POINT.
+ *
+ * The underlying EC_METHOD can optionally implement this function:
+ * ec_point_blind_coordinates() returns 0 in case of errors or 1 on
+ * success or if coordinate blinding is not implemented for this
+ * group.
+ */
+ if (!ec_point_blind_coordinates(group, r, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, EC_R_POINT_COORDINATES_BLIND_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
r_is_at_infinity = 0;
} else {
if (!EC_POINT_add
ret = 1;
err:
- if (new_ctx != NULL)
- BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
- if (tmp != NULL)
- EC_POINT_free(tmp);
- if (wsize != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(wsize);
- if (wNAF_len != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(wNAF_len);
+ EC_POINT_free(tmp);
+ OPENSSL_free(wsize);
+ OPENSSL_free(wNAF_len);
if (wNAF != NULL) {
signed char **w;
OPENSSL_free(val);
}
- if (val_sub != NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(val_sub);
- }
+ OPENSSL_free(val_sub);
return ret;
}
{
const EC_POINT *generator;
EC_POINT *tmp_point = NULL, *base = NULL, **var;
- BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
- BIGNUM *order;
+ const BIGNUM *order;
size_t i, bits, w, pre_points_per_block, blocksize, numblocks, num;
EC_POINT **points = NULL;
EC_PRE_COMP *pre_comp;
int ret = 0;
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+#endif
/* if there is an old EC_PRE_COMP object, throw it away */
- EC_EX_DATA_free_data(&group->extra_data, ec_pre_comp_dup,
- ec_pre_comp_free, ec_pre_comp_clear_free);
-
+ EC_pre_comp_free(group);
if ((pre_comp = ec_pre_comp_new(group)) == NULL)
return 0;
goto err;
}
- if (ctx == NULL) {
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ if (ctx == NULL)
ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- if (ctx == NULL)
- goto err;
- }
+#endif
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- order = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (order == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, ctx))
+ order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
+ if (order == NULL)
goto err;
if (BN_is_zero(order)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_PRECOMPUTE_MULT, EC_R_UNKNOWN_ORDER);
num = pre_points_per_block * numblocks; /* number of points to compute
* and store */
- points = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EC_POINT *) * (num + 1));
- if (!points) {
+ points = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*points) * (num + 1));
+ if (points == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_PRECOMPUTE_MULT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
}
- if (!(tmp_point = EC_POINT_new(group)) || !(base = EC_POINT_new(group))) {
+ if ((tmp_point = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL
+ || (base = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_PRECOMPUTE_MULT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
}
- if (!EC_POINTs_make_affine(group, num, points, ctx))
+ if (group->meth->points_make_affine == NULL
+ || !group->meth->points_make_affine(group, num, points, ctx))
goto err;
pre_comp->group = group;
pre_comp->points = points;
points = NULL;
pre_comp->num = num;
-
- if (!EC_EX_DATA_set_data(&group->extra_data, pre_comp,
- ec_pre_comp_dup, ec_pre_comp_free,
- ec_pre_comp_clear_free))
- goto err;
+ SETPRECOMP(group, ec, pre_comp);
pre_comp = NULL;
-
ret = 1;
+
err:
- if (ctx != NULL)
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- if (new_ctx != NULL)
- BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
- if (pre_comp)
- ec_pre_comp_free(pre_comp);
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+#endif
+ EC_ec_pre_comp_free(pre_comp);
if (points) {
EC_POINT **p;
EC_POINT_free(*p);
OPENSSL_free(points);
}
- if (tmp_point)
- EC_POINT_free(tmp_point);
- if (base)
- EC_POINT_free(base);
+ EC_POINT_free(tmp_point);
+ EC_POINT_free(base);
return ret;
}
int ec_wNAF_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group)
{
- if (EC_EX_DATA_get_data
- (group->extra_data, ec_pre_comp_dup, ec_pre_comp_free,
- ec_pre_comp_clear_free) != NULL)
- return 1;
- else
- return 0;
+ return HAVEPRECOMP(group, ec);
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff